

Amphibolie – Ambiguität – Ambivalenz

Herausgegeben von

Frauke Berndt
Stephan Kammer

Königshausen & Neumann

which opens an undecipherable field of possibilities and *aporiai* between which sense occurs. All three rows of difference obey so to say a fundamental withdrawal; the threefold withdrawal in turn marks the place of sense. The interplay between the rows of differences creates a space making communication possible while at the same time making it seem precarious. The three-fold withdrawal precedes the question of reference, of structure or the method of speech as well as the context and its occasional scenes thereby marking the boundaries of both comprehension and communication.

In short, sense is the occurrence of a transitional space which is crossed at least three times. This transitional space posits itself anew time and time again in the enacting of language, since: it is never determined where we are speaking from or what we are answering when we answer, nor is it determined what the said means or if it means anything at all i.e., if it does not in fact rather ›show‹. Partly for this reason Heidegger deciphered ›die Sage‹ (the saying) as ›die Zeige‹ (the showing),⁴³ because it can never be absorbed by or assimilated into what it pretends to make understood in speaking. Instead it contains the source of a perpetual excess, which can never be domesticated by cultural discipline. A ›not‹, a fission or otherness always pushes or holds itself ›in between‹. The contingencies of the lines that cross and miss each other in speech are therefore immeasurable, which is why no dialogue or interpretation, no matter how serious or careful, can ever claim to have comprehended, just as it cannot claim to have not comprehended. At the same time, it seems just as inappropriate to speak of the consensus or dissent of a discussion, or play their alternatives off against each other because they adhere to the same figures of success or failure, identity and error. It is therefore impossible not to perceive expression and communication as occurrences that do not conform to the oppositions of success and failure, but instead are like a gift in the sense of a given moment, which can only be accepted, inverted and passed on.⁴⁴

⁴³ Martin Heidegger, *Der Weg zur Sprache*, in: *Unterwegs zur Sprache*, Pfullingen 1975, pp. 239–268, here p. 257.

⁴⁴ This essay was translated by James Kennaway (Stanford) and Rett Rossi (Berlin).

FRAUKE BERNDT

In the Twilight Zone

Ambiguity and Aesthetics in Baumgarten

ABSTRACT

The conflict between reason and its media has not only formed the basis of modern aesthetics, but also – as is generally accepted 250 years after the publication of Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten's writings – of cultural studies. In this paper, I would like to provide a brief outline of the founding preconditions of this aesthetic theory by, firstly, elucidating the ambiguity of aesthetics (I); secondly by showing how Baumgarten roots this aesthetic ambiguity in an ambiguity of rhetoric (II); thirdly and finally by retracing the processes by which he, on the premise of such rhetorical ambiguity, eventually arrives at a metaphysics of ambiguity (III).

I Ambiguity of aesthetics

Marriage stabilizes – in the medium term at least – competing centrifugal and centripetal forces and is thus an institution capable of economically managing and controlling formidable tensions. Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten, therefore, does not rely on the power of love, but rather on a marital alliance based on friendship (*amicissimum connubium*) when, in his 1735 *Meditationes philosophicae de nonnullis ad poema pertinentibus*, he joins a truly odd couple: reason and its media,¹ or, to put it somewhat differently, pure thought and its material presentation.² The crucial reasons for this misalliance, however, are due to Baumgarten's discovery of the non-discursive in literature (*poema*), which, for better or worse, leads him to a new epistemology. But as expected, marital bliss is not to last for long. Following fifteen years of acrimonious bickering, and in an attempt to avert the threat of an outright divorce, Baumgarten is forced to considerably revise the marriage contract between reason and its media – between thought

¹ [MED]: Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten, *Reflections on Poetry*. Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten's *Meditationes philosophicae de nonnullis ad poema pertinentibus*, transl., with the original text, an introduction, and notes, by Karl Aschenbrenner and William B. Holther, Berkeley/Los Angeles 1954.

² The term ›representation‹ could be (and is often) used instead of ›presentation‹. This misses, however, the target, for Baumgarten always uses representation (*repraesentatio/cogitatio*) in a non-material sense.

and its presentation – in his 1750 *Aesthetica*.³ Nonetheless, this revision comes too late: in 1758, only seven years after the publication of the first volume, he sees himself forced to abort the experiment and leave the second volume unfinished, and this failed attempt lies in the account of ambiguity.

Etymologically speaking, the term ›ambiguity‹ denotes a fundamental ›equivocalness‹ that engenders ›uncertainty‹ and ›doubt‹, and occasionally even leads to ›conflict‹ or outright ›hostility‹. This ›double plight‹, when relating to Baumgarten's problems, does not so much describe a passive state of affairs, but rather the setting for a variety of activities, and the various paragraphs of the revised marriage contract in the *Aesthetica* are nothing if not the scene of competing and conflicting activities. In his ›Wissenschaft von allem, was sinnlich ist‹ (KOLL § 1)⁴ – the ›science of everything that is sensuous‹ –, originally presented to the College on Aesthetics at Frankfurt (Oder),⁵ Baumgarten investigates the laws of perceptual data processing, or, as it is generally called: sensuous cognition (*cognitio sensitiva*).⁶ The insights he comes up with derive, characteristically enough, neither from psychology nor from logic, but from rhetoric.⁷ Baumgar-

ten refers epistemology to the theory of presentation. And he answers the essentially psychological question as to the sensuous cognition in terms of rhetoric by listing six categories of style:⁸ *ubertas, magnitudo, veritas, lux, certitudo, and vita cognitionis*.

This ambiguity of aesthetics, which had already been criticized by Johann Gottfried Herder,⁹ is, of course, not an expression of any lack of awareness of the problem at hand – on the contrary: it is the very duality of our talk about thought and its presentation that reveals a problem which contemporary philosophy lacked both the systems and the terminology to solve. Hence, Baumgarten bravely goes in search of a systematic that could be applied to a *scientia cognitionis sensitivae* and scours the theory of liberal arts, the ›lower epistemology‹, the ›art of the fine (beautiful) thought‹, and the ›art of thought analogous to reason‹ for a solution: »AESTHETICA (theoria liberalium artium, gnoseologia inferior, ars pulcre cogitandi, ars analogi rationis,) est scientia cognitionis sensitivae« (AE § 1). In this new systematic, theoretical logic, empirical psychology, technical rhetoric, and speculative metaphysics all fuse to feed into the new super-discipline of aesthetics. What Baumgarten did not foresee, however, was the considerable resistance that eventually proved built into his new systematic.

