Employment, Partnership and Childbearing Decisions of German Women and Men: A Simultaneous Hazards Approach

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Zitierfähiger Link (URI): http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bsz:21-opus-66981
http://hdl.handle.net/10900/47990
Dokumentart: Arbeitspapier
Erscheinungsdatum: 2013
Originalveröffentlichung: University of Tübingen Working Papers in Economics and Finance ; 51
Sprache: Englisch
Fakultät: 6 Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Fakultät
Fachbereich: Wirtschaftswissenschaften
DDC-Klassifikation: 330 - Wirtschaft
Schlagworte: Beschäftigung , Fertilität , Eheschließung , Familienplanung , Arbeitsnachfrage
Freie Schlagwörter:
Employment , Fertility , Marriage , Family planning , Labor demand , Simultaneous hazards
Lizenz: http://tobias-lib.uni-tuebingen.de/doku/lic_ohne_pod.php?la=de http://tobias-lib.uni-tuebingen.de/doku/lic_ohne_pod.php?la=en
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Abstract:

This paper investigates the interrelated dynamics of employment, cohabitation and fertility for German women and men. Using a simultaneous hazards approach due to Lillard (1993), I estimate a five-equation model with unobserved heterogeneity. One of the contributions of this paper is to include the current employment and nonemployment hazard rates and the union formation and union dissolution hazard rates as regressors. My results suggest that being employed or nonemployed only has small effects on other transitions, but that employed women with a high hazard of becoming nonemployed are less likely to have children, while nonemployed men having a low hazard of finding a job are more likely to have children. Children reduce the hazard of taking up a job for women and reduce the hazard of becoming nonemployed for women and men. Children also increase the stability of unions. Having a partner strongly increases the likelihood for having children. Interestingly, unions with a high risk of splitting up are more likely to have children. Economically, this can be interpreted as an attempt to invest in partner-specic capital in order to reduce the likelihood of splitting up.

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