A Kraftian Approach to the Thick

Unexpected Thoughts from a Logical Positivist in Metaethics

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Chapter 1

Introduction

1.1 What are Thin and Thick Concepts?

Thick and thin concepts are best introduced by examples. Compare the two following descriptions of *Spieltrieb* by Juli Zeh, a Post-modernist German novelist[1]:

> SPIELTRIEB is a (...) novel about immorality and its consequences and it questions the continued validity of traditional principles and values and poses one of the most significant questions of our time: who today can say what is good and what is evil, and how can they know?

Although this description contains many terms with moral connotations ('immorality', 'validity of traditional principles and values', 'good', and 'evil'), it sets out to describe the plot of the story in a rather neutral fashion (whilst at the same time also interpreting the essence of the novel). Nevertheless, the reader is rather informed by a general overview of the novel than being manipulated into reading this novel by a subversive evaluation of the work, such as seems to be the aim of the following review:

> Set in the heart of the west of the German Republic at a high school in Bonn in the present day, this is the breath-taking story of students Ada and Alev and their obsessive dependence on one another: initially it leads to a readiness – then to a compulsion – to perform acts which

[1] These two descriptions are taken from the official website of the publishing house "Schoeffling". Gaming Instinct is the novel's English title. `https://www.schoeffling.de/foreignrights/juli-zeh/gaming-instinct`, August 29, 2017)

> overstep all moral bounds, all human compassion, and are beyond any form of predictable behaviour. The two youngsters select their teacher, Smutek, as victim of their ingenious blackmail. A malicious game begins.

The second review is supposed to convince the reader that the book is 'good' and therefore worth reading. The review does more than simply inform the reader, but praises the novel as a must-read. By comparing the two reviews it becomes clear that the second one contains a lot of so-called 'thick concepts', such as breath-taking, obsessive, ingenious, or malicious. These adjectives give a description of the novel, but since they are supposed to be persuasive, they also evaluate the story and the characters. The reader expects the malicious game to be gloating, deceitful, or spiteful, and especially he or she expects it to be 'bad in some way'. However, the reader does not really perceive purely non-evaluative information about the content of the game because these adjectives express thick concepts. Nevertheless, the reader gets an impression of what this game is like. The term ingenious appears to give the reader more information about the blackmail than good would do. Although Ada and Alev are only teenagers, the blackmail seems to be more than a nasty trick played by kids on their teacher, but it appears rather gruesome and well-prepared. Furthermore, the term 'ingenious' evaluates the blackmail itself. It can be regarded as a form of admiration towards the blackmailers.

So far it can be stated that there are adjectives that are more informative than others. Adjectives that seem not to contain any evaluation are purely non-evaluative (such as 'yellow'), others however are both non-evaluative and evaluative. They are called *thick concepts* because they do not only evaluate a person or an act, but they also embody a *thickish* informative description of the person or the act. Purely evaluative concepts (such as malicious, good, or bad) are called *thin concepts*.[2] Typically they are said to have not much or any non-evaluative conceptual content because they offer less factual information about the things described as good, or bad. It only becomes clear that the person, who describes something as good, likes it or approves of it.

Typical thick concepts, which are referred to in the philosophical debate, are often ethical concepts, such as just, fair, kind, chaste, discreet, cautious, or cruel. However, there are also other kinds of thick concepts, such as aesthetic

[2]Sometimes ought is also said to be a thin concept, but it seems rather *normative* than *evaluative*.

or epistemic thick concepts like glamorous, elegant, reliable, or observant.[3] In this study, the nature of thick concepts referring to ethical ideas will be looked at. Unless mentioned otherwise, the considerations can be transferred to the other types of thick concepts.

1.2 Concepts, Conceptions and Terms

There is a threefold distinction between possessing a concept, having a conception of a concept and expressing a concept. Concepts are representations of word meaning, they *refer* to entities in the world which they represent.[4] We have conceptions of concepts and terms are expressions of concepts. Conceptions might be either tacit or conscious.
The advantage of the concept-conception distinction is that one can differentiate between the 'public' or 'intersubjective' character of concepts and 'subjective' conceptions of concepts. One can possess a concept without having an adequate conception of the concept. For instance, Sue believes that penguins are birds, but Dean believes that penguins are fish. They both possess the concepts fish, bird, and penguin, but have different conceptions of penguins.[5] The meaning of a term is much the same as the content of a concept. In the following, 'sans serif' will be used to indicate concepts and single inverted commas to indicate terms.

1.3 Differentiating the Evaluative from the Non-Evaluative

The debate about thick concepts has often been conducted in terms of the 'evaluative' vs. the 'descriptive', the 'factual', or the 'natural'. In this study the term 'descriptive' will be used to refer to the kind of information that is communicated when using non-evaluative terms. But it might be odd to talk about 'descriptive properties' as those ascribed by non-evaluative predicates. The same consideration holds for 'factual properties'. In contrast, it seems intuitive to talk about 'natural' properties, but to say that thick concepts have

[3] Cp. Kirchin (2010, 2).
[4] This study leaves it open to the reader to decide whether concepts are mental representations, abstract entities, or a combination of both.
[5] Cp. Ezcurdia (1998, 187-188).

a 'natural element' is similarly odd. Thus, as suggested by Roberts (2011) and Dancy (2013), in this study the term 'non-evaluative' will be used because it appears a legitimate way of referring to 'non-evaluative properties', the 'non-evaluative content' of thick concepts, and 'non-evaluative concepts'. Whenever it becomes clear from the context whether properties or the content of concepts are referred to, the terms 'descriptive', 'factual', or 'natural' will be used.

A first differentiation concerns evaluative and non-evaluative concepts. One common realist strategy is to characterize evaluative or ethical concepts as concepts that pick out evaluative or ethical properties, whereas non-evaluative concepts pick out non-evaluative properties.[6] The anti-realist denies that there are evaluative or normative facts. According to an anti-realist view, *evaluativeness* is a feature of a concept and not a feature of the world.[7] For instance, Michael Smith proposes the following definition of an ethical concept:

> [A] concept is an ethical concept if and only if, if someone believes that that concept is instantiated, then that person believes that there is a reason for him to desire that the world be a certain way.[8]

In the following, I will use a more liberal, minimal definition which holds for *evaluative* thick concepts only: A term 'T' represents a thick concept iff 'x is T' contains or entails 'x is good in a way (bad in a way)'.

1.4 Differentiating the Thick from the Thin

Gilbert Ryle was the first to use the terms 'thin' and 'thick description' in print, in order to differentiate less detailed from more detailed descriptions. In *Thinking and Reflecting* he explains the term 'thick description' by using the example of a golfer, who is practising approach-shots. The observer of a picture showing this man hitting a golf ball might think that he is playing golf. What the observer does not see in the picture, however, is that the man is only practising approach-shots by hitting one ball after the other. Since

[6] Matti Eklund (2013, 162) calls this view the *metaphysical view*. Cf. also Finlay (2010, 334).

[7] Cp. Finlay (2010, 334). Gibbard (1992, 268-269) proposes the following informal definition: "A term stands for a thick concept if it praises or condemns an action as having a certain property."

[8] Smith (2013, 105).

he has no opponent, Ryle says that one cannot say that the man is playing golf. Consequently, in order to give a 'thick description' (that is a much more detailed description) of this picture, the observer of the pictures needs much more information than what he or she simply sees on the picture.[9]

In *Thinking of Thoughts* Ryle gives a similar example. When somebody says 'Today is the 3rd of February' this is "obviously the thinnest possible description of what he [is] doing"[10], according to Ryle. A 'thicker' description would include the information that this person is actually telling somebody else the date, or that he or she is trying to communicate a wanted calendar-information.[11] Therefore, the difference between a thin and a thick description depends on the amount of information the description conveys. It appears that thin and thick descriptions only materialise when there are at least two descriptions: It follows that the concepts of thin and thick descriptions are not absolute, but rather relative.

One of Ryle's students, Bernard Williams, introduced the term 'thick concept' into the debate about ethical knowledge.[12] Williams characterizes 'thicker notions', such as treachery, promise, brutality, and courage, as notions that "seem to express a union of fact and value"[13]. He further explains:

> The way these notions are applied is determined by what the world is like (for instance, by how someone has behaved), and yet, at the same time, their application usually involves a certain valuation of the situation, of persons or actions. Moreover, they usually (though not necessarily directly) provide reasons for actions.[14]

To express those two distinct aspects of thick terms, Williams introduces the notions of 'world-guidedness' and 'action-guidingness'. He calls thick concepts both 'world-guided' and 'action-guiding'. On the one hand, they are guided by the world because they describe what the world is like, and on the other

[9] Ryle (1966-7, 465-479) offers a lot more examples.

[10] Ryle (1968, 484).

[11] Cp. *ibid.*, 484.

[12] This should not imply that Williams took the term 'thick concepts' from Ryle, although this connection might be obvious. Compare Kirchin (2013) for further implications about the connection between Ryle's 'thick descriptions' and Williams 'thick concepts'. Putnam (1990, 166), however, stresses that Iris Murdoch was the first one to emphasize that there are two distinct kinds of concepts: abstract ethical concepts (good, right) and more descriptive concepts (cruel, inconsiderate).

[13] Williams (1985, 129).

[14] *Ibid.*, 129-130.

hand, they are action-guiding because they also involve an evaluation of what is described.[15] A's calling a cake 'delicious' might give B a reason for choosing it over the other cakes.[16]

Although Williams uses the term 'thick concept', he does not use 'thin concepts' for right or good. Instead he calls them 'most general and abstract' concepts, which lack world-guidedness.[17]

As has been indicated, the distinction between thick and thin concepts is rather gradual than clear-cut. Some evaluative concepts are thicker than others and vice versa. The distinction is best seen as a continuum.[18]

Timothy Chappell radically denies that there are any thin concepts:

> There are no thin concepts. Or almost none. And those that there are are like the higher-numbered elements in the periodic table, artefacts of theory which do not occur naturally and which, even once isolated, are unstable under normal conditions; they may have some theoretical interest, but we should expect far less of them than many theorist do.[19]

Although this study will argue in a different way, it also shares Chappell's view that there are no thin concepts because all of them are at least a bit thick.[20]

1.5 Theoretical Requirements

There are some more phenomena concerning thick concepts which any theory about the thick should be able to handle: In some contexts, a thick concept may have positive colouring, whereas in another context its colouring may be negative. Moreover, some thick concepts convey values that are not unanimously shared by everybody. The former phenomenon is called 'evaluative flexibility'[21] or 'variability in evaluative valence'[22], the latter is referred to as 'objectionability'. For example, brutal actions are most often bad, but in some circumstances even a brutal action might be somehow judged positively. This

[15] Cp. Williams (1985, 140-141).

[16] In this paragraph, these two characterizations are called 'aspects' to make it clear that these two sides do not necessarily have to be two distinct (separable) elements of thick concepts.

[17] Cp. Williams (1985, 152).

[18] This idea is ascribed to Scheffler (1987, especially 417-418).

[19] Chappell (2013, 182).

[20] Chapter 6 deals with this aspect in more detail.

[21] This term was coined by Kirchin (2013, 13).

[22] Väyrynen (2013, 215).

might be the case when it comes to football games. Some football fans like the brutality of the sport. In their eyes, it makes football even more attractive. More examples of this kind can be found in the literature concerning this discussion, such as: Sometimes it is bad to be honest because one should have been discreet; cherubic children might be bores; cheekiness is not necessarily bad;[23] or selfishness must not always be bad.[24]

The phenomenon of objectionability occurs, if the use of a thick concept conveys an evaluation that some people reject. For instance, religious people might reproach atheists for using blasphemous insincerely because atheists do not believe that God exists. Moreover, the atheist might not want to evaluate things as being lewd, chaste, or sinful because this assumes that he or she shares religious values which are commonly rejected by atheists. These concepts which convey rejected evaluations are called 'objectionable thick concepts'. Pekka Väyrynen (2013) even argues that any thick concept is principally open to being regarded as objectionable. Referring to Kant, Simon Blackburn also seems to support this thesis in saying that "there is nothing unconditionally good about courage, temperance and the rest"[25].

A third phenomenon is that even clearly non-evaluative concepts may have evaluative colouring in some contexts. For instance, black, red, or green may have negative or positive meaning when talking about political parties.

In addition to the characteristics mentioned in the preceding sections, an overall theory of thick concepts should be able to explain these three phenomena as well. In the following, a list with the requirements and questions a theory of the thick needs to handle will be given:

- Are thick concepts evaluative, or normative in the sense of action-guidingness?
- What exactly is this evaluative and non-evaluative element, if thick concepts contain both?
- How are these two elements connected or related to each other?
- How is the phenomenon of evaluative flexibility explained?
- How can objectionable thick concepts be included in the theory?

[23] Cp. Kirchin (2013, 13).
[24] Cp. Väyrynen (2013, 124).
[25] Blackburn (1992, 287).

- Can the theory explain why evaluative concepts are sometimes used in a non-evaluative fashion? Can it also explain the use of non-evaluative concepts in an evaluative way?
- Is the difference between thick and thin concepts a difference of degree or a difference in kind?
- Is the theory connected to any meta-ethical theories?
- Are presumptions on the basis of this theory justifiable? Are the possible implications of this theory desirable?

1.6 Current Theories about the Thick

To begin with, this study sets out to classify the existing theories about the thick. They can be outlined in the following scheme:



[26]Wiggins (1976); Williams (1985); Putnam (2002); Kirchin (2010; 2013); Roberts (2011); Dancy (1995; 2013).
[27]Miller (2003); Gibbard (1992).
[28]Stevenson (1944); Hare (1952, 1981); Foot (1958a, 1958b); Barker (2000).
[29]Kraft (1937); Elstein & Hurka (2009); Burton (1992).
[30]Finlay (2004, 2005); Copp (2001, 2009); Strandberg (2012, 2015).
[31]Blackburn (1984, 148-9; 1992); Väyrynen (2013).

Basically, the theories distinguish between semantic and pragmatic views. Semantic (or content) views hold that the evaluation is part of the content of a thick concept. These views can be subdivided into non-separationist and separationist views. Advocates of the former claim that thick concepts cannot be separated into distinct elements[32], whereas proponents of the latter maintain that the content can be disentangled into an evaluative element, which may be reduced to a thin concept, and a non-evaluative element which contains various non-evaluative concepts.[33] Common to extensionally descriptive equivalence views is the thesis that for any thick concept there is a non-evaluative concept which is extensionally equivalent to the thick concept. Opposing views deny this assumption.

Semantic views are dominant in the debate about the thick, but there are also pragmatic views on the rise. Proponents of these hold that thick concepts are not essentially or inherently evaluative, that is, the evaluation conveyed by the use of a thick concept is not part of the semantic content, but rather some effect of pragmatics. Just like semantic views, pragmatic views are both compatible with cognitivism as well as with non-cognitivism.

1.7 Plan and Aims

The primary objectives in this study are, firstly, to summarize and evaluate competitive theories about the thick, secondly, to compare these theories to theories about non-evaluative concepts, thirdly, to include Victor Kraft's thoughts about evaluative concepts into the debate and, fourthly, to elaborate an independent theory about the thick which refers to Kraft's theoretical considerations.

Chapters 2 and 3 discuss the current semantic and pragmatic theories which have been presented above in chapter 1.6. In particular, the questions outlined in chapter 1.5 will be discussed with reference to both semantic and pragmatic theories. In doing so, this study deals with these theories in a critical and con-

[32]This characterization is impartial to both understandings that the elements cannot be separated a) because they are either deeply entangled or b) because there is only one kind of element.

[33]This disentangling procedure could sound peculiar to those unfamiliar with the debate about the thick. E. g., a separationists might hold that *x is courageous* is equivalent to *x has done an action in spite of danger and x is good in a way for it.* The former part of the analysis is purely non-evaluative (although it might be admitted that danger is at least a bit evaluative), whereas the latter part is evaluative.

structive way. Chapter 2 is twofold: It starts dealing with non-separationism before it turns to separationist accounts. Having considered semantic theories, chapter 3 handles pragmatic views. Apart from Simon Blackburn's account, it is primarily paid attention to Pekka Väyrynen's impressive study about thick concepts which combines philosophical and linguistic methods to evolve a new account by completely rethinking the topic.
Chapter 4 takes a step back from the actual problem and looks at it by adopting a fully different perspective: Theories about non-evaluative concepts are researched to raise awareness of problems that also concern the theories discussed in chapters 2 and 3. At the end of chapter 4, a proposal how thick concepts can be captured theoretically will be briefly outlined before it will be discussed in more detail at the end of chapter 6.
In the 1930s the logical positivist, Victor Kraft, dealt with evaluative concepts and evaluation despite general reservations of logical positivism. His theory is introduced in chapter 5, in order to look for interesting and inspiring ideas to promote the debate about the thick. Though Kraft was one of the first to handle the thick, his account has not been noticed in the current debate.
In the last chapter the ideas developed in the preceding sections of the book and especially Kraft's considerations will be deployed to elaborate an independent approach to the thick. This approach will be hybrid-expressivist and anti-realist. Moreover, it will be argued that the Kraftian account fulfils the criteria and answers the questions raised in section 1.5.

Chapter 2

Semantic Views

With regard to concepts, the philosopher's main interest focusses on questions concerning reference or conceptual content. The relation between concepts and the entities in the world which the concepts represent strongly fascinates philosophers. Semantic views deal with the reference and conceptual content of thick concepts. As the term 'semantic' indicates, these views hold that the evaluation conveyed by the thick is part of the semantic content of thick concepts. This view is intuitively understandable as the following example shows:

a. Max is a bachelor and he is unmarried.
b. Max is a brutal person and he is bad in a way.

Both sentences appear somehow odd. The statements seem to be redundant. Sentence a. is redundant because the meaning of bachelor already contains being unmarried. Therefore, it is unnecessary to also state that Max is unmarried. Analogous to a., proponents of a semantic view hold that b. is redundant because the evaluation that Max is bad in a way is already contained in the meaning of the thick judgement that Max is brutal. This point has been made explicitly by Brent Kyle (2011).
Despite the unifying thesis that the evaluation is part of the thick content, semantic views are wildly heterogeneous: The most important distinguishing criterion is the disentangleability of thick concepts. Separationists hold that thick concepts can be disentangled (separated) into two distinct elements: a non-evaluative and an evaluative one. Non-separationists, however, maintain that the non-evaluative and the evaluative meaning of thick concepts are so deeply entangled that they cannot be separated.

2.1 Non-Separationism

Non-separationist accounts deny that thick concepts are disentangleable. Instead, they hold that thick concepts are not analysable. Any analysis of thick concepts is therefore circular which means that the analysis itself contains the thick concept.[1] The same argument regarding the colour 'red' has been produced by David Wiggins:

> x is red if and only if x is such as to give, under certain conditions specifiable as normal, a certain visual impression.[2]

An answer to the question 'Which visual impression?' would be circular because it needs to involve that the impression must be an impression of seeing x red. Similarly, the judgement *x is selfish* could not be analysed without itself containing the value of selfishness. Hence Debbie Roberts often calls this account non-reductionism instead because *x is selfish* cannot be reduced to an equivalent sentence which only contains a description and an evaluation reduced to a thin concept.[3] If selfishness was reduced to a non-evaluative description and the thin concept good in a way, this circumscription would miss to express the genuine property of selfishness. Likewise, any evaluating description could by no means express the meaning of selfishness equally. As a result, there is no naturalistic way to analyse thick concepts which means that there simply are no non-evaluative criteria stating what to count as selfish, or brutal. Selfishness or brutality cannot be grounded by non-evaluative facts only. Jonathan Dancy puts it slightly different: "[T]he similarity between different [for instance] lewd actions will not be entirely natural."[4]
Roberts says that it would be mistaken to think that thick concepts have evaluative and non-evaluative elements of content that are so deeply entangled in a way that makes disentangling impossible. Rather, to understand non-separationism, one has to assume that there is only one kind of content which is evaluative. The question of disentangling, then, does not even arise. So, evaluative concepts "pick out wholly evaluative features of the world"[5] and

[1] Putnam (2002, 38) says that it is impossible to say what the non-evaluative meaning of a thick concept is without using the thick concept itself.

[2] Wiggins (1987, 189).

[3] In her (2013), she says that her non-reductionist view which she calls 'inclusive' view is a third alternative to semantic and pragmatic views. However, this term could be misleading because her view simply appears to be a semantic view that denies separability.

[4] Dancy (1995, 276).

[5] Roberts (2013a, 684).

hence create an evaluative world. Dancy takes up the same aspect, but adds the necessity of an appropriate attitude concerning the given properties. The following quote also shows that non-separationism – at least in the way he understands it – is often linked to sentimentalism:

> The correct picture (...) is not that there are two 'really' distinct elements which by a pseudo-chemical reaction somehow become indistinguishable from each other. There are no elements at all, in any normal sense. There is indeed a property and an attitude (...), but these things are not *elements* of a concept. They are incapable of being so because the property is best characterized as being that of meriting the attitude, and the attitude is best characterized as the appropriate one given the presence of the property. So there are not two things to amalgamate – there is not even *one* which, with the addition of something incapable of independent existence, is somehow transformed into something other than itself (...). The so-called amalgam cannot be disassembled or dissolved, since there is not enough to dissolve it into.[6]

The thesis that there are certain properties and an appropriate attitude towards these properties which are not themselves elements of the referring thick concept is an idea of David Wiggins.[7] According to Wiggins, there is a pair ‹*property*, *response*› which gives rise to a thick concept. His definition of x *being* φ[8] is that

> x is really φ if it is such as to evoke and make appropriate the response A among those who are sensitive to φ-ness.[9]

It could be objected that it depends on the person, if he or she is sensitive to φ-ness. This would make the account rather relativistic. To avoid this consequence, Wiggins introduces the term 'really' to be able to categorize thick evaluations as either right or wrong. If x really is φ, then the correctness depends on the appropriateness of the attitude. The appropriate attitude is the one we *owe* to x.[10]

[6] Dancy (1995, 268).
[7] Cp. Dancy (2013, 46).
[8] φ might be a thick concept in his account.
[9] Wiggins (1987, 205).
[10] Dancy (2013, 46) uses the term 'merit'.

In Roberts' understanding the irreducible thick says that a thick concept applies to objects having certain shapeless features in virtue of which the application of the thick concept is *justified*. These features, in virtue of which the application of the thick concept is appropriate, are determined in a way that cannot be specified and that depends on a case-by-case basis. She suggests the following analysis:

1. The concept (e. g., TACTFUL) applies to an object in virtue of it having features of a certain sort, of which we may be able to give a rough purely nonevaluative characterization, but where there is no nonevaluative shape for the concept.

2. The object has features of that certain sort that ground the relevant property (e. g., makes it tactful) and thus merits the application of the thick concept.

3. Precisely which features ground the property (e. g., make the object tactful), and thus make the application of the concept appropriate, are determined, in a way that cannot be specified in advance, by evaluation on a case-by-case basis.[11]

According to Dancy, when applying a thick concept to a thing or a person, the thing or the person certainly has 'neutrally descriptive' features which make the application appropriate. However, these features are not part of the concept because their relevance is restricted to the particular case.[12] Instead of the *appropriate*-relation in the accounts of Wiggins and Dancy, Roberts suggests that evaluative properties which are given by the content of evaluative concepts are *grounded* in lower-level non-evaluative properties.[13]
Simon Kirchin follows a quite different path to defend his non-separationist view. His account is based on Ryle's thick descriptions and a critique of Williams' characterisation of thick concepts as world-guided and action-guiding. Kirchin uses ideas of Ryle to show how the thick can be explained in a more accurate way. He starts with one of Ryle's examples of a thick description. Ryle imagines two boys contracting their eyelids of their right eyes. The one boy is involuntary twitching, whereas the other is winking conspiratorially to an accomplice. The thinnest description of this situation is that the two boys

[11] Roberts (2011, 511).

[12] Dancy (1995, 277) agrees with Blackburn that the characterization concerning a thick concept is a 'semantic anchor', that is, a rough characterization of the non-evaluative 'content'.

[13] Cp. Roberts (2013b, 88-94). This will not be discussed in more detail because Roberts seems to be vague on this topic herself.

are contracting their eyelids and there appears no difference in it. A thicker description of the second boy's winking is more precise and offers further information:

> (1) had deliberately winked, (2) to someone in particular, (3) in order to impart a particular message, (4) according to an understood code, (5) without the cognisance of the rest of the company.[14]

Ryle points out that the signaller has not done five separately do-able things, but rather one complex action. Now imagine a boy who is trying to impress a girl by parodying a fellow pupil. Then, Kirchin suggests, the boy is doing only one thing, but this one single action is more complex than just the parody of the fellow student. He concludes that for Ryle there is no base to describe the more complex action:

> Or, in other words, if one has a range of similar actions, described using related but different thick descriptions, then there is no core that all have in exactly the same way.[15]

The common base of the actions of the three boys could be the winking, but this would not be true for the involuntary twitcher. The only thin description which is available in all three cases is 'the boy contracts his eyelids'. This is not sufficient to give a proper core description in all three cases.
Analogous to thick descriptions, there is no core element available when it comes to thick concepts. Therefore, Kirchin suggests that thick concepts are a type of thick description. The contraction of the eyelids can be involuntary, or used to give a signal to an accomplice, or even to impress a girl. Likewise, to call someone 'honest' can have several intentions: to guide action directly, to express relief, to voice hope, and many more. The common base in all these possibilities is the attribution of 'honesty'. So, a thick concept can have a lot of functions and not just the guidance of action, as suggested by Williams.[16]
As a consequence, Kirchin questions the idea that evaluative concepts always carry a pro or con evaluation by stating that a concept can be evaluative, but at the same time it can be used on occasions where it does not convey any positive or negative point. An evaluative concept which is used without

[14] Ryle (1968, 481).
[15] Kirchin (2013, 68).
[16] Cp. *ibid.*, 72.

conveying a pro or con point is still an evaluative concept because evaluation is only one function of evaluative concepts among various functions:

> When we use MACABRE of a story, say, we can indicate pro and con ideas, such as praise or worry. And, we can imply other ideas that themselves may be either wholly pro or wholly con, or also fluctuate in this respect: intrigue and fright come to mind. But, beyond that, perhaps we just wish to say that the story is macabre and this itself be an evaluation that is neither obviously pro nor obviously con, and that is, additionally, not just a recording of some nonevaluative descriptive aspect of the story. I see no reason to think that lots of thick concepts, including ethical ones, cannot or do not work in the same way.[17]

So, according to Kirchin, a non-separationist is not committed to holding that thick concepts only have the function of evaluating and acting-guiding. These are only two functions among many.

2.1.1 The Difference between Thick and Thin Concepts

According to the non-separationist view, both thin and thick concepts are wholly, or at least primarily evaluative.[18] The difference between them is that thick concepts are somehow *more specific*[19], or that they have a more specified domain of their application[20] or narrower satisfaction conditions[21]. This means that there are (almost) no restrictions on the features that make things *good* or *bad*. However, there are restrictions for the application of a thick concept. The domain, on which these concepts operate is more specific or narrower. The difference between thin and thick concepts is one of degree, not one of type, and is best seen as a continuum: The narrower the domain of things to which evaluative concepts can be applied, the thicker the concepts.[22] Thick concepts are more specific than thin concepts because they "narrow down the sorts of things that the concept can apply to"[23].

[17] Kirchin (2013, 75).
[18] According to Roberts (2013b, 87), a concept is evaluative in virtue of directly ascribing an evaluative property.
[19] Roberts (2013a, 684).
[20] Dancy (1995, 277).
[21] Harcout & Thomas (2013, 23).
[22] Cp. Roberts (2011, 513).
[23] *Ibid.*, 508.

Dancy assumes – contrary to the continuum-view – that the distinction between thin and thick concepts is not a matter of degree, but of type.[24]
In summary, both views – that the difference is one of type and one of degree – are supported.

2.1.2 Evaluative Flexibility

In the preliminary remarks it became clear that an account of the thick has to be able to explain evaluative flexibility. That is, it needs to explain why a thick concept might convey a pro-evaluation in some contexts, whereas it conveys a con-evaluation in others.
The most fruitful solution is offered by Dancy.[25] He unfolds the idea that there is no single-attitude which is lexically signalled, but rather a 'range' of attitudes which in turn is not lexically signalled because of the flexibility concerning thick concept. On the one hand, there is no reason why there should be a lexically signalled attitude at all, on the other hand, there might be an appropriate attitude and many inappropriate attitudes – at least occasionally. To be a competent user of a thick term, one requires the ability to also understand the range of attitudes associated with it.[26] Elsewhere, Dancy adds that it might be acceptable to say that any thick concepts is connected with a "default valence". However, there might be counterexamples (provocative or seductive).[27]

2.1.3 Motivations for Non-Separationism

Any philosopher defending non-separationism is a cognitivist about values. So the truth of cognitivism is a necessary condition for non-separationism to be true.[28] Cognitivism about values is widely held and appears very attractive. Intuitively, our value experience seems to suggest that evaluative properties are genuine properties of the world and that it is implausible that there should be no such properties to which thick terms apply. As Jonathan Dancy puts it: "[W]e take moral value to be part of the fabric of the world; (...) and

[24] Cp. Dancy (2013, 51).
[25] Dancy (1995) uses the term 'essential contestability' instead of 'evaluative flexibility'. Kirchin (2013) relies on Dancy.
[26] Cp. Dancy (1995, 270).
[27] Cp. Dancy (2013, 45).
[28] For defences of moral realism cf., e. g., Platts (1979), Dancy (1986), Finlay (2004; 2005), Copp (2001; 2009).

we should take it in the absence of contrary considerations that actions and agents do have the sorts of moral properties we experience in them"[29]. Based on the mind-independent existence of value facts[30], non-separationists offer a consistent view that has philosophical significant consequences. To state that value judgements are subjective judgements that lack truth value, is unpopular in philosophy because it immediately faces relativistic objections. The converse statement appears to be more favoured in philosophy. If someone maintains that murdering is generally good, it is human to really want to answer that this judgement is wrong. A further favourable consequence is that the Frege-Geach objection poses no problem to cognitivism.

2.1.4 Consequences and Problems of Non-Separationism

Non-separationism has four major consequences: i) moral cognitivism is true, ii) it undermines the fact-value distinction, iii) thick concepts are naturally shapeless, and iv) thick concepts are unanalysable.

Cognitivism about values has its favourable aspects which the preceding section has shown, but clearly it also has its problems. One major problem is that a cognitivist account has no natural explanation for the action-guidingness of thick concepts and their link to reasons for actions.[31] According to Williams, thick concepts are action-guiding, and, thus, have motivational force. Assuming cognitivism, judgements containing thick concepts express beliefs about the world, and according to reason internalism, having a belief and a desire is necessary for being motivated to do an action. But since value judgements express beliefs, according to cognitivism, the non-separationist has trouble explaining the link to action-guidingness. For instance, calling a distribution 'just', provides a reason to prefer it over another unjust distribution. However, if *This distribution is just* expresses a belief, then the link to the action-guiding character of just is not obvious.[32]

[29] Dancy (1986, 172).

[30] Even if cognitivism is based on a single premiss, it is a strong premiss, though, which is difficult, if not even impossible, to prove.

[31] There are further arguments against cognitivism. Cf., e. g., Mackie's (1990 [1977]) famous arguments from queerness and relativity.

[32] Cf. the *argument from moral psychology* in Miller (2003, 6). In chapter 6 of this study, it is argued for a separationist account which denies cognitivism about values, that is, it is assumed that value judgements cannot be true or false. Although chapter 6 assumes that non-cognitivism is more convincing, it is not argued against cognitivism apart from the argument that the motivational problem cannot sufficiently be solved within a cognitivist

A second consequence of non-separationism is that it wreaks havoc with the fact-value distinction. Hilary Putnam tries to prove this thesis. He attacks the ontological distinction between facts and values by showing that i) values depend on facts, and that ii) facts depend on values. The former appears to be commonly accepted, whereas the latter is more difficult to prove. Putnam supposes that there are so-called 'super-Benthamites' who live on the Australian continent and share the history, geography and exact science with the rest of the earth's population, but they contradict in ethics. Furthermore, suppose that they can measure the 'hedonic tone' scientifically. An act is right, if it maximizes the hedonic tone of the greatest number. Now imagine, a super-Benthamite tells a lie because he or she wants to maximise the hedonic tone of a great number of people. Indeed, some human beings would judge the lie to be wrong because of its deceitfulness. The super-Benthamites agree with these humans with regard to all empirical facts, but still they evaluate these facts in a different way. Putnam derives:

> And it is not counted as being 'dishonest' in the pejorative sense to tell lies out of the motive of maximizing the general pleasure level. So after a while the use of the description 'honest' among the super-Benthamites would be extremely different from the use of that same descriptive term among us. (...) The texture of the human world will begin to change. In the course of time the super-Benthamites and we will end up living in different human worlds.[33]

So, according to Putnam, this example shows that the human world might change, if facts are evaluated differently. Putnam concludes that both values depend on facts, and facts depend on values.
The third and the forth consequence are mutually dependent. In section 2.2.2, the shapelessness of thick concepts will be evolved. The fourth consequence that thick concepts are unanalysable means that thick concepts cannot be expressed by more primitive concepts and hence must be primitive themselves. This presupposes an atomistic view about thick concepts. More on this issue in section 4.6.