Apparently, Baumgarten was ultimately unable to arbitrate between the warring disciplines concerned with thought on the one hand and with its presentation on the other. The clearest indication of their agonal relationship can be found in the parenthetical comments inserted into the first paragraph of the *Aesthetica*, where Baumgarten attempts to regulate the relationship between epistemology and the theory of presentation in terms of economy. The parentheses bracket the asyndeton of the four disciplines: rhetoric, psychology, metaphysics, and logic. Penned up in such a confined space, these disciplines are now condemned to eke out an unfree existence as mere appositions to the new super-discipline. The result is a monovalent and rather lapidary definition: »AESTHETICA [...] est scientia cognitionis sensitivae« (AE § 1). The rest – particularly the theory of the liberal arts, i.e. rhetoric and poetics – is simply factored out of the equation. With this rather rigid measure, Baumgarten counters the ambiguity that, in his earlier writings on aesthetics, seemed not yet to have both-

³ [AE]: Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten, *Aesthetica*, Frankfurt 1750/58, Reprint Hildesheim/New York 1961. There is no English translation available yet. For the German translations see: Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten, *Theoretische Ästhetik*. Die grundlegenden Abschnitte aus der *Aesthetica* (1750/58), transl. and ed. by Hans Rudolf Schweizer, Hamburg 1988; Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten, *Aesthetica*, transl. and ed. by Dagmar Mirbach, 2 vols., Hamburg 2007.

⁴ [KOLL]: Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten, *Kollegium über die Ästhetik*, edited in: Bernhard Poppe, Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten. Seine Bedeutung und Stellung in der Leibniz-Wolffschen Philosophie und seine Beziehung zu Kant. Nebst Veröffentlichung einer bisher unbekanntenen Handschrift der Ästhetik Baumgartens, Leipzig 1907.

⁵ See: Ursula Franke, *Kunst als Erkenntnis. Die Rolle der Sinnlichkeit in der Ästhetik des Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten*, Wiesbaden 1972; Hans Rudolf Schweizer, *Ästhetik als Philosophie der sinnlichen Erkenntnis. Eine Interpretation der Aesthetica A. G. Baumgartens mit teilweiser Wiedergabe des lateinischen Textes und deutscher Übersetzung*, Basel/Stuttgart 1973; See also: Heinz Paetzold, *Ästhetik des deutschen Idealismus. Zur Idee ästhetischer Rationalität bei Baumgarten, Kant, Schelling, Hegel und Schopenhauer*, Wiesbaden 1983; Howard Caygill, *Art of Judgement*, Oxford 1989; David E. Wellbery, *Lessing's Laocoon. Semiotics and Aesthetics in the Age of Reason*, Cambridge et al. 1984. Friedhelm Solms, *Disciplina aesthetica. Zur Frühgeschichte der ästhetischen Theorie bei Baumgarten und Herder*, Stuttgart 1990.

⁶ Even though Baumgarten's science is also considered as ›sensory cognition‹ or ›sensual cognition‹, I prefer the general term ›sensuous cognition‹, which includes both sensory and sensual aspects.

⁷ See the papers in: *Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie* 49 (2001); Steffen W. Groß, Felix aestheticus. Die Ästhetik als Lehre vom Menschen. Zum 250. Jahrestag des Erscheinens von Alexander Gottlieb Baumgartens *Aesthetica*, Würzburg 2001; Anselm Haverkamp, *Wie die Morgenröthe zwischen Nacht und Tag*. Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten und die Begründung der Kulturwissenschaften in Frankfurt an der Oder, in: *DVjs* 76 (2002), pp. 3–26; Petra Bahr, *Darstellung des Undarstellbaren. Religionstheoretische Studien zum Darstellungsbegriff bei A.G. Baumgarten und I. Kant*, Tübingen 2004; Frauke Berndt, *Poema*.

Ästhetik und Poetik des Symbols bei A.G. Baumgarten und F.G. Klopstock [forthcoming: 2009].

⁸ See: Wellbery, *Lessing's Laocoon*, p. 53. See also: Marie-Luise Linn, *A.G. Baumgartens Aesthetica und die antike Rhetorik*, in: *DVjs* 41 (1967), pp. 424–443; Heinz Paetzold, *Rhetorik-Kritik und Theorie der Künste in der philosophischen Ästhetik von Baumgarten bis Kant*, in: Gérard Raulet (ed.), *Von der Rhetorik zur Ästhetik: Studien zur Entstehung der modernen Ästhetik im 18. Jahrhundert*, Rennes 1995, pp. 7–37; Wolfgang Bender, *Rhetorische Tradition und Ästhetik im 18. Jahrhundert: Baumgarten, Meier und Breitingen*, in: *ZfdtPhil* 99 (1980), pp. 481–506.

⁹ See: Johann Gottfried Herder, *Viertes Wäldchen über Riedels Theorie der schönen Künste*, in: *Werke in zehn Bänden*, vol. 2 *Schriften zur Ästhetik und Literatur 1767–1781*, ed. by Gunter E. Grimm, Frankfurt/M. 1993, pp. 247–442, p. 267.

ered him unduly. As he maintained without any apparent qualms in all editions of the *Metaphysica* he undertook between 1739 and 1757: »Scientia sensitive cognoscendi & proponendi est AESTHETICA, (Logica facultatis cognoscitivae inferioris, Philosophia gratiarum & musarum, gnoseologia inferior, ars pulcre cogitandi, ars analogi rationis)« (MET § 533).¹⁰

But what does Baumgarten gain by revising his definition? – It allows him to obscure the rhetorical origins of his laws of perceptual data processing. The revision introduces a hierarchy among the individual disciplines feeding into the one super-discipline of aesthetics, a hierarchy in which, crucially, presentation is subordinated to thought. Such a disambiguation of the super-discipline is a vital prerequisite for convincing the scholarly world of the philosophical value of aesthetics. For the new discipline will only be worthy of philosophical attention if it is capable of formulating *a priori*, i.e. pre-empirical laws: »Hinc opus est perspicentia veritatis regularum graviorum a priori, quam dein confirmet ac illustret experientia, sicut illius inveniendae forte primum fuit subsidium« (AE § 73). Thus, if Baumgarten had continued to countenance the ambiguity of aesthetics and maintained aesthetics' duality as a science of thought and its presentation, his project would have been doomed to failure. Philosophically speaking, a presentation is not capable of being true, since every presentation implies its own history, individuality, and tradition, as well as its physical, perspectival, and communicatory conditions – in short: its inescapable mediality.

Following the revision, rhetoric can bring its full terminological and conceptual armatorium to the task without having any claim beyond rendering this particular service: rhetorical concepts communicate the principles of sensuous cognition, because the medium exemplifies the laws governing thought. Hence, Baumgarten has no problem with paying more attention to presentation than to thought: »[H]inc aestheticae pars de proponendo prolixior esset, quam logicae« (MED § 117),¹¹ he declared as early as the *Meditationes*. Here, Baumgarten applied himself – one might say in almost a dream-like state of attention – to the analysis of literary texts; for literature in general, and poetry in particular is, to him, in its non-discursive aspects the prototype of presentation. As Thomas Abbt explains this rather unusual move on the part of the philosopher, Baumgarten saw, even back then and in a kind of twilight-state of cerebration, that the rules according to which poets work are based on general principles of sensuous cognition.¹² Baumgarten thus acknowledges literature's epistemological achieve-

ments, and even if the principles he discerns in literature differ from those of logic, they are, at least, principles of sorts. To summarize: *to talk about thought, to analyze text, to strive for truth* – these are the conflicting activities that mark out the field in which Baumgarten's aesthetic theory unfolds.

II Ambiguity of rhetoric

The center of the stage on which the conflict between thought and its presentation is played out is occupied by a particular term: »REPRESENTATIO non distincta SENSITIVA vocatur. Ergo vis animae meae repraesentat per facultatem inferiorem perceptiones sensitivas«, Baumgarten writes in his *Metaphysica* (MET § 521). Crucially, the term *sensitivus* provides rhetoric with an entry-point into the realm of psychology. And Christian Wolff points out in his *Psychologia empirica*: »Appetitus sensitivus dicitur qui oritur ex idea boni confusa.«¹³ Baumgarten confirms this:

Quoniam appetitus quam diu ex confusa boni repraesentatione manat, sensitivus appellatur: confusa autem cum obscura repraesentatione comparatur per facultatis cognoscitivae inferiorem partem, poterit idem nominis ad ipsas etiam repraesentationes applicari, ut distinguantur ita ab intellectualibus distinctis per omnes gradus possibiles. (MED § 3, note)¹⁴

In the rhetorical context of his Halle master's thesis, Baumgarten had fine-tuned the term when he employed »sensitivus« as an attribute of speech: »ORATIO repraesentationum sensitivarum sit SENSITIVA« (MED § 4),¹⁵ he writes in the *Meditationes*. Over the following paragraphs, Baumgarten traces the »sensitive-ness« of speech in great detail; interestingly, the analysis of presentation is always one step ahead of the analysis of thought in these deliberations. In fact, by turning to conceptions only in a second step, Baumgarten merely translates the statements about presentation into statements about thought. Contrary to what scholars have hitherto assumed, however, this translation does not simply substitute presentation for thought, but rather sustains the duality constitutive of aesthetics. Baumgarten neither treats presentation in order to draw inferences re-

¹⁰ [MET]: Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten, *Metaphysica*, Halle 1779, Reprint Hildesheim/New York 1963.

¹¹ »Hence that part of aesthetics which treats of such presentation is more extensive than the corresponding part of logic« (MED § 117).

¹² »Er sah nemlich, damals schon wie bey einer Dämmerung: daß die Regeln, nach welchen die Dichter arbeiten, aus Grundsätzen herstiessen müsten, die vielleicht allgemeiner wären, als man sich es jetzt noch vorstellte, und daß sie eines schärfern Beweises fähig seyn dürften, als man bishero davon gegeben«. Thomas Abbt, *Leben und Charakter Alexander Gott-*

lieb Baumgartens, in: *Vermischte Werke*, 3 vols., 1780, Reprint Hildesheim 1978, vol. 2, pp. 215–244, p. 222 sq.

¹³ Christian Wolff, *Psychologia empirica*, in: *Gesammelte Werke*, section 2 Lateinische Schriften, vol. 5, ed. by Jean Ecole, Leipzig 1738, Reprint Hildesheim/New York 1968, § 580.

¹⁴ »Since desire, so far as it derives from a confused representation of the good, is called sensate, and since, on the other hand, a confused representation, along with an obscure one, is received through the lower part of the cognitive faculty, we can apply the same name to confused representations, in order that they may be distinguished from concepts distinct at all possible levels« (MED § 3 note).

¹⁵ »By *sensate discourse* we mean discourse involving sensate representations« (MED § 4).

garding thought, nor does he look at presentation only. Rather, almost in the manner of a reversal image, his epistemological arguments turn out to be rhetorical ones, his rhetorical arguments epistemological ones, and neither seem to offer a way out of this fundamental ambiguity. The process of translating from one discipline to the other not only makes this ambiguity apparent, but also creates it afresh at every turn.

Baumgarten himself is rather irritated by the effects of his experimental deployment of rhetoric. These irritations occur because, in his declension of ›sensitive‹ speech,¹⁶ he encounters not only language, but also language *as* medium – or, to put it another way, the media *of* language. Here, rhetorical terms and concepts function as search keys for the mediality of literature. Such mediality of language, which becomes apparent with the rhetorical turn in philosophy, is somewhat discordant with the premises of rationalist semiotics, a discipline not concerned with the material aspects of the sign. As Wellbery explains such a semiotic turn of rhetoric: »Semiotics makes possible the comparative study of different types of aesthetic representation, the description of their intrinsic limits and possibilities, the measurement of their relative efficacy.«¹⁷ In his *Meditationes*, where he had linked the two media of language – the voice and writing – to the term ›sensitivus‹, Baumgarten had already encountered this mediality: »*Orationis sensitivae varia sunt 1) repraesentationes sensitivae, 2) nexus earum, 3) voces sive soni articulati litteris constantes earum signa.* §. 4. 1.« (MED § 6).¹⁸ The philosopher can only recoil in horror from the consequences of such a definition; Baumgarten thus quickly seeks to reassure us: »[S]ed haec ipsi cum imperfecta sensitiva oratione communia facile transimus, pro fine ne nimii simus. Nihil ergo de qualitate poematis, qua series sonorum articulorum« (MED § 97).¹⁹ And yet, Baumgarten, even if only *ex negativo*, introduces important systematic default settings for the mediality of language, namely language's phonetic nature on the one hand and its textual nature on the other.²⁰