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account. Therefore, a non-cognitivist view is preferred because it can accommodate the motivational problem naturally.

[33] Putnam (1992 [1981], 140-141).

2.2 Separationism

The disputed issue between separationists and non-separationists is the disentangleability of thick concepts. In contrast to non-separationists, separationists state that the disentangling move is possible.
Before the question of disentangleability will be discussed, it is useful to recapitulate the attractiveness of the disentangling manoeuvre which results from its ability to solve an important problem.
The problem of disentangling emerged contemporaneously with non-cognitivist positions becoming popular in metaethics in the middle of the twentieth century. Non-cognitivists state that facts and values are ontologically distinct from each other. While facts are typically held to be 'genuine features of the world'[34], non-cognitivists claim that values are non-cognitive responses to facts. The existence of value facts is denied. Hilary Putnam[35] says that this fact-value dichotomy arose from the Humean doctrine that one cannot derive an 'ought' from an 'is'.[36] Hume observes that non-evaluative and evaluative propositions are often mixed within thoughts about morality:

> In every system of morality, which I have hitherto met with, I have always remark'd, that the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary way of reasoning, and establishes the being of a God, or makes observations concerning human affairs; when of a sudden I am surpriz'd to find, that instead of the usual copulations of propositions, *is*, and *is not*, I meet with no proposition that is not connected with an *ought*, or an *ought not*.[37]

Putnam points out that Hume himself never unambiguously says that one cannot infer an 'ought' from an 'is', but nevertheless this is what is known as Hume's law. In his *Tractatus* Ludwig Wittgenstein takes a similar view: "Der Sinn der Welt muss außerhalb ihrer liegen. In der Welt ist alles wie es ist und geschieht alles wie es geschieht; es gibt *in* ihr keinen Wert – und wenn es ihn gäbe, so hätte er keinen Wert."[38]

[34] McDowell (1981, 144).
[35] Much of what follows is owed to the thoughts in his essay *The Collapse of the Vact/Value Dichotomy*.
[36] Cp. Putnam (2002, 14). For a detailed account on the fact-value dichotomy and its genesis cf. *ibid.*, 7-27.
[37] Hume (2009 [1738], 3.1.1, 302).
[38] Wittgenstein (1989 [1922], 6.41, 170).

Wittgenstein who belonged to the periphery of the so called *Vienna circle* had influence on some particular views of the circle's members. This influence can be observed in the Wittgensteinian interpretation of logical laws as tautologies and mathematical theorems as analytical. Following the Carnapian *criterion of cognitive meaningfulness*, cognitively meaningful sentences must either be empirically verifiable or analytical in the Wittgensteinian sense. As a consequence of this strong criterion, sentences containing ethical or moral content are meaningless.

Since ethical statements were said not to be empirically verifiable and hence not cognitively meaningful statements, (meta-)ethical positions emerged that were compatible with the fact-value dichotomy. Alfred Jules Ayer who is seen to be supportive of a paradigmatic ethical position of the Logical Positivism, constructed a non-cognitivist theory that is in accordance with the fact-value dichotomy. He states that "in so far as statements of value are significant, they are ordinary 'scientific' statements; and that in so far as they are not scientific, they are not in the literal sense significant, but are simply expressions of emotion which can be neither true nor false"[39]. Ayer concludes that value statements are not suitable for truth-value because of the 'pseudo'-concepts they entail.

Although Ayer's emotivism is compatible with both the fact-value distinction and the criterion of cognitive meaningfulness, thick concepts pose another challenge. In *The Collapse of the Face/Value Dichotomy* Putnam claims that the fact-value distinction is challenged through the sort of fact-value entanglement, that can be observed in the use of thick concepts. He uses the bare 'existence' of thick concepts which he says are both normative and descriptive as an argument against defenders of the fact-value dichotomy.[40] And indeed, thick concepts, which are both non-evaluative and evaluative, appear not to fit the fact-value distinction at first sight. An emotivist or any non-cognitivist must find a solution to handle thick concepts while holding on to the fact-value dichotomy. This difficulty, however, can be overcome by performing one of two moves. The first one may be too simple. It says that thick concepts

[39] Ayer (1956 [1936], 102-103).

[40] Cp. Putnam (2002, 34-35). Putnam, like Wiggins, McDowell, Roberts and Kirchin, is a non-separationist. The non-separationist view, that argues against the fact-value distinction, is typically a cognitivist realist view because it assumes value facts (see Section 2.1.3 and 2.1.4).

are plain non-evaluative concepts without evaluative meaning.[41] According to Putnam, this is Hare's response (in the case of rude) and Mackie's (in the case of cruel). The second move is the classical separationist's move. According to separationists, moral concepts are neither exclusively emotive nor evaluative, but they also contain some non-evaluative content which can be entangled from the emotive or evaluative content.[42] Thus, thick concepts contain two components: a non-evaluative and a distinct evaluative component. If this disentangling manoeuvre is possible, then the distinct separation between facts and values can be kept up.
Such two-component analyses can be found in the works of Richard Hare, Charles Stevenson, and Leslie Mackie, but also in writings of current non-cognitivist such as Simon Blackburn, or Allan Gibbard, or even in writings of cognitivists such as Christine Tappolet.[43]

2.2.1 Extensionally Non-Evaluative Equivalence

The extensionally non-evaluative equivalence view holds that for any thick concept there is a non-evaluative concept which is extensionally equivalent to the extension of the thick concept.[44] In the subsequent sections, the extensionally non-evaluative equivalence view will be developed while the arguments of the non-separationists against separationist accounts are reproduced. The extensionally non-evaluative equivalence view is often ascribed to Hare and Stevenson, but as this study will show scepticism is warranted concerning this classification.

[41] Dancy (1995, 264) says that a non-cognitivist is committed to denying the existence of thick concepts. Such a descriptivist view is defended by Brower (1988).
[42] Cp. Croom (2010, 210).
[43] The separationist view is often ascribed to non-cognitivists, but as Elstein & Hurka (2009) point out even cognitivist can be separationsts.
[44] The extension of a concept is the set of all entities to which the concept applies.

2.2.2 Arguments against Separationism

McDowell: The Disentanglement Argument (DA)

John McDowell[45] develops several arguments against the non-cognitivist analysis which supports the fact-value dichotomy. The first one, which will be discussed later on, is called the *uncodifiability argument* and a second one is referred to as the *disentanglement argument* (DA)[46] which he elaborates in a debate with Simon Blackburn about non-cognitivism and rule-following. According to Roberts, McDowell's remarks about the so-called shapelessness of thick concepts form a further argument against non-cognitivism[47] which is referred to as *shapelessness hypothesis*.[48]

The DA is the most significant argument in the literature against the separationist view of thick concepts.[49] It has been similarly repeated by Bernard Williams and Hilary Putnam. The following passage is quoted in the literature as the DA[50]:

> Now it seems reasonable to be sceptical about whether the disentangling manoeuvre here envisaged can always be effected: specifically, about whether, corresponding to any value concept, one can always isolate a genuine feature of the world – by the appropriate standard of genuineness: that is, a feature that is there anyway, independently of anyone's

[45] McDowell was not the first to question the fact-value distinction. But he may be the first one to formulate a proper argument against the fact-value distinction. Before him, Iris Murdoch and Bernard Williams already tried to argue for the entanglement of facts and values.

[46] The term 'disentanglement argument' might be confusing since it is no argument *for* but *against* disentangling.

[47] It is often said in the literature that the DA is presented against non-cognitivism. Since Elstein & Hurka show that cognitivists sometimes also support the reductivist view, it is more correct to comprehend it as an argument against all sorts of reductivist accounts.

[48] The concept *shapelessness* was first used in print by Blackburn (1981, 167).

[49] This argument, according to Elstein & Hurka (2009, 519-520), is popular among non-separationists because it is based upon one premise which is acceptable and compelling, whereas the uncodifiability argument rests on assumptions that themselves are controversial.

[50] Williams (1985, 141-142) puts this as follows: "An insightful observer can indeed come to understand and anticipate the use of the concept without actually sharing the values of the people who use it: this is an important point, and I shall come back to it. But in imaginatively anticipating the use of the concept, the observer also has to grasp imaginatively its evaluative point. He cannot stand quite outside the evaluative interests of the community he is observing, and pick up the concept simply as a device for dividing up in a rather strange way certain neutral features of the world." Equally it is expressed by Putnam (2002, 37-38): "[I]f one did not at any point share the relevant ethical point of view one would never be able to acquire a thick concept, and that sophisticated use of such a concept requires a continuing ability to identify (at least at imagination) with that point of view."

> value experience being as it is – to be that to which competent users of the concept are to be regarded as responding when they use it; that which is left in the world when one peels off the reflection of the appropriate attitude.
>
> Consider, for instance, a specific conception of some moral virtue: the conception current in a reasonably cohesive moral community. If the disentangling manoeuvre is always possible, that implies that the extension of the associated term, as it would be used by someone who belonged to the community, could be mastered independently of the special concerns which, in the community, would show themselves in admiration or emulation of actions seen as falling under the concept. That is: one could know which actions the term would be applied to, so that one would be able to predict applications and withholdings of it in new cases – not merely without oneself sharing the community's admiration (there need be no difficulty about that), but without even embarking on an attempt to make sense of their admiration. That would be an attempt to comprehend their special perspective; whereas, according to the position I am considering, the genuine feature to which the term is applied should be graspable without benefit of understanding the special perspective, since sensitivity to it is singled out as an independent ingredient in a purported explanation of why occupants of the perspective see things as they do. But is it at all plausible that this singling out can always be brought off?[51]

At first, singling out the premisses and the conclusion of the DA in detail is crucial to comprehend the argumentation[52]:

(P1) If non-cognitivism is true, then one can isolate a genuine feature of the world to which a thick concept is corresponding.

(P2) If one can isolate a genuine feature of the world to which a thick concept is corresponding, then an outsider can apply any thick concept correctly without comprehending the special evaluative perspective of an insider.

(P3) There is at least one thick concept that the outsider could not mimic because he or she does not share the evaluative point.

(C) Non-cognitivism is false.

[51] McDowell (1981, 144).

[52] For a slightly different analysis of the DA cf. Blomberg (2007). His analysis of the DA comprises even a further premiss.

(P1) is basend on an auxiliary assumption which says that every two-component analysis must have a 'non-evaluatively determinate two-part form'.[53] This kind of analysis maintains that the non-evaluative content fully determines the extension of the concept, so that one can isolate a genuine feature of the world to which a thick concept is corresponding. If the non-evaluative content of a thick term is fully determined by non-evaluative properties, the term is equivalent to a pure non-evaluative term.[54] For the sake of brevity, this view is called the 'extensionally non-evaluative equivalence' view which was introduced above. For instance, the pejorative Kraut is extensionally equivalent to German. An extensionally non-evaluative equivalist holds that for every thick concept there is such an equivalent non-evaluative concept as in the case of Kraut.

From the second premiss it can be derived, that the evaluative component must be independent from its non-evaluative component in some way; Otherwise the outsider could not learn the thick term, unless he or she shares the evaluative point. Also, McDowell presupposes that a two-component analysis assumes *universalizability*. Else the outsider could not apply a thick term correctly. Universalizability means that any moral situation which has certain non-evaluative features by virtue of which these features are judged to be good (or bad), these features *must* be called good (or bad) in any similar situation. And this *thesis of universalizability*[55] is what McDowell's scepticism about the disentangling manoeuvre is directed at in (P3).[56] Given determinateness and universalizability, the extension of a thick concept is determined by its non-evaluative content and it would be possible for an outsider to master the concept's extension. (C) then follows via modus tollens.[57]

[53] This term is owed to Elstein & Hurka (2009).

[54] According to Williams (1985, 141-142), Hare's prescriptivism assumes that "all the output into its use [the use of thick concepts] is descriptive" and "all the evaluative aspect is output". But if the extension of a thick concept could be governed by its non-evaluative content, then a purely non-evaluative extensionally equivalent concept must be available. Adopting McDowell's view, Williams doubts that such non-evaluative concepts can always be found or produced. Therefore, an outsider needs to share the evaluative point in order to apply a thick concept correctly.

[55] Hare (1963, 139) characterizes universalizability in the following way: "[B]y calling a judgement universalizable I mean only that it logically commits the speaker to making a similar judgement about anything which is either exactly like the subject of the original judgement or like it in the relevant respects." Cf. also Hare (1981, 115).

[56] Roberts (2011, 502) calls the premise in (P3) *Graspability Point*. It says that grasping the extension of a thick term without making any evaluations is implausible.

[57] Elstein & Hurka (2009) say that the conclusion is that the separationist view is false. However, the non-cognitivist is committed to separationism. Ergo, any attack against the

To summarize, the separationist positions that McDowell attacks (these positions must at least accept (P1) and (P2)) share the following assumptions:

(A1) The non-evaluative component of a thick term fully determines its extension.

(A2) The evaluative component is independent from its non-evaluative component.

(A3) The application of a thick term is universalizable.

If one should try to give an analysis which an extensionally non-evaluative equivalist agreed to, it would take the following form:

(S1) x is courageous iff (x is D, where D are genuine and determinate features of the world, $\bigoplus$ admiration towards x, though not necessary).[58]

McDowell doubts that this disentangling is always possible for any thick term. He considers, for instance, moral virtue-terms whose extension is not determined by the non-evaluative meaning given. Since the non-evaluative meaning of virtue-terms such as justice is not fully determined, an outsider could not assimilate the correct application of justice just by observing non-evaluative features. Another counterexample that strengthens (P3) is given by Christine Tappolet:

> Let us suppose that courageous actions are done in spite of danger and involve overcoming fear. Now, it has to be acknowledged that there are behaviours, such as the attempt by someone who can hardly swim to save a child drowning in deep waters, which correspond to this description but which fail to be courageous. Such actions are silly or foolhardy, but not courageous.[59]

Putnam (2002) also argues against disentangling[60] and Hare's two-component approach by applying a similar argument. His main argument is that non-

separationist view is also an attack against non-cognitivism.

[58]The sign $\bigoplus$ indicates that the attitude is not truth-conditional for courageousness. $\bigoplus$ is not logically identical to any logical operator, especially not to the conjunction. If it were logically identical to the conjunction, then one could only call x courageous, if x has certain features *and* one holds x in high esteem. Those two conditions may not necessarily interrelate with each other because both conditions could be true coincidentally but nevertheless, both need to be fulfilled. E. g., a naturalistic position might fulfil these assumptions.

[59]Tappolet (2004, 214).

[60]Putnam uses the term 'factorability'.

cognitivists cannot explain "what the 'descriptive meaning' of, say, 'cruel' is without using the word 'cruel' or a synonym"[61]. Cruel does not simply mean causing deep suffering because, e. g., surgeons caused deep suffering before the invention of anaesthesia. Still, it would be inappropriate to call the surgeons cruel because they did not want to torture the patients willingly. In his book *Reason, Truth and History*, which was published in 1981[62], he also points out that the meaning of thick terms cannot be translated in the language of physics:

> 'X is considerate' (...) [is] also not *translatable* into the language of 'physical theory'. What this means is that, if there *are* two components to the meaning of 'X is considerate', then the only description we can give of the 'factual meaning' of the statement is that it is true if and only if X is *considerate*. And this trivializes the notion of a 'factual component'.[63]

He concludes that the two-components approach collapses because the definiendum already contains the definiens and the definition of considerate is therefore circular. To give it a proper definition, the non-evaluative meaning of considerate would have to be translated into the language of the physical theory. This, however, is impossible and hence it is impossible to specify the non-evaluative meaning of considerate. In the end, the falseness of the two-component approach follows.

McDowell also draws the conclusion that the separationist account of non-cognitivism is false.[64] But his objection is only directed at two-component analyses of extensionally non-evaluative equivalists as in (S1). It is widely held that Hare, Stevenson, and Mackie support such an analysis.[65]

Before discussing the two-component accounts of Hare and Stevenson and examining whether it is true that they stand in for the analysis (S1), further arguments against the separationist (and non-cognitivist) view will be brought forward.

[61] Putnam (2002, 38).

[62] He points out that he criticized the two-component approaches already in *Reason, Truth and History*. Cp. *ibid.*

[63] Putnam (1992 [1981], 205).

[64] The objection that equivalent purely non-evaluative do not always exist, is one of the most popular arguments of the non-separationist. This argument is held also by Williams (1985), Tappolet (2004), and Putnam (1992 [1981]).

[65] McDowell's (1981, 159n6) scepticism is directed at Mackie and Hare. Putnam (1992 [1981], 206-211) attacks Stevenson and Mackie.

McDowell: The Uncodifiability Thesis

The *uncodifiability argument* is McDowell's second argument against disentangling.[66] In *Are Moral Requirements Hypothetical Imperatives?* McDowell argues against Philippa Foot in a debate about moral reasons. According to McDowell, Foot "sometimes seems to suggest that if someone acts in a way he takes to be morally required, and his behaviour cannot be shown to be rational as a case of conformity to an hypothetical imperative, then he must be blindly obeying an inculcated code."[67] McDowell rejects this suggestion by claiming that moral rules cannot be reduced to codified rules.[68] Similarly, in *Virtue and Reasons* McDowell argues against the Socratic thesis that virtue is knowledge. If virtue is knowledge, then the knowledge must have a stateable propositional content, thus virtues must be codifiable. Yet, McDowell rejects this possibility.[69]

The argument of uncodifiability is often transferred to the debate about the thick. Given disentangling, one has to separate a thick concept into a cognitive and a non-cognitive component. Then, those two components should provide the same reasons for action as the entangled thick concept. For instance, A's calling a cake 'delicious' might be more convincing for B to chose the cake over others than A's calling the cake 'contains flour, baking, powder, eggs, sugar, butter and water, you should try it'.[70]

The persuasiveness of this thesis is given different weight: Elijah Millgram concludes that it fails to show what it is meant to show.[71] Elstein & Hurka say that they "do not see how on its own it bears on the thick/thin issue"[72] because a reductivist position is "perfectly consistent" with uncodifiability.[73] Roberts also concedes that a separationist is not necessarily committed to accepting codifiability.[74]

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[66] For a more detailed discussion of the uncodifiability argument cf. Millgram (1995). The discussion in this study is quite brief because it is close to the shapelessness-thesis which is i) more comprehensively discussed and ii) has direct bearing to the debate about the thick.

[67] McDowell (1978, 20).

[68] Cp. *ibid.*, 20-21.

[69] Cp. McDowell (1979, 336).

[70] Cf. Millgram (1995) for a more detailed and more convincing example.

[71] Cp. *ibid.*, 373.

[72] Elstein & Hurka (2009, 517).

[73] *Ibid.*, 518.

[74] Cp. Roberts (2013a, 681).

The Shapelessness Thesis

Suppose for a moment that there is a moral outsider, e. g. an anthropologist, who does not share the community's evaluation of some features in the world.[75] The assumption now is that the outsider cannot predict the application of a thick term because the features or properties to which the term refers cannot be codified in non-evaluative terms, that is, thick concepts are *shapeless with regard to the non-evaluative*. Consequently, even an insider cannot list all the items and properties to which a thick term applies. There is no unifying feature that connects all the items to which the concept employs. And therefore, the outsider cannot apply a thick term correctly without sharing the reactions or attitudes of the community to the corresponding properties. Let us reconsider Tappolets example of courageous. The definition of courageous actions as actions which are done in spite of danger and involve overcoming fear, does not fit in every situation.[76] So, not even this general criterion is a sufficient criterion for an action to be courageous.

The shapelessness hypothesis is vividly discussed in the recent literature by Roberts (2011), Väyrynen (2014), and Kirchin (2010).[77] It roughly states that the extension of evaluative terms is non-evaluatively shapeless.[78] The shapelessness thesis is ascribed to McDowell's thoughts about supervenience, but Blackburn is the first one to use the term *shapelessness* in reaction to McDowell's DA.[79] McDowell is sceptical that "however long a list we give of items to which a supervening term applies, described in terms of the level supervened upon, there may be no way, expressible at the level supervened upon, of grouping just such items together."[80] One has to understand why things are grouped together and for understanding why things are called courageous it is not enough to understand the supervened level (in the case of courageous, this means features which make an action courageous). Thick terms are

[75] For the later see, for example, the anthropologist in Gibbard (1992) and the case of 'gopa'.

[76] Cp. Tappolet (2004, 214).

[77] The focus of our investigation will not be on Kirchin because he focuses mainly on the simplest version (S1) which is already refuted by the DA as was shown above. Kirchin (2010, 22) considers other versions of non-cognitivist positions just briefly. And theses remarks do not help to advance this discussion.

[78] This characterization is neutral in relation to realist and anti-realist positions. A realist version of the shapelessness thesis is also that evaluative properties cannot be reduced to non-evaluative properties.

[79] Cp. Blackburn (1981, 167).

[80] McDowell (1981, 145).

only shapeful with respect to the evaluative but shapeless with respect to the non-evaluative. According to Kirchin, the list of kind things could continue "indefinitely". He uses the term 'outrunning' to indicate that there can be "an infinite number of ways in which actions get to be kind"[81].
Väyrynen indicates that there are at least two ways of reading the shapelessness thesis. One reading of the thesis is "that no such non-evaluative classifications are built into the meanings of evaluative terms or concepts". A second reading says "that evaluative terms and concepts have no non-evaluative shapes at all"[82]. McDowell's thesis supports the former reading. According to Väyrynen, the latter reading is appropriate, "if the relevant notion of understanding an evaluative term requires not merely grasping its sense but also some further not merely conceptual competence"[83]. He continues that the former fails to threaten non-cognitivism because non-cognitivists need not claim that the connection between the evaluative and the non-evaluative is conceptually or semantically fixed.[84] The connection could be pragmatic, as in Blackburn's or his own view. Therefore, Väyrynen suggests the following definition:

(ST) The extensions of evaluative terms and concepts aren't unified under independently intelligible non-evaluative relations of real similarity, not even as a synthetic *a posteriori* matter that isn't settled by the meanings of evaluative terms or concepts.[85]

Roberts distinguishes the graspability point strictly from the shapelessness hypothesis. According to her, even if a separationist (reductivist) can support an analysis which is compatible with graspability, this analysis is still incompatible with shapelessness. She says that an evaluative concept is shapeless, if there is no unifying feature or real resemblance, and concludes:

> If evaluative concepts are nonevaluatively shapeless, then that unifying feature or real resemblance is not nonevaluative: it is simply that we lack a term for the nonevaluative feature of the world that we were nonetheless sensitive to in applying our evaluative concept – it is not there. Evaluative concepts are nonevaluatively shapeless, if McDowell is correct, because the commonality that unifies instances across a range

[81] Kirchin (2010, 13).
[82] Väyrynen (2014, 575).
[83] *Ibid.*
[84] Cp. *ibid.*
[85] *Ibid.*, 576.

> of cases of the concept's correct application is evaluative.[86]

So, Roberts supports the second reading of the shapelessness thesis that evaluative terms have no non-evaluative shape at all because the unifying instance is the evaluative commonality. Whether kind applies is independent from the object having certain non-evaluative properties.[87] Whereas graspability poses a problem for any outsider who does not share the evaluative view of the insiders, shapelessness poses also a problem for insiders.

Though the shapelessness thesis is commonly accepted, there are at least two critical points which are worth considering.[88] Firstly, the thesis is an argument against certain kinds of separationist accounts. But this does not mean that it is an argument *for* non-separationism. Blackburn admits that it is no surprise that a unifying feature for valued things – for example all the comic things – cannot be found. But, nevertheless, he sees the shapelessness of thick terms not solely as a problem for a projective theory and he questions why the shapelessness should be only a problem for non-cognitivism:

> Do we really support a realist theory of the comic by pointing out the complexity and shapeless nature of the class of things we laugh at? On the contrary, there is no reason to expect our reactions to the world simply to fall into patterns which we or anyone else can describe. So the plight of the outsider affords no argument against a Humean theory.[89]

Secondly, and this is the major objection, the thesis is given too much weight in the debate about thick concepts, especially since *most* concepts are somehow shapeless, or undefinable.[90] So, shapelessness might not be a particular problem of the thick. If this objection should turn out to be correct, (ST) has no argumentative force in showing that non-separationism is true. This second objection will be elaborated in detail in chapter 4 of this study.

2.2.3 Conclusion

So far there have been three distinct but interconnected arguments against separationism: The *disentanglement*, the *uncodifiability*, and the *shapelessness*

[86] Roberts (2011, 505).
[87] Cp. Roberts (2011, 508).
[88] Besides from the fact that the truth of the thesis has never been properly proven and will perhaps never been proven. Cp. Kirchin (2010, 10).
[89] Blackburn (1981, 167).
[90] This objection is also made in Millgram (1995, 367) and Väyrynen (2014, 588).

argument. McDowell's disentanglement argument criticizes the two-component approach in the simplest form (S1) and it is convincing and its demur should be accepted. (S1) maintains that the extension of a thick concept is fully determined by its non-evaluative content. The DA objects that it is not always possible to produce an equivalent non-evaluative concept with the same extension. If this was possible, an outsider could grasp the meaning of any thick concept without sharing the evaluative point. Therefore, DA appears to succeed against (S1). The argumentative force of the uncodifiability thesis concerning thick concepts has been questioned, and it is also doubtful whether the shapelessness thesis, even if it is true, is supportive of non-separationism. In the next section, Stevenson's two-component analysis and Hare's prescriptivist account of the thick will be discussed. Further, the question will be clarified whether their analyses equal (S1). If this will turn out to be true, then their analyses will equally be defeated by the DA. In addition, it will be suggested that any account stating that the evaluation is part of the content of a thick concept cannot also hold that its non-evaluative content drives the extension of a thick concept. If a thick concept has the same extension like its purely non-evaluative equivalent, then the thick concept itself cannot be evaluative any more. This would show that the DA is no threat to any non-cognitivist view of the thick as it is often maintained.

2.2.4 Classical Two-Component-Analyses

Charles L. Stevenson

In his book *Ethics and Language* (1944), Stevenson holds that thick terms[91] can be disentangled into two meaning components: non-evaluative and emotive. There are signs and words that have both kinds of meaning and "may at once have a disposition to affect feelings or attitudes and a disposition to affect cognition"[92]. The emotive and non-evaluative meaning components are interrelated and not two isolated elements. Emotive and non-evaluative meaning "are distinguishable aspects of a total situation, not 'parts' of it that can be studied in isolation"[93]. The emotive meaning is dependent from the

[91] Stevenson (1960 [1944], 71) speaks of signs that have both 'emotive' and 'descriptive' meaning, instead of labelling such signs 'thick concepts'.

[92] *Ibid.*

[93] *Ibid.*, 76. Elsewhere (p. 210) he says that value terms "involve a wedding of descriptive and emotive meaning".

non-evaluative meaning because "a word acquires a laudatory emotive meaning partly because it refers, *via* its descriptive meaning, to something which people favour"[94]. According to Stevenson, a word has emotive meaning in virtue of its non-evaluative meaning. This means that Stevenson strictly rejects the assumption (A2) (see ch. 2.2.2). The non-evaluative meaning can be altered through *persuasive definition*.[95] A redefinition of some ethical concepts is possible because they are vague.[96] Although he concedes the vagueness of language, he maintains that "meaning *must not vary* in a bewildering way" and that "some variation must of course be allowed, else we shall end with a fictitious entity, serene and thoroughly useless amid the complexities of actual practice".[97]

Besides from the non-evaluative meaning, the emotive meaning of a thick concept can vary, as well. "Democracy"[98] – for example – is appreciated by most Americans but the emotive meaning is not fixed because the emotive meaning of democracy may vary to at least some degree:

> Suppose, for example, that a group of people should come to disapprove of certain aspects of democracy, but continue to approve of other aspects of it. They might leave the descriptive meaning of 'democracy' unchanged, and gradually let it acquire, for their usage, a much less laudatory emotive meaning. On the other hand, they might keep the strong laudatory meaning unchanged, and let 'democracy' acquire a descriptive sense which made reference only to those aspects of democracy (in the older sense) which they favoured.[99]

Stevenson also gives an explicit analysis of value concepts, the so-called *second pattern of analysis* denoted (S2):

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[94] *Ibid.*, 71-72.

[95] Cp. *ibid.*, IX: 2.

[96] Stevenson (*ibid.*, IX: 1) explicitly calls value terms vague.

[97] *Ibid.*, 43.

[98] democracy may not be a typical thick concepts. But Stevenson's analysis of the second pattern is for concepts like sportmanship, genius, beauty, selfishness, or hypocrisy which are partly mentioned as typical thick concepts.

[99] *Ibid.*, 72.

(S2) 'This is good' has the meaning of 'This has qualities or relations X, Y, Z . . .,' except that 'good' has as well a laudatory emotive meaning which permits it to express the speaker's approval, and tends to evoke the approval of the hearer.[100]

He points out that this pattern is not a definition of good, but only a formal schema, whose variables have to be replaced by ordinary words.[101] His aim is not to specify the words with which the variables should be replaced (that would be the aim of an applied ethical theory). But nevertheless he says that there are "certain boundaries (. . .) between which descriptive meanings of 'good' may be expected to fluctuate, and beyond which they are unlikely to extend"[102]. What is important here is that – even if the boundaries are vague and shadowy – they in some kind are available. With reference to determination, Stevenson supports the claim that thick concepts are undetermined and he even refuses to accept (A1). Hence, the DA does not violate his account.

Richard Hare

As has already been mentioned, Hare's two-component account is also explicitly attacked by McDowell and Williams.[103] Therefore, his account of thin and thick concepts should be investigated to find a response to the question, if this attack is justified. It will be suggested that McDowell's picture of a non-cognitivist's two component analysis does not fit Hare's conception.
In his *The Language of Morals* (1952) Hare scrutinizes if value-words can be taught in the same way as purely non-evaluative words. If someone wanted to teach a foreign philosopher the meaning of red, he or she could show him a lot of red things and declare that they are red. In the next step the foreigner could be shown identical things in different colours, e. g. green and red tomatoes, and the teacher could tell him, 'This is *red*; That isn't *red*', and so on. Could

[100]Stevenson (1960 [1944], 207).
[101]He calls those terms, for which the pattern holds, persuasive definitions because one can be persuaded to believe one definition of good or another.
[102]Stevenson (1960 [1944], 208).
[103]Williams does not criticise Hare for his two-component approach, but also for his prescriptivism. Williams holds that thick concepts are both world-guided and action-guiding, whereas Hare's prescriptivist account holds that thick concepts contain a non-evaluative and a prescriptive element. Williams dislikes the role of the prescriptive element in Hare's account. He criticizes it for being action-prescribing instead of action-guiding (telling someone to do something is not having a reason to do something). Cp. Williams (1985, 124-125; 130; 141).

the same procedure also work for the thin concept good?[104] Hare remarks that a foreigner might not be able to call a tennis racket 'good', even if he or she has been taught the criteria of a good chronometer. But anyone familiar with the evaluative meaning of good is able to apply good to new classes of things without knowing its criteria of application. Whereas it is sufficient to know the application criteria of red to fully grasp its meaning, this is different in the case of good:

> Suppose that someone starts collecting cacti for the first time and puts one on his mantel-piece – the only cactus in the country. Suppose then that a friend sees it, and says 'I must have one of those'; so he sends for one from wherever they grow, and puts it on his mantel-piece, and when his friend comes in, he says 'I've got a better cactus than yours'. But how does he know how to apply the word in this way? He has never learnt to apply 'good' to cacti; he does not even know any *criteria* for telling a good cactus from a bad one (for as yet there are non); but he has learnt to use the word 'good', and having learnt that, he can apply it to any class of objects that he requires to place in order of merit.[105]

good can be applied to cacti because of its evaluative, or prescriptive meaning.[106] The non-evaluative meaning of good cannot be taught in general, only from case to case[107], and it is only secondary to the evaluative meaning because the evaluative meaning is constant for every entity to which good is applied. However, a motor-car or a strawberry are recommended for different reasons because the non-evaluative meaning of good is variable with regard to different contexts, and even a competent user of good must permanently learn to apply it in new situations.[108]

The non-separationists imply that the non-cognitivists hold that an outsider – or in our case the foreign philosopher – could learn to apply thick concepts correctly by being shown genuine features of the world. At least in the case of good, this thesis is obviously wrong concerning Hare's account.[109]

[104] Hare calls good a value-word. Taking thin concepts in consideration is important because some philosophers hold that there are no thin concepts and even good is at least a bit thick.

[105] Hare (1961 [1952], 96-97).

[106] Hare (1963, 27) explains why he uses the term 'evaluative meaning' first and only later speaks of 'prescriptive meaning'.

[107] Cp. Hare (1961 [1952], 6.2: 95-98).

[108] Cp. Hare (1963, 7.4: 118-121).

[109] Further evidence is given in 7.2: Hare supposes that there is a non-evaluative word that has purely informational, but not commendatory function. Let us suppose that such a

So far only thin concepts have been discussed. It has been shown that thin concepts are not vulnerable to the DA. So let us focus on thick concepts. Hare could still be reproached for having the opinion that an outsider could learn a thick concept without sharing the evaluative point.

Hare makes some remarks about the thick concepts tidy and industrious[110], and honest and courageous[111]. On the contrary to thin concepts, the evaluative meaning is only secondary and the non-evaluative meaning is primary[112] which means that the non-evaluative meaning is constant and the emotive meaning can vary: "[T]he standard to which the word appeals has become conventional"[113]. This suggests that the non-evaluative meaning of thick terms is determinate and that Hare accepts (A1).[114]

In *Sorting Out Ethics* (1997), Hare directly addresses the DA and the objection that one cannot apply a thick term correctly without sharing the evaluative point:

> It is often said that if we had just the descriptive meaning of 'kind' we might, indeed, be able to recognize examples of kind people in the existing descriptive sense of the word, but would be unable to extend or extrapolate its use to new and perhaps slightly different examples. This seems to me to be simply false. Suppose that I (...) can recognize the qualities that people call kind and esteem, but do not myself esteem them. And suppose that some new example is produced of a person who does not have *exactly* those qualities, but has qualities very like them,

word exists in the case of good. This new word, which has only non-evaluative meaning, is baptised doog. According to Hare, the understanding and use of doog can be learned just like 'ordinary' non-evaluative words by means of examples for the application of doog. So, by being shown examples of *doog* or *dab* motor-cars, someone could learn the meaning of doog and dab motor-cars. But as has been shown this is not possible in the case of good. Therefore, doog and good must have different meanings. Cp. Hare (1961 [1952], 116-117).

[110] *Ibid.*, 121.

[111] Hare (1963, 24).

[112] Cp. Hare (1961 [1952], 121).

[113] *Ibid.*

[114] This appears also to be suggested, when Hare says that the meaning of kind is to commend someone according to a certain standard. He adds: "The truth conditions of statements containing the word [kind] are fairly well known, although admittedly not precise." (1997, 60). In *The Language of Morals* Hare says that both non-evaluative concepts such as red and value-concepts such as good might be non-evaluatively loose, "according to how rigidly the criteria have been laid down by custom or convention". Yet, the exactness or looseness is no specific characteristic of value-words. However – he thinks that "the standard of goodness, like the meaning of red, is normally something which is public and commonly accepted" (1961 [1952], 114-115). The sentence 'A is a good motor-car' provides informative knowledge only if the criteria for the application of good are known.

> so that people who *do* esteem them are likely to esteem that person too, and call him kind. I can see no difficulty in my predicting that this is what they will do. In order to make this prediction I do not myself have to esteem the qualities or the person; I only have to be confident that *they* will. I find it surprising that people should rely on this very weak argument.[115]

Hare simply does not share the assumption that the correct evaluative perspective is necessary to come to reliable applications of thick terms. He even seems to accept (A2).[116]
Hare accepts (A3) as well because he presupposes universalizability. The DA appears to disprove Hare's two-component approach.[117]
Yet, the next section will argue that Hare could be read divergently and that some of his passages even support this kind of reading.

The Classical Approaches, Disentanglement, and Shapelessness

Hare certainly accepts (A1) and (A3), and the quoted section above suggests that he accepts (A2), too. Even if Hare himself does not offer an analysis of thick concepts, the following analysis which is similar to the analysis given by Roberts (2011) and Blomberg (2007) is likely to fit his theory:[118]

(S3) x is honest iff x is D and is good in virtue of being D, in which D is some determinate set of non-evaluative properties.[119]

This analysis suggests that the application of a thick term is only correct, if the speaker has knowledge of all non-evaluative properties of honest *and* takes the relevant evaluative perspective. The knowledge of the non-evaluative meaning

[115] Hare (1997, 61).
[116] Blomberg (2007, 72) concludes that Hare does not understand McDowell's objection.
[117] This conclusion is often drawn in the literature. Cf. Elstein & Hurka (2009, 520) or Roberts (2011, 501).
[118] An even more simple analysis could be imaged which is merely conjunctive. But in spite of the fact that Hare has no adequate formalization himself, it becomes clear from his remarks about the thick concepts tidy and industrious that his analysis is not merely conjunctive, but that actions are evaluated in virtue of having certain properties. Williams offers a second analysis ("this act is such-and-such a character, and acts of that character one ought not to do.") to strengthen the prescriptivist aspect. Cp. Williams (1985, 130).
[119] This is the simplest form of a separationist analysis. Christine Tappolet suggests an even more simple version: "x is courageous iff x is F and x is good (pro tanto)", but she rejects this analysis because something can only be good (pro tanto) in virtue of being F. Cp. Tappolet (2004, 214), Roberts (2011, 497-498), and Elstein & Hurka (2009, 518).

is not necessary *and* sufficient, in order to say that the application of kind is correct. The evaluative component is part of the truth-conditions. This reading is at least partly suggested by Hare. In his later book *Sorting out Ethics* Hare claims that the evaluative meaning of kind can be disentangled from the non-evaluative:

> Suppose now that someone gives much of his money to relieve distress. Nearly all of us would say that such a person was kind. But there might be someone who thought that it was not a characteristic of a good person to do this. This person could agree that someone did this (namely gave much of his money to relieve distress), but might *condemn* his doing this. He would then not be able to use 'kind' as a term of commendation. But he might well be able to recognize the sort of people that the others called kind. So he would know well the descriptive meaning they attached to the word. But he would not use it, because it carried an evaluative meaning to which he could not subscribe.[120]

The kind-objector cannot call the person who gives much of his money to relieve distress 'kind' because otherwise he or she could not express her disagreement in attitude.[121] So, even if an outsider might be able to go on from one application to another by guessing (and almost always being right), the evaluative element – although it is only secondary – is of fundamental importance for thick terms. In literal usage, a thick term cannot be uttered without expressing its evaluative point. Hence there must be a difference between making a prediction about the application and applying a term correctly or, respectively, understanding the concept. So, it would not be a proper application, if the outsider applies the term, but does not know or share its evaluative point.[122] According to Dancy, "to reject a concept one has to do more than fail to see its point; one has to know what its point is and reject it for that reason"[123]. Why not say the same about the correct application of a thick term?
In (S3) each side implies the other. Thus, the evaluative meaning is, neces-

[120]Hare (1997, 60).
[121]In *Freedom and Reason* Hare (1963, 187-189) also states that one has to give up using courageous (or at least to use it in inverted commas), if the referring acts are not willingly evaluated. courageous is a term of recommendation.
[122]Blackburn (1981, 166) is also expressing his scepticism about the thesis that a non-cognitivist is committed to holding that an outsider can predict the application of a thick concept in new cases without understanding the evaluative reaction.
[123]Dancy (1995, 269).

sarily, part of the meaning of honest. An outsider who is not aware of the implicated evaluation might be able to apply the concept to a correct set of properties and he or she might even predict its application to new cases, but the concept would still be non-evaluative to the outsider. Although honest and honest*[124] are *extensionally equivalent*, it should be clear that the *meaning* of honest is, according to (S3), different from the meaning of honest* because the evaluation is part of the truth-conditional content of honest. To really apply a concept correctly, the speaker must know its meaning and, subsequently, its evaluative perspective.[125] Therefore, it is conceivable that Hare would agree that the evaluative element is much more dependent on the non-evaluative because it is part of the thick concept's meaning. Consequently, (A2) must be wrong and the claim of the DA does not succeed.

Alexander Miller makes a similar point in reference to the Fregean distinction between sense and reference. He writes that "the non-cognitivist can concede that for the evaluative predicate E there is no non-evaluative predicate E* with the same sense as E, such that mastery of the sense of E* (*ex hypothesi* available to an outsider) will confer mastery of the sense of E"[126]. Further, he continues, "[b]ut he [the non-cognitivist] can point out that it is possible for E and E* to denote the same kind (property, function, extension) even though they are non-equivalent in sense."[127]

To conclude: Classical approaches are not necessarily defeated by the DA. But Hare's account which holds (A1) cannot avoid the force of the shapelessness thesis, whereas Stevenson's approach even avoids it by postulating vagueness-ness with regard to the non-evaluative content.

2.2.5 Current Separationist Approaches To The Thick

The thoughts in the preceding section have suggested that a two-component analyst is not necessarily committed to holding that the non-evaluative component of a thick concept must have the same extension as the thick concept. Instead, it could be claimed that the non-evaluative component only partly

[124] honest* denotes the non-evaluative counterpart of honest.

[125] Even Roberts concedes that Hare has never maintained that evaluation does not determine the extension for thick concepts at all. Cp. Roberts (2013a, 5).

[126] Miller (2003, 251).

[127] *Ibid.*

determines the extension of the concept.[128] So, there must not only be some specific non-evaluative features, but it must also be judged as being good in virtue of having these non-evaluative features to fall under a thick concept.[129] A separationist account must give up (A1) and (A2) to avoid the disentanglement argument and the shapelessness thesis, but it may still hold (A3).
Stephan Burton even gives up (A3) by denying universalizability. Answering McDowell's and Williams' objections against disentangling, Burton interprets thick concepts as "basically *evaluations* with added descriptive *qualifications*"[130], instead of non-evaluative with added evaluative meaning. He suggests the following analysis:

(S4) 'x is F' means '(pro tanto) good/bad in virtue of some particular instance of X, Y, Z, etc.'[131]

Whether x is F cannot be codified with respect to the non-evaluative because only *some particular* instances of X, Y, and Z are F. Burton rejects the shapefulness of the thick, and also universalizability because being X, Y, and Z is not sufficient to be F. Even most realizations of X, Y, and Z are not F. He concludes:

> In sum, this analysis of thick evaluative concepts maintains a strict distinction between description and evaluation while allowing for the fact that one may not be able correctly to apply such concepts by means of purely descriptive criteria alone.[132]

If an item has features X, Y, and Z, this item is not necessarily F. Only if the item falls under a thick concept, then it has some of the features X, Y, and Z.
In contrast to Burton, Elstein & Hurka give up (A1) and (A2), but keep up universalizability.[133] They accept the key premise of the DA that the extension

[128] Gibbard (1992, 269-270) emphasizes this point by saying that a thick concept is partly determined by its properties and partly by ways things feel. Blackburn (2013, 122) offers a concise example how to understand what it means that the evaluative partly determines the extension of a thick concept: "So, for instance, you do not call someone 'pig-headed' unless you wish to imply a criticism of them, and this fact goes some way into determining who is so-called."
[129] Cp. Roberts (2011, 498) and Tappolet (2004, 214-215).
[130] Burton (1992, 30).
[131] *Ibid.*, 31.
[132] *Ibid.*
[133] They say that any non-cognitivist is committed to separationism (reductionism), but that separationists may also be cognitivists (e. g. Sidgewick and Moore). Their account

of a thick concept cannot be determined without making some evaluations[134]. They assume universalizability[135], but deny that it is possible to name an exact and finite set of properties in virtue of which these properties fall under a thick concept. Assuming some kind of continuum, they hold that thin concepts, which are indeterminate regarding their non-evaluative properties, are at the one extreme and that fully non-evaluatively determinate concepts (e. g. pejoratives) are at the other extreme. Thick concepts are somewhere in between because they assume that the non-evaluative component of thick concepts "only specifies good- or right-making properties to some degree but not completely"[136]. The analysis only puts restrictions on the extension of the non-evaluative properties. So it is possible to claim that the use of a thick concept that is associated with properties outside a specific area is a misuse of the concept.

In their paper, they develop two patterns of a reductive analyses of thick concepts. Their first analysis is the following:

(S5.1) 'x is distributively just' means[137] 'x is good, and there are properties X, Y, and Z (not specified) of general type A (specified), such that x has X, Y, and Z, and X, Y, and Z make anything that has them good.'[138]

This analysis escapes the DA because evaluating judges are required to determine which unspecified properties X, Y, and Z of type A are the good-making properties that determine the extension of the thick concept completely.[139] And therefore, it would be impossible for an outsider to imitate the use of a thick concept without sharing the evaluative point because (S5.1) excludes that it is ever possible to give a non-evaluatively equivalent term to the non-evaluative properties.

As an illustration of this analysis, Elstein & Hurka discuss the concept just. A defender of the analysis (S3), who is committed to holding a fully determinate two-component analysis, must say that a desert-theorist and an egalitarian use different concepts, and therefore, cannot have a genuine disagreement because

is neutral, that is, is may be held by cognitivits as well as non-cognitivists. Cp. Elstein & Hurka (2009, 517).

[134] Cp. *ibid.*, 519-520.

[135] Cp. *ibid.*, 521.

[136] *Ibid.*

[137] Roberts (2011, 501) equate 'means' with the biconditional 'if and only if'.

[138] Elstein & Hurka (2009, 521).

[139] Cp. *ibid.*

they talk past each other. Elstein & Hurka want to avoid that consequence. In their analysis both the desert-theorist and the egalitarian make use of the same concept, but they disagree about the application of that concept. The egalitarian and the desert-theorist disagree about the good-making properties of distributions. In order to specify these properties of distributions and to know the actual extension of the term, "we must know which properties in fact make distributions good"[140]. Since their account is supposed to be impartial concerning non-cognitivism and cognitivism, they avoid to substantiate this assumption.

The first pattern can be used for many thick concepts, but not all can be analysed in this way. For virtue-concepts such as courageous and kindly, which are central in the debate about disentangling, no two-part analysis is available: A three-part analysis is needed. Contrary to the first pattern, which involves a global evaluation, that is, an evaluation which governs the whole concept, the second pattern involves an embedded evaluation that is embedded within the 'non-evaluative' content. This second analysis is the following:

(S5.2) 'x is courageous' means 'x is good, and x involves an agent accepting harm or the risk of harm for himself for the sake of *goods* greater than the evil of that harm, where this property makes any act that has it good.'[141]

In this pattern, the global evaluation 'x is good' is supplemented with the embedded evaluation in the second conjunct. Elstein & Hurka state that "we cannot determine the extension of the thick concept without determining the extension of the embedded thin one, that is, without making some evaluations"[142]. So, in the case of courageous, one has to know what to count as 'good goals', in order to specify the definition. They admit, however, that there can be disagreement about the good goals as well.

An opponent might protest that there are no or only few thick concepts that have an analysis as in the first pattern and that there are no non-evaluative properties that can be inserted in the placeholders. [143] According to Kirchin, honest may be defined as 'providing information to others in a way that allows them to know or achieve what one thinks they wish to know or achieve'. Here, allow is itself evaluative in some way. So, the thickness goes all the way

[140] Elstein & Hurka (2009, 522).
[141] *Ibid.*, 526.
[142] *Ibid.*
[143] This point is made by Harcourt & Thomas (2013, 32).

down.[144]

Comparing the analysis of courageous given by Elstein & Hurka with the analysis given by Tappolet, the man, who wants to save the child from drowning, though he cannot swim, is not courageous because the goods are not greater than the harm. Thus, the analysis of Elstein & Hurka appears convincing in many cases.

Critique on Elstein & Hurka's Account

It is commonly accepted that the analyses (S4) and (S5) escape the DA because the non-evaluative content only partly determines the extension of the concept, whereas it is much more difficult to decide whether these approaches also escape the shapelessness thesis. Roberts (2011) holds that if irreductionism (non-separationism) is true, then thick concepts are shapeless. This does not exclude the possibility that separationism could be true, even if shapelessness was true. So, at least according to Roberts, the shapelessness-thesis does not necessarily defeat separationism. But Roberts seems to want to imply that Elstein & Hurka's account is false because of the shapelessness of thick concepts.[145] Indeed, Elstein & Hurka's analysis does not presuppose that thick concepts are shapeful because the good- or bad-making properties are unspecified properties of some specified sort. This specified sort is very general, it only restricts the extension of the thick concept. Besides, Roberts herself maintains:

> If thick concepts are irreducibly thick, however, this is nonetheless consistent with there being some rough but not extensionally equivalent purely nonevaluative characterization of the sort of things the concept applies to. (...) The defender of irreducible thickness could thus say 'x is tactful if x is of nonevaluative sort T,' where 'T' means 'having something to do with having or showing concern for other feelings.'[146]

So, at least a rough characterisation is available. Being of sort 'T', in this formula, is even sufficient for being tactful. But, as she points out, something can be of sort 'T' and, nevertheless, not be tactful because it also depends on evaluation.[147] Roberts' and Elstein & Hurka's analyses appear not to be much

[144] Cp. Kirchin (2013, 74).
[145] Cp. Roberts (2011, 507-508).
[146] *Ibid.*, 508.
[147] Roberts emphasizes that in some cases not even a rough characterisation must be available. That would mean that not every thick concept is shapeless, only those, for which no

different from each other – with regard to the restriction of the thick concept's extension. At least, there seems to be no big difference in stating that one can only give a 'rough characterisation' or that one can give a 'specified characterisation that needs to be supplemented by further features to give it a more concrete analysis'.
Either Roberts must concede that such a rough characterization cannot be given[148] or else she has to drop the thesis that the shapelessness-thesis threatens the analysis of Elstein & Hurka.
Dancy is also aware of this problem. He asks, "how can we have description without descriptive meaning?", and adds "[t]his seems an almost insoluble puzzle"[149]. His answer is that the domain of the application of a thick concept can be specified, but this specification is not the non-evaluative meaning of the thick concept: "Locating a thick concept by specifying the domain of its operation is different from giving even a vague specification of its content."[150]
This seems to imply that Dancy proposes that thick concepts do not have semantic structure. This, however, has difficult consequential claims which are hard to defend as will be shown in section 5.6.

2.2.6 The Evaluative Element

Comparing the list of theoretical requirements from the introduction with the knowledge gained in this section, there are still some open questions concerning separationism. First, it must be noticed that the specification of the evaluative element depends on the metaethical theory that the respective proponents of the theory favour. Exempli gratia, the evaluative element in Hare's theory is not purely evaluative, but rather prescriptive, whereas the evaluative element in Elstein & Hurka's analyses is literally evaluative because it can be reduced to good and bad. Expressivists such as Allan Gibbard and Simon Blackburn, however, say that thick judgements are informative because of their non-evaluative component, but also express attitudes (Blackburn), or warranted feelings (Gibbard). Expressing an attitude or a feeling includes an evaluation because if someone expresses his or her attitude or feelings, then a pro- or con point

rough characterisation is available.
[148] Christine Tappolet (2004, 215), e. g., doubts that all instances of a thick concept fall under a specification, whatever that rough specification is.
[149] Dancy (1995, 276-277).
[150] *Ibid.*, 277. Cf. also Dancy (2015, 46-47).

is also conveyed. Thus, both the expressivist's assumption that thick judgements express an attitude or a feeling, and the prescriptivist's supposition that thick judgements are action-guiding are stronger assumptions than that thick judgements convey bare evaluations. This assumption is stronger because a thick judgement could convey an evaluation, even if the speaker does not have the corresponding attitude or feeling, or if the speaker's own judgement does not motivate him or her to act respectively. This difference is not sufficiently emphasised in the debate, although it has severe consequences. To say that the evaluative element has prescriptive character is a way stronger assumption than to say that it is solely evaluative and reducible to some thin concepts. If the evaluative element is said to be prescriptive, a robust link to action-guidingness is assumed. A prescriptivist account must explain how judgements such as *Football is brutal, but I don't mean to imply that you should stop playing it* seems acceptable, although this suggests that the link between a thick judgement and action-guidingness is not as robust as prescriptivism might suggest.

Another open question is how separationist accounts deal with evaluative flexibility, although Kirchin holds that evaluative flexibility is less a problem for separationists than for non-separationists because the thin concept is easily added to the non-evaluative.[151] Yet, this does not explain in a satisfactory way in which contexts or circumstances a pro- or con-evaluation should be added. Further, not much is said about objectionable concepts. One way to accommodate them is to claim that they are evaluative, thus convey a pro- or con point, but someone who objects against the evaluative point cannot use them for this reason.[152]

[151] Cp. Kirchin (2013, 13).

[152] This strategy is for instance adopted by Gibbard (1992, 279), or as outlined above also by Hare (1997, 60).

Chapter 3

Pragmatic Views

The main interest of semantic views are questions about reference. Pragmatic views are interested in the linguistic use of value concepts, however, less attention is devoted to questions concerning reference. In contrast to semantic views, pragmatic views are not prevalent in the debate about the thick, although in recent years there have been a few attempts to establish pragmatic hybrid-expressivist accounts.[1] Pragmatic views hold that the evaluation conveyed by an utterance containing a thick concept is only pragmatically linked to the semantic content. Hence, it is concluded that thick concepts are not that important for an ethical theory as is often maintained.[2] The connection between thick concepts and evaluation consists in mimics or gestures, according to Blackburn, and it consists in conversational mechanisms, according to Väyrynen. The motivation for a pragmatic account is based on evaluative flexibility which pragmatic theories can easily accommodate.

3.1 'There are no Thick Concepts'-View

In *Through Thick and Thin* Simon Blackburn holds that it depends on the context whether a thick concept expresses a positive, a neutral, or even a negative attitude: "We can easily hear any of these terms, except perhaps 'good sense' negatively."[3] He points out that there are only few lexical conventions of the standard attitude which we typically connect with a certain thick concept

[1] Chapter 6 will deal in more detail with these accounts.
[2] Cp. Blackburn (1992, 285) and Väyrynen (2013, 2-3).
[3] Blackburn (1992, 286).

and that evaluation must not be part of its meaning.[4] Vice versa 'neutral' concepts different from thick concepts can be used to express condemnation or praise. If the speaker expresses an attitude depends on "pitch, length and loudness of parts of an utterance" which "subserve difference of stress, accent and rhythm"[5]. He illustrates this thesis with the following example:

> Suppose, for instance, that the word 'gross' is correctly entered in the dictionary as applied to fat people and derog.. The fattist can get by without it, by using the word 'fat' instead, with the right kind of sneery tone.[6]

The 'fattist' (someone who dislikes fat people) can use the neutral term 'fat' with a sneer.[7] The evaluative meaning of the concepts can be changed by intonation. The attitude expressed by a thick concept can therefore not be codified because the attitude is not part of the dictionary meaning.[8]
As Blackburn is an expressivist, his account of the thick is expressivist in spirit. In chapter 2.2.6 attention was caught of the difference between evaluation and attitude. Blackburn does not seem to distinguish evaluating from having an attitude.[9] He mixes 'good/bad' with 'condemnation/praisal'.
Further, Blackburn points out that "dictionaries typically have no term signalling a convention of approval"[10] concerning thick concepts. Thus, his account is not about evaluation, but about the attitude which are commonly connected with the use of thick concepts. But, to evaluate something positively/negatively does not presuppose to have a certain attitude. Actions might be called 'cruel', 'just', or 'fair' without sincerely meaning it. As a typical example, consider a wife asking her husband whether he likes her new dress. The husband really dislikes the colour, but does not want to upset his wife. Therefore, he calls her dress 'beautiful'. The husband might even say this with enthusiasm in his voice, so that his wife beliefs him. By calling her dress beautiful he evaluates it positively without having a praiseful attitude.

[4] He refers to Kant who has shown that virtues such as courage or temperance can turn to bad. Cp. Blackburn (1992, 287).
[5] *Ibid.*, 287-288.
[6] *Ibid.*, 290.
[7] Blackburn denotes this with 'fat↓'.
[8] Cp. *ibid.*, 287.
[9] It could even be claimed that evaluation and the having of an attitude are often mixed in the whole debate about the thick. Dancy speaks about evaluating in one breath along with having an attitude throughout his paper. Cp. Dancy (1995).
[10] Blackburn (1992, 286).

So, one might agree with Blackburn that attitudes are not lexically signalled concerning thick concepts and – as a consequence – do not belong to the meaning of thick concepts but still hold that the evaluation is lexically signalled. In chapter 6.3, the point will be picked up again.

3.2 'Evaluation isn't a Matter of Semantics'-View

In his book *The Lewd, the Rude and the Nasty* Pekka Väyrynen holds a pragmatic view. His main thesis is that thick concepts are not 'inherently evaluative' in their meaning of content, but that evaluation is a matter of the pragmatics of their use. Although semantic views are widely held, there is a lack of evidence that this is the correct picture because it is commonly assumed that evaluation is part of the semantic content, but it has never been proven explicitly.[11] Väyrynen wants to give evidence in favour of a pragmatic view. A pragmatic theory meets the challenge of *Grice's razor* not to make unnecessary semantic postulations.[12] Further, he states that thick concepts lack philosophical significance, if the pragmatic view is true. According to him, thick concepts do not have significant consequences in the (meta-)ethical debate because the evaluation conveyed is only a matter of pragmatics. Only if thick concepts are inherently evaluative, they may for instance have an impact on the fact-value distinction and on issues concerning the objectivity of value judgements. If thick concepts are not inherently evaluative, they lack this impact.[13]
The central question in his book is the *Evaluation Question (EQ)*:

(**EQ**) How are thick terms and concepts related to the evaluations they may be used to convey?[14]

Väyrynen admits that thick concepts are related to evaluation, but he maintains that this relation can be explained without having to assume that thick concepts are inherently evaluative. His view is also supposed to explain why non-evaluative terms, such as athletic or painful, can carry evaluations in certain circumstances.

[11] Cp. Kyle (2013, 1).
[12] Grice's Razor (1967, 47-48) is a principle of parsimony that postulates conversational implicatures rather than semantic implicatures, or semantic presuppositions.
[13] Cp. Väyrynen (2013, 2-3).
[14] *Ibid.*, 7.

Methodologically, Väyrynen focuses on linguistic tests and investigates how thick terms are typically used in everyday contexts. With the use of linguistic tests and especially by calling attention to 'objectionable' thick concepts (especially lewd, lascivious, and chaste), he wants to scrutinise various (most often semantic) views about the thick.

3.3 Linguistic Prerequisites

Väyrynen uses linguistic methods and data to explain certain linguistic phenomena of thick evaluations. In order to offer a proper understanding of his theses, first of all the linguistic prerequisites necessary to understand his arguments are outlined. The reader who is familiar with these linguistic notions is free to skip this section.[15] It is started with all kinds of implications of language use.

3.3.1 Semantic Entailments

Some advocates of the semantic view claim that evaluations are semantic, conceptual, or analytical entailments of utterances containing thick evaluations.[16] This means that value utterances somehow semantically entail evaluations. A semantic entailment is closely connected to logical implications. If a proposition semantically entails another proposition, this entailment is not cancelable. For instance, (2) is a semantic entailment of (1). Yet, (3), in which (2) is cancelled, is contradictory[17].

(1) Max is a bachelor.
(2) Max is unmarried.
(3) ♯ Max is a bachelor, but he is married.

3.3.2 Conversational Implicatures

Implicatures are different from logical implications. The theory of conversational implicatures is established by Paul Grice in his William-James-Lectures

[15] This study does not presuppose that any philosopher is familiar with the different kinds of entailments.
[16] Cp. Kyle (2013).
[17] Contradictory or infelicitous statements are usually marked by ♯

on *Logic and Conversation* in 1967.[18] Grice introduces the term *implicature* as opposed to *implication*. What is meant with *implicature* is best explained by an example from Grice[19]:
Suppose that A and B are talking about a mutual friend, Max, who started working in a bank:

A: How is Max getting on in his job?
B: Oh quite well, I think; he likes his colleagues, and he hasn't been to prison yet.

B says that Max has not been to prison yet, but what he actually implicates or means is distinct from what he says. B suggests that Max might "yield to the temptation provided by his occupation", or that his "colleagues are really very unpleasant and treacherous people, and so forth"[20].
There is a difference between what is said (expression meaning) and what is meant (speaker's meaning). This difference leads to the semantics and the pragmatics of an utterance. Hence a general question is how it is possible that speakers mean more than they actually say, and that they understand one another, although what is meant often differs considerably from what is actually said. Grice's assumption is that there is a general principle which all participants follow non intentionally:[21]

> **Cooperative Principle:** Make your conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged.

The Cooperative Principle is complemented by four more specific conversational maxims under which submaxims fall:

> **Maxim of Quantity:**
>
> 1. Make your contribution as informative as is required (for the current purposes of the exchange).
> 2. Do not make your contribution more informative than is required.
>
> **Maxim of Quality:** Try to make your contribution one that is true.

[18] Published in Grice (1989).
[19] Cp. Grice (1967, 24).
[20] *Ibid.*
[21] Cp. *ibid.*, 26-27.

1. Do not say what you believe to be false.
2. Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence.

Maxim of Relation: Be relevant.
Maxim of Manner: Be perspicuous.

1. Avoid obscurity of expression.
2. Avoid ambiguity.
3. Be brief (avoid unnecessary prolixity).
4. Be orderly.

Grice assumes "that talkers will in general (ceteris paribus and in the absence of indication to the contrary) proceed in the manner that these principles prescribe"[22] because participants in talk exchanges have a common interest or goal which can be reached only if all participants act rationally. For instance, a communication could not be made reasonably, if all participants of a talk assumed that everyone wants to mislead one another by not telling the truth or talking in riddles. So, assuming that all speakers follow the Cooperative Principle unconsciously, the hearer infers that something else must be meant by the speaker if one of the maxims is violated. Consequently, implicatures often arise when a maxim is violated. In the initial example, B patently violates the maxim 'Be relevant'. Hence, A must infer that B means something different. Yet, implicatures may not only arise by a violation of the maxims as the following example suggests:

(4) A: I am out of petrol.
B: There is a garage around the corner.[23]

According to Grice, B made the conversational implicature (5):

(5) The garage is open and has petrol to sell.

This example shows that a maxim need not necessarily be violated to give rise to a conversational implicature, it can also arise by *exploitation* of the corresponding maxim. The utterance of B suggests that the garage is open. If B believed the garage to be closed, B would violate the maxim of relevance.

[22] Grice (1967, 28).
[23] *Ibid.*, 32.

Thus, A must infer that B implicates that (5) is true.
Conversational implicatures can arise by four mechanisms: i) violating a maxim, ii) opting out from the operation of the maxim and of the Cooperative Principle, iii) facing a clash between two or more maxims, or iv) flouting a maxim.[24]

Properties of Conversational Implicatures

Grice identifies a range of features of implicatures which can be tested easily. The most important features will be illustrated with help of example (6).[25]

(6) Anne: I'm hungry.
Paul: There is a supermarket around the corner.
$\hookrightarrow$ You can get food in the supermarket.

If 'You can get food in the supermarket' is a conversational implicature, it has the following features:

(a) **Calculability** Paul said that there is a supermarket around the corner. Anne assumes that Paul follows the Cooperative Principle and the corresponding maxims. Paul could only have said that there is a supermarket around the corner, if he believed it to be open. Otherwise he would have violated the maxim of relevance. Since Paul did not behave as if he attempted to trick Anne, she concludes that she must be able to get food in the supermarket for Paul's utterance to be cooperative. This shows that the conversational implicature is calculable.

(b) **Variability** Conversational implicatures are variable, that is, the same utterance might give rise to another implicature in a different context.

(7) Anne: I have forgotten to take a toothbrush.
Paul: There is a supermarket around the corner.
$\not\hookrightarrow$ You can get food in the supermarket.

Paul's utterance has different implicatures depending on context. Thus, implicatures are variable with regard to the context in which they are uttered.

[24] Grice (1967, 30). For further examples of implicatures and maxims cf. Grice (1967, 31-37).
[25] (6) is similar to the example in Finkbeiner (2015, 27-28).

(c) **Cancelability** Furthermore, conversational implicatures are cancelable, that is, the speaker may cancel the implicature without making the utterance contradictory:

(8) Anne: I'm hungry.
Paul: There is a supermarket around the corner, but I'm not sure if it is open.
$\not\rightarrow$ You can get food in the supermarket.

By adding *I'm not sure if it is open* the implicature is cancelled, but Paul's utterance is not contradictory.

(d) **Reinforceability and Non-Detachability** Conversational implicatures can be reinforced without being redundant.[26] Paul could also answer *There is a supermarket around the corner where you can get food.*
Last but not least conversational implicatures are non-detachable. Grice says that the conversational implicature content is connected to what is said and is not implicated by the the way it is said. So, "it is not possible to find another way of saying the same thing, which simply lacks the implicature in question"[27]. This means that Paul's utterance does not depend on its exact wording. He could have said *There is a food store around the corner*, which would have given rise to the exact same implicature.