Baumgarten, however, is not interested in a mere sound event here, but rather in a conceptualised voice – the voice of writing. It is precisely in and through poetry that he becomes aware of the problematic relationship between the two presentational media of voice on the one hand and writing on the other. In the few paragraphs of the *Meditationes* devoted to metrics, Baumgarten discovers a significant friction loss that occurs in the transition from the acoustic medium of the voice to the visual medium of writing: »*QUANTITAS SYLLABAE est, quicquid in ea non potest cognosci sine compresantia alterius syllabae. Ergo ex moris elementorum non potest cognosci quantitas*« (MED § 98).²¹ The reference to the grammarians (see: MED § 100 note) – both classical ones such as Quintilian and Cicero and Renaissance-humanist ones such as Scaliger or Vossius (see: MED § 9) – gives a good indication of which way the wind is blowing for Baumgarten here²² – namely in the direction of the so-called *vox*. As the proper voice of writing, *vox* produces ideal sounds, the distinguishing feature of which – *vis-à-vis* real sound events – is their repeatability. Baumgarten's construction of this *vox* allows us some unique insights into his thought processes here; interestingly, and in a curiously finicky fashion, he wrests this voice of writing from a rationalist semiotics. For the time being, there can thus be no doubt that Baumgarten does indeed distinguish between the medial and conceptual aspects of written as well as spoken language.²³ His rationalistic model of signs presupposes both the concept of sound and the concept of the graphic symbol that represents this sound. In order for the symbol or letter to be able to represent the sound, it must be capable of reminding us of the concept of sound, that is, of the concept of its medial Other. And it is on this basis that Peirce contends that a sign is meaningful only if its ›interpretand‹ always-already contains »the translation of a sign into another system of signs«. It follows that »[t]he meaning of a sign is the sign it has to be translated into.«²⁴

¹⁶ Whereas Aschenbrenner/Holther choose the translation ›senseate‹, I prefer the translation ›sensitive‹, which is closer to the Latin term.

¹⁷ Wellbery, Lessing's *Laocoon*, p. 48.

¹⁸ »The various parts of senseate discourse are: (1) senseate representations, (2) their interrelationships, (3) the words, or the articulate sounds which are represented by the letters and which symbolize the words« (MED § 6).

¹⁹ »But these things the poem has in common with imperfect senseate discourse. We may, then, easily pass them over so as not to wander too far from our purpose. There will, therefore, be nothing here about the character of a poem as a series of articulate sounds, § 4, § 1« (MED § 97).

²⁰ See: Hans Poser, Signum, notio und idea. Elemente der Leibnizschen Zeichentheorie, in: Zeitschrift für Semiotik 1 (1979), pp. 309–324; Hans Werner Arndt, Semiotik und Sprachtheorie im klassischen Rationalismus der deutschen Aufklärung. Eine historische Einordnung, in: Zeitschrift für Semiotik 1 (1979), pp. 305–308; Ursula Franke, Die Semiotik als Abschluß der Ästhetik. A.G. Baumgartens Bestimmung der Semiotik als ästhetische Propädeutik, in: Zeitschrift für Semiotik 1 (1979), pp. 345–359; Sylvia Knops, Bestimmung

und Ursprung literarisch-ästhetischer Erkenntnis im frühen und mittleren 18. Jahrhundert (Gottsched, Breitinger und Baumgarten), Aachen 1999, pp. 208–231; Dietfried Gerhardus, Sprachphilosophie in der Ästhetik, in: Marcelo Dascal et al. (eds.), Sprachphilosophie. Ein internationales Handbuch zeitgenössischer Forschung, vol. 7, 2, Berlin/New York 1996, pp. 1519–1528.

²¹ »By quantity of a syllable we mean that property which cannot be known apart from association with another syllable. Therefore, quantity cannot be known from the value of the letters« (MED § 98).

²² See: Gregor Vogt-Spira, Vox und littera. Der Buchstabe zwischen Mündlichkeit und Schriftlichkeit, in: Poetica 23 (1991), pp. 295–327.

²³ See: Wulf Oesterreicher, Grenzen der Arbitrarität. Zum Verhältnis von Laut und Schrift, in: Andreas Kablitz, Gerhard Neumann (eds.), Mimesis und Simulation, Freiburg 1998, pp. 211–233; Peter Koch, Graphé. Ihre Entwicklung zur Schrift, zum Kalkül und zur Liste, in: Peter Koch, Sybille Krämer (eds.), Schrift, Medien, Kognition. Über die Exteriorität des Geistes, Tübingen 1997, pp. 43–77.

²⁴ Charles Sanders Peirce, Collected Papers, ed. by Charles Hartshorne, Paul Weiss and Arthur W. Burks, vol. 4, Cambridge, Mass. 1933, 4.127 and 4.132.

Baumgarten, however, not only distinguishes between psychological concepts and the media of their realisation, but also assumes that the medial characteristics as such are stored *in*, and are thus recallable *from*, memory. He thus now conceives of the relationship between concept and event as a cyclical one in which the sequence of sounds of an articulated word is perceived, while the perception, in its turn, presupposes the concept of a sequence of sounds: »*Voces, qua soni articulati, pertinent ad audibilia, hinc ideas sensuales producunt*« (MED § 91).²⁵ This model enables Baumgarten to define all features of a presentational medium, including, for example, the visual characteristics of a particular typeface that a reader (*lector*) perceives (see: MED § 113), as sensitive concepts in themselves – concepts that transform the sensitive sign into a complex sign that, on the basis of writing (*littera*), integrates a voice (*vox*) which, in turn and rather paradoxically, is characterised by its *conceptualised performativity*.

In order to expand the theory of the non-discursive inextricably related to the concept of this mediality, Baumgarten broadens his terminological arsenal, taking us from rhetoric to poetics in the process. By means of the notorious and oft-repeated analogy »*sensitivus ergo poeticus*«, he recasts »sensitive« speech as text: »*Oratio sensitiva perfecta est POEMA*« (MED § 9),²⁶ as he writes in the *Meditationes*. A text is thus defined by its completeness vis-à-vis »sensitive« speech. This premise leads Baumgarten to differentiate between three non-discursive aspects of a text: firstly, a text's concatenation; secondly, its non-concreteness; and, thirdly, its motion. All three of these aspects will come to prominence again in the theories of presentation developed around 1800. Concatenation is at the center of the second part of the *Aesthetica*, where Baumgarten takes an extremely tedious stroll through the world of rhetorical figures (*amplificationes*).²⁷ Here, he encounters the so-called equivalence-figures, i.e. figures that link their elements according to the principle of like with like to form complex sequences – such as: *homoioteleuton, anapher, epipher, symploke, repititio, epizeuxis, epanalepsis, anadiplose, ploke, pleonasmus* or *polyptoton*. But why is Baumgarten interested in figures to such an interminable extent? – Because figures allow him to observe the non-discursive aspects he is laboring over at the time. Significantly, a figure as such is characterized, precisely, by the material excess that bursts the boundaries of rationalist premises. Equally significantly, the figures Baumgarten catalogues all express a single object by means of at least *two* words²⁸ – and they do so in a way that makes the concatenation of the words

command most of our attention while the object of expression recedes into the background: »*Nexus repraesentationum poeticarum debet facere ad cognitionem sensitivam. §. 7. 9. ergo debet esse poeticus. §. 11.*« (MED § 65; vgl. § 68).²⁹ The figure thus stands for the duality or doubleness that lies at the heart of our current deliberations. One divides into two: this is what Baumgarten sees as the poetic imperative.

At the center of this new scheme, Baumgarten positions none other than comparison in the broader sense of the term (*comparatio latius dicta*), which, as »*figura princeps illustrantium*«, encompasses all special cases of similarity-induced complexity listed so far (AE § 742; see: § 735). In a comparison, words that stand in a relationship of similarity or kinship to one another are interchanged or joined together:

Hinc substitutio illius pro hac pulcre cogitanda, vel coniunctio illius cum hac, non sine vividitate, dabit ARGUMENTUM illustrans A COMPARATIS, quod aliqui dicunt A MEDITATIONE, §. 730, nos dicamus figuram, §. 26, COMPARATIONEM et collationem LATIUS, quae complectitur assimilationem, sed in multa etiam alia argumentorum genera diffunditur, quam quae petantur a simili. (AE § 734)

Comparison in the broader sense also, however, includes those comparisons in which the relationship between object and detail is governed by other, again topos-derived, relationships. These include: comparisons based on the relations between part and whole (*comparatio maioris et minoris/comparatio adscendens et descendens*), oppositions (*antithesis*), and comparison in the strict sense of the term (*comparatio strictius dicta*). By meticulously differentiating between all these possible modes of comparative concatenation that close the gap between figure and text, Baumgarten re-evaluates, perhaps even elevates, the particular operation of the figure to the status of a general macro-structural principle of concatenation.

The principle of duality has far-reaching consequences when it comes to the second non-discursive aspect of a text: its non-concreteness. While an entire century is busy revering the image, and the moving image generated by language in particular, Baumgarten does not seem to set any great store on the presentational value of the text. This is because, to him, the imaging capacities of the tropes are, again, dependent on the duality of the figure (*hypotyposis*). This move is based on a decision that would seem nothing if not bold. Baumgarten recasts the trope, which, after all, represents only one element of the text rather than a concatenation of two, as a figure. By shifting duality from the horizontal to the vertical, he is able to declare: »*Omnis tropus, quem definivi, est FIGURA, sed*

of »description«: *Ästhetik der Beschreibung. Poetische und kulturelle Energie deskriptiver Texte (1700–2000)*, Tübingen 2006.

²⁹ »The interconnection of poetic representations must contribute to sensate cognition, § 7, § 9. Therefore, it must be poetic, § 11« (MED § 65).

²⁵ »Words, in the respect that they are articulate sounds, belong among audible things; hence they elicit sense perceptions« (MED § 91).

²⁶ »By *poem* we mean a perfect sensate discourse« (MED § 9).

²⁷ See: Rüdiger Campe, *Bella evidentia. Begriff und Figur von Evidenz in Baumgartens Ästhetik*, in: *Zeitschrift für deutsche Philosophie* 49 (2001), pp. 243–255.

²⁸ See: Sabine Mainberger, *Die Kunst des Aufzählens. Elemente zu einer Poetik des Enumerativen*, Berlin/New York 2003; in view of this strategy, Heinz J. Drügh suggests the term

CRYPTICA, cuius genuina forma non statim apparet, quoniam est figura contracta per substitutionem« (AE § 784).

With the term ›crypticus‹, Baumgarten imports a concept borrowed from Petrus Ramus into his aesthetics (see: KOLL § 1), which he then refashions to suit his own purposes:

Logici scholasticorum docent PROPOSITIONEM EXPONIBILEM, ex affirmanti et negante cryptice compositam, quales exclusivae, exceptivae, restrictivae, e.c. Nisi vereretur latinis incommodus esse auribus, tropos figuras dicerem exponibiles. (AE § 785)

Kretzmann comments on this term from Ramean philosophy by pointing out that, if one wishes to integrate the logical concept of aesthetics, such propositions or figures require further exposition: »An exponible proposition is a proposition that has an obscure sense requiring exposition in virtue of some syn-categorema occurring either explicitly or included within some word.«³⁰ Thus, the trope becomes the nodal point for two texts joined in a figure. In a web of concatenation with no discernable beginning or end, verbal images do, however, lose their critical value and are in danger of becoming nothing more than opaque chimeras.

In this context, Baumgarten's examples show how figurality time and again blurs the boundary between perception and knowledge, which, in turn, allows him to justify such famous examples of digressive sequences as the Homeric Catalogue of Ships:

Nostris Choerilis tantum abest, ut observetur haec poe[ma]tis elegantia, ut potius naso adunco suspendant Homerum Il. β. ηγεμονας και κοιρανους, αρχους αυνηων νηας τε προπασας dicentem, narrantem Il. η. omnes, Hectori qui obviam ire sustinebant, in Hymno autem Apollinis plurima regnantis dei loca sacra recensentem. Idem in Virgilio Aeneide, qui libr. VII. finem & posteriores evoluerit satis superque notare poterit. Addatur & Ovidii catalogus canum dominum lacerantium in Metamorphosi. (MED § 19 note)³¹

The most significant of Baumgarten's examples of such digression is, however, contained in the First Ode of Horace, where a mythological-narrative intertext identifies the figural structure as an encyclopaedic one:

Cur in ea atavi pro maioribus, pulvis olympicus pro pulvere ludorum, palma pro praemio, Lybicae areae pro terris frugiferis, Atalicae condiciones pro magnis, trabs Cypria pro mercatoria, mare myrtoium pro periculoso, luctans Icaris fluctibus Africus pro vento, vetus Massicum pro vino generoso, Marsus [aper] pro fulmineo &c. nisi virtutis esset substituere conceptibus latioribus angustiores. (MED § 20 note)³²

This dense opacity of the text however provides a neat fit for the third non-discursive aspect of a text. Baumgarten implants the function of an energetic impulse into the text, an impulse that stirs the space of the text into motion: »VIVIDUM dicimus, in quo plura varia, seu simultanea fuerint, seu successiva, appercipere datur« (MED § 112).³³ For within this space, textual elements are not only so closely concatenated with one another that the text becomes opaque, but each element is also constantly striving to enter into an alliance with other elements so that the text is, so to speak, continuously striving for its own completion.

Wherever Baumgarten thus defines the poetic, that is, the figural structure in his *Meditationes*, it is either speech itself or its constituent parts and elements to which the grammar of his sentences assigns the role of *agens* – the agent, that is, »cuius varia tendunt ad cognitionem repraesentationum sensitivarum« (MED § 7, see: § 5).³⁴ By emphasising the aspect of activity, the aspect of tendency or striving (*tendere*) inherent in sensitive speech, Baumgarten is able to give the catenation of elements in space both a direction and a goal – the goal of completion: »Aesthetices finis est perfectio cognitionis sensitivae, qua talis« (AE § 14). In the context of this particular argument, Baumgarten also shifts his attention from the processes of rhetorical presentation (*enargeia*) to those of rhetorical actualisation (*energeia*). The subject matter of his deliberations, meanwhile, remains the same, although his discourse is now informed by a very specific concern, namely a concern with tropes as figures. In the *Rhetoric*, Aristotle defined the operations of *energeia* that Baumgarten has in mind here in the following terms: »By ›making them see things‹ [pro omnino poeion, F.B.] I mean using expressions that represent things as in a state of activity.«³⁵ As far as tropes are concerned, it is above all metonymy and metaphor that win the day, leading Ari-

³² »If there were no merit in putting narrower concepts for broader ones, why, then, in this poem ›great-grandfathers‹ for ancestors, ›Olympic dust‹ for the dust of the Games fields, ›the palm‹ for the prize, ›Libyan threshing-floors‹ for productive countries, ›the circumstances of Attalus‹ for affluence, ›Cyprian beam‹ for a trading ship, ›Myrtoan sea‹ for a dangerous sea, ›Africus struggling against the Icarian floods‹ for the wind, ›Old Massic‹ for a well-aged wine, ›the Marsian boar‹ for a destructive animal, and so on?« (MED § 20 note).

³³ »We call that *vivid* in which we are allowed to perceive many parts either simultaneously or in succession« (MED § 112).

³⁴ »[...] whose various parts are directed toward the apprehension of sensate representations« (MED § 7).

³⁵ Aristotle, *Rhetoric*, in: *The Complete Works of Aristotle. The Revised Oxford Translation*, ed. by Jonathan Barnes, 2 vols., Princeton 1984, vol. 2, pp. 2152–2269, 1411b, p. 2252.

³⁰ Norman Kretzmann, *The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy. From the Rediscovery of Aristotle to the Disintegration of Scholasticism 1100–1600*, Cambridge 1982, p. 215. See: Haverkamp, *Wie die Morgenröthe zwischen Nacht und Tag*, p. 16; Haverkamp, *Figura cryptica. Theorie der literarischen Latenz*, Frankfurt/M. 2002, p. 14.

³¹ »Our tyro poets, far from observing this nicety of a poem, turn up their noses at Homer, who tells in *Iliad* II of the *Leaders and chieftains, commanders of ships, and all the fleet*. In VII he tells the stories of all those who crossed Hector's path. In the Hymn to Apollo he lists the many places sacred to the god. Likewise, in Virgil's *Aeneid*, anyone who reads through book VII and following will have many opportunities to observe the same thing. We may also cite, in the *Metamorphoses* of Ovid, the enumeration of the dogs who rend their master to shreds« (MED § 19 note).

stotle to comment on Homer and the latter's evident fondness for and trust in the power of precisely these two tropes: »Here he represents everything as moving and living; and activity is movement.«³⁶


With regard to duality, however, this means that Baumgarten needs to furnish the two elements, which, within the figure, occupy fixed and separate points in textual space, with a mutual desire that leads them to move towards each other. To summarize: at the point at which Baumgarten's epistemology comes up against language as a medium, or rather; against the media of language, ambiguity becomes theoretically relevant. Its matrix is the rhetorical figure caught in a persistent state of tension between difference and identity.

III Metaphysics of ambiguity

Aesthetics would not qualify as a super-discipline if Baumgarten did not ultimately intend it as his vehicle to reach for the stars. At the Frankfurt College on Aesthetics, he succinctly describes the ultimate aim of his project: »[S]o könnte man die Ästhetik nach einiger Ähnlichkeit auch die Metaphysik des Schönen nennen« (KOLL § 1) – »thus you could claim that aesthetics is a metaphysics of beauty«. Within the dense thicket of paragraphs, however, there lurk a number of surprises that render a proper literary critique of such metaphysics a difficult feat to accomplish. In paragraph 14 of the *Aesthetica*, Baumgarten paves the way towards metaphysics by committing the duality of our talk about thought and its presentation to the goal of its own perfection: »Aesthetices finis est perfectio cognitionis sensitivae, qua talis [...]. Haec autem est pulcritudo« (AE § 14). In the context of metaphysics, Baumgarten encounters the old conflict once again, albeit this time in a somewhat different form: do aesthetics provide us with a theory of aesthetic experience or with an ontology of beauty? Both options are inherently ambivalent, and it is this duality of the site of beauty that makes Baumgarten a transitional figure in the history of aesthetics. In his scheme of things, beauty is both objective (within the context of traditional ontology) and subjective (in the context of the functions of sensuous cognition). And while Kant came to reject, as we know, the idea of a »perfection of any object« and accepted »nothing [...] but the subjective purposiveness in the mind of the beholder«,³⁷ subject and object are, in Baumgarten, still two sides of one and the same coin.

This ambivalence, as Franke, applying psychoanalytic categories, describes this seesaw, not only pertains to the conflict between subject and object, how-

ever.³⁸ Rather, it is doubled yet again on the side of the subject when Baumgarten differentiates between logical and aesthetic subjective truth: »Posset metaphysica veritas obiectiva, obiective verorum repraesentatio in data anima SUBIECTIVA dici VERITAS« (AE § 424). He coins the term *aestheticologicus* to describe this type of duality in an attempt to reconcile the competing intellectual and sensuous elements of truth. As soon as Baumgarten starts emphasizing the first part of the compound of »aestheticological« truth, however, mediality once again sneaks into his argument through the backdoor (fig. 1).



Given this double ambiguity – the ambiguity governing the relationship between subject and object *and* the ambiguity governing the relationship between logic and aesthetics –, the truth of beauty cannot but be a knotty issue of the first order. In his attempt to account for aesthetic truth, Baumgarten becomes enmeshed in a web of metaphoric imagery that catapults him straight out of the rigid 18th century, and he ends up doing nothing less than advocating a metaphysics of ambiguity. As Baumgarten ploughs through his metaphors one by one, the conflict that had hitherto been largely of a symptomatic nature seems to gain an awareness of its own potential, as it were. However, the conflictual self-awareness that becomes apparent through metaphor differs markedly from Baumgarten's own awareness of this conflict.

Aesthetic truth resembles a dense fog (*nebula*), Baumgarten writes in the *Aesthetica* (see: AE § 451). Properly speaking, this truth even emerges only in the twilight hours, as Baumgarten explains to the College:

Our opponents say that confusion is the mother of all error; let us continue this metaphor; a mother may not continuously bear children, and so confusion may not give rise to error all of the time. In nature, the darkness

³⁶ Aristotle, *Rhetoric*, 1412a, p. 2253.

³⁷ Immanuel Kant, *Critique of the Power of Judgement*, ed. by Paul Guyer, transl. by Paul Guyer and Eric Matthews, Cambridge 2000 (The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant), § 15, p. 112.

³⁸ See: Franke, *Kunst als Erkenntnis*, p. 89; Brigitte Scheer, *Einführung in die philosophische Ästhetik*, Darmstadt 1997, p. 70.

of night is not immediately followed by the bright light of day; rather, dawn necessarily comes in between the two. As such, we cannot expect to bask in the bright midday light of knowledge immediately; rather, the light of knowledge has to be preceded by the twilight of confusion. (KOLL § 7)³⁹

Both these metaphors – the lifting fog and the clearing dawn – measure the truth of thought and its presentation that becomes visible in the beauty of these two activities against the logical ideal of the gleaming sunlight. For Baumgarten, however, beauty is not to be sought in the bright light of day anyway, but rather in the shadowy realm of the night. This schema quite literally puts things in black-and-white terms: here the field of logic – light –, there the field of aesthetics – darkness. It would seem reasonable to assume that the site of beauty lies somewhere between light and darkness, namely in a twilight zone that Baumgarten conceptualizes not only as a vague dimness, but also as an intermediary realm – a realm that lies somewhere between the heavens and the bottom of our souls (*fundus animae*). Nature does not move erratically: »[N]atura non facit saltum ex obscuritate in distinctionem« or »ex noctis per auroram meridies« (AE § 7); this, at least, is how Baumgarten justifies the truth function of his twilight metaphor. But he swiftly comes up against yet another problem: if logic and aesthetics were linked in a sort of cyclical day-and-night model, Baumgarten would lose aesthetics' autonomy vis-à-vis logic; this very autonomy is, however, at the heart of his endeavors here. He thus quickly realizes that the twilight is not, after all, such a very useful metaphor for beauty.

The solution seems obvious: Baumgarten separates logic and aesthetics from one another, just as one would separate two worlds. The world of aesthetics is illuminated by a different sun from that which shines on the world of logic: that is to say by an almost extraterrestrial, otherworldly – or in other words a ›sensitive‹ – light (*lux sensitiva*):

[L]ux autem et claritas vel sensitiva, vel intellectualis [...] rectissime iam veteres obscuritatem [kar' aisthesin] ab obscuritate [kata noesin] distinxerunt. Res et cogitatio, quae sensitive percipienda non satis claritatis, extensivae scilicet, aestheticaeque lucis habet, est obscura [kar' aisthesin]. (AE § 631)

It shines no less brightly than the sun of logic, but it casts a somewhat different light, for we are dealing with a sort of indirect lighting system here. Unlike the active luminosity of logic, the illuminating power of aesthetics lies in its reflectivity. The brilliance of beautiful thought and beautiful presentation emanates

not from a body that is radiant in itself, but rather from a body that reflects a light cast upon it:

Omnis itaque lux aethetica, quam in rebus intendas directo, perspicuitas rerum erit sensitiva, claritatis per multitudinem notarum extensio, §. 617. etiam absoluta, comparativa vero vividarum cogitationum et materiae nitor ac splendor. (AE § 618)

Beauty thus lies hidden in a twilight zone that, unlike dawn or dusk, does not merely mark the passage from one realm to the other. It thus also does not conform to the idea of an evenly distributed indirect light, but rather leads Baumgarten to conceive of it as a sort of play of light reflexes – a light show, as it were, that does not play itself out somewhere between light and darkness, but is rather generated by a quick and constant alternation of the two. Beauty is not revealed at either the brightest or the darkest point of this spectrum. With a sideward glance at the visual arts, Baumgarten notes that paintings, after all, also become true only once there is a constructive interplay of brightness and shadow. If, as Baumgarten envisages, such a painting is, as it were, set in motion, it is neither the whole scene that is illuminated at once nor do some elements shine all the time while others remain in permanent darkness; instead, the image as a whole is in a state of iridescence owing to the continuous back and forth of shadow and light. It is in this movement that Baumgarten encounters a simulacrum – the will o' the wisp or *ignis fatuus* of beauty, whose flecks of brightness are constantly flitting hither and thither:

Verum in omni venustate generatim, sicut in pictura, modo sint omnia luce, quam absolutam diximus, conspicua, non omnia, sed quaedam tantum, comparative lucida

*Ore floridulo nitent,
Alba parthenice velut,
Luteumve papaver,* [Catull 61, v. 186 sq.; F.B.]

quaedam sunt vere, sunt belle perspicua, quanquam, cum nitidis illis et admodum collustratis ubi comparentur, appareant opaca. (AE § 624)⁴⁰

Whether or not Baumgarten is aware of it, his imagery allows us to glean a surprising result: while the philosopher employs his most important strategic weapons in the battle against the ambiguity of aesthetics that arises from the conflict between thought and its presentation, ambiguity, in the context of metaphysics, reveals itself as a positive value. Here, ambiguity does not mark a transitional phase between light and darkness in the manner of rhetoric conceiving of *ambiguitas* as an intermediary stage between *perspicuitas* and *obscuritas*. Rather, duality in metaphysics is uncircumventable. Baumgarten thus discovers the absolute

³⁹ »Unsere Gegner sagen, die Verwirrung ist die Mutter des Irrtums; lasset uns die Metapher fortsetzen; eine Mutter darf nicht immer gebären, so darf auch die Verwirrung nicht immer Irrtümer hervorbringen. In der Natur ist nicht jetzt Nacht, und dann folgt gleich heller Mittag, sondern es ist eine Dämmerung dazwischen. So haben wir nicht gleich hellen Mittag der Kenntnis, sondern die Verwirrung als die Dämmerung ist dazwischen« (KOLL § 7; transl. by Alexa Alfer).

⁴⁰ See: Andreas Jürgensen, *Der ästhetische Horizont. Baumgartens Ästhetik und die Malerei um die Mitte des 18. Jahrhunderts*, Diss. Kiel 1993.

ambiguity of aesthetics: this is the simple upshot that concludes a whole succession of involved and digressive paragraphs that mushroom around a problem the solution of which ultimately escapes Baumgarten as he not only lacks the terms and concepts to tackle it, but, in the final analysis, also fails to develop a proper awareness of the issues at hand. Thus, the metaphors he labors over inscribe a metaphysics of mediality, and they do so precisely once Baumgarten has, in the context of rhetoric, discovered the self-referentiality of the medial structure – a self-referentiality that would only come to the fore of aesthetic theory much later, namely during the Modern period.⁴¹

The token or mnemonic of this metaphysics of mediality is the figure two, which Baumgarten had first encountered in his deliberations on the rhetorical figure. Two expresses the fact that Baumgarten does not conceive of beauty as a unified entity – as *consensus*, *harmonia*, or whatever other terms may have been applied to such concepts in the past; rather, he essentially sees beauty as a differential structure – as duality. In his attempt to define this metaphysical duality, Baumgarten even goes one step further and emphasizes, under the heading of aesthetic wealth, the eccentricity of the medial structure – its centrifugality; under the heading of aesthetic brevity, meanwhile, he stresses its complementary concentricity – its centripetality. The structure is eccentric because the first element always desires a second, the second a third, and so forth, all without the ultimate desire for completeness and perfection ever being fulfilled. The structure is concentric in so far as the elements encounter themselves in their duality as the figure refracts and diverts the vector of desire from its goal and drives it back to the immediately preceding element. This, however, ultimately twists ambiguity, as Baumgarten conceives of it, in a paradoxical direction; ambiguity itself *becomes* a paradox of ›infinite finiteness‹ or ›finite infinity‹ that holds thought and its presentation in a permanent state of inextricable tension between openness and closure.

In conclusion, I would contend that Baumgarten did not us leave a mere fragment in 1758. In terms of ambiguity, his writings on aesthetics are, for all intents and purposes, complete: they root the new super-discipline of aesthetics in the conflict between reason and its media, they recognize the matrix of the non-discursive in the duality of the rhetorical figure, and they project, through the twilight quality of beauty, a medio-metaphysics. In 1758, and over the course of the few remaining years of his life, Baumgarten did not fail to complete his project; he merely failed to recognize or accept that ambiguity represented the master key to his aesthetic theory.⁴²

⁴¹ See: Christoph Bode, *Ästhetik der Ambiguität. Zu Funktion und Bedeutung von Mehrdeutigkeit in der Literatur der Moderne*, Tübingen 1988.

⁴² This essay was translated by Alexa Alfer (London).

HEINZ J. DRÜGH

Die Ambivalenz des Klassischen

Zu Schillers *Die Braut von Messina*

ABSTRACT

With an eye to the origins of Schiller's classical period, and with strong lights trained on Winckelmann as prototypical classicist and on the most fragmented of classical writers, Karl Philipp Moritz, this essay begins by illuminating ambivalence in classicism itself. Then a reading of Schiller's late drama, *Die Braut von Messina*, with which the dramatist attempts to revive Greek tragedy for the modern world, will serve as a test case for classicism's only very tentative compromise between reason and sensuality.

I

Als sachlicher Nukleus jener Arbeitssymbiose zwischen Goethe und Schiller, die seit der Mitte des neunzehnten Jahrhunderts unter der Bezeichnung *Weimarer Klassik* firmiert, gilt gemeinhin ein ästhetisch-humanistisches Projekt der Versöhnung der zwei menschlichen Teilnaturen Sinnlichkeit und Rationalität, ein Projekt, bei dem der griechischen Antike modellhafter Charakter zugeschrieben wird. »Damals bey jenem schönen Erwachen der Geisteskräfte« in Griechenland, so Schiller in seiner Abhandlung *Über die ästhetische Erziehung des Menschen in einer Reihe von Briefen*, »hatten die Sinne und der Geist noch kein strenge geschiedenes Eigenthum« (NA 20, 321);¹ und so scheint die Kunst der Griechen Widerstrebendes auf das Engste zusammenzuführen. Sie ist, wie Schillers drängende *repetitio* betont, »zugleich voll Form und voll Fülle, zugleich philosophierend und bildend, zugleich zart und energisch« und verbindet »die Jugend der Phantasie mit der Männlichkeit der Vernunft in einer herrlichen Menschheit«. Am Beispiel der antiken Allianz von Sinnlichkeit und Vernunft soll sich, so Schiller weiter, das neuzeitliche Gefühl der Entzweiung beruhigen, soll sich die Moderne »über die Naturwidrigkeit [ihrer] Sitten [...] trösten« (NA 20, 321).

Am Kunstgegenstand entsprechen einem solchen auf den Ausgleich von Spannungen und die Nivellierung von Ambivalenzen bedachten Unternehmen

¹ Ich zitiere nach dem Text: Nationalausgabe von Schillers Werken, herausgegeben im Auftrag des Goethe- und Schiller-Archivs, des Schiller-Nationalmuseums und der Deutschen Akademie von Julius Petersen, Gerhard Fricke, Hermann Schneider et al., Weimar 1943ff. mit der Sigle NA im laufenden Text unter Angabe der Bandnummer und der Seitenzahl.