3.3.3 Conventional Implicatures

Unlike conversational implicatures, conventional implicatures are part of the conventional meaning of an expression and belong to semantics. According to Christopher Potts, "conventional implicatures (...) are entailed by lexical and constructional meanings but distinct from the regular at-issue content of a sentence"[28]. Grice's example for a conventional implicature is the following[29]:

1) He is an Englishman; he is, therefore, brave.
2) His being brave is a consequence of his being an Englishman.
3) He is an Englishman and he is brave.

[26] Cp. Potts (2007a, 669-670).
[27] Grice (1967, 39).
[28] Potts (2014, 27).
[29] Grice (1967, 25).

1) and 3) are logically equivalent. Yet, the consequence implied by therefore is a conventional implicature. Grice's introduces 'conventional implicatures', but misses to define them properly.[30] A minimal definition of conventional implicatures is offered by Potts:

> Meaning p is a *conventional implicature* of phrase S if, and only if:
>
> 1. p is a conventional (endcoded) property of a lexical item or construction in S
> 2. p is entailed by S
> 3. p's truth or falsity has no effect on the at-issue content of S[31]

One further characteristic is that the alleged conventional implicature content is hard to articulate in propositional content and that it is context-dependent.[32] There might be more conventional implicatures than Grice might have assumed. *Inter alia* Potts lists the following: Adverbs (*almost*, *already*, *even*, *barely*, *only*, *still*, and *yet*), additive particles (*too*, *also*, *either*), anaphoric epithets (*the jerk*), connectives (*but*, *nevertheless*, *so*, *therefore*), diminutives, implicative verbs (*bother*, *conscend*, *continue*, *deign*, *fail*, *manage*, *stop*), racial epithets, swears, and subordinating conjunctions (*although*, *despite (the fact that)*, *even though*).[33]

Properties of Conventional Implicatures

(a) **Non-Cancelability and Non-Reinforceability** Since conventional implicatures are part of the semantic meaning of an utterance, they cannot be cancelled (9) nor reinforced (10) without sounding redundant.

(9) ♯ Lisa is poor but pretty. I don't mean to imply that there is a contrast between being poor and being pretty.

(10) ♯ Lisa is poor but pretty, and there is a contrast between being poor and being pretty.[34]

[30] Cf. also Potts (2014, 28).
[31] *Ibid.*, 28.
[32] Cp. *ibid.*, 30.
[33] For an extended list cp. *ibid.*, 29.
[34] Kyle (2013, 8) points out that many linguists are reluctant to generalize that conventional implicatures are not reinforceable. For instance, *Smith has not arrived yet, but he is expected* and *Even Bill passed the test, and he was among the least likely* both appear

(b) **Detachability** The conventional implicature content does not affect the truth-conditions of 'Lisa is poor but pretty'. Thus, conventional implicatures are detachable.

(11) Lisa is poor and pretty.
$\not\leftrightarrow$ There is a contrast between being poor and being pretty.

d) **Behaviour under Projection** Conventional implicature content does not belong to the at-issue-content of an utterance, and therefore, projects under entailment-cancelling operators such as negations, questions, possibility modals, or antecedents of conditionals, as is illustrated in (12):

(12) a. Lisa isn't poor but pretty.
b. Is Lisa poor but pretty?
c. Lisa might be poor but pretty.
d. If Lisa is poor but pretty, she may be happy anyway.
$\hookrightarrow$ There is a contrast between being poor and being pretty.

3.3.4 Presuppositions

A presupposition (nlat. *praesupponere* 'presuppose') is an assumption which a speaker makes in a conversation without speaking it out loud. Suppose, A tells B *Julia stopped reading 'The Lord of the Rings'*. A assumes that Julia has previously read *The Lord of the Rings*, but does not say it explicitly. Furthermore, A assumes B to know that Julia has previously read this book. So, *Julia has previously read 'The Lord of the Rings'* is a presupposition of *Julia has stopped reading 'The Lord of the Rings'*. Roberts Stalnaker defines presuppositions as "the propositions whose truth he [=the speaker] takes for granted (...). They are the background assumptions that may be used without being spoken – sometimes without being noticed"[35].
Terms as in (a)-(f)[36] give rise to a presupposition and are called *presuppositiontriggers*:

(a) *Aspectual verbs*
Julia stopped reading *The Lord of the Rings*. ($\gg$ Julia previously read *The*

felicitous. In footnote 53 of this chapter, it will be illustrated that there are cases with evaluative utterances containing thick concepts, where the reinforcement is also felicitous.

[35]Stalnaker (1973, 447).

[36]These are the most common triggers for presuppositions. However, the list is not complete.

Lord of the Rings.)

(b) *Factive verbs*
Peter regrets not having said goodbye. (≫ Peter didn't say goodbye.)

(c) *Definite noun phrases*
The Bundeskanzler is old. (≫ There is a Bundeskanzler.)

(d) *Implicative verbs*
John managed to leave. (≫ John tried to leave)

(e) Temporal clauses.
Since I know what you have done, I can't sleep. (≫ I know what you have done.)

(f) *Counterfactual conditionals*
If I didn't know what you did, I could still sleep. (≫ I know what you did.)

Properties of Presuppositions

Presuppositions behave similar to conventional implicatures in many respects: Presuppositions are also non-cancelable and non-reinforceable.[37] A further central feature of presuppositions is their behaviour under projection. *Julia stopped reading 'The Lord of the Rings'* has at least the following implications: (i) Julia stopped reading *The Lord of the Rings*, and (ii) Julia previously read *The Lord of the Rings*. (ii) but not (i) is constant under entailment-cancelling operators in b.-e.:

(14) a. Julia stopped reading *The Lord of the Rings*.
b. Did Julia stop reading *The Lord of the Rings*?
c. Julia didn't stop reading *The Lord of the Rings*.
d. If Julia stopped reading *The Lord of the Rings*, she surely started reading another book.
e. Julia might have stopped reading *The Lord of the Rings*.

The projective behaviour distinguishes presuppositions and conventional implicatures from semantic entailments and conversational implicatures which

[37] Presuppositions are not reinforceable without being redundant: ♯ *Julia stopped reading 'The Lord of the Rings'. Indeed, she read 'The Lord of the Rings'.* In unembedded contexts, cancellation of presuppositions is infelicitous: ♯ *Julia has stopped reading 'The Lord of the Rings', but I don't want to imply that she previously read 'The Lord of the Rings'.*

both do not project (e. g. under negation):

(15) a. Max is a strong man.
⇒ Max is strong.
b. Max is not a strong man.
⇏ Max is strong.

Max is strong is a semantic entailment of a., but it is not a semantic entailment of b..
Unlike conventional implicatures and presuppositions, conversational implicatures do not project. Compare (16):

(16) Anne: I'm hungry.
Paul: There isn't a supermarket around the corner.
↛ You can get food in the supermarket.

Pragmatic and Semantic Theories about Presuppositions

Potts differentiates *semantic* from *pragmatic* presuppositions.[38] The latter are "purely speaker actions" whereas the former "trace to conventional aspects of the meanings of specific words and constructions"[39].

Pragmatic presuppositions The theory of pragmatic presuppositions was developed by Robert Stalnaker (1973; 1974), Lauri Karttunen (1974), David Lewis (1979) and Irene Heim (1983). A common feature of pragmatic presuppositions is that they are not presupposed by propositions but rather by the speakers themselves. According to Stalnaker, for instance, "the basic presupposition relation is not between propositions or sentences, but between a person and a proposition"[40]. The speaker takes the truth of the presuppositions *for granted*. Hence they belong to the background assumptions of a conversation. Mutual public knowledge, or norms of turn-taking in dialogues belong to these background assumptions.[41] Pragmatic presuppositions cannot be traced to specific words or phrases. Rather, they arise from the context and the expectations of the participants in talks.[42]

[38] It is a major issue within presupposition theory whether presuppositions are pragmatic or semantic or whether both kinds occur. This study wants to stay neutral on this question.
[39] Potts (2014, 3).
[40] Stalnaker (1973, 447).
[41] Cp. Potts (2014, 3).
[42] Cp. *ibid.*

Semantic presuppositions Semantic (*conventional, lexical*) presuppositions are independent from context and therefore part of the encoded meaning of specific words and constructions (presupposition triggers).[43]
The standard definition of semantic presuppositions is based on the constance of presuppositions under negation[44]:

> **Semantic presupposition** A proposition p presupposes semantically another proposition q iff:
>
> (a) whenever p is true, q is also true;
> (b) whenever p is false, q is true.

The relation of semantic presuppositions can then be identified with the logical implication which suggests following definition:

> A proposition φ presupposes (semantically) another proposition ψ iff:
>
> (a) φ implies semantically ψ (that is $\varphi \Rightarrow \psi$), and
> (b) $\neg\varphi$ implies semantically ψ (that is $\neg\varphi \Rightarrow \psi$).[45]

This definition poses a problem for the bivalence of logic because the falseness of the presupposition ψ is excluded. If ψ were false, φ would (according to modus tollens) be true and false at the same time which is a contradiction to the law of the excluded middle. This, however, is inappropriate because some presuppositions can indeed be false. For instance,

> a. The King of France is bald.
> b. There exists a King of France.

b. is a presupposition of a., but b. is false. As a consequence, the classical bivalent logic must either be rejected, or a many-valued logic must be introduced which drops the law of excluded middle.[46]

3.4 Väyrynen's Theory of the Thick

After having set out the prerequisites, it is time to reiterate the data Väyrynen employed to establish his pragmatic view.

[43] Cp. *ibid.*, 4.
[44] Cp. Levinson (1989 [1983], 175).
[45] Cp. *ibid.*
[46] Instead there could be three truth values: *true*, *false*, *neither-true-nor-false*. Cp. *ibid.*, 175-6.

3.4.1 The Data

Behaviour of Global T-Evaluations under Projection

Väyrynen calls value judgements containing thick concepts 'T-utterances' or 'T-sentences', and evaluations conveyed by these 'T-evaluations'. His first argument against the semantic view is that T-evaluations cannot be semantic entailments because they satisfy projection.
Imagine, some *lewd*-users[47] are talking about Madonna's upcoming show. It is likely that one utters (1):

(1) Madonna's stage show is lewd.

According to Väyrynen, this implicates something like (2) or (3):

(2) Overt displays of sexuality that transgress conventional boundaries are bad in a certain way.[48]
(3) If Madonna's show involves overt display of sexuality that transgresses conventional boundaries, then it is bad in a certain way.

(2) and (3) both survive under projection:

(3) a. Is Madonna's stage show lewd?
b. Madonna's show might be lewd.
c. {Maybe/it is possible that} Madonna's show will be lewd.
d. {Presumably/probably} Madonna's show will be lewd.
e. If Madonna's show is lewd, the tabloid press will go nuts.[49]

Since (2) and (3) satisfies projection, Väyrynen draws two conclusions: i) Global T-evaluations belong to the background information, are not part of the main point of a T-utterance, and cannot be semantic entailments. ii) These data will not refute the semantic view at all because semantic presuppositions and conventional implicatures also satisfy projection.

[47] People who are somehow prudes and evaluate things as lewd are typically called *lewd*-users. People who reject the valued embodied in *lewd* are called *lewd*-objectors. This nomenclature is owed to Brent Kyle (2013, 13).

[48] The non-evaluative description *Madonna's stage show is an overt display of sexuality that transgresses conventional boundaries* is only an approximation because there a no analytically sufficient application conditions to express thick concepts. Cp. Väyrynen (2013, 58-59).

[49] All of them are uttered by a *lewd*-user.

The conclusion that the global T-evaluation is an implication of a T-utterance other than a semantic entailment also explains the behaviour of global T-evaluations when embedded in the complements of *I'm sorry to hear*. Compare (4) and (5):

(4) I'm sorry to hear that Israel and Palestine aren't managing to form a two-state solution.
⇒ Isreal and Palestine aren't managing to form a two-state solution.
≫ Israel and Palestine are trying to form a two-state solution.

(5) I'm sorry to hear that Madonna's show is lewd.
⇒ Madonna's show is an overt display of sexuality that transgresses conventional boundaries.
≫ Overt displays of sexuality that transgress conventional boundaries are bad in a certain way.

In both (4) and (5) the speaker is neither sorry to hear that Israel and Palestine are trying to form a two-state solution nor that overt displays of sexuality that transgress conventional boundaries are bad in a certain way. They are not sorry for the backgrounded information, but for the information which is at-issue (the at-issue content is marked by ⇒.).

Global T-Evaluations and Deniability

Suppose, a *lewd*-objector enters the conversation about Madonna's upcoming show. The objector cannot show his or her disagreement about the negative evaluation of overt displays of sexuality by directly denying (1) (*Madonna's stage show isn't lewd*) because this would imply – at least in a conversation among *lewd*-users – that he or she is thinking that Madonna's stage show is not sexually explicit enough to count as lewd. Instead, the *lewd*-user must answer something like (6) which means that he or she must deny the background information:

(6) a. Nuh uh, things are in no way bad just for involving overt sexual display that transgresses conventional boundaries.
b. No it isn't, its involving explicit sexual display doesn't mean that it's bad in any way.[50]

[50] Väyrynen (2013, 70).

c. Hey, wait a minute! Things are in no way bad just for involving overt sexual display that transgresses conventional boundaries.
d. Whether or not Madonna's stage show is lewd, it's not bad in any way distinctive of explicit sexual display.
e. Whether or not Madonna's show involves explicit sexual display, it would be in no way bad for that.

Väyrynen expresses his doubts if 6a. and 6b. are felicitous. Instead, he thinks that 6d. and 6e. are better replies to the statement that Madonna's stage show is lewd. It will be discussed in more detail in the last chapter of the book which reply might be best.
The *lewd*-objector negates the evaluation which belongs somehow to the background information of *lewd*-users. A similar behaviour is shown by presuppositions. Compare (7), where Anne communicates that Julia stopped reading *The Lord of the Rings*:

(7) Anne: Julia stopped reading *The Lord of the Rings*.
Paul: No, she didn't.
Frederick: No, impossible. Julia has never read *The Lord of the Rings*, just now she's reading *Lord of the Flies*. You must be mistaken about the title.

Paul saw Julia reading *The Lord of the Rings* just before the conversation started, so he protests that Julia did not stop reading *The Lord of the Rings* by directly denying the at-issue-content. Frederick, Julia's room-mate, is absolutely sure that Julia never read *The Lord of the Rings*. In c. he protests against the presupposition that Julia previously read *The Lord of the Rings* by indirectly negating the presuppositional content.
Evaluative content as well as presuppositional content cannot be directly denied. This is further evidence that global T-evaluations must somehow belong to the background information and cannot be semantic entailments of T-utterances.[51]
Väyrynen aims to undermine the semantic view as a whole and hence he may have missed to see that these findings highly suggest that the separationist analyses considered in the previous chapter cannot be correct because they implicitly share the assumption that evaluative content is at-issue-content. For instance, consider the following analysis of lewd in the way of (S3):

[51] Cp. Väyrynen (2013, 67).

(8) 'x is lewd' means 'x involves overt displays of sexuality that transgress conventional boundaries and x is bad in a certain way in virtue of involving overt displays of sexuality that transgress conventional boundaries'.[52]

($\neg$8) 'x is not lewd' means 'x does not involve overt displays of sexuality that transgress conventional boundaries or x is not bad in virtue of involving overt displays of sexuality that transgress conventional boundaries'.

As ($\neg$8) illustrates both the non-evaluation and the evaluative content can be directly denied. Yet, this is implausible concerning the given data. If the evaluation belongs to the semantic content of an T-utterance, then it must be secondary not-at-issue content.

Global T-Evaluations, Cancelability, Reinforceability and Detachability

In this section, it is tested whether T-evaluations are cancelable, reinforceable and detachable.

- **Cancelability and Reinforceability** Consider (9) and (10):

(9)	♯	Madonna's stage show is lewd, but I don't mean to imply that it is bad in any distinctive way for its overt and transgressive sexual display.
(10) $\equiv$ (1) $\wedge$ (2)	♯	Madonna's stage show is lewd, and indeed it is bad in a distinctive way because of its explicit sexual display.

  If uttered in a conversation among *lewd*-users, it would be odd and infelicitous to utter (9) because there is an obvious contradiction and, likewise, it would be odd to utter a conjunct of (1) and (2) because it sounds redundant. Therefore, T-utterances are neither cancelable nor reinforceable.[53]

[52] The same argument could be made against the indeterminate analysis of Elstein & Hurka, and against the analysis of Burton.

[53] Cp. Väyrnen (2013, 101; 104). Kyle (2013, 3) also holds that T-evaluations are neither reinforceable nor cancelable. His conclusion is that T-evaluations cannot be conversational nor conventional implicatures. As was shown in footnote 34, he states that sometimes conventional implicatures are reinforceable, but that T-evaluations always are non-reinforceable. But imagine, Nancy's fellow workers are discussing whether Nancy is good in a way because she is dishonest, aggressive, unkind, and the like. The colleagues all agree that she has the listed character traits. But then one of them realizes: 'Nancy is generous, and giving more money than is expected *is* good in a way.' So, in this context, the utterance is not redun-

- **Non-Detachability?** Unlike pejoratives, thick concepts are said to be non-detachable because there is no neutral counterpart coextensive with the thick term.[54] But this move might seem ad-hoc because the non-evaluative component of pejoratives can also not always be detached. For instance, the non-evaluative component of *Pavarotti is a wop* can be detached, whereas the non-evaluative component of *Pavarotti is a jerk* is not detachable.[55] This difference is reflected in value terms, as well. The non-evaluative component in *Madonna's stage show is lewd* can be detached more easily than in *Stealing is wrong.* One possible way to cope with the poverty of our language is to find non-evaluative equivalent non-natural linguistic *phrases.*[56] Another strategy is to claim that thick terms can be used in inverted commas to indicate that one does not share the evaluative perspective. E. g., the utterance *Madonna's stage show is "lewd"* indicates that the speaker does not evaluate the display of sexuality negatively, although the use of lewd assumes a negative evaluation.[57]

T-Evaluations and Presuppositions

So far, Väyrynen's tests have suggested that T-evaluations are neither semantic entailments nor conversational implicatures. One remaining possibility is that T-evaluations are presuppositions. This possibility is likely to be true because T-evaluations share all kind of different features that are also features of presuppositions: T-evaluations are noncancelable, non-reinforceable and non-detachable[58]. Let us call a view which holds that T-evaluations are presuppositions the *presupposition view.*[59]

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dant, too. This shows that such utterances need not always be redundant. In both cases (T-evaluations and typical examples of conventional implicatures as but), there are examples where a reinforcement is not redundant and, hence, acceptable. Thus, Kyle's objection fails to show that T-utterances cannot be conventional implicatures.

[54]For a definition of non-evaluative detachability cp. Hay (2011, 455).

[55]Cp. *ibid.*, 454-455.

[56]This strategy is often adopted: Hare's (1961 [1952]) doog for good (see chapter 2.2.4), Kaplan's (1978) *dthat*-operator, or Copp's (2009) "has the property that would be ascribed by saying it is 'morally wrong'" for morally wrong.

[57]This strategy is defended by Copp (2001, 35-36). For a discussion cf. also Hay (2011, 454-8).

[58]For instance, consider *Julia gave up reading 'The Lord of the Rings'.* This has the same presupposition.

[59]Väyrynen differentiates between the *semantic presupposition* and the *pragmatic presupposition view.* Since he rejects both of them, we do not go into detail what differentiates

Väyrynen rejects the presupposition view, firstly, because of the 'triggering problem', and, secondly, because of the 'appropriateness problem'. With regard to the former, an advocate of the presupposition view needs to explain why thick concepts work as presupposition triggers, especially since they do not fall into any category of typical triggers. Regarding the latter problem, the definition of presuppositional content as background information of conversations which is *taken for granted* is not appropriate for objectionable thick terms. According to Väyrynen, a lewd-user should not call things lewd in the presence of *lewd*-objectors because in such situations, the T-evaluation that explicit sexual display is bad in any way is not in the common ground of the conversation.[60] The last chapter will comment on these arguments.

T-Evaluations and Conventional Implicatures

Though the tests suggest that T-evaluations cannot be conversational implicatures, they might still be conventional implicatures. If they were conventional implicatures, they would belong to the semantic meaning of a T-utterance. Väyrynen's most important argument against the CVI (***C**on**V**entional **I**mplicature)* view is that (11) seems to be acceptable, even to lewd-objectors, whereas (12) seems to be generally unacceptable.[61]

(11) Whether or not Madonna's stage show is lewd, it would be in no way bad for that.

(12) ♯ Whether or not life is short but sweet, there would be no contrast between life being short and life being sweet.

This argument and the 'whether or not'-test are uncommented unless chapter 6 where arguments for a presupposition and especially for a conventional implicature view will be discussed.

3.4.2 Väyrynen's Conclusions from the Data

Väyrynen claims to have proven that T-evaluations i) satisfy projection, are ii) non-cancelable, iii) non-detachable, iv) not triggered by thick terms and v) not shared by participants in conversations. i)-iii) are presuppositional

those views and only illustrate his arguments against the *presupposition view*. Gibbard's (1992) account sometimes appears to be a *presupposition view*.

[60] Cp. Väyrynen (2013, 112-113).

[61] Cp. *ibid.*, 104.

features, iv) and v) differentiates T-evaluations from presuppositions. i)-iii) determine that T-evaluations somehow belong to the background information of the conversation or not to the 'main point'. Therefore, T-evaluations are 'not-at-issue' in a talk which means that they are not under scope of negation, questions, modals, etc. The not-at-issueness explains the behaviour under projection. Entailment cancelling operators do not effect implications that are not at-issue. The notion *at-issueness* is defined by Mandy Simons et al. (2010). Not-at-issueness applies to all kinds of implications that satisfy projection. Implicatures, presuppositions or other types of implications are not-at-issue, as well.
But the observation that T-evaluations are not-at-issue in talks is no defeating argument for a pragmatic view. Therefore, Väyrynen additionally states that a further characteristic of T-evaluations is that they arise conversationally and not semantically (conventionally). The following quote summarizes his pragmatic view:

> Global T-evaluations are implications of T-utterances which are normally "not at issue" in their literal use in normal contexts, and which arise conversationally.[62]

3.5 Critical Appraisal

In her review of *The Lewd, the Rude and the Nasty*, Roberts praises Väyrynen's study:

> This book articulates and defends a novel view of thick concepts extremely carefully and rigorously. It is an excellent example of how method and theory from other areas, in this case philosophy of language and linguistics, can be brought fruitfully to bear on debates in metaethics. And it takes on a topic with a deserved reputation for being obscure and performs much needed clarifications. In short, *The Lewd, the Rude and the Nasty* makes considerable advances not only in the thick concepts debate but in metaethics and metanormative philosophy in general.[63]

[62] Väyrynen (2013, 122).
[63] Roberts (2015, 910).

It must be agreed with everything Roberts says about the book wherefore Väyrynen's theses are dwelt on for so long. Especially, Väyrynen's discovery that T-evaluations are not at-issue in talks is fundamentally important. But it is appropriate to also have reservations about his theory. Firstly, it might be irritating to say that T-evaluations are not conversational implicatures, but some other kind of conversational implicating "we don't have a dedicated name for"[64]. It might be more promising to support a pragmatic presupposition view, especially since the data supports such a view.
Secondly, Väyrynen admits that the relation between thick terms and concepts and global evaluation is "robust"[65]. To explain that robust relationship semantically is relatively simple because it follows immediately from the 'inherently evaluative' claim. A pragmatic view, however, needs to explain why thick terms are linked to certain evaluations in normal contexts although T-evaluations only arise conversationally. For instance, why the use of cruel usually implicates a negative evaluation. Väyrynen's argument is the following:

> T-evaluations won't need any specific contextual features to arise even if they are pragmatic implications insofar as they are sufficiently 'generalized'. What the Pragmatic View needs for this explanation to get going is that T-evaluations won't need to be worked out from scratch in each particular context but can be detected on the basis of the general knowledge that the licensed users of a given thick term or concept widely and robustly share certain evaluations. What Parochiality [that is, the application of a (paradigmatic) thick term or concept tends to derive its point or interest from the term's or concept's relation to the evaluative perspective reflected in its application] suggests is precisely that the mutual acceptance of T-evaluations is this kind of a robust fact about T-utterances. In that case T-evaluations can become routinely associated with the linguistic expressions that trigger them in all ordinary contexts, and thereby part of the default interpretation of T-utterances, even if they are pragmatic. But that is what it is for an utterance implication to be generalized.[66]

The pattern of usage of a thick term and concept becomes common knowledge

[64] Väyrynen (2013, 123).
[65] *Ibid.*, 128.
[66] *ibid.*, 130-131.

and the evaluation can become a 'mutually accepted generalized pragmatic implication'. If someone uses lewd without holding the evaluative point – negative evaluation of the sexually explicit – the user violates conversational norms. But 'generalized' appears to be just another term for 'conventionalized' – at least the difference is only marginal.

Väyrynen often maintains that the Pragmatic View offers a simpler explanation.[67] Yet, it might, nevertheless, be simpler to posit that thick concepts are inherently evaluative than trying to explain this robust relation between thick concepts and evaluation in such a somehow cumbersome way.

[67] Cp. Väyrynen (2013, 149-150; 157-158).

Chapter 4

Theories of Concepts

Investigating theories about purely non-evaluative concepts is helpful, to offer some new perspectives and gain new insights into the debate about value concepts, particularly since thick concepts are said to have some non-evaluative content. As will become clear, there are arguments against certain types of conceptual analyses which can be brought forward against some analyses of thick concepts as well. Therefore, it is of great value to take those theories into perspective. The method of this chapter will mainly be exegetical.[1]

The debate about thick concepts is primarily a philosophical debate. Thus, questions concerning conceptual content are the most interesting in the debate. Besides from these questions, theories of concepts also deal with concept acquisition, categorization, and the productivity of concepts.[2]

Both philosophers and psychologists have been interested in theories about concepts. Accordingly, the development of these theories is often dialectical: Arguments against the first philosophic theory of the empiricists, the so-called classical theory, are mainly psychological. On the basis of this criticism, several further psychological theories originated: prototype theories according to which concepts are analysable in terms of typical features or exemplars, and theory-theories which hold that concepts are constituents of theories. These theories, however, have been reattacked by philosophers, especially by Saul Kripke and Hilary Putnam. Since all the theories stating that concepts have semantic structures failed, a radical alternative view (conceptual atomism)

[1] For a more detailed summary cf. Laurence & Margolis (1999), 'Concepts,' by Earl, *The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, and Smith & Medin (1981).

[2] According to Susan Carey, psychology students are more interested in the categorization behaviour and concept acquisition, whereas philosophy students name the accounting for reference as their main interest. Cp. Carey (2009, 489).

emerged which, likewise, has its own weaknesses. Consequently, two-factor theories were developed that try to combine philosophical and psychological perspectives and eliminate the weaknesses of both.

4.1 The Classical Theory of Concepts

The *classical theory*[3] was the prevailing view up to the second half of the twentieth century before it was challenged in the 1950s in philosophy.[4] Proponents of this view hold that for any (lexical) concept there are specified conditions for their application which are (i) singly necessary and (ii) jointly sufficient.[5] The conjunction of the listed necessary conditions form a sufficient condition for belonging to a certain concept. If all those necessary conditions which are jointly sufficient are listed up, one gets an analysis of the corresponding concept.[6] Every mathematical or logical definition is an example for this view. For instance, an equilateral triangle can be defined as follows:

i) A triangle is an equilateral triangle if and only if all three sides of the triangle are equal.

Equivalently, it could also be said:

ii) A triangle is an equilateral triangle if and only if all three angles of the triangle are equal.

The condition that all three sides of the triangle must be equal is a necessary (and sufficient) condition for a triangle to be equilateral. A triangle must have three equal angels or sides to be an equilateral triangle. And vice versa an equilateral triangle necessarily has three equal angels or sides.

[3] Laurence & Margolis (1999, 9-10) emphasize that it is an oversimplification to speak of *the* classical theory because there is a family of theories defending the classical view. Yet, they have the idea in common that concepts have definitional structure. What we call the classical theory is an idealized theory.

[4] The classical theory has a long history. For instance, Laurence and Margolis (1999, 9-10) ascribe a classical theory to Plato, or John Locke.

[5] These conditions are often structural features, but even functional features are not necessarily excluded. Cp. Smith & Medin (1981, 26-27).

[6] There are further conditions for an analysis: It must not be circular, which means that the analysis must not contain the concept itself in the list of the necessary conditions, and it must not be more complex than the concept to be analysed. Cp. 'Concepts,' by Earl, *The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.*

Another example, which is often recited, is the concept of being a bachelor.[7] A bachelor is not married, male, and an adult. These three features form a set of representations of bachelor. So, if a man is called a bachelor, it can be derived that he is unmarried. The concept bachelor analytically entails the concept unmarried. Earl sums up: "A classical analysis is then a proposition that specifies such a logical constitution by specifying individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions."[8] These propositions are sometimes said to be defining ones.

A classical theory holds most concepts to be complex and hence composed of simpler representations. These simpler representations might be equally composed of even simpler representations, or they are primitive undefineable representations. According to the classical view, there is a process of reference determination: The reference of the defining concept is determined by the reference of its definition. However, the process of reference determination must come to an end and some concepts must be reached which form the *primitive base*.[9] According to the empiricists (e. g., John Locke), these concepts of the primitive base are derived from sensations or perceptions.[10].

According to the classical theory, a concept can be acquired by assembling the necessary and sufficient features. Laurence & Margolis compare the process of categorization with "a process of checking to see if the features that are part of a concept are satisfied by the item being categorized"[11]. To know a concept is to know all necessary and sufficient features belonging to the concept. E. g., A is B's 'sister' if and only if A is B's 'female sibling'. In the process of concept acquisition, a child might think that a girl can only be a sister if she is an elder female sibling because the child may only have an elder sister. By experience, the concept sister may then be adapted in so far as sisters might be younger as well.

The classical view is very attractive: In philosophy, the truth of sentences is unambiguously determined by the concepts involved in the sentence and the the-

[7] Cp. 'Concepts,' by Earl, *The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, or Laurence & Margolis (1999).

[8] 'Concepts,' by Earl, *The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.*

[9] Cp. Pitt (1999, 140).

[10] David Pitt, defender of the thesis that concepts have definitional structure, argues that there can be an alternative account to the empiricist theory to explain the primitive base. He (*ibid.*, 143) suggests that "one might, alternatively, take the operative relation between primitive (hence *any*) terms and their extensions to be *instantiation*: primitive terms refer to the things that instantiate the properties expressed by their associated concepts".

[11] Laurence & Margolis (1999, 11).

sis that some concepts are semantically structured has been used to explicate the distinction between analytic and synthetic judgements[12]. In logic, classical analyses are used to explain non-logical inferences[13] and subset-relations between concepts[14], and in linguistics and psychology, it offers explanation to language acquisition and categorization.[15] Further, the classical theory accommodates synonymy (bachelor and unmarried man), redundancy (male bachelor), and autonomy (male and female).[16]

4.1.1 Classical Analyses of Thick Concepts

A classical analysis of a purely non-evaluative concept, such as equilateral triangle, is as follows:

(CA) x is an equilateral triangle $\Leftrightarrow$ All three sides of x are equal.

The condition that all tree sides of the triangle x must be equal is both necessary and sufficient for x to be an equilateral triangle. The analyses of thick concepts are often formulated equally as if they were definable in terms of the classical theory. For instance, consider the following reductive analyses of tactful suggested by Roberts:

(RA1) x is tactful $\Leftrightarrow$ x is T and is good in virtue of being T.

(RA2) x is tactful $\Leftrightarrow$ x is good, and there are properties X, Y, and Z (not specified) of general type A (specified), such that x has X, Y, and Z, and X, Y, and Z make anything that has them good.[17]

Comparing (CA) with these two analyses, it becomes clear that they both assume the classical theory to be correct. Both analyses suggest that a person's being good and having certain properties that make anything that has them good are necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for x to be tactful. Consequently, these types of analysis face at least the objections aiming against

[12] Cp. Pitt (1999, 139), or Putnam (1979 [1975], 72-77).

[13] The classical theory can explain why it is valid to infer *Petra died* from *John killed Petra* by defining kill as cause to die.

[14] If a concept x is a subset of a concept y, then the defining properties of x must be a subset of the defining properties of y. Cp. Smith & Medin (1981, 24).

[15] Cp. Pitt (1999, 139).

[16] Cp. *ibid.*, 149-150.

[17] Cp. Roberts (2011, 496; 507).

the classical theory. These objections will be topic in the following section.

4.1.2 Intuitive Criticism against the Classical Theory

Two objections against the classical theory arise immediately: First, according to its assumptions, it should be possible to classify any entity in the world and to assign a concept to it. But there are ambiguous cases where it is not clear whether a thing belongs to a certain concept or not.[18] For instance, it may not be clear whether carpets are furniture, belts are cloths, or tomatoes are fruits.[19] A proponent of the classical view can object in two ways. Firstly, he or she might respond that the definitions are unambiguous, but the defining necessary and sufficient conditions are not. For instance, an animal must be both black and a cat to fulfil the criteria of the concept black cat. However, it may not be unambiguously decidable whether a cat that looks dark-grey in the sun and black in the shadow is actually black. Secondly, the advocate of the classical theory might reply that, e. g., the analysis of the concept furniture is not unambiguously defined, if in doubt about carpets being furniture.
A second objection against the classical theory is that many concepts lack definitions. When it comes to philosophical concepts, such as knowledge, justice, or free will, a definition in terms of sufficient and jointly necessary conditions is either not available or has at least not been detected in the past.[20] This objection has not only been risen against philosophical concepts, but also against everyday concepts. For instance, Smith & Medin try to come up with a definition of cup:

> (1) concrete object, (2) concave, (3) can hold liquids, (4) has a handle, and (5) can be used to drink hot liquid out of[21]

But these properties seem not to be true of every cup. Teacups used in Chinese restaurants typically do not have a handle, but are still called 'cups'. If we

[18] Putnam (1979 [1975], 23) calls such entities 'fuzzy'.
[19] Cp. Smith & Medin (1981, 29-30).
[20] Laurence & Margolis (1999, 14) refer to this as *Plato's problem*. So-called *Neoclassical theories* have tried to avoid Plato's problem by giving up the assumption that the conditions are necessary and jointly sufficient. Instead, they only hold that for every complex concept C, C has individually necessary conditions for something to fall into its extension. The idea of the neoclassical theory is that concepts only have *partial definitions*, i. e. there has to be at least a necessary core that has to be fulfilled by any instance of a given concept. Though neoclassical theories avoid Plato's problem, they face other problems. Cp. Laurence & Margolis (1999, 54-59).
[21] Smith & Medin (1981, 2).

give up (4), the definition also holds for certain kinds of Thermos bottles.[22] A similar objection against the classical theory is Wittgenstein's thesis that there are not even features which are common to all instances of a concept, but rather family resemblances, such as similarities or relationships.[23]

4.1.3 Transferring the Critique to Thick Concepts

The second objection (*Plato's Problem*) might remind the reader on the shapelessness thesis according to which thick concepts are shapeless with regard to the non-evaluative. In the section about shapelessness, it was concluded that the thesis is likely to be true. Shapelessness, however, does not seem to be a particular property of thick concepts because non-evaluative concepts – especially philosophically interesting ones – are also criticized for being shapeless because of their lack of definitional structure. Also adequate classical analyses can often not be found. Thereupon, a defender of the shapelessness thesis might object that the evaluative component within the thick concept guarantees that thick concepts have definitional structure. Although the conditions expressed in non-evaluative terms are not sufficient for x to be tactful, jointly with the evaluative condition it could become sufficient and necessary. However, this move only seems to postpone the issue: The non-evaluative component would still have to be fully determinate which is against the assumption of shapelessness.

One conclusion drawn from the discussion of the classical theory is that the shapelessness thesis appears highly overestimated in the debate about thick concepts because shapelessness is no particular characteristic of thick concepts.

[22] Although there are concepts that lack definitional structure, the classical theory might still be true of scientific concepts, as Rudolf Carnap suggests: "In the case of many words, specifically in the case of the overwhelming majority of scientific words, it is possible to specify their meaning by reduction to other words ('constitution,' definition). E. g. "'arthropodes' are animals with segmented bodies and jointed legs." Thereby the above-mentioned question for the elementary sentence of the word 'arthopode,' that is for the sentence form 'the thing x is an arthropode,' is answered: it has been stipulated that a sentence of this form is deducible from premises of the form 'x is an animal,' 'x has a segmented body,' 'x has jointed legs,' and that conversely each of these sentences is deducible from the former sentence. By means of these stipulations about deducibility (in other words: about the truth-condition, about the method of verification, about the meaning) of the elementary sentence about 'arthropode' the meaning of the word 'arthopode' is fixed. In this way every word of the language is reduced to other words and finally to the words which occur in the so-called 'observation sentences' or 'protocal sentences.' It is through this reduction that the word acquires its meaning." Carnap (1932, 62-63).

[23] Cp. Wittgenstein (1978 [1953], no66).

4.1.4 The Psychologists' Objections

Contrary to the arguments against the classical theory in section 4.1.2, the following objections do not refute the classical theory because of the lack of definitional structure, but because psychological studies showed that definitions of concepts are irrelevant to psychological processes concerning our use of concepts.

A first objection is that even if some concepts have definitional structure, then the definitional structure is not psychological real.[24] In several experiments it has been proven that the psychological complexity of lexical concepts does not depend on their definitional complexity. For instance, Jerry and Janet Dean Fodor, and M. F. Garrett (henceforth FFG) name four types of negatives in semantic representation: *explicitly negative free morpheme* (e. g. *not*), *bound morphemes* (e. g. *in-, un-, im-*), *implicitly negative morphemes* (e. g. *any, much, give a damn, etc.*), and *pure definitional negatives* (PDNs) which have a negation as part of their definitions (e. g. bachelor).[25] Stating that "if it can be shown that their [=the PDNs'] linguistic representations do not contain 'negative', that would argue for the unreality of definitions"[26] they want to show that PDNs do not contain negatives. For the tests sentences containing one of the four types of negatives are used. Then the test compares explicit negative vs. morphological negative, explicit negative vs. implicit negative, and explicit negative vs. PDNs. For instance, the following two sentences are compared:

1) If practically all of the men in the room are not married, then few of the men in the room have wives.
2) If practically all of the men in the room are bachelors, then few of the men in the room have wives.

Then the reaction time to a correct evaluation is measured to draw conclusions regarding the validity of the working hypothesis.[27] As most interesting result FFG found out that "the difference between PDNs and explicit negatives was significantly greater than the difference between explicit negatives and either implicit or morphological negatives"[28]. They conclude that the result

[24] Cp. Laurence & Margolis (1999, 17) and Gonsalves (1988).
[25] Cp. FFG (1975, 520-521).
[26] *Ibid.*, 521.
[27] Cp. *ibid.*
[28] FFG (1975, 522).

suggests "that PDNs do not act as though they contain a negative element in their linguistic representation; and therefore, that PDNs are not semantically analyzed at any level of linguistic representation"[29]. These results militate against the classical view.[30]

The major attack on the classical theory, however, has to do with its theory of categorization.[31] In researches psychologists proved Ludwig Wittgenstein's claim that concepts have family resemblance structure which is one of the most influential arguments against classical theories.[32]

In a series of experiments Eleanor Rosch found out that some members of certain categories are more representative than others. But, according to the classical theory, any member of a category[33] is an equally good member because all members are instantiations of the necessary and sufficient properties. In studies, however, it has been proven that strawberries are less typical members of the category nut than peanuts or walnuts. Thus strawberries are not as typical members as peanuts.

In a further experiment Eleanor Rosch and Carolyn Mervis wanted to find out the characteristics and attributes which people typically connect with different kinds of everyday objects. Subjects had a minute and a half to list as many characteristics as they could think of. Then, the researchers listed all attributes mentioned by the subjects and credited them – depending on how often they were mentioned. As result, they found out that there were only few, or even none properties that were attributed to all members of a superordinate category.[34] So, there is hardly a common attribute of all members of the categories.[35] Additionally, they had the subjects rate the items on a 7-point scale to find out which items are most representative of a category. They found out that "the degree to which a given member possessed attributes in common with other members was highly correlated with the degree to which it

[29] *Ibid.*

[30] Gonsalves (1988) gives the results a different kind of explanation and does not agree with the conclusion of FFG.

[31] There is a series of experiments which cannot exhaustively be discussed. For a summary of these experiments cf. Smith & Medin (1981).

[32] Cp. Laurence & Margolis (1999, 24).

[33] The terms 'category' and 'concepts' are used synonymously in this chapter.

[34] Superordinate categories were furniture, vehicle, fruit, weapon, vegetable, and clothing. Examples of all categories were chair, car, orange, gun, peas, and pants. For the whole list cf. Rosch & Mervis (1975).

[35] For two third of the categories, there was one combining item; for the rest, there was none. When there was a common feature, it was no defining feature (e. g. "is edible", or "has four legs"). Cp. *ibid.*

was rated prototypical (representative) of the category name"[36]. For instance, robins possess quite many attributes that other birds also have, and therefore, robins are more representative members of the category bird, whereas chickens are less representative members.

A further objection against classical analyses can be derived from the mean reaction time for verification of category membership. Subjects were told either a superordinate category (e. g. musical instrument, or a basic level category (e. g. guitar), or a subordinate category (e. g. classical guitar). Then, they were shown pictures of objects and had to signal whether they think that the object on the picture belongs to the heard category. Rosch et al. found out that the mean reaction time was the fastest when the subjects heard basic level category names before. Superordinates and subordinates did not differ significantly from each other.[37]

These results pose problems for the classical theory because proponents of the classical theory cannot give an adequate explanation to these results. All members of certain categories should be equally representative and hence they should share the same necessary and jointly sufficient conditions. Hence it should not be possible that an item is a "better" or "worse" member of a category.[38]

From these decimating results new views have emerged which will be discussed in the next sections.[39]

4.2 Prototype Views

Prototype theories were developed in order to give an explanation of the psychological data which have been collected during the 1970s.[40] There are two

[36] *Ibid.*, 584.

[37] Rosch et al. (1976).

[38] Smith & Medin discuss a classical-view model for simple typicality effects. Roughly, it states that typical members have fewer features than atypical ones. They define typicality as an "inverse measure of complexity". Therefore, more time is needed to compare the features of atypical members. However, they reject the complexity model because it cannot explain why it takes no longer for an atypical probe to be confirmed that it is not a member of category than it takes for a typical probe. Cp. Smith & Medin (1981, 36).

[39] Smith & Medin (1981, 60) discuss further developments of the classical theory, but conclude that all of them still face insoluble problems.

[40] An important book by Edward Smith and Douglas Medin (1981) summarizes the psychological response to the empiricist's theory and different varieties of prototype views.

main kinds of prototype theories: exemplar[41], and probabilistic, or statistical views. Exemplar views hold that concepts are represented by their exemplars.[42] The core idea behind all probabilistic theories is that the extension of a concept cannot be given in necessary and sufficient conditions, but that the structure of a concept rather encodes a probabilistic analysis of the features which members of the concept tendentiously have.[43] In contrast to the classical view, a member of a concept may have a feature, but the member does not necessarily have it because it is only maintained that members have the encoded features with statistical certainty. An item might be classified as belonging to a concept, although it only has a sufficient number of features because not all features are weighted equally. For instance, penguins or chickens are birds, although they cannot fly. The ability to fly is a feature tendentiously subscribed to birds, yet, a member of the bird-category need not necessarily have this ability. This also explains why some birds are classified more easily than other birds: They have more of the features subscribed to a category. The following figure exemplifies these considerations including features with their statistical appearance:[44]

[41] For a detailed discussion of the exemplar view cf. Smith & Medin (1981). In this study, it is paid little attention to the exemplar view.

[42] Cp. *ibid.*, 143.

[43] Smith & Medin (1981) emphasize that not all proponents of a prototype theory have used features to describe concepts, but favoured dimensional or holistic patterns instead. However, both the dimensional and the holistic approach raise serious doubts. The dimensional approach is closely linked to the assumption of a metric space in which all items are somehow represented by a point in the metric space. As will be shown, Tversky (1977) doubts that the corresponding metric distance function is a proper function to measure the similarity between two represented items. The holistic approach cannot make sense to talk of templates for philosophical concepts such as justice or truth.

[44] This tabular is taken from Smith & Medin (1981, 63).

F_i \ X_i	**Robin**	**Chicken**	**Bird**	**Animal**
F_1	*moves* $\mathcal{P}(F_1\|X_1)$=1.0	*moves* $\mathcal{P}(F_1\|X_2)$=1.0	*moves* $\mathcal{P}(F_1\|X_3)$=1.0	*moves* $\mathcal{P}(F_1\|X_4)$=1.0
F_2	*winged* $\mathcal{P}(F_2\|X_1)$=1.0	*winged* $\mathcal{P}(F_2\|X_2)$=1.0	*winged* $\mathcal{P}(F_2\|X_3)$=1.0	
F_3	*feathered* $\mathcal{P}(F_3\|X_1)$=1.0	*feathered* $\mathcal{P}(F_3\|X_2)$=1.0	*feathered* $\mathcal{P}(F_3\|X_3)$=1.0	
F_4	*flies* $\mathcal{P}(F_4\|X_1)$=1.0		*flies* $\mathcal{P}(F_4\|X_3)$=0.8	
F_5		*walks* $\mathcal{P}(F_5\|X_2)$=1.0		*walks* $\mathcal{P}(F_5\|X_4)$=0.7
F_6	*sings* $\mathcal{P}(F_6\|X_1)$=0.9		*sings* $\mathcal{P}(F_6\|X_3)$=0.6	
F_7	*small size* $\mathcal{P}(F_7\|X_1)$=0.7		*small size* $\mathcal{P}(F_7\|X_3)$=0.5	
F_8		*medium size* $\mathcal{P}(F_8\|X_2)$=0.7		
F_9				*large size* $\mathcal{P}(F_9\|X_4)$=0.5

These results also explain the process of learning a concept. A young child who encounters a robin, first learns its features F_1, F_2, F_3, F_4, F_6, and F_7. Then the child may learn that a chicken which has features F_1, F_2, F_3, F_5, and F_8 is also a bird. F_1, F_2, and F_3 which have occurred in both cases are more likely to become representatives of the concept bird.

The most attractive aspect of the prototype theory is its treatment of categorization.[45] Categorization in prototype theories is modelled as a similarity comparison process as proposed by Amos Tversky in *Features of Similarity*[46],

[45] Cp. Laurence & Margolis (1999, 29).

[46] Tversky develops a new set-theoretical approach to similarity which supersedes geometric models of similarity that have been rejected. The most common geometric model defines similarity as a metric distance function, δ, that assigns to every tuple of points, (a, b) a non-negative number. δ fulfils minimality (i.e. $\delta(a, b) \geq \delta(a, a) = 0$), symmetry (i.e. $\delta(a, b) = \delta(b, a)$), and the triangle inequality (i.e. $\delta(a, c) \geq \delta(a, b) + \delta(b, c)$). Tversky lists empirical evidence against all of the three axioms. For instance, from the axiom of symmetry follows that statements of the form *a is like b* and *b is like a* should be judged true equally. So if someone judges *a is like b* to be true he or she should likewise *b is like a* judge to be true. However, there is empirical evidence that most commonly either *a is like b* is more often judged to be true than *b is like a* or the other way around. Therefore, the geometric model is said to be insufficient to give a proper explanation to appearances of similarity. Cp. Tversky (1977, 328). Tversky's (1977) new approach describes similarity as a *feature-matching process*. Given a set $\Delta = \{a, b, c, \ldots\}$ of objects under study. Further, Δ is represented by a set of features or attributes containing $A, B, C, \ldots$. The set of features $A, B, C \ldots$ refers to the objects $a, b, c, \ldots$. Then, the similarity, s, of a and b is defined as $s(a, b) := F(A \cap B, A \setminus B, B \setminus A)$, where F is the matching-function that measures the cardinality of common and distinctive features. F has three arguments: the common features of both A and B, the features that belong to A but not to B and those

or as a process described by an *accumulator model*:

> To determine that the instance is a member of the concept of fruit, one proceeds as follows: One first finds a feature match between two representations (either directly if the concept's feature is perceptual, or via identification features if the concept's feature is abstract), next takes the weight of the matching feature and puts it in an accumulator or counter, and then repeats this process over other features until the counter reaches some criterion value.[47]

The attractiveness of prototype theories lays in its appropriateness for the explanation of the problems the classical theory is faced with. For instance, typicality effects can be sufficiently explained. Typical members are categorized faster than atypical ones because they have more common features shared with their parent concept. A simple explanation can be given to the finding that typical features of concepts are listed more often than atypical ones: The features of the prototype are listed first. However, prototype theories face numerous problems as well.

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belonging to B but not to A. (The similarity function s has two features: s is monotone (That is: $A \cap C \subset A \cap B, A \setminus B \subset A \setminus C, B \setminus A \subset C \setminus A \Rightarrow s(a,c) \leq s(a,b)$) and is independent. That is, the ordering of the joint effect of any two components is independent of the fixed level of the third factor.)According to Tversky, similarity is a proximity relation, but there are other proximity relations such as prototypicality or representativeness. So let $P(a,\Lambda)$ be the degree of prototypicality of an object a with regard to a category Λ which has cardinality n. The prototypicality P is defined as $P(a,\Lambda) = p_n(\lambda \sum_{i=1}^{n} f(A \cap B_i) - \sum_{i=1}^{n} f(A \setminus B_i) - \sum_{i=1}^{n} f(B_i \setminus A)))$, where $B_i \in \Lambda$ $\forall i = \{1,\ldots,n\}$. The constant λ determines the weights of the features and p_n describes the effect of category size on prototypicality. A member a of a category is a prototype, if it maximizes $P(a,\Lambda)$, that is its features are highly common to the features of the members of the category and a has only few features that differ from the features of the other members. Tversky points out that Rosch and her collaborators have missed the importance of family resemblance which has been detected by Wittgenstein (1978 [1953]). Family resemblance can be understood as a network of similarity relations between various members of a category. To measure the degree of family resemblance, Tversky suggests the following definition: $R(\Lambda) = p_n(\lambda \sum_{i,j=1}^{n} f(A_i \cap B_i) - \sum_{i,j=1}^{n} f(A_i \setminus B_i) - \sum_{i,j=1}^{n} f(B_i \setminus A_i)))$. What distinguishes this definition from the definition of prototypicality is that the summations are over all elements a_i, b_j of category Λ. A member of a category is not only compared to all other members, but any member is compared to all other members of that category. Family resemblance equals the average similarity between all members of Λ. Cp. Tversky (1977, 348).

[47] Smith & Medin (1981, 65).

4.2.1 Problems for the Prototype Theory

Sharon Armstrong, Lila and Henry Gleitman (1983) revised three of the experiments of Rosch and her collaborators. They question the thesis that concepts are non-definitional, if the responses to exemplars of certain concepts are graded. If this thesis was true – they argue – it would also be true (by contraposition) that responses to exemplars of concepts must not be graded, if these concepts were definitional. When repeating the experiments of Rosch and her collaborators, Armstrong et al. did not only include everyday categories of objects (furniture, vehicle, fruit, weapon, vegetable, and clothing), but also well-defined categories such as even, and odd number, female, or plane geometry figure. These well-defined concepts ought not – according to the assumed hypothesis – yield graded responses. Yet, the results showed otherwise. The psychologists found out that both prototype and well-defined categories yield the same result. Subjects find it natural to rank exemplars of both categories depending on how typical they think these exemplars are as members of the category. For instance, apple is a better exemplar of the category fruit than olive, and 3 is a better example for odd number than 501.[48] They concluded, that the thesis that concepts are non-definitional because of graded responses to their exemplars is wrong.

4.3 Theory-Theory

A second type of theory which was developed as answer to the psychologists' objections are so-called theory-theories. According to a theory-theory, there is a relation between language and thought. A child's acquisition of an early concept can be seen analogous to a philosophy student hearing a scientific term like 'meta-physics' for the first time. The development of an understanding of concepts and the ability to apply the corresponding terms correctly equals the forming of a theory.

[48] In a second experiment Armstrong et al. (1983) tested the verification times for good and poorer exemplars of several prototype and well-defined categories. The results of Rosch et al. were reproduced. In a third experiment, subjects said whether they believe that membership in a certain category (the same categories were used as in the first experiment) is graded or categorical. Then, the subjects who answered that well-defined categories are categorical, that is the members of the category cannot be graded, participated in the first experiment. Although they agreed to the thesis that well-defined categories are categorical, the experiments yielded approximately the same results.

The theory-theory view states "that concepts are organized within and around theories, that acquiring a concept involves learning such a theory, and that deploying a concept in a cognitive task involves theoretical reasoning, especially of a causal-explanatory sort"[49].

Theory-theories originated from different roots: Firstly, developmental stage theories (e. g. Piaget and Vygotsky) were rejected. Theory-theorists such as Carey (1985), Gopnik and Meltzoff (1997), and Keil (1989) provided empirical evidence that was not in favour of developmental stage theories.[50] They started to form an alternative view of how cognitive development proceeds. A second root is the general critique of the prototype theories which were predominate in the 1970's. Murphy and Medin argued that these theories "are insufficient to provide an account of conceptual coherence" because these accounts rely on the notion of similarity relationships and are inadequate to explain intra- and inter-concept relations.[51]. A third root is the Kuhnian approach to the philosophy of science.

There are two varieties of theory-theories: The *concepts in theories* view and the *concepts as theories* view. The former view holds that concepts are constituents of theories. This view is defended by Carey (1985; 2009) as well as by Murphy & Medin (1999). Carey seems to hold a strong version of the concepts in theories view: "Concepts must be identified by the roles they play in theories."[52] In (1999) she states:

> Concepts are constituents of beliefs; that is, propositions are represented by structures of concepts. Theories are mental structures consisting of a mentally represented domain of phenomena and explanatory principles that account for them.[53]

The idea of Carey is that there is some body of knowledge similar to a scientific theory. The concepts which occur within these bodies of knowledge are individuated by their cognitive roles.[54] The *concepts as theories* view holds

[49] 'The Theory-Theory of Concepts,' by Weiskopf, *The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.*

[50] Carey (1985) focused her research on how children understand things differently from adults in biological domains, such as animals, living things, etc.

[51] Murphy & Medin (1985, 289). Murphy & Medin (1985, 291) hold that similarity is rather a by-product of conceptual coherence and not its determinant.

[52] Carey (1985, 198).

[53] Carey (1999, 460).

[54] Cp. also Laurence & Margolis (1999, 44).

that concepts are identified with miniature theories of a particular domain.[55] A question that any theory-theory has to answer is how the notion of a mentally represented theory is to be understood. Carey (1985) reduces theories to their explanatory power: "[A] theory is characterized by the phenomena in its domain, its laws and other explanatory mechanisms, and the concepts that articulate the laws and the representations of the phenomena"[56]. Further, explanation is fundamental to theories and explanatory mechanisms distinguish theories from other types of cognitive structures.[57] Gopnik & Meltzoff offer a detailed and strict characterization of what a theory is.[58] Murphy & Medin offer a more liberal interpretation of theory:

> When we argue that concepts are organized by theories, we use *theory* to mean any of a host of mental 'explanations', rather than a complete, organized, scientific account. For example, causal knowledge certainly embodies a theory of certain phenomena; scripts may contain an implicit theory of the entailment relations between mundane events; knowledge of rules embodies a theory of the relations between rule constituents; and book-learned, scientific knowledge certainly contains theories.[59]

An advantage of the theory-theory concerning categorization is its close relation to *psychological essentialism*. According to essentialism, people are apt to represent categories as if they contained some kind of *hidden property* rather than obvious properties. Instead of checking a list of properties, people categorize objects regarding its hidden unobservable essence.[60]

4.3.1 The Problem of Stability

The theory-theory is holistic, that is, the knowledge and use of a concept includes all propositions and relations involving that concept.[61] When a mentally represented theory changes, this gives rise to a change of the concept. So, concepts may change over time. Concepts are unstable. However, concepts

[55] Cf. for instance Keil (1989, 281).
[56] Carey (1985, 201).
[57] Cp. *ibid.*, 200-201.
[58] Cp. Gopnik & Meltzoff (1997, 32-41).
[59] Murphy & Medin (1985, 290).
[60] There is not only evidence that adults categorize objects regarding its hidden properties, but also that children think so. Gelman and Wellman (1991) have found evidence for essentialism emerging in childhood.
[61] Cp. Murphy & Medin (1985, 297).

should be more stable than this because people should possess more or less the same concepts. The same problem arises even within individuals because individuals also change their mentally represented theory over time. So concepts possessed by an individual also change from time to time.
There are mainly two replies to this objection. i) It need not be implausible that sometimes adults, or children and adults do not understand each other because they have different concepts.[62] ii) Nevertheless, there might be some kind of core that remains stable over time.[63]

4.3.2 The Philosophers' Response to the Psychological Theories

Saul Kripke and Hilary Putnam offer different arguments against classical and prototype views. Putnam argues that prototype structure is not constitutive for the reference of the concerning concept because meanings are not in the head.[64] Putnam illustrates this thesis with his famous example of the Twin Earth. Suppose that elsewhere in our universe there is a planet which is exactly like our Earth, that is, it equals our earth in all relevant aspects, the 'Twin Earth'. The only difference between our Earth and the Twin Earth is that the chemical formula for water on Twin Earth is not 'H_2O' but 'XYZ'. Nevertheless, both liquids share the same properties (density, boiling point, colour, etc.). Now imagine the year 1750 where the chemical formula for water was undetected, yet. Then the water experience of people on Earth and Twin Earth would be identical and the mental states of residents of the Earth and of the Twin Earth would also be identical. But when an earthling says 'water', he or she refers to H_2O, whereas when the twin earthling says 'water', he or she refers to XYZ. Thus, the extension of water_{Earth} and the extension of $\text{water}_{TwinEarth}$ are not equal. Putnam concludes that mental states are not sufficient to determine the reference of concepts.[65]
A similar argument why prototype or definitional structure does not determine a concept's reference is that it might be the case that a speaker possesses a concept, thus has a prototype conception of the concept, but is mistaken about the conceptual content:

[62] This objection is – for instance – made by Carey (2009, 378).
[63] This is the basic idea of dual-factor theories. See section 7 of this chapter.
[64] Cp. Putnam (1979 [1975], 37).
[65] Cp. *ibid.*, 31-34.

> Even if cats turn out to be robots remotely controlled from Mars we will still call them 'cats'; even if it turns out that the stripes on tigers are painted on to deceive us, we will still call them 'tigers'; even if normal lemons are blue (we have been buying and raising very atypical lemons, but don't know it), they are still lemons (and so are the yellow ones.)[66]

The example of the robot-cat or the blue lemon might be far-fetched. Let us instead think of thunder. In the ancient world, people used to think that thunder was a sign of angry gods. Although the people in the ancient world were mistaken about the nature of thunder, the term 'thunder' referred to the same phenomenon than it refers to nowadays. So, the theory about thunder that the people in the ancient world had is not constitutive for the concept's reference.

4.4 Fodor's Conceptual Atomism

Fodor's Conceptual Atomism is a radical alternative to all theories just mentioned, but it handles the criticism raised by Putnam and Kripke. One of Fodor's starting thesis is the compositionality of concepts because concepts are the constituents of thought and thought is compositional. The classical theory has the potential to explain compositional meaning, prototype theories and the theory-theory, however, cannot handle the phenomenon of compositionality of concepts.[67] Fodor & Lepore point out:

> There is a standard objection to the idea that concepts might be prototypes (or exemplars, or stereotypes): because they are productive, concepts must be compositional. Prototypes aren't compositional, so concepts can't be prototypes.[68]

The main idea is that infinitely many (complex) concepts can be constructed by composition of more primitive concepts because of the their productivity.[69]

[66] Putnam (1975a, 143).

[67] For objections against this thesis cf. Osherson & Smith (1988), and Kamp & Partee (1995).

[68] Fodor & Lepore, (1996, 253-254). It is consensus that productivity of concepts is a real phenomenon. Cp. Fodor & Lepore (1966, 257). A similar formulation of the compositionality constraint can be found in Robins (2002, 2): "The content of a complex (i.e., non-lexical) concept is exhaustively determined by the contents of its constituent concepts and the rules governing the combination of those constituents."

[69] Fodor & Lepore (1996, 254).

For instance, pet fish is a composition of pet and fish. According to the classical theory, the mental representation pet fish is the intersection of the set of pets with the set of fishs. Given compositionality, there should also be a prototype analysis of pet fish in terms of pet and fish. However, if we list all typical features concerning pet and fish and if we take the intersection of both sets of features, we do not get a list of typical features of a pet fish. Or, according to the exemplar view, a goldfish is an atypical exemplar of pet and an atypical exemplar of fish, but it is quite a good exemplar of pet fish. It could be objected that prototypes are idioms and pet fish is mentally represented by its own prototype description. Then, however, there would be indefinitely many prototype descriptions. A further response to this problem is that concepts must only be compositional in principle, not in practice.[70]

The theory-theory has also problems accommodating the compositionality of concepts. Fish might be a constituent of a biological theory and pet might be part of a theory about social behaviour. However, the knowledge about pet fish is not determined by the knowledge about fish and pets. A pet fish is kept in bowls and fed with flakes. Neither of this knowledge can be derived from existing theories about biology and social behaviour.[71]

Closely linked to the compositionality is what Laurence & Margolis call the *missing prototype problem*.[72] Fodor takes the Boolean operators *and*, *if*, *then*, *or*, and *not* into consideration. His thesis is that "for indefinitely many Boolean concepts, there isn't any prototype"[73]. For example, the concept isn't a cat obviously has no prototype. Furthermore, many complex concepts also lack a prototype representation:

> There may, for example, be prototypical *American cities* (New York, Chicago, Los Angeles), but there are surely no prototypical *American cities situated on the East Coast just a little south of Tennessee*. Similarly, there may be prototypical *grandmothers* (Mary Worth) and there may be prototypical *properties of grandmothers* (*good*, *old* Mary Worth). But there are surely no prototypical properties of *grandmothers most of whose grandchildren are married to dentists*.[74]

[70] Cp. Prinz (2002, ch. 11), or Robbins (2002).

[71] Cp. 'The Theory-Theory of Concepts,' by Weiskopf, *The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy*.

[72] The same argument could be made against the theory-theory.

[73] Fodor (1996, 260).

[74] Fodor (1981, 296-297).

These examples show that the problem of missing prototype is not an isolated problem of a few concepts, but that it refers to many concepts.
Based on these objections Fodor develops an atomistic view by adopting an informational semantics, instead of an inferential role semantics.[75]
Fodor rejects the common assumption of all theories just mentioned that lexical concepts have a semantic structure:

> Informational semantics denies that 'dog' means *dog* because of the way that it is related to other linguistic expressions ('animal' or 'barks', as it might be). Correspondingly, informational semantics denies that the concept DOG has its content in virtue of its position in a network of conceptual relations. So, then, the intuition that there are other concepts that anybody who has DOG must also have is one that informational semantics can make no sense of.[76]

The atomistic view is mainly a negative view. But if the content of concepts is unstructured, an explanation of how reference can be determined is needed. Fodor holds that the content of a primitive concept is determined by the concept's standing in an causal-cum-nomological relation to things in the world:

> I'm going to assume that what bestows content on mental representations is something about their causal-cum-nomological relations to the things that fall under them: for example, what bestows upon a mental representation the content *dog* is something about its tokenings being caused by dogs.[77]

A major advantage of atomism is that one does not need to have a concept in order to have another concept. For instance, one can have the concept dog without having the concept animal. A further benefit is that neither the problem about ignorance and error nor the problem about stability arise. Unless the mind-world nomic relation between the mental representation dog and the entity 'dog' is robust, it does not matter what beliefs someone has about dogs, or if the beliefs are wrong, or if people share different beliefs about dogs.
Despite its benefits, at least the strong version of atomism has been under serious attack. If a strong version of atomism is true, then radical nativism about

[75] An informational semantics claims that the conceptual content is constituted by a causal mind-world relation, whereas an inferential role semantics claims that the conceptual content is constituted by the inferences it is involved in. Cp. Park (2008, 61-64).
[76] Fodor (1981, 73-74).
[77] *Ibid.*, 12.

concepts is true. Radical nativism means that all concepts are innate which is a counterintuitive claim. Consider, for instance, the concept doorknob (Fodor's example) which we intuitively would not think to be innate.[78] Therefore, the atomist view has often been rejected.

4.5 Dual-Factor Theory

Any theory about concepts which assumes that concepts have a structure (be it a classical, prototype, or a theory structure) are mainly theories about complex concepts. The problem of these theories is that they – except from the classical view – offer no proper theory of primitive concepts. If these theories want to avoid an infinite regress or circularity, they have to assume the existence of primitive concepts and also offer a declaration concerning their existence. So, even if one is not willing to accept the claim of strong atomism that all concepts are primitive, the atomistic view seems to have its justified role in a theory of concepts.[79]

We have seen that all theories of concepts have their benefits, but also have their drawbacks. The classical theory has trouble with fast categorization, but can accommodate compositionality naturally. Fast categorization can in turn be explained by the prototype theory. On the other hand, the prototype theory has trouble with the compositionality of concepts. So, why not assume that a single type of theory of natural kind concepts cannot explain all of these phenomena and suppose that natural kind concepts have multiple types of structure? Laurence & Margolis' dual theory connects atomistic cores with prototypes and theory structure. The atomistic cores are i) compositional, ii) determine reference, iii) act as the "ultimate arbiters" of categorization, and iv) provide stability.[80] Such an account allows that concepts have prototype-structured identification procedures and that, e. g., explanatory inferences depend on theory structure. Other non-natural kind concepts (mathematical or logical concept) which are well-defined may have a definable core, but as the study by Sharon Armstrong and Lila and Henry Gleitman (1983) suggests they may also have prototype structure concerning identification procedures,

[78] Cp. Fodor (1981, 135).
[79] Cp. Park (2008, 62-65).
[80] Cp. Laurence & Margolis (1999, 74).

but this prototype structure is not constitutive for the reference.[81]

4.6 Inferences for Thick Concepts

Thick concepts are complex and hence non-natural kind concepts, but still they might have definitional cores.[82] Conceptual analyses have a long tradition in philosophy, but as William Ramsey (1992) suggests it is unlikely that any philosophical concept has definitional structure because of the long-term failure to find proper definitions. Although philosophical analysis has been and still is fruitful to deepen our understanding, the claim that thick concepts have a well-defined structure is hard to prove.[83]
Jussi Jlkkä observes:

> The strategy of conceiving of philosophical terms as natural kind terms is even less plausible in the case of concepts like JUSTICE, VIRTUE, or GOOD. The long history of failure to define philosophical concepts suggests that these concepts also lack definitions. It is improbable that they are prototypes or exemplar sets either, since the long history of philosophical study suggests that they involve much more complex, theoretical aspects than simple prototypes or sets of exemplars would. An account of a prototype or exemplar concept could be given basically in terms of a list of the features which are more or less typical of the category members, but it seems that philosophical concepts cannot be captured this easily. How, then, are philosophical concepts structured? If the theory-theorists are correct in claiming that even artefact concepts involve theoretical elements, it is well possible that so do philosophical concepts (note that this does not necessarily mean that they should have definite concept cores).[84]

Chapter 6.5 will try to outline a proposal how the theory structure of thick concepts could be explained within a theory of the thick.

[81] Cp. Jylkkä (2008, 55-56).
[82] Certainly a nonseparationist might claim that they are natural kind concepts even if it appears difficult to prove.
[83] Cp. Jylkkä (2008, 57-59.) for similar thoughts.
[84] Jylkkä (2008, 59).

Chapter 5

Victor Kraft's Two-Component Analysis

The question of (dis)entangleablity is often directly tied to whether someone is a cognitivist or a non-cognitivist about values. Cognitivists most often hold that thick concepts cannot be disentangled and, therefore, support a non-separationist view, whereas non-cognitivists are separationists because they take thick concepts to be separable.
The debate about thick concepts and their role in the discussion between cognitivist and non-cognitivists dates back to the first half of the twentieth century. Hence immersing deeper into the discussion between these two opposing positions one might find interesting ideas which may still be relevant and of high interest for the ongoing debate. Inspiration might even be found in the works of philosophers from whom one would least expect it: the logical positivists.
The members of the Vienna Circle whom are called logical positivists at least agree upon one issue – the critique of metaphysics which absolutely denies metaphysics in its most radical version. This critique does not only bear on sentences of metaphysics, but on all sentences which are not verifiable according to the verifiability principle. These sentences also include all ethical and moral sentences as has already been remarked in section 2.2. Let us bear in mind the following quote from Carnap, in order to additionally illustrate the alleged 'paradigmatic' position of the logical positivists concerning the status of ethical and moral sentences:

> Further, the same judgement must be passed on all *philosophy of norms*, or *philosophy of value*, on any ethics or aesthetics as a normative disci-

> pline. For the objective validity of a value or norm is (even on the view of the philosophers of value) not empirically verifiable nor deducible from empirical statements; hence it cannot be asserted (in a meaningful statement) at all. In other words: Either empirical criteria are indicated for the use of 'good' and 'beautiful' and the rest of the predicates that are employed in the normative sciences, or they are not. In the first case, a statement containing such a predicate turns into a factual judgement, but not a value judgement; in the second case, it becomes a pseudo-statement. It is altogether impossible to make a statement that expresses a value judgement.[1]

This quote which is taken from *The Elimination of Metaphysics Through Logical Analysis of Language* is possibly the most cited statement of a member of the Vienna Circle on the status of ethical and moral sentences. Often it is also employed to show that the logical positivists had no interest in questions concerning ethics and morals. According to critics, Carnap's position leads to a moral nihilism. Carnap himself reports that Oskar Kraus who is such a critic portrayed Carnap as dangerous for morals. Kraus even wanted to report Carnap's 'nihilist position' to the authorities.[2]

The thesis that the logical positivists were not interested in questions concerning ethics and moral is regarded as outdated what is shown by the contributions in Siegetsleitner (2010).

Regarding the meaninglessness of ethical judgements, the conceptualisation of normative ethics seems difficult to achieve. The prejudice that the logical positivists held all kinds of normative ethics as an absurd endeavour appears to be a logical consequence of the postulated meaninglessness of all ethical sentences. The attempt of Victor Kraft[3] (1880-1975), a member of the Vienna Circle[4], in his *Foundations for a scientific analysis of value (Die Grundlagen einer wissenschaftlichen Wertlehre)*[5] is all the more remarkable when taking

[1] Carnap (1932, 77).

[2] Carnap (1993, 128).

[3] Victor is sometimes written with 'c' and sometimes with 'k'. As a matter of uniformity, Victor will be written continuously with 'c', even if it will have to be adjusted in quotes.

[4] Kraft did not belong to the hard core of the Circle. Cp. Kraft (1981 [1951], xi).

[5] In 1981 an English translation of the *Grundlagen* has been published by Henk L Mulder. The quotations cited are taken from the English translation. Whenever the literal expression seems important, it will also be quoted from the 1951's edition in German. Furthermore, it will be complied with the English translation of certain expressions. The 1951's edition is a revised edition of the 1937's edition. In the second edition, Kraft added the section about the system of values and supplemented the second part of the book.

into account this postulated meaninglessness of ethical sentences:[6] In contrast to Ayer's emotivism, Kraft aims to show that ethical sentences must not be non-cognitively meaningless despite their cognitively meaninglessness.[7]

After having studied geography and history at the University of Vienna, Kraft first graduated with an epistemological book, *Die Erkenntnis der Außenwelt* (1903), and then habilitated with *Weltbegriff und Erkenntnisbegriff* (1915). But throughout his life, he worked on a possibility to find a proper justification of moral norms which was quite unusual for a logical positivist.[8] Although Kraft had to retire after the forced incorporation of Austria by Nazi Germany because of the Jewish origin of his wife and though he lost his *venia legendi*[9], he stayed in Vienna and tempted to revive the logical positivism. However, the discussions about the logical positivism were proceeded in England and in the USA and Kraft's work has not been noted for a long time.[10] Only recently there has been new interest in Kraft's work and two studies (Vollbrecht 2004; Radler 2006) were published which treat both his epistemological and his ethical writings.

In this chapter Kraft's thoughts about thick concepts and value judgements will be elaborated because many interesting and helpful ideas can be found to promote the debate about the thick. In the last chapter of this study, his ideas about the thick will be includes into the debate.

[6] In his introduction of the English translation, Topitsch indicates that in English-speaking countries Kraft is especially known for being a member of the Vienna Circle. Cp. Kraft (1981 [1951], xi).

[7] This point has also been made by Hegselmann (1970, 29).

[8] Rutte even holds the opinion that Kraft developed his philosophical works concerning morals *en passant*. Cp. Rutte (1986, 162).

[9] Cp. Stadler (1997, 717).

[10] Vollbrecht traces this back to *catastrophic circumstances*. A year after the publishing of *Die Grundlagen einer wissenschaftlichen Wertlehre* the Nazis invaded Austria. According to Kraft, all exemplars of the *Grundlagen* had been burnt under their dictatorship. After the *Anschluss* Kraft was in scientific isolation because he was the only member of the Vienna Circle who stayed in Vienna. The other members interested in practical questions (Schlick, Neurath and Zilsel) were not alive any more. The publication of *Der Wiener Kreis* did neither succeed in regaining Kraft's reputation nor in reviving the logical positivism. On the contrary: Kraft strengthened the impression that the Vienna Circle was not interested in moral and ethical question because he focused on theoretical issues. For further reasons why Kraft has not been received for a long times cf. Vollbrecht (2004, 6-8), and also Kraft (1981 [1951], xiv).

5.1 In Between Subjectivism and Realism

In Kraft's time, there were two predominant positions in metaethics: subjectivism (such as the emotivism supported by Ayer (1956 [1936]))[11] and realism about values (intuitionism of Scheler (1954 [1913]) and Hartmann (1962 [1926])). Emotivists state that value judgements are mere expression of feelings lacking cognitive content, whereas intuitionists maintain that there are absolute values which can be detected through intuition. According to Topitsch, "[t]here seemed to be scarcely any prospects in the inter-war period for a theory of value with an empiricist basis", on the other hand, "that only made one all the more necessary"[12].

Kraft rejects both subjectivism and objectivism. Considering his belonging to the Vienna Circle, it is a natural thing to understand why he rejects Scheler's intuitionist realism about values. According to the logical positivists, intuition is not an adequate type to come to genuine knowledge. Kraft follows this line of argument: "Die Intuition trägt noch nicht die Gewähr ihrer Richtigkeit in sich, eine emotionale noch weniger als eine intellektuelle, sie verbürgt noch keine sichere Erkenntnis."[13] Intentional feelings and emotions only constitute personal insight. If, however, intuition is supposed to constitute super-individual legitimation, then any individual intuition of value must coincide for all evident value judgements.[14] This is obviously not the case. Kraft admits that "there is something attractive about this [intuitionist] analysis of value, with its consistency and the novel conception it employs to sweep away all past difficulties"[15]. Furthermore, he thinks that it is attractive to be able to ascribe objectiveness to values. Yet, he criticises the relation between values as ideal essences and their realization in the world:

> If values, as timeless ideal essences, are contrasted to empirical reality, it becomes impossible to understand how they can stand in any relation to reality. This relation is supposed to consist in the fact that values 'realize' themselves in empirical things and persons, that they 'attach' themselves to these, thereby 'lending' them value. Yet, as ideal essences,

[11] Ayer's emotivism is in accordance with the claims of the logical positivists. His position is often seen as a paradigmatic ethical position of the logical positivism, although he never belonged to the Vienna Circle.

[12] Kraft (1981 [1951], xiv).

[13] Kraft (1963, 26).

[14] Cp. Kraft (1981 [1951], 154).

[15] *Ibid.*, 4.

> values cannot make a transition into reality or connect themselves with reality without losing their character as ideal essences and becoming something other than values, viz., empirical reality.[16]

In accordance with logical positivism, he thinks that the assumption that values are platonic abstract objects is unfounded metaphysics (*haltlose Metaphysik*)[17].
Otherwise, he does not want to be exposed to what he calls an 'unrestricted subjectivism'[18]. He objects against Ayer that value judgements are not like interjections because they have a significant content. Value concepts are not mere 'pseudo'-concepts.[19]
Instead, he wants to find a third way in between subjectivism and realism which he constitutes in his *Foundations for a scientific analysis of value*. On the one hand, he works analytically, on the other hand, some of his findings are empirical. His methodology is therefore in consistency with the demands of the logical positivism. His claim that the rejection of absolute moral facts is not necessarily linked to a moral subjectivism is one of his central motives.[20]

5.2 Analysis of Value Concepts

In his *Foundations* Kraft analyses value concepts[21] to reveal the elements of which their content is constituted. At first he distinguishes between values and bearers of value (valuable things). A bearer of value is an entity to which a value is ascribed. Bearers of value "may be material or spiritual or mental, a remedy or a character trait of a person or a poem, something real or something ideal, a meaning. Bearers of value may be things or persons."[22] Goods are not identical to values, but *have* value. Values, however, are "universal conceptual contents [which] are presented in value concepts"[23], values

[16] *Ibid.*
[17] Kraft (1968, 100).
[18] Kraft (1981 [1951], xvii).
[19] Cp. *ibid.*, p. 48 and footnote no. 119.
[20] Cp. Vollbrecht (2004, 21).
[21] Kraft uses the term 'value concepts'. Value concepts can be both thick and thin concepts. Kraft does not differentiate between these two. Even if he does not use the terms thick and thin concepts, sometimes these terms will be used to be able to distinguish between both.
[22] Kraft (1981 [1951], 6).
[23] *Ibid.*, 6-7.

are "unified and timeless"[24], this is, "ideal units of meaning"[25]. The ideality of values is not ontological, but conceptual.[26] Thus, his meaning of ideality is different from Hartmann's "Being-in-itself". Instead, Kraft understands values as "something that can be pointed to as identical among the wealth and variety of evaluations"[27]. According to him, values only 'exist' insofar as they are *ascribed* to a bearer of value. This means, values are dependent from an evaluating subject and do not exist independently. Consequently, values are not genuine phenomena. A thing or person receives a qualification that characterizes the relation between the evaluating person and the bearer of value.[28] Evaluation is a *relation* between an individual and a thing or another person. If this relation holds, the thing or person becomes a bearer of value for the individual.
Value concepts are expressed by value predicates, e. g. *x is sinful*, *x is a sin*, or *x sins*.[29] Value concepts have in common that they indicate whether something is valuable or valueless. What differentiates value concepts from each other is their belonging to certain general categories. Kraft distinguishes between the following spheres and value concepts:

- **moral sphere** (conscientious, honourable), the aesthetic sphere (harmonious, dissonant, lovely, ill-proportioned);
- value concepts concerning **utility** (helpful, obstructive, advantageous, disadvantageous);
- **religious sphere** (pious, holy, sinner, heretic), value concepts concerning **law and justice** (just, usurious, negligent, slander, crime);
- **biological sphere** (healthy, ill, salutary, withered, degenerate, barren);
- value concepts denoting **abilities** (industrious, lazy, clever, stupid, sharp-witted, gullible, ingenious, foolish, (mal)adroit, well (ill)-considered, deft, energetic, feeble);
- value concepts concerning **emotions and endeavours** ((un)pleasant, pleasing, displeasing, enchanting, abhorrent, satisfying, attractive, boring, captivating, repellent, repulsive, unbearable, (un)comfortable, embarrassing);

[24] Kraft (1981 [1951], 7).
[25] *Ibid.*
[26] Cp. Kraft (1963, 26).
[27] Kraft (1981 [1951], 6).
[28] Cp. *ibid.*, 41.
[29] Cp. *ibid.*, 10.

- value concepts that express the **nature of an object in relation to our needs** ((im)perfect, adequate, insufficient, deficient, scanty); and
- value concept **of the most general sort** (good, bad, excellent, valuable, worthless, well, evil, praiseworthy, blameworthy.).[30]

Krafts classification is much more differentiated as those proposed in the current literature. Usually, only three spheres are distinguished: the moral or ethical, the prudential or epistemological, and the aesthetic sphere.[31]
Kraft emphasizes that the sole characteristic common to all value concepts is the function of valuation. The differentiating feature is their non-evaluative 'material or factual' content that is specific in every value concept (except in the general *thin* concepts). This logical analysis of value concepts reveals that thick concepts contain two components: a non-evaluative 'purely factual' and the distinguishing evaluative component.



Kraft calls his two-component analysis an analysis of "fundamental significance" because it shows that value judgements have – in contrast to the assumption of subjectivism – non-evaluative content. But his analysis also "signals the collapse of the main thesis of absolutism with respect to values:

[30] Cp. *ibid.*, 10-6.
[31] Cf. FitzGerald & Goldie (2012); Kirchin (2010). FitzGerald & Goldie point out that some thick concepts belong to more than one sphere (e. g. aesthetical usage of crude as applied to an artwork, or ethical usage as applied to humour).

that values are unitary qualities which are immediately perceived and which therefore must simply be accepted as they are"[32].
Kraft's account is one of the first separationist two-component analyses. What distinguishes him from other classical separationists, as for instance Hare or Stevenson, will become clear in the next sections.

5.3 Psychological Analysis of Evaluations

As has been explained by Kraft, thick concepts are differentiated by their non-evaluative content. What they have in common is their evaluative character. The evaluative character, that is "the ultimate ground of value"[33], can neither be analysed logically nor conceptually because "the pure evaluative meaning is logically ultimate, non-derivative, and cannot be reduced to, constructed from, another concept"[34]. The evaluative element of a thick concept has no truth value and is cognitively meaningless. Yet, Kraft does not stop his investigation at this point. According to him, a psychological analysis of the evaluative character is still possible: "We must investigate the way in which distinction comes into being, the means whereby it is related to other phenomena and the way in which it differs from them, in which it is delimited."[35] Kraft points out that the methods of psychology are empirical because psychological knowledge is factual knowledge.[36] He is interested in the psychology of the relation of evaluation.

5.3.1 Methodological Approach

Older representatives of psychological value theory (Ehrenfels, Meinong, and Kreibig) do not attract interest in Kraft because their investigations have serious methodological defects.[37] Investigations using methods of scientific psychology which have been justified by the Würzburg group are also rejected. Kraft criticises that they have tried "to investigate such a complex act as evaluating by means of the simple schema of reaction experiments"[38]. However,

[32] Kraft (1981 [1951], 14).
[33] *Ibid.*, 22.
[34] *Ibid.*
[35] *Ibid.*
[36] Cp. Kraft (1950, 22).
[37] *Ibid.*
[38] *Ibid.*, 23.

the value character is a complicated matter which cannot be investigated in experiments without any preparing theoretical considerations. Therefore, "[a] thorough analysis of the phenomenon of value must be made before the situation becomes ready for the application of experimental methods"[39]. The psychological analysis must start with a genetic analysis, that is, it must investigate how evaluations emerge and come into being.[40] To understand the emergence of valuations during childhood development, Kraft employs records of continuous observations of particular children[41], statements and autobiographical observations of adolescents and school children, questionnaires and essays about issues concerning values or diary entries[42], as well as biographical and autobiographical material. Kraft's analysis should rather be understood as a preparatory work because the empirical data on which he refers is not sufficiently scientific and should be supplemented with further experimental findings. His psychological analysis is to be understood as a "preliminary analysis and an explication of value phenomenon"[43].

5.3.2 Evaluating and Adopting an Attitude

Firstly, Kraft differentiates evaluative attitudes from neutral attitudes towards objects. A neutral behaviour is a behaviour which lacks any emotional colouring (*ira*) and any direct intention or endeavour with a definite orientation (*studium*). If, otherwise, something concerns us, then it triggers emotions and feelings and at the same time an endeavour to avoid or to maintain it, or to treat something in a friendly or hostile fashion. The endeavour may be reduced to a sole acceptance or repulsion. This two-sided pair of ‹*emotion, endeavour*› constitutes the *adoption of an attitude*. A neutral behaviour is characterised by the absence of the pair ‹*emotion, endeavour*›.
The adoption of an attitude of acceptance or rejection finds expression in praising or blaming which is involved in value concepts. But positive and negative attitudes cannot be reduced to acceptance or rejection: "Agreement or denial, friendly or hostile – these are intended as only very general descriptions of the orientation of an attitude. The nature of positive or negative attitudes may

[39] *Ibid.*, 24.
[40] Cp. *ibid.*, 27.
[41] Cf. Preyer (1912). A classics which has been published in a 9. edition.
[42] Cf. Bühler (1927) and Bühler (1967).
[43] Kraft (1981 [1951], 28).

vary considerably, depending upon the nature and intensity of the elements of emotion or endeavour particularly involved."[44]

But evaluation is not merely adopting an attitude.[45] This identification would be to simplifying because sometimes (e. g. when indicating that something is valuable for someone else or if a speaker utters a conventional value judgement which he himself or she herself does not support), the speaker does not have the corresponding emotions or feelings.[46] So, the adoption of an attitude is not even necessary for an evaluation, and also, adopting an attitude alone is not sufficient for an evaluation. If this was the case, it would already be an evaluation, if a young child not even having the ability to speak shows that it dislikes something. For instance, it would be an evaluation, if the young child showed a preference for certain foods, pet animals, toys, or for going on a walk. But, according to Kraft, evaluations are necessarily linked to a conscious use of language. One cannot speak about evaluations unless someone has the ability to speak. To make an evaluation, which is distinct from sole attitude adoption, one has to have a deeper understanding of thick and thin concepts: "We cannot speak of evaluating before a child has any comprehension of value concepts."[47]

Kraft differentiates three steps in the development of evaluation. In the first step, a child perceives an object as pleasant or painful. The child expresses his pleasure or pain towards the perceived objects (e. g. through an interjection, smiling, or crying). The second step is that the child shows feelings, if reminded of the things it likes/dislikes. It does not need to perceive the object to feel pleasure or pain. Rather, the imagination of the object is sufficient for feeling pleasure or pain. Finally, the child utters an evaluation through a value concept.[48] Kraft exemplifies this with an example. Imagine a one year old boy who sees a beautiful sunset. The boy might interject "Oooh!" and pointing towards the sunset while his face expresses admiration. At the age of four the same boy sees a sunset again. However, the sunset does not lead

[44]Kraft (1981 [1951], 45).

[45]Cp. *ibid.*, 30.

[46]Cp. *ibid.* For instance, outsiders to moral communities, or FitzGerald & Goldie's (2012) example of the 'dispute arbitrator' who judges that someone's behaviour was offensive without feeling any offence or resentment herself. Prinz (2006, 32) mentions psychopaths who treat wrong as if it were congruent to prohibited by local authorities. He concludes that psychopaths cannot be adequate moral judges.

[47]Kraft (1981 [1951], 31).

[48]According to Kraft, this takes place during the second or third year of a child's life. Cp. *ibid.*

him to make an interjection, but rather a value judgement like "It's beautiful! It's like fire!". In the first case, the boy adopts an attitude, which is expressed through the interjection, and in the second case, the boy even utters a value predicate. His application of 'beautiful' shows that he has learned the semantic content of beautiful. If a child learns the meaning of good or bad and in which situation to use them, something new is entering his conciousness: By uttering a value judgement the speaker consciously ascribes a particular qualification or characterization to an object. What differentiates an evaluation from an attitude adoption, is the *conciousness* of value, its sense of praise and blame. The question remains how the conciousness of value emerges. Towards the end of the second year, Kraft reports, a child starts to use thin concepts (nice, good, bad). In the third year, the child employs further quite general value concepts (naughty to imply that something is bad). Value concepts are learnt contemporaneously with concepts in general. The child learns to classify the phenomena in concordance with its belonging to certain categories, that is, the child learns the semantic meaning of the concepts. The evaluations which are employed by the use of thin concepts are connected to the pleasant or unpleasant colouring attaching to an object. For instance, a food is called 'good' or 'bad' depending on its taste. The child experiences pleasure and displeasure as something that exists simultaneously with the perceived object: "From the element of pleasure or pain, the object takes on, for the child's consciousness, a new characterization, similar to a property: it is designated as 'good' , 'nice', and so forth."[49] A child ascribes a value concept to an object as a non-evaluative property. A little child cannot separate the subjective from the objective, yet. The child gives a rather objective than a subjective characterisation. The process of understanding the subjective starts to develop at the age of four. And "[o]nly when the child comes to remark the actually distinctive position of the sources of pleasure and pain and to single it out does a conscious distinction result. Only when he becomes conscious of the special character of objects connected with pleasure and pain does value emerge."[50]

The distinction is a process of abstracting. A child learns that all the things he likes (e. g. chocolate, cats, going on a walk, bananas) have something in common which is not a genuine feature of these things. What they have in

[49] *Ibid.*, 36.
[50] *Ibid.*, 40.

common is their "pleasant quality"[51].

To summarize, at the beginning a child uses a value term without comprehending its evaluative point. For instance, the family of the child might always talk about the 'good grandmother'. The child might refer to his grandmother when speaking of the 'good'. The child uses 'good' as the grandmother's name.[52] The child reaches the stage of value comprehension when it understands that a value term is used to form a distinction, but it does not quite get the special sense, its value nuance, of the corresponding value term. For instance, uttering the thick concepts 'magnificent', 'vile' or 'heavenly' a two-year-old child only assimilates adults. It comprehends that the term expresses an evaluation, but it does not grasp its value nuance because the value terms are too differentiated for its age. The differentiation and full comprehension of value concepts arise, finally, through the linking of the value characteristic to richer non-evaluative contents.[53]

To conclude: Evaluating is adopting an attitude consciously and actively. The difference between the two lies in the conciousness of value. However, it is not the case that an objects gains a further feature, but rather a special qualification or colouring that characterizes its relation to us.[54] Concerning values, Kraft is a subjectivist. According to him, values are not genuine features of objects, but they only exist in relation to a perceiving subject.[55] This distinguishes him clearly from realists about value, who hold that values are real features of objects.

Regarding a descriptive-psychological view, the characteristic of value is something specific and ultimate. Therefore, it is non-reducible to any concept. The sense of the evaluative element of a thick concept is the significance and implications for our behaviour[56]:

> The characteristic of value consists in an object's being known as distinguished under a specific characterization, 'distinction' referring to the special function of being an immediate determinant of an attitude. The distinction conferred on an object by a value predicate stems from

[51] Kraft (1981 [1951], 46).

[52] A similar example is given by FitzGerald & Goldie (2012): The selfish toddler, who uses selfish to show his dislike and anger towards other children, but is not mature enough to feel the complex emotions of guilt and resentment that are connected to the use of selfish.

[53] Cp. Kraft (1981 [1951], 34-35).

[54] Cp. *ibid.*, 41.

[55] Cp. *ibid.*, 36-37.

[56] Cp. *ibid.*, 44.

> its characterizing the object's relation to our attitude. It pertains ultimately to the difference between what moves us to adopt an attitude and what leaves us indifferent. Thus value predicates are entirely different in kind from the predicates ascribing properties to an object.[57]

Thick concepts are different from neutral adjectives: Ascribing a value predicate to an object often means that the speaker is moved to adopt a certain attitude, whereas the use of neutral predicates means that the speaker is rather indifferent. However, a speaker must not necessarily be moved to adopt an attitude when applying a thick concept. As became clear at the beginning of this section, value predicates can be used without having the appropriate attitude.

5.3.3 Sources of Distinction

The impression could arise that Kraft holds a hedonistic theory of action similar to Moritz Schlick.[58] Kraft admits that the hedonistic motivating forces play a significant role in evaluation. Yet, Kraft doubts that pleasure and pain are the sole sources for distinction because many evaluations seem to be more complex. It might even be possible that an object is excelled although it does not evoke any pleasure or pain.
Are there any other sources from which a distinction might stem? This question already implicates that Kraft's answer will be 'yes'. In what follows, these different sources of distinction distinguished by Kraft will be presented.

(a) **Pleasure-pain** Pleasure and pain are sources of distinction when sense qualities such as smells and tastes, light and color, or notes and sounds are concerned. An object is distinguished in virtue of being pleasant or unpleasant within itself.[59]
Sense qualities might also occur in "simultaneous or sequential complexes (...) as linear figures or patchworks, as corporeal forms, as rhythms and melodies, as harmonies of color and tone"[60]. The sense qualities of which

[57] *Ibid.*
[58] Cp. Vollbrecht (2004, 54). Schlick's (1984 [1930], 80) moral philosophy is based on the assumption that pleasure and pain are the sole sources of distinction: "[V]on den als Motive wirkenden Vorstellungen setzt sich die schließlich am meisten lustbetonte oder die am wenigsten unlustbetonte durch und verdrängt die übrigen, und damit ist die Handlung eindeutig bestimmt."
[59] Cp. Kraft (1981 [1951], 53-54).
[60] *Ibid.*, 54.

the complex consists need to be harmonic or proportional to evoke pleasure and pain. A disharmonic composition does not evoke pleasure, but rather pain. According to Kraft, the distinction is based upon "elementary aesthetic emotions"[61].

Pleasure and pain might not necessarily rest upon sense qualities, but might also accompany bodily or mental activities. This so-called "functional pleasure" might for instance result from sports or mathematical riddles. It exists only when the activity itself causes pleasure or pain and not the result of the activity. This excludes all kinds of pleasures resulting from the achievements or consequences of an activity. Functional pleasure is pursued for the sake of the pleasure gaining from the activity. One might also think of the Aristotelian connection between pleasure and activities.[62]

Yet, Kraft argues that hedonism has never attempted to establish its thesis in detail, that pleasure and pain are the only sources of distinction. Kraft relies on Heinrich Gomperz's critic on hedonism which "has received far too little attention"[63]. According to Gomperz, there is a variety of motivational sources such as habit, imitation, suggestion, or compulsion.

(b) **Feelings and emotions** The dichotomy of pleasure and pain is not enough to cover all phenomena to which values are assigned. Kraft, therefore, analyses the relation between a distinction and affective emotions which have also been held to explain distinctions. Especially Scheler and Hartmann[64], and pupils of Brentano, Meinong and Ehrenfels have declared feelings as the "empirical-psychological basis of value"[65]. And also in recent papers, the role of emotions concerning the usage of thick concepts is considered to be important. Chloë FitzGerald and Peter Goldie (2012) say that emotional responses are tightly connected to the thick, Allan Gibbard (1992) speaks of 'warranted feelings' which are involved in thick judgements, Christine Tappolet (2004) holds that thick concepts are related to affective states, and Jesse Prinz (2006) claims

[61] Kraft (1981 [1951], 54).
[62] Cf. books VII and X of the Nicomachean Ethics.
[63] Kraft (1981 [1951], 51).
[64] According to Scheler, the emotional feeling possesses evidence and is a cognitive method which equals the theoretical comprehension.
[65] Kraft (1981 [1951], 60).

that there is an equivalence relation between emotions and moral judgements.[66] Kraft points out the importance of emotions concerning the usage of value concepts, but he claims that the explanatory force of feelings is overestimated: Often the arousal of feeling is simply a phenomenon resulting from the fact that one is confronted with something that he or she already distinguishes or values. The distinction in virtue of feelings and affective emotions is only secondary. For instance,

> [i]t is not gratitude that bestows value upon the donor, the helper, the provider; that he has already. Even where the gratitude is lacking, where the gift, the act of kindness is accepted without a murmur, the donor or helper may very well be distinguished, if only as the source of these welcome services, available for repeated exploitation. Thus the attribution of value to donor or provider does not in the least depend upon the gratitude he evokes in the recipient. He is distinguished by the fact of having caused enjoyment, by having bestowed something that was desired; gratitude is simply a consequence.[67]

The distinguishing function of emotions becomes clear when turning to cases where the distinction is primary. As an example, Kraft takes the story of a sixteen-year-old girl:

> When my brother had scarlet fever, I had to spend seven weeks with my dear grandmama. How I love to think about that time! It was in winter, as it happened, and every evening in the twilight, when it was still too early to light the lamp, grandma sat behind the stove. I used to sit at her feet, with my head in her lap, and she'd tell me about 1864 and 1866, and about the revolution of 1848. I listened, enthralled, while she told me how she had to put the geese in the attic and the lamp in the oven so that the Russians wouldn't notice anything. Then, after the oil lamp had been lit, my grandma would

[66] Kraft would deny that emotions are necessary for a moral judgement because a moral judge might utter a moral judgement insincerely without having the associated emotion. It is needless to say that, in principle, a sincere moral judge needs to have the disposition to have emotions. Kraft would certainly agree with Prinz that a psychopath cannot make genuine moral judgements.

[67] *Ibid.*, 62).

> sit on the sofa and knit; usually I would read to her from the Bible. Such happy times – I wish they had never come to an end![68]

The distinction of the girl is based on the mood of the whole situation, primarily on the feeling of happiness. Feelings and emotions can occur as primary sources of valuations when emotions are identified as a basis for a distinction which is the case when calling something 'wonderful', 'enchanting', and 'lovable', or 'abhorrent', 'horrible', 'frightful', 'pitiable', and 'miserable'.[69]

Some cases might suggest that feelings and emotions could be reduced to pleasure and pain[70], but – as Kraft confirms – this is not always possible. Firstly, not all feelings contain pleasure or pain. E. g., esteem, gratitude, or admiration are neither pleasant nor unpleasant. Secondly, "in some instances in which feelings are aroused, it is not the element of pleasure or pain attaching to the object that determines the attitude towards it, but the affective excitement itself."[71] According to Kraft, this is the case, when an adventurer or a gambler seeks excitement as such. The seeking of excitement also explains why horror or drama films are distinguished positively. Indeed, it could be objected that horror or drama films are valued because the release and quiescence following the suspense are experienced as pleasant. Kraft argues that the pleasure emerges only after the entire film and that it would be quite unbelievable that one only watches drama or horror films for the pleasure of being released from the torture and fear.[72]

(c) **Other sources of distinction** According to Kraft, other sources of distinction, which will be summarized below, "come to the fore principally where the element of pleasure or pain is too weak and incidental for us

[68] Kraft (1981 [1951], 62).

[69] Cp. *ibid.*, 63. FitzGerald & Goldie (2012) further mention shameful (feeling of shame), disgusting (feeling of disgust), dangerous (feeling of fear), embarrassing (feeling of embarrassment), infuriating (feeling of fury), and unjust (feeling of anger and resentment).

[70] Cp. Kraft (1981 [1951], 64). Kraft illustrates an example in which a two-year-old girl sees a pair of doll's eyes. She was frightened by this object because she did not recognise it as doll's eyes. Encouraged by her parents, she touched them and finally recognised them as doll's eyes. Her fear vanished, she laughed and called the eyes 'good little peepers'. In this case, the distinguishing function of the emotions, then, can be reduced to the distinguishing function of pleasure and pain.

[71] *Ibid.*, 65.

[72] Cp. *ibid.*, 66.

to adopt an attitude towards an object because of it"[73].
As a further source of distinction Kraft indicates the satisfaction of natural drives (unconscious and conscious):

> We have thus uncovered a new and different source of distinction: the satisfaction of an unconscious need, of a drive. (...) Anything that satisfies such a need thereby takes on special significance for our attitude, and when this special significance is brought sufficiently into relief, then the thing is marked out, distinguished, in just the way that other features are marked by their pleasantness." [74]

The satisfaction of needs and drives is source for several valuations, e. g. poisonous. Further instinctive drives which give rise to valuations are organic needs: the need for nourishment, rest, physical functioning, sexual and erotic needs, or social needs.[75].
Equally, distinctions emerge by the satisfaction of conscious drives: desires. For instance, medicine has positive value because it helps to fulfil the desire to be healthy. If it would not be a means to an end, it might lack the positive valuation. The value of medicine cannot be explained in virtue of pleasure and pain because the medicine might have bitter taste and hence it might be unpleasant. But the medicine is taken because an ill person hopes to get healthy.
As a further source of distinction Kraft names habit: "The habitual becomes valuable simply by virtue of being the habitual."[76] And vice versa: Things are evaluated negatively when somebody is not used to them. For instance, sometimes one might think that the new haircut of a friend is unhandsome because it seems unusual at first sight. When used to it, this evaluation might change.
Last but not least, Kraft names derivative and adopted distinctions. For instance, a widow might evaluative a shirt positively because it belongs to her deceased husband, although she might have wanted him to throw the shirt away when he was still alive. The distinction is derived from the distinction of the husband. An adopted distinctions occurs when

[73] *Ibid.*, 85.
[74] *Ibid.*, 84.
[75] Cp. *ibid.*, 85.
[76] *Ibid.*, 97.

something has been evaluated by someone else and this distinction is adopted without scrutinising the evaluative point.[77]

5.4 Meaning of Value Judgements

Kraft's philosophy of values is subjective. This section will show that his theory of value judgements is differentiated from a mere subjectivist point of view. In the preceding section it has been shown that distinction is an individual phenomenon: "It invariably emerges for one particular person only, existing, for the nonce, solely for the person whose attitude is determined by the object that is distinguished. (...) Distinction (...) exists only subjectively, for the individual."[78] The subjective distinction finds expression in the personal opinion of the subject. Subjective distinctions are expressed from a personal standpoint. Regarding value judgements, however, there is a shift of perspective. Value judgements are expressed from an inter-subjective standpoint. The distinction which is expressed in value judgements is not individual, but impersonal.[79] When forming a value judgement, the distinction is detached from subjective experience. Rather, the value judgement is expressed to make others also agree on the judgement. When uttering *x is beautiful* it is intended to say more than just *x pleases me*.[80] Rather, the speaker intends to express a challenge or an instruction for the hearer to also adopt a certain attitude. A value judgement, therefore, has two important characteristics: Value judgements are i) propositions about actual determinations of attitudes, and ii) general guidelines for attitudes. For instance, if Anna says, *The Mona Lisa is such a beautiful painting*, she does not only want to say that she thinks that the *Mona Lisa* is a beautiful painting and the she has a certain attitude towards the *Mona Lisa*, but from an inter-subjective perspective she wants to say that the *Mona Lisa* is a beautiful painting and she wants everyone to agree on her judgement. Hence the meaning of an inter-subjective value judgement is to be understood independently from the attitude of the speaker. Even if uttered by an individual, a value judgement is to be understood as transcending the individual opinion.[81] There is a difference between Anna's utterance and the utterance of

[77] Cp. Kraft (1981 [1951], 102).
[78] *Ibid.*, 129.
[79] By *inter-subjective* Kraft means that it holds for indeterminate persons. Cp. *ibid.*
[80] Cp. *ibid.*, 130.
[81] Cp. *ibid.*, 129.

I think that the Mona Lisa is a beautiful painting. The latter is expressed from a personal point of view, whereas the former is somehow *demanding*: It claims to be objective in some way because "we regard it as inappropriate if others form valuations disagreeing with ours; we simply contradict them". Further, "[w]e consider our own valuation to be the correct one, that is, the one that is binding for everyone"[82]. So, by uttering a value judgement, the speaker wants everyone else to agree. Value judgements are precepts that *ought to be recognized*, and instructions to adopt certain attitudes.[83] However, the recognition of the hearer cannot be forced and is always a personal act.
Although value judgements are more than the expression of an individual attitude and often contain tick concepts that refer to some non-evaluative content, value judgements are not objective in the way ordinary statements are because of the value conveyed:

> [A] value judgement may also include a factual content; indeed, value concepts generally include a factual content in addition to their value characteristic. But insofar as it expresses a value, with respect specifically to its value significance, a value judgement does not assert any factual content.[84]

Value judgements cannot be true in the sense of "fitting the facts".[85] Yet, a value judgement can be false in virtue of its non-evaluative content. Consider the following example:

Petra: Mrs. Miller is such a nice person because she just brought me some flowers.

Paul: No, she isn't because she only brought you the flowers because she thinks that they are ugly and she didn't want them.

Paul has knowledge (that Mrs. Miller thinks that the flowers are ugly) that Petra does not have. In fact, Mrs. Miller does not have the kinds of features which are necessary for a person to be called nice. For a value judgement to be false it is a sufficient condition that the state of affairs it assumes is false.[86]

[82] *Ibid.*, 138.
[83] Cp. *ibid.*, 199.
[84] *Ibid.*], 139.
[85] *Ibid.*, 138.
[86] Cp. Kraft (1981 [1951], 140). The state of affairs it assumes can be expressed by a non-evaluative statement because of the separability of thick concepts. The non-evaluative statement is verifiable.

Although value utterances "take on an objectivity analogous to that of purely descriptive propositions"[87], truth cannot be assigned to them. Instead, Kraft says that value judgements are either *valid* or *invalid*.[88] Validity also applies to any sort of rules, norms or laws. Valid rules of a game are binding and must be followed, they are *precepts* or *commands*. As opposed to being, validity always includes an ought. Kraft says:

> The validity of a proposition is something other than its truth. (...) Validity (...) pertains to the treatment of the proposition in our mental actions: it is a normative consequence of its truth, bearing on our actual behaviour. Truth does not consist in validity, nor is validity exhausted by truth; it is, rather, a consequence of truth.[89]

But when is a value utterance valid? Value utterances stay valid, if they are derived from more general valid utterances or stem from practical abductions. This reduces the problem of validity to finding valid axiomatic *principles of evaluation*. These principles of evaluation cannot be grounded ultimately, but must be defined by experts. It is the task of ethics to give definitions of the supreme good and of the moral.[90] The validity of the definitions is not absolute, but only conditional and hypothetical.[91]

5.5 Conclusion

According to Kraft, a value judgement could only be true, if in fact everyone agreed on it. But this is an unreal scenario. Thus value judgements cannot be true or false. On the other hand, Kraft objects to the thesis of the logical positivists that value judgements are cognitively meaningless. By showing that value judgements have non-evaluative content, Kraft implicitly rejects the criterion of the logical positivists that value judgements are cognitively meaningless. According to Hegselmann, that would even be a refutation of this

[87] *Ibid.*, 130.

[88] "Validity" concerning values is introduced by Rudolf Hermann Lotze, who ascribes validity to values. Although values do not exist, they may be imagined as objective and, therefore, they exist at least in some way. Cp. Sander: (2001), S. 45-46. Kraft does not ascribe validity to values but to value judgements and dismisses Lotze's assumption that values are valid because values are concepts and validity does not apply to concepts. Cp. Kraft (1981 [1951], 143).

[89] *Ibid.*, 142.

[90] Cp. *ibid.*, 152.

[91] Cp. *ibid.*, 170.

criterion because it is inappropriate.[92] The criterion needs to be modified. In *Der Wiener Kreis*, Kraft says that the initial criterion is too tight and that later on even Carnap admitted this.[93]

An important concession of Kraft is that genuine disagreements about evaluations cannot be solved because they do not only depend on the state of affairs it assumes, but are also determined by the evaluating subject. Two persons can only agree if they agree about both the state of affairs and if they share the same attitude towards this state of affairs. If they do not share the same attitude, even if agreeing on all relevant facts, then contradicting valuations emerge that are not capable of resolution.[94]

A realist about values can resolve any genuine disagreement about evaluations by assuming some kind of inability, such as a blindness or a consequence of deception, to explain why individuals disagree in their evaluations.[95] Yet, Kraft rejects a realism about values because he does not think that values are genuine properties of objects: "Value cannot be reduced to the nature of an object; it is not possible to point to an objective property, attaching, as a value, to other objective properties. An objectivistic interpretation of value judgements is therefore untenable."[96] Instead, Kraft points out that values consist in a relation between an evaluating subject and the evaluated object:

> Value, then, is connected with the relation between the subject who adopts an attitude and the object of the attitude; this relation is essential to value. Differentiation of value into the various categories or classes of value depends upon differentiation within the object-subject relation, inasmuch as it occurs between various kinds of objects and various forms of attitude. Hence absolute value, in the sense of something independent of the evaluating subject and the evaluated object, is impossible, meaningless, because self contradictory.[97]

On the other hand, Kraft also rejects a subjectivism about values because he thinks that value judgements are more than the mere expressions of emotions or feelings. Indeed, value judgements are cognitively meaningful:

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[92] Hegselmann (1979, 92).
[93] Cp. Kraft (1950, 167-168).
[94] Cp. Kraft (1981 [1951], 135-136).
[95] Cp. *ibid.*, 134.
[96] *Ibid.*, 131.
[97] *Ibid.*, 48.

> The meaning of value judgements depends upon the meaning of value concepts, for these are the components that actually evaluate. The sense of value concepts has already been clarified: in addition to an actual value attribute, they generally also possess a material content. Insofar as an object naturally corresponds to the material content of the value concept predicated, the value judgement also states something about the nature of an object.[98]

Kraft's meta-ethical might be classified as a hybrid-expressivist anti-realism which is determined by the following assumptions:

1. Moral and ethical sentences are neither empirical nor analytical sentences. Thus they lack truth value. (Basic assumption of non-cognitivism)

2. "Values are concepts"[99] and not properties of objects or abstract objects. (Refutation of value realism)

3. Value judgements are different from mere expressives because they are expressed from an inter-subjective point of view and have a demanding character. (Refutation of emotivism)

4. Value judgements are dependent from the evaluating subject. (Basic assumption of subjectivism)

5. Thick concepts have both a non-evaluative and an evaluative element. (Basic assumption of separationism)

6. Value judgements are not primarily normative or prescriptive, but distinguishing and evaluative. (Delimitation to Hare's prescriptivism)

7. Attitudes are not projected as though they were real properties, attitudes are ascribed to objects. (Delimitation to Blackburn's quasi-realism)[100]

[98] Kraft (1981 [1951], 131).

[99] *Ibid.*, 143.

[100] Though sometimes, a quasi-realist interpretation of Kraft cannot be denied. For instance, he says that "[i]n common parlance, value judgements are interpreted as propositions concerning properties objectively attributable to objects, in just the same way as other properties". *Ibid.*, 130.

Chapter 6

A Kraftian Approach To The Thick

The last chapter of this study aims to establish an approach to the thick by integrating Kraft's ideas into the debate about the thick. This Kraftian approach is a hybrid-expressivist anti-realist theory of the thick which integrates the idea that T-evaluations are conventional implicatures. At the end of the chapter, this approach will be combined with the considerations about non-evaluative concepts from chapter 4.
Moral or evaluative thoughts, and moral or evaluative language have to be distinguished when disputing the thick: On the level of thought, it can simply be spoken of moral or value thoughts which are expressed through value or moral judgements on the level of language. This distinction demands the proposed theory to have two dimensions: It needs to explain value thoughts on the level of thought and value judgements on the level of language. In sections 1-4 it will be started with the latter before it is turned to moral thoughts in section 5.

6.1 Semantics of Value Judgements

First of all, the Kraftian approach will appear to be a semantic view stating that T-evaluations are conventional implicatures (CVIs). In order to defend a semantic view, it is necessary to show that pragmatic views are questionable, especially Väyrynen's theory which seems to be the most elaborated pragmatic view so far.

Hence, this study aims to show that i) Väyrynen's arguments against the CVI view fail (section 6.1.1 and 6.1.2), and ii) his own view is not as simple as maintained (section 6.1.3). Afterwards a semantic view will be defended by demonstrating that iii) a semantic view is much more convincing, and iv) the CVI view which is both semantic and separationist is a promising approach to the thick.

But first of all, the argumentation starts with affirming Väyrynen's thesis that T-evaluations of T-sentences are not-at-issue in conversations because this is also necessary for a CVI view. Not-at-issue content involves that a) T-evaluations cannot be directly assented or dissented with, b) T-evaluations do not address the question under discussion, and c) the relevant set of alternative answers to a question is determined by the at-issue content.[1] To show that T-evaluations are not-at-issue, some remarks about T-evaluations of T-sentences that involve paradigmatic thick concepts will be made first. This secures that the data also fit paradigmatic thick concepts, and not just objectionable thick concepts.

6.1.1 T-Evaluations and At-Issueness

Väyrynen's approach is based on thick concepts that are in principle open to being regarded as objectionable. If someone is not religious, concepts arising in religious contexts, such as lewd, chaste, or blasphemous are obviously objectionable. Showing that, e. g., cruel, or just are 'principally open to being regarded as objectionable' is a more difficult task.[2] Hence, imagine a radical nihilist. The radical nihilist speaks German properly and, therefore, he or she does not appear as a radical nihilist at first sight. But he or she is some kind of outsider regarding our moral community and is not even aware of it: The radical nihilist objects to all the values shared by human beings, but since he or she speaks German properly, his or her usage of good conveys a positive evaluation and the usage of bad conveys a negative evaluation, although all values are denied. The radical nihilist knows the values usually shared by human beings, but he refuses to value anything. As will become clear from the following examples, the radical nihilist supports Väyrynen's view that every thick concept is objectionable.

[1] These are the relevant tests to identify the intended at-issue-content of speech acts described in Tonhauser (2012).

[2] Roberts (2015, 912) also emphasizes this criticism.

Väyrynen's thesis that T-evaluations of thick concepts are a matter of pragmatics rests on the assumption that T-evaluations are not-at-issue in conversations. So, it should also be possible to show that T-evaluations of paradigmatic thick concepts are not-at-issue, when the radical nihilist's point of view is taken.

To confirm a) that T-evaluations cannot be directly assented or dissented with, suppose that the radical nihilist takes part in a conversation between pacifists, but he or she is not aware that the participants of the conversation reject any kind of violence. One participant says that (1):

(1) Foltern ist GRAUsam.[3]
'Torture is CRUel.'

The radical nihilist disagrees with the speaker that torture is cruel because the nihilist objects to the negative evaluation which the use of cruel conveys. Uttering (1a) the nihilist thus only denies that torture is cruel, but he or she cannot express his or her point of view that torture should not be called cruel because it conveys that torture is somehow bad in way. If the nihilist utters (1a), the pacifists participating in the debate might think that the radical nihilist is a defender of torture which would be false likewise.

(1a) Nein, das stimmt nicht!
'No, that's not right!'

However, the radical nihilist does not want to imply that torture is not cruel. Therefore, he or she must interpose (1b), in order to express his rejection of the conveyed evaluation:

(1b) Augenblick mal, Foltern ist in keiner Weise gut oder schlecht!
'Wait a minute! Torture is neither good nor bad in any way!'

The radical nihilist cannot interpose (1a) because he or she cannot directly dissent with the rejected evaluation. If he or she wants to show his or her objection of the negative evaluation concerning cruelty, he or she has to interrupt the conversation by the *Wait-a-minute*-phrase as in (1b).
To confirm b) that T-evaluations do not address the question under discussion, suppose that the participants of the discussion are bewildered by the radical

[3]In this chapter I use German example sentences because German is my mother tongue. A syllable is stressed to indicate the at-issue-content of the utterance.

nihilist's interruption. One woman thinks that the radical nihilist might have misunderstood the statement in (1). Instead, she asks the radical nihilist:

(2) WAS ist Foltern?
'WHAT is torture?'

The radical nihilist immediately comprehends the woman's confusion. Hence, he or she explains his objection to the conveyed evaluation by uttering (2a):

(2a) ♯ Das absichtliche und wissentliche Zufügen von Schmerzen ist weder gut noch schlecht.
♯ 'Inflicting pain deliberately and knowingly is neither good nor bad.'[4]

This response, however, is not answering the question under discussion because it is not at-issue whether inflicting pain deliberately and knowingly is good or bad. Rather, all participants – except from the nihilist – silently agree that the deliberate infliction of pain is bad in a way because they all are pacifists.
Finally, the following example also shows c) that the relevant set of alternative answers to a question is determined by the at-issue content. A mediator wants to skip the confusion with the radical nihilist by taking up the utterance in (1). The mediator asks the other participants:

(3) Was meinen Sie? Ist Foltern GRAUsam?
'Want do you think? Is torture CRUel?'

Then, (3a) would be an adequate answer, whereas (3b) would be less adequate. The nihilist's reply in (3c) would fail to answer the question under discussion. Instead, the remark would bring a topic up for discussion the pacifists do not even have to discuss:

[4]The nihilist uses pain in a non-evaluative fashion.

(3a) Ja, Foltern ist grausam, weil dem Opfer absichtlich und wissentlich Schmerzen zugefügt werden.
'Yes, torture is cruel because pain is inflicted deliberately and knowingly on the victim.'

(3b) ? Ja, weil Foltern etwas Schlechtes ist.
? 'Yes, torture is somehow bad.'

(3c) ♯ Wie ich bereits erwähnt habe, ist das absichtliche und wissentliche Zufügen von Schmerzen weder gut noch schlecht.
♯ 'As I have already mentioned inflicting pain deliberately and knowingly is neither good nor bad.'

This shows that the relevant set of alternative answers to a question is determined by the at-issue content. So, all three tests support the assumption that T-evaluations of T-sentences are not-at-issue.

6.1.2 T-Evaluations, Semantic Presuppositions, and Conventional Implicatures

Yet, the not-at-issueness of T-evaluations is not sufficient for thick concepts to be a matter of pragmatics because there are propositions that are not-at-issue but are semantic implications of sentences. For instance, presuppositions and conventional implicatures are also not at-issue, but they are widely held to be a matter of semantics. So, pointing out that T-evaluations are not-at-issue does not unravel the mystery whether T-evaluations are a matter of pragmatics or not.

Väyrynen raises two objections against the view that T-evaluations are semantic presuppositions: the 'triggering problem' and the 'appropriateness problem'. The former concerns the necessity to show that thick terms actually behave as presupposition triggers which might not be too problematic because it could be examined *individually* for each thick term (there are not so many thick concepts), if it works as a trigger. The latter problem is that T-evaluations cannot always become common ground because they might be rejected (as in the case of lewd). Here, it could be objected that not the T-evaluation becomes common ground, but rather the information that the speaker evaluates the explicit display of sexuality negatively, when calling something lewd. Suppose, five people who are complete strangers get to know each other because they are in the same room and start to have a conversation. At the beginning

of the conversation, there is only few information in the common ground, e. g. information about the room or the building in which they are, the intention why they are in this room, or current happenings that are in the media. The people might talk about trivial things and A might tell the others that he or she is planing to go to Madonna's upcoming stage show. Thereupon, B answers that he or she is not going to see the stage show because he or she thinks that it is lewd. Thereby, it becomes common knowledge that B thinks negatively about explicit sexuality. However, the others must not agree that Madonna's stage show is bad in virtue of its explicit display of sexuality. The presupposition which is triggered by thick terms is a proposition about the values of the speaker. Therefore, it need not be agreed with Väyrynen that the appropriateness problem is an actual problem.

Yet, there are three further problems concerning the presupposition view: Firstly, it is difficult to give the content of T-evaluations propositionally when it comes to less objectionable thick concepts such as cruel. Cruelty might have something to do with inflicting pain deliberately and knowingly, but it cannot be reduced to it. This fact is not in favour of a presupposition view. Rather, it advances a conventional implicatures view because, as Potts emphasizes, "the alleged conventional implicature content is extremely hard to articulate"[5].
Secondly, T-evaluations do less function as background information, but are rather speaker-oriented side comments.[6] Imagine, a person x inflicts pain deliberately and knowingly. Only if a speaker intends to evaluate x negatively, he or she calls x 'cruel'. Equally, only if a speaker intends to stress the difference between being poor and being pretty, he or she calls someone 'poor but pretty'. If the speaker does not assume that poor people usually are not pretty, he or she would say that someone is 'poor and pretty', but the speaker would not apply 'but'.
Thirdly, T-evaluations – contrary to presuppositions – do not survive embedding in plugs because they are speaker-oriented. If embedded in belief reports, presuppositions survive whereas conventional implicatures are blocked:

[5]Potts (2014, 30), cf. also Potts (2007, 172).
[6]Cf. Potts (2012).

a. Jones believes that Carla stopped smoking, but I think she never smoked.
b. ♯ Jones believes that Madonna's lewd stage show is on Saturday, but I think the show isn't bad in any way for its sexual display.

The T-evaluation in b. is not blocked since the speaker of the sentence must necessarily be a lewd-user. If the speaker disagrees that Madonna's stage show is lewd, he or she needs to say rather something like c.:

c. Jones believes that Madonna's stage show is lewd and that it is on Saturday, but I think the show isn't bad in any way for its sexual display.

These evidence make it likely that T-evaluations are rather conventional implicatures. Väyrynen maintains that T-evaluations cannot be conventional implicatures because they behave contrarily when embedded in "whether-or-not"-phrases. In what follows a counterexample will be given, in order to use it as an argument for a conventional implicature (CVI) view of the thick.
Suppose, three friends, Peter, Martin and Greg, are talking about Madonna's upcoming show. Peter and Martin are ultra-traditional Catholics, and, therefore, they evaluate the explicit display of sexuality negatively. To indicate their displeasure, they call such explicit displays of sexuality 'lewd'. Greg, however, seems to be more liberal. He finds nothing condemnable in displaying sexuality and rejects the value – the negative evaluation of sexual display – his friends convey when calling something lewd. Suppose further that they are having a dispute about going to Madonna's show. Peter and Martin disagree about whether Madonna's stage show is lewd or not:

(1) Peter: Madonna's stage show is lewd.
(2) Martin: Madonna's stage show isn't lewd.

Their value judgements are contradictory, that is, they are having a genuine disagreement. Peter might think that Madonna will only wear a mini skirt and a bikini top. He might utter something like (3):

(3) Peter: Ich habe ein Foto von ihr auf der Bühne gesehen. Sie hat nur einen kurzen Rock und ein Bikini-Oberteil getragen. Sie zeigt eindeutig zu viel Haut!
'I've seen a picture of her at her stage show. She's only wearing a mini skirt and a bikini top. She's definitely showing too much skin!'

Martin might answer something like (4):

(4) Martin: Ich habe das Foto auch gesehen. Ihr Rock ist knielang und sie trägt ein Tank-Top.
'I've seen that picture, too. Her skirt is knee-length and she's wearing a tank top.'

Greg is annoyed by their dispute. He is looking for a possibility to interrupt and convince them that they should go to the show nonetheless. He answers (5):

(5) Greg: Whether or not Madonna's stage show is lewd, it would be in no way bad for that.[7]

Further, he might add (6):

(6) Greg: Deshalb denke ich, dass wir auf jeden Fall hingehen sollten.
'That's why I think, we should go there anyway.'

Väyrynen says that a denial of the form of (5) is acceptable to a lewd-objector, in this case, to Greg. Yet, a denial of the form of (7) is defective:

(7) ? Whether or not life is short but sweet, there would be no contrast between life being short and life being sweet.[8]

He concludes that this is evidence against the view that T-evaluations are conventional implicatures.
Both Matthew Bedke and Brent Kyle hold that (5) strike them as semantically improper.[9] But, for the sake of argument, the acceptability of (5) will be granted. Instead, examples of conventional implicatures will be alleged where i) a "whether-or-not"-phrase like in (5) seems unacceptable, and ii) (7) a "whether-or-not"-phrase like in (7) seems acceptable.
Let us consider the following situation: Peter and Martin are not only ultra-traditional Catholics, but also racists. They are talking about a mutual friend, Marco, who is half German half Italian. Peter utters (8) and Martin disagrees by uttering (9):

[7] Väyrynen (2013, 104).
[8] *Ibid.*
[9] Cp. Bedke (2014) and Kyle (2015).

(8) Marco ist ein Kraut.
'Marco is a Kraut.'

(9) Nein, ist er nicht.
'No, he isn't.'

Peter and Martin are disagreeing about whether being half German is sufficient for being a Kraut. Greg wants to intervene and says (10):

(10) ? Egal ob Marco ein Kraut ist oder nicht, er ist in keiner Weise schlecht deswegen.
? 'Whether or not Marco is a Kraut, he is in no way bad for that.'

Although there is still a controversy about the status of pejoratives, they are widely held to be CVIs.[10] Yet, if (5) is judged to be a proper objection, then surely (10) is, too. (10) would then be an example of a CVI where the denial is acceptable.
Still, someone could protest that (10) is unacceptable for a liberal person who objects to racist values because it might be unacceptable that Greg even dares uttering a racist word.[11] Therefore, let us imagine that the radical nihilist participates in a dispute about the slaughtering of animals. Both Peter and Martin participate in the discussion. As usually, Peter and Martin disagree about the slaughtering of animals:

(11) Peter: Das Schlachten von Tieren ist grausam.
'Slaughtering animals is cruel.'

(12) Martin: Nein, es ist nicht grausam, obwohl ich zugebe, dass das Schlachten von Tieren nicht gut ist.
'No, it isn't cruel, though I admit that slaughtering animals isn't good.'

The radical nihilist wants to object against both of their value judgements and interposes:

[10] Cp. Potts (2007). Potts does not speak of 'evaluative content', but of 'expressive content'. Yet, evaluative content seems to be intended. For instance, Potts says that the expressive content of 'The bastard Kresge is famous' is 'Kresge is a {bastard/bad in the speaker's opinion}'. Cp. Potts (2007, 168).

[11] Väyrynen (2013, 70, no. 43) also says that racial slurs in the form of (10) might be unacceptable because slurs are taboo words.

(13) ? Egal ob das Schlachten von Tieren grausam ist oder nicht, es ist in keiner Weise schlecht deswegen.
? 'Whether or not slaughtering animals is cruel, it is in no way bad for that.'

The radical nihilist is justified to use the term 'cruel' because he or she is a competent speaker and is aware that the use of cruel conveys a negative evaluation.[12]
But if someone thinks that (13) is odd, consequently, (5) should be unacceptable, too. So far, two things have been done. Firstly, in (10) an example of a CVI has been introduced that seems acceptable. Secondly, in (13) an example of a thick concept has been found that might be unacceptable. This is already strong evidence that the "whether-or-not"-test is unreliable to test for CVIs. An ultimate proof could be given, if a *typical* conventional implicature could be found where the test fails. This is difficult because hardly anybody would ever take into consideration to deny that but expresses some contrast.
Let us take a case into consideration where an utterance is based on a false belief. Imagine, Peter, Martin and Greg give a dinner party. As might not be expected otherwise, Peter and Martin disagree about the amount of guests being at their party. Peter is a self-centred person and he thinks that he is popular and, therefore, he is disappointed about there being only five guests at their party. Martin, however, seems to be more reflective. Indeed, he did not expect anybody to join a party held by two ultra-traditional Catholic racists:

(14) Peter: Kaum jemand ist auf der Party.
'There is barely anybody at the party.'[13]
(15) Martin: Nein, das stimmt nicht. Es ist nicht nur kaum jemand auf unserer Party.
'No, that's not true. There ist not only barely anyone at our party.'

In the meantime, the five guests are annoyed because Peter and Martin quarrel all the time. They decide to leave the party without telling anybody. Greg is the only one to realize that they are leaving. Peter and Martin are too busy

[12] Väyrynen (*ibid.*, 71) admits that *Whether or not bullying is cruel, it's in no way worse for knowingly inflicting much more substantial damage on others than is necessary* is "at least odd or questionable". He concludes that his account might not be generalized to all thick concepts.
[13] This implicates that there is at least someone at the party.

with fighting to realize that all the guests left. Greg, too, is annoyed by Martin and Peter and gives relieve to his anger:

(16) (Immer streitet ihr, aber) egal ob kaum jemand auf der Party ist oder nicht, tatSÄCHlich ist niemand auf der Party.
'(You're always having a fight, but) whether or not there is barely anybody at the party, ACtually there is no one at the party.'[14]

In this situation, (16) might be an acceptable answer and it is also uncontroversial that barely gives rise to a CVI.[15]
So, (16) could be an example of a paradigmatic CVI where a "whether-or-not"-answer is acceptable. Hence it is doubtful if the test gives evidence that T-evaluations are not CVIs.
Besides from the considerations just made, the CVI view has also been challenged in section 3.4.1 because CVIs might not be detachable. Bedke who supports the view that T-evaluations might be CVIs holds that "the test cannot provide evidence against the conventional implicature view" because "[i]t only goes one way: if detachable, that's some evidence of conventional implication. If, by contrast, there are no truth-conditional substitutes for thick terms, and so the global evaluations are non-detachable, that simply shows something about the poverty of our language"[16]. So, the difficulty to show that T-evaluations are detachable does neither hold against the CVI View. So far, the study showed that Väyrynen's arguments against a CVI view are not as effective as he suggests.

6.1.3 The Problem of Generalization and its Consequences

Reservations might be appropriate that a pragmatic view is not suitable for all thick concepts: Väyrynen's pragmatic view holds for thick concepts that are in principle open to being regarded as objectionable, but it might not hold for every thick concept or not even for thin concepts. This might be called the *problem of generalization*. Väyrynen admits that the *problem of generalization* poses a real threat to his view:

[14] That there is no one at the party is the negation of the conventional implicature of (14).
[15] Yet, responses to this example have been different. Some agreed that (16) is an acceptable utterance, some did not. Hence it is left open to the reader's intuition to decide whether (16) is acceptable or not.
[16] Bedke (2014).

> Suppose the Pragmatic View were plausible only with respect to objectionable thick terms and concepts, and the other sorts of terms that fall into the class of thick terms and concepts required some other account. Wouldn't this mean (contrary to my claim in chapter 4) that the Pragmatic View is in fact not simpler and more unified than rival explanations of the data concerning objectionable thick terms and concepts which are compatible with Inherently Evaluative?[17]

He tries to mitigate this objection by holding that even just is objectionable and that any thick concept not regarded as being objectionable might still be in principle open to being regarded as objectionable.[18] However, this explanation seems quite unsatisfactory. Yet, if paradigmatic thick concepts which are not open to being regarded as objectionable must be treated differently from objectionable thick concepts, then a pragmatic view is not a simpler explanation at all. Even if any thick concept is at least in principle open to being regarded as objectionable, thin concepts are still not even principally open to being regarded as objectionable and must therefore be treated differently.[19] Thus, a view that can explain thin and thick concepts, and maybe even pejoratives and emotives is preferable, even if – contrary to Grice's razor claim – semantic posits cannot be avoided.

Another advantage of a CVI view is that the evaluations conveyed by pejoratives are held to be CVIs, as well. If this is true, it would make the theory consistent for any thick concept, but also for thin concepts, and pejoratives.

Regarding CVIs, Christopher Potts (2007) holds a multidimensional semantic view about expressives. An expressivist version of the CVI view has been proposed by Stephen Barker. His analysis of *T is good* is the following:

> **Implicature Theory (IT)** If U asserts the sentence 'T is good', then U denotes a property F by 'good' and:

[17] Väyrynen (2013, 149).

[18] *Ibid.*, 150.

[19] Eklund (2011, 39-40) thinks that an account which treats thick concepts and epithets in the same way unsatisfactory, but nevertheless thick concepts and epithets are still quite different. In section 6.3 it will be demonstrated that having a certain attitude is not conceptually conveyed by the use of the thick, whereas attitude and evaluation are deeply entangled in the case of epithets. For instance, a book might be called 'interesting' although it is actually boring. But one cannot call someone else a 'Kraut', if he or she does not condemn Germans. The use of Kraut would be defective, if the judge does not have the relevant attitude towards Germans. Equally, *Marco is a Kraut, and I despise Germans* is redundant which shows that the attitude is already contained in the use of epithets.

(i) *U expresses-as-explicature* the content that T is F

(ii) *U expresses-as-implicature* the content that *U* is committed to approval of F-things

(iii) *U* conveys that she believes the contents in (i) and (ii)

(iv) *U* conveys that she approves of T.[20]

Barker's theory is a dual content theory because the sentence *T is good* has both truth-conditional content (*T is F*) and non-truth-conditional content (*U approves of T in virtue of its being F*). Since the expressivist content is CVI content, *x is good* and *x is F* both have the same truth-conditions. Barker's view might be taken as a first starting point to establish a CVI view, although an attentive reader might be sceptical about the determinate explicature content in his analysis.

As indicated above, the proposed account will be compatible with Kraft's ideas about thick concepts. Naturally, CVIs do not matter in Kraft's account because they have not been 'detected' and theoretically described at the time *The Foundations* were published. But although Kraft never explicitly mentions that the evaluation is conventionally connected to value terms, this would nicely fit his view because it is not contradictory to anything he says and Kraft even implicitly agrees that T-evaluations are not-at-issue because they cannot be directly assented or dissented with. According to him, a direct negation of a value judgement is a negation of the non-evaluative content and not of the evaluative content: "Refutation of a value judgement concerns the state of affairs undergoing evaluation, which is the source of the error; it does not concern the value characteristic"[21].

6.2 Truth of Value Judgements

In the preceding section, the idea was evolved that both a semantic presupposition view and a CVI view might be hopeful candidates for an adequate theory about the thick. One argument speaking in favour of a CVI view is that it is hard to articulate T-evaluations propositionally. The view that the evaluation is semantically linked to a value judgement containing a thick concept is neutral concerning cognitivism and non-cognitivism. David Copp, for instance,

[20] Barker (2000, 271).

[21] Kraft (1981 [1951], 140).

defends a CVI view that is compatible with cognitivism. However, based on Kraft's thoughts it will be contended that value judgements are different from ordinary purely non-evaluative sentences and hence lack truth-conditions in the sense of non-evaluative sentences. Here Kraft's idea will be adopted that it is more reasonable to speak of the validity of value judgements, instead.
Reconsider Martin and Peter's disagreement in (1) about slaughtering animals:

(1) a. Peter: Das Schlachten von Tieren ist grausam.
'Slaughtering animals is cruel.'
b. Martin: Nein, das Schlachten von Tieren ist nicht grausam.
'No, slaughtering animals isn't cruel.'

According to cognitivism, the disagreement in (1) is genuine because Peter and Martin are arguing about facts – moral facts. But from now on, a realist interpretation of this disagreement will be dropped and an anti-realist interpretation will be described.
Subjectivists about value judgements hold that the disagreement in (1) is a *faultless disagreement* because subjectivists deny that one of them could be wrong. Instead, both Peter and Martin only report their attitudes towards the slaughtering of animals. A subjectivist interpretation, hence, does not promote our investigation.
Let us compare the disagreement in (1) with the disagreement in (2) assuming that there are no moral or evaluative facts. Then the disagreement in (1) seems to be different from the disagreement in (2):

(2) a. Peter: Tiere werden nicht betäubt, bevor sie getötet werden.
'Animals aren't stunned before slaughter.'
b. Martin: Nein, das stimmt nicht. Sie werden betäubt, bevor sie getötet werden.
'No, that's not true. Animals are stunned before slaughter.'

The difference between (1) and (2) is that the latter is a disagreement about facts whereas the former is a disagreement about values.
Isidora Stojanovic (2012) formulates four assumptions about value disagreements that cannot be true altogether[22]:

1. Peter in (1a.) and Martin in (1b.) disagree and contradict each other.

[22]These assumptions are held for value terms such as 'it is sad that'. Yet, these assumptions also fit for thick terms.

2. Neither Peter in (1a.) nor Martin in (1b.) express falsehoods.

3. Both (1a.) and (1b.) have truth values.

4. For any two utterances u_1 and u_2: If u_1 is true, then u_2 is false, and if u_1 is false then u_2 is true. $\Rightarrow$ The utterer of u_1 disagrees with the utterer of u_2, and they contradict each other.

Barely anyone would deny that either (2a.) or (2b.) must be true because their truth value depends on facts. A subjectivist about values cannot say that either (1a.) or (1b.) is true because these value judgements lack truth-value. A non-cognitivist denies the third assumption, whereas a cognitivist argues that both (1) and (2) are *genuine disagreements* because in (1) Peter and Martin disagree about value facts and either Peter or Martin has the wrong attitude concerning the slaughtering of animals. So, a realist about values rejects the second assumption.

A test that is in favour of a subjectivist view of T-sentences is the German finden[23]-test. According to this test, there is evidence that value judgements containing thick terms behave more like subjective judgements of taste than factual statements. Consider (3):

(3) a. Peter: Ich finde, das Schlachten von Tieren ist grausam.
'I find slaughtering animals is cruel.'

b. Peter: ♯ Ich finde, sie nicht werden betäubt, bevor sie getötet werden.
♯ 'I find animals aren't stunned before slaughter.'

Value judgements as in (3a.) can be combined with finden, whereas factual statements cannot be combined with finden. So the finden-test is usually consulted, in order to differentiate between matters of fact and matters of taste. Value judgements seem to behave similar to subjective judgements of taste. If both Peter and Martin use finden as in (4), their disagreement is faultless because they only report their attitudes towards the slaughtering of animals:

[23]German finden is close to English find, but according to Umbach, the latter is more restricted in distribution. Sometimes German finden cannot be translated with English find and think or consider is a better option although it does not mean the same. Cp. Umbach (2014, 2). The difference between English find, think, and consider are also explained in Kennedy (2012).

(4) a. Peter: Ich finde, dass das Schlachten von Tieren grausam ist.
'I find that slaughtering animals is cruel.'
b. Martin: Ich finde, dass das Schlachten von Tieren nicht grausam ist.
'I find that slaughtering animals isn't cruel.'

This means that concerning finden value judgements containing thick concepts behave similar to judgements of taste. This is an argument that value judgements might be subjective. Admittedly, this is not a desirable consequence because value judgements should not be equivalent to judgements of taste. Instead, this section aims to show that the disagreement in (1) about the cruelty of slaughtering animals is a *genuine disagreement* and that one of their judgements might be defective. Why should Martin deny Peter's judgement in the first place, if Peter's judgement was only subjective?
Kraft's account offers a solution to this problem. According to him, a distinction "emerges for one particular person only (...), solely for the person whose attitude is determined by the object that is distinguished"[24]. A distinction is only valid for the speaker, at the time and place of the speech-act. Thus, distinctions are nondisplaceable which Pott also counts as a property of emotives.[25] But value judgements are different from distinctions because they are expressed from a different point of view: Distinctions are expressed from a personal standpoint, whereas general value judgements express an *intersubjective* view. Value judgements are uttered to convince others also to agree on the judgement. These two types of value judgements are close to their linguistic form. When Peter says that he *finds* that slaughtering animals is cruel, he may not intend to persuade Martin to agree with him. He only expresses his own opinion. Also, Martin cannot directly dissent with Peter's statement because he cannot deny that Peter finds this so. However, he can directly dissent with Peter's statement, if Peter says that slaughtering animals is cruel. In this case, Peter intends Martin to agree with him. If embedded in German finden, the speaker expresses a distinction that is his own attitude. If stated as a proposition, the speaker not only ascribes properties to the object. Rather, he or she utters the judgement as if these properties really belong to the object, as if these properties are *real* properties of the object. The speaker kind of wants the proposition to be true, or at least acts as if it was true. This is why Kraft says that "such judgements take on an objectivity analogous to

[24]Kraft (1981 [1951], 129).
[25]Cp. Potts (2007, 169-173).

that of purely descriptive propositions"[26]. When uttering a value judgement the speaker intends to convince the other to adopt his or her attitude towards the non-evaluative content expressed in the statement. Thus, according to Kraft, (1) is a genuine disagreement because both Peter and Martin want to persuade the other that they base their utterance on false beliefs, or that their attitude towards the slaughtering of animals is inappropriate.
The major difference between disagreements about matters of taste and disagreements about value judgements concerns their pragmatics. Consider the disagreements about liquorice in (5):

(5) a. Peter: This Liquorice is tasty.
b. Martin: No, that's not true. Liquorice isn't tasty at all.

This disagreement cannot be resolved because it rests on matters of taste and not on questions about facts. The disagreement in (1), however, seems to be resolvable because both Peter and Martin could try to convince the other that the opposing judgement is based on false believes or that the other has too less knowledge to be an adequate judge of the situation. Martin could argue that animals are not stunned before slaughter. This fact could convince Peter that Martin is right. However, Martin surely cannot change his taste concerning liquorice because he has no influence on changing his taste. Even if he knew that the ingredients of the liquorice are from controlled biological cultivation, Martin would surely still find that liquorice is not tasty. If the disagreement in (1) cannot be resolved, despite a long debate, it is a question about how they evaluate the assumed states of affairs, that is, what kinds of reactions are provoked in them by these states of affairs. Peter is sensible to the cruelty of slaughtering animals and Martin is not. Opinions and attitudes often evade rational argumentations. But disagreements in attitude are less often than disagreements in beliefs because most often it is disagreed about the facts which are subject to the evaluation.[27] Only if the disputants agree on all relevant facts and still disagree in their value judgements, then they have a disagreement in attitude.[28]
According to Kraft, truth is not the relevant criterion for value judgements:

[26]Kraft (1981 [1951], 130).
[27]Cp. *ibid.*, 141.
[28]Stojanovic interprets such a disagreement as a practical disagreement because Martin and Peter disagree about the extension of lewd.

"Truth in the sense of fitting the facts does not in any way constitute a vantage point from which value judgements may be legitimized."[29] More important are the reasons in virtue of which a value judgement is held to be valid or invalid. Only if these reasons are known, it can be debated about the evaluation of the assumed states of affairs. As in (1), either Martin or Peter might realize that his value utterance is based on false beliefs. If someone utters a value judgement which others would immediately refute, protesting that the other is wrong has absolutely no argumentative force. Instead, one must show in virtue of which reasons the stated value judgement is judged to be invalid. The claim that value judgements lack truth does not necessarily result in a hard subjectivism that there never are any 'right' answers. Furthermore, it might even be an unsatisfactory description to say that value judgements express moral beliefs, if someone utters a value judgement containing thick concepts. If a speaker utters a value judgements, he or she is doing way more than just giving information: Value judgements can tell us about the speaker's intentions, attitudes, or desires. So, in conversations it might often be more important to learn that one speaker thinks that Madonna's stage show is lewd, or that he or she thinks that slaughtering animals is cruel because this tells us something about the speaker. One of the most important things about ethics is that there is a lively discourse about the good and the bad (and the lewd, or the cruel)! According to Kraft, value judgements are neither true nor false, but valid. Speaking with Barker, "the usual definitions of validity, which are applicable to formal and purely truth-conditional languages, are not appropriate"[30]. Hence Barker suggests the following alternative definition of the validity of value judgements:

Val: An argument of the form $S_1 \ldots S_n \vdash R$ is valid iff the combined correctness-conditions for $\{S_1 \ldots S_n\}$ are not compossible with the non-obtaining of the correctness-conditions for R.[31]

According to Barker, "the value (implicature) content enters significantly into the validity of the argument in accordance with **Val**"[32] and, consequently, the

[29] Kraft (1981 [1951], 138).

[30] Barker (2000, 273).

[31] *Ibid.*, 274. Ridge (2006, 326) suggests a similar definition of validity: "An argument is valid just in case any possible believer who accepts all of the premises but at one and the same time denies that conclusion would thereby be guaranteed to have inconsistent beliefs."

[32] Barker (2000, 274).

Frege-Geach problem does not occur.

6.3 Pragmatics of Value Judgements

According to Kraft, persuasion is one function of value judgements. But as section 5.3.2 showed, the use of value predicates provokes reactions in human beings so that there often is a certain attitude towards the evaluated object. However, having a certain attitude is not necessarily linked to the evaluation in contrast to what some expressivists hold.

Hybrid-expressivist views have been discussed in detail recently.[33] The central claim is that value judgements express both beliefs and desire-like aspects[34] and that moral conversations might have other purposes besides from giving information.[35] In contrast to traditional expressivisist views, hybrid-expressivism can also have a realist colouring[36] and they can be both semantic or pragmatic. Semantic versions hold that the attitudinal content is a conventional implicature[37], whereas pragmatic versions claim that it arises conversationally[38]. Unlike the semantic view defended here these accounts hold that the implicature does not consist of an evaluation, but rather of an approval or disapproval of the stated non-evaluative content. Finlay and Strandberg argue that the attitudinal content is only pragmatically linked to value judgements because it can easily be cancelled.[39] For instance, (1) is neither defective nor contradictory:

[33]Barker (2000), Copp (2001; 2009), Finlay (2004; 2005), Ridge (2006; 2009), Strandberg (2012; 2015). Michael Ridge rather uses the term 'ecumenical expressivism'. The value judgements in these views are judgements containing thin concepts. But since the difference between thickness and thinness is rather a matter of degree than an absolute distinction, their views can easily be transferred to the debate about the thick.

[34]Cp. Fletcher (2014, 848).

[35]Cp. Strandberg (2012, 102).

[36]Proponents of realist views are Copp, Finlay and Strandberg, whereas Ridge is a proponent of an anti-realist view.

[37]Barker (2000), Copp (2001; 2009)

[38]Finlay (2004; 2005), Strandberg (2012; 2015)

[39]Finlay gives the example of an amoralist who makes value judgements without moral motivational attitudes. Cp. Finlay (2004, 209; 2005, 14-17). A second example from Finlay (2004, 217-20) which is the following: Jim and Mary want to burn down their house for the insurance money. They pay a detective to find out the best way to betray the insurance. The detective gives the advise that leaving a hot iron on a shirt is good, but that placing a space heater by a curtain is even better. Hence, the detective calls the actions 'good' in an instrumental way, but the detective surely does not approve of them.

(1) Madonna's stage show is lewd, but I don't want to imply that I disapprove of it.

In (1) other aspects (e. g. Madonna's vocal talent) of her show could make the speaker of (1) approve of it, or the evaluation might only be adopted. Or else, suppose a spectator of the news watches a reporting about the ongoing war in Syria. Thereupon, he or she utters (2):

(2) The war in Syria is horrifying.

(2) pragmatically conveys that the speaker feels horror, but this need not necessarily be the case because the speaker might be too far away to be emotionally affected. Rather, he or she expresses the feelings he or she anticipates to feel, if he or she really would be emotionally involved. So, when someone has an attitude towards an object, he or she must evaluate it somehow. But an evaluation could also only be adopted, or anticipated. It must be credited to Kraft to have emphasized that "[i]t follows, however, that ascription of a characteristic of value by means of value concepts occurs independently of whether the object in question is actually considered valuable by the ascriber"[40], and further he says, "[t]hus two completely different kinds of evaluation are distinguished: practical evaluation (*Werthaltung*)[41] and the ascription of value through value predicates, otherwise value judgement. Predication by means of value concepts constitutes an impersonal, objective distinction"[42].
According to Williams, the main characteristic of thick concepts is that they are also action-guiding. If a T-utterance shall become action-effective, the speaker needs to have a corresponding motivation. This motivation is also pragmatically conveyed by a T-utterance. For instance, by stating that Madonna's stage show is lewd, the speaker often intends to express that he or she is not willing to join the concert. People thinking that actions are wrong, cruel, brutal, or lewd pragmatically do not want these actions to be performed. The action-guidingness of thick concepts is linked pragmatically to value judgements because, e. g., a sadist might call an action cruel and still, or maybe even therefore, is motivated to perform that action. To conclude, by uttering

[40] Kraft (1981 [1951], 49).
[41] The English translation 'practical evaluation' is infelicitous because 'attitude' plays no part, whereas 'attitude' is part of 'Werthaltung'.
[42] *Ibid.*

a value judgement the speaker pragmatically

1. tries to persuade the hearer and influence the hearer's behaviour[43]
2. expresses approval and disapproval[44]
3. expresses a corresponding motivation[45]
4. gives moral reasons for action.[46]

Action-guidingness of the thick follows from this items: If a person approves of an act and has a corresponding motivation, then it is likely that he or she will perform that act.[47]
These pragmatic features distinguish value judgements from purely informational judgements.[48] Thus, value judgements compensate the lack of truth-conditions trough these mechanisms. The significance of value judgements is not solely to give information about the world, but rather to express attitudes, intentions, desires, prescriptions, or motivations.[49]

6.4 Shapelessness, Context-Sensitivity and Flexibility

6.4.1 Shapelessness

Section 2.2.2 dealt with the shapelessness-thesis, according to which thick concepts are shapeless with regard to the non-evaluative. This section aims to show that the proposed account is compatible with shapelessness. Thus shapelessness is assumed to be true.
As has been indicated above, shapelessness does not mean that thick concepts lack any rough characterization – at least relative to a determined context.[50]

[43] Strandberg (2012, 103); Finlay (2004, 207).
[44] Cp. Finlay (2004, 206).
[45] Such a view is compatible with motivational internalism. Cp. Finlay (2004, 206).
[46] Cp. Strandberg (2012, 102-103).
[47] Strandberg (2012) calls an attitude which becomes action-effective 'action-guiding attitude'.
[48] Certainly, informational judgements can also be used for persuasion purposes and the like, but this function is not as obvious in informational judgements than in value judgements. For instance, these pragmatic functions need to be supplemented by intonation, gestures, or facial expressions.
[49] Andrew Payne (2006) also emphasizes that thick concepts are used to ascribe intentions, desires, and beliefs.
[50] Cp. Roberts (2011, 511) and Ridge (2006, 314).

So, suppose that there is at least a rough characterization of any thick concept. Thick concepts might be defined as follows: A term 'T' represents a thick concept iff *x is T* conventionally (conceptionally) entails *x is good in a way (bad in a way).*[51] Similar to Elstein & Hurka's definition, *S*'s utterance of *x is cruel* means:

(i)	S believes that x has properties X, Y, and Z (not specified) of general type A (specified with regard to a determined context)[52]	(asserted at-issue content)
(ii)	S ascribes negative valence to x in virtue of X, Y, and Z of general type A.	(asserted conventional implicature content)
(iii)	S tries to persuade the hearer and influence their behaviour	(conversational implicature)
	S expresses disapproval of x	(conversational implicature)
	S expresses a corresponding motivation	(conversational implicature)
	S's utterance is reason-giving	(conversational implicature)

This analysis guarantees the shapelessness of the thick because the filling of the placeholders depends on the speaker S. The general type A is the roughest non-evaluative characterization which is available in a determined context, whereas X, Y, and Z need not be non-evaluative. An alert reader might interject that this analysis is under attack of the disentanglement argument because the evaluation in b. is not part of the truth-conditions of 'x is cruel' and therefore does not even partly determine the extension of the concept. But the non-evaluative characterisation is only rough and not any entity to which this characterisation can be ascribed falls under the corresponding thick concept. The classification of a thick concept is driven by the provoked reaction within the evaluating subject. Thus, the DA poses no challenge for this analysis.

If it is assumed that thick concepts are shapeless and if a non-cognitivist view is preferred, it must be assumed that thick concepts are vague and underde-

[51] *Good in a way* means roughly *good pro tanto*, to differentiate it from *good in toto*. For a discussion on this matter cf. Tappolet (2004, 210-212.)

[52] X, Y, and Z are underspecified by the lexical meaning of *cruel*.

termined by their lexical meaning. Therefore, firstly, Chris Barker's dynamic perspective on vague concepts will be reiterated and, secondly, his thoughts about the dynamics of vagueness will be transferred to shapeless thick predicates as well.[53] This shows that it can appropriately be dealt with thick concepts, although they have no jointly sufficient and necessary application conditions.

According to Barker's dynamic perspective, there are two different modes to use vague predicates: the descriptive and the metalinguistical usage, whereby it depends on context which usage occurs. In the following, it will be demonstrated that thick terms, too, can be used both metalinguistically and descriptively.[54]

Suppose, A wants to tell B something about Feynman whom A recently got to know. A might tell B:

(1) Feynman is tall.[55]

Thus, A adds information about Feynman to the common ground. If, for instance, A tells B later on that Feynman hit his head on the door frame when entering another room, then B knows that he hit his head because of his body height. Barker calls this kind of use *descriptive use* because A uses (1) to describe Feynman. According to Barker, there is another kind of usage – the *metalinguistic use*. Imagine, A and B are at a party at Feynman's house. Feynman and some of his friends are dancing in front of A and B, while A and B are talking about men and A tells B that A finds tall men attractive. Thereon B asks what A means by tall. A answers (1) and points in direction of Feynman. In this situation, (1) is not used descriptively because no information is added. Barker calls this a *metalinguistic use*. According to him, all A has done is to give B guidance concerning what A's relevant standard for tallness happens to be. Barker then argues that the metalinguistic update is "part of the normal update potential of most vague predicates and present to one degree or another in most (but not all!) uses"[56].

Now, reconsider

[53] Typical vague predicates are 'tall', 'expensive', or 'bald'.
[54] Cp. Barker (2002).
[55] *Ibid.*
[56] *Ibid.*, 2.

(2) a. Madonna's stage show is LEWD.
b. [MaDONna's stage show] is lewd.

Suppose, Peter joined Madonna's stage show and after that he tells Martin (2a.). Since both of them are lewd-users, Peter's utterance is descriptive. He tells Martin that sexuality was explicitly shown during her show. This information is added to the common ground. If Peter says that all of Madonna's dancers only wore a tiny bikini, this is no surprise to Martin because Peter already told him that the show is lewd. Now imagine, both Peter and Martin are at Madonna's stage show and all the dancers only wear tiny bikinis. Peter is outraged and yells (2b.). Martin gets to know what Peter counts as lewd concerning a stage show. Furthermore, the conversational implicature content that Peter might disapprove of her show because of its lewdness or that he might want to leave are also added to the common ground.

It is obvious that value judgements containing thin concepts have metalinguistic usage, however, it seems to be more difficult to explain their descriptive usage.[57] Imagine, A tells a friend that A's neighbour is a morally good person, the friend might not understand what A is referring to unless A tells the friend that the neighbour went to the supermarket to buy food when A's foot was broken and he or she could not go to supermarket, or A and B have already talked about morally good persons and have some common knowledge whom to count as morally good and in virtue of which characteristics. According to Michael Ridge, when uttering a value judgement, the speaker's belief makes *anaphoric reference* to the properties which count as 'morally good', or 'lewd', etc.[58] So, if the participants in a talk have some kind of common knowledge concerning the non-evaluative content of thin concepts, judgements containing thin concepts also have a descriptive usage.

According to Carla Umbach, the descriptive and the metalinguistic (interpretational[59]) usage lead to different modes of updating the common ground: "While the former leads to updating worlds, the latter leads to updating interpreta-

[57]Umbach (2014, 16-17) solves this puzzle with the help of Hare. Suppose, A tells B on the phone that A wants to buy a new car and has already inspected a car A wants to buy. B replies that the car is a *good* car because B is a car mechanic. Even if B has no information about the car in particular, B at least knows some accepted standard of the goodness of cars from experience.

[58]Ridge (2006, 313).

[59]This is Umbach's term for the metalinguistic use.

tions"[60], that is, by uttering a subjective value judgement the speaker does not want it to become common knowledge. Whereas a general value judgement is supposed to become common knowledge because the speaker wants everyone to agree. If no one disagrees, this value judgement is adopted to the common ground.[61]

6.4.2 Context-Sensitivity

Closely linked to the idea of vagueness is the idea that thick concepts are context-sensitive. That is, a man who is 1,90 m tall is tall with reference to all other men, but small with reference to basketball players. Also, complaining about food in a restaurant is not a courageous action for a self-confident person, but might be courageous for sociophobic people. Or, not spending 100 $ is selfish for a millionaire, but not for poor people. Väyrynen concludes that many thick terms are gradable.[62] As has been mentioned in the introduction the distinction between thick and thin concepts is a matter of degree. And the thinner a value concept, the more it is i) shapeless with regard to the non-evaluative and ii) context-sensitive: good can relate to very different properties dependent from context (good cook, good thief, etc.). The meaning of thin concepts is, therefore, partly determined by the context. As Peter Geach points out *A is a good F* is not equivalent to *A is good and A is F*.[63] The standards or norms to which 'a good F' refers depends on F and the context in which it is uttered.

6.4.3 Flexibility

In the introduction, it has been remarked that thick concepts are also flexible regarding the evaluation point which is conveyed. E. g., some football fans like the brutality of football. Thus, brutality is rather positively coloured in this context. An explanation in accordance with the proposed theory is that thick concepts are globally evaluative in normal contexts (default use)[64],

[60] Umbach (2014, 10).

[61] Cp. *ibid.*

[62] Evidence for gradability is that something can be *too courageous*, or *too honest*, etc. Cp. Väyrynen (2013, 170).

[63] Cp. Geach (1956, 33) also Tappolet (2004, 209).

[64] *Normal* contexts are contexts where the utterance is not made with gestures or an intonation that change the meaning of what is said, nor is it made ironically, or in the inverted-comma-sense, or with modifiers such as *too* and *not ... enough*.

but one might agree with Blackburn that there is no lexically signalled single attitude connected with a thick concept. For instance, the usage of good conveys a positive evaluation even when used in 'good murderer'. 'Good murderer' means that the speaker thinks that the features of the murderer are *good-making*, which means that the person is good in murdering. Still, the speaker certainly disapproves of good murderers. Also, brutality conceptually conveys a negative evaluation, but a football fan approves of brutal football. One example[65] for 'evaluative flexibility' from Väyrynen is Alan's positive use of selfish after the lecture of Ayn Rand. But, selfishness still has conventionally negative colouring. Only Alan's attitude towards selfish acts has changed. If Alan tells a friend that his girlfriend acted selfishly, the friend may think that his girlfriend is bad in a way because the use of selfish conceptually conveys a negative evaluation. So, Alan needs to add that his attitude towards selfish actions changed after the lecture of Ayn Rand and that he thinks that her acting was good in a way, or at least not necessarily bad in any way, although is was selfish.

The proposed account can also accommodate the challenge posed by Väyrynen that athletic or painful are often used for evaluative purposes.[66] The *meaning* of these concepts is purely non-evaluative, but in some contexts, the use of these concepts pragmatically conveys the speaker's approval or disapproval, his having a certain attitude or motivation. Athletic does not conceptually convey that being athletic is being good in a any way, but if uttered in certain circumstances, it becomes clear that the speaker approves of being athletic. To conclude, the term 'evaluative flexibility' is improper and might be misleading because not the conventionally conveyed evaluation is flexible, but rather the attitude towards the evaluated object. The use of a thick concept always conveys a certain evaluation, thus thick concepts are inherently evaluative. The evaluation is conceptually tied to the use of thick concepts, whereas attitudes are only pragmatically linked to the use of thick concepts.

The last challenge the account has to accommodate are objectionable thick concepts. How can an objector handle the use of objectionable thick concepts without also conveying the involved evaluation? According to our proposed account, *Madonna's stage show is lewd* conceptually implicates that Madonna's

[65] The proposed explanation is also valid for all other examples mentioned in the introduction.

[66] Cp. Väyrynen (2013, 10).

stage show is bad in a religious way. As has already been indicated an objector must i) know that certain terms express concepts that convey certain evaluations, and ii) he or she must object to these evaluations. The sincere objector disapproves that those features in virtue of which they are judged to be lewd are bad-making. To clarify this in more detail, it is helpful to distinguish four cases concerning the use of lewd: 1) all speakers of a conversation share the conveyed value, 2) not all speakers share the conveyed value, 3) not all speakers except from one do not share the conveyed value, and 4) all speakers do not share the conveyed value. Further, it is assumes that it is common knowledge among the participants of the conversation, if someone is a lewd-user or -objector. The first case should be clear because there are no objectors taking part in the conversation. In the second case, the lewd-objectors are aware that the use of lewd conceptually implicates a negative evaluation. Thus, they cannot directly deny utterances as *Madonna's stage show is lewd.* But they might interrupt with *Wait a minute! I think that there is nothing wrong with displaying sexuality explicitly*, in order to attract the attention of the speakers that religious values are not commonly shared in the conversation. In the third case, the lewd-user might not even dare uttering that Madonna's stage show is lewd, or else his utterance might be ignored. Rather, it is imaginable that the lewd-user only expresses his attitude by uttering that he or she *thinks/finds* that Madonna's stage show is lewd. In the last case, it might even happen that one speaker says ironically or in the inverted-commas-sense that Madonna's stage show is lewd to mimic those who would judge her show to be bad in virtue of the explicit display of sexuality. Then, because of the ironic use the utterance *Madonna's stage show is "lewd"* entails that lewd typically has negative colouring, but that the speaker does not share this religious evaluation which is connected to the use of lewd.[67] An objector cannot use a concept to which he or she objects sincerely in its literal meaning.[68]

Having made these reflections objectionable thick concepts appear less important for a theory about the thick. lewd, chaste, blasphemous, and the like conceptually entail religious evaluations and if a speaker does not share any

[67] This strategy is also proposed by Hare: "He [the objector] might stop using the word altogether, or he might use it 'in inverted commas', to signify that a person had the descriptive qualities expected by most people in those called kind." Hare (1997), 60-1. The strategy is also reflected in the German expression 'anzüglicher Witz' ('lewd joke').

[68] Kyle (2013) asserts that an generous-objector might claim 'Nancy is generous, and she's not good in any way' among generous-objectors. Yet, this might only be possible with a hint of irony.

religious values, he or she cannot use these concepts in their literal meaning. Full stop.[69]

6.5 A Theory-Theory of the Thick

So far only moral or evaluative language has been in the focus of the study. In this last section, an account is offered of i) how moral concept's reference might be determined and ii) how individuals classify entities in terms of thick concepts. Thus, a psychological theory of thick concepts is outlined which holds that thick concepts have theory structure which is relevant in procedures of classification and identification. The idea that thick concepts have theory-theory structure is supplemented by Kraft's considerations about the psychological analysis of evaluation. Finally, some thoughts about thick concept's reference determination are outlined.
Reconsider the disagreement about evaluation about slaughtering from section 6.1:

(1) Peter: Das Schlachten von Tieren ist grausam.
'Slaughtering animals is cruel.'
Martin: Nein, es ist nicht grausam.
'No, it isn't cruel.'

Let us suppose that Peter and Martin assent on all relevant facts. Suppose also that their disagreement does not rest on an inability to apply the concept cruel correctly because both possess this concept and they also know that applying the term 'cruel' to an action conveys a negative evaluation. Then their disagreement is a disagreement about the appropriate evaluation of these facts. But since they agree on all relevant facts and the disagreement does not rest on a misapplication of the concept, their disagreement must have something to do with how they *think* about cruelty and what kinds of reactions are provoked by these relevant facts. On the one hand, Peter and Martin seem to be differently affected by the facts and, on the other hand, they might simply have different mental *conceptions* of the concept cruel. The conception associated with a thick concept is – as proposed by the theory-theory – a body of knowledge of beliefs and judgements involving the thick concept and other concepts as their constituents. These beliefs and judgements might not be explicit, but rather

[69] Cf. also Priest (1997) and Slote (1975).

implicit tacit knowledge. This explains why it might be difficult to explicitly say what makes an action, e. g., cruel.

For instance, if Peter sees animals being slaughtered, this provokes horror in him and he feels sympathy for the animals, whereas this is not the case concerning Martin.[70] The affective reactions cause Peter to evaluate the slaughtering of animals as bad-making. Alternatively, it could be said that Peter's conception of cruel involves the killing of any living beings, whereas for Martin a cruel action must involve the killing of self-concious living beings. These two explanations are mutually dependent because Peter's conception of cruel might be the way it is because horror and sympathy are invoked in him when the killing of any living being is concerned. Also, Martin feels horror and sympathy only when self-concious living beings are killed and, therefore, his conception of cruel includes the killing of self-conscious living beings. The application of a thick concept is, therefore, not primarily guided by facts, but rather by the reactions provoked within the evaluating subject. As Kraft points out, evaluations are not only caused by emotions or feelings, but also by other sources of distinction (pleasure and pain, natural drives, desires, habit, or adopted evaluations lacking any affective reactions). These sources of distinction are the driving forces in classification and identification procedures, whereas in classification and identification procedures concerning non-evaluative concepts these sources do not matter because these processes are purely cognitive. A desk is classified as desk even in the absence of any emotions, feelings, etc.

The theory structure is relevant concerning identification and classification procedures. According to reference, there are two possibilities: Thick concepts have stable and definable cores, or cores consisting of placeholder beliefs about evaluative essences. As Plato's problem or the shapelessness-thesis suggest thick concepts are not analysable in terms of non-evaluative concepts. This, however, does not mean that thick concepts are not analysable at all. So, the postulation of definable cores does not contradict the shapelessness-thesis. The analysis outlined above presupposes that the general type A is supposed to be the definable core of a thick concept. This core is spelled out in terms of non-evaluative concepts. For instance, causing pain intentionally is the definable core of cruel. The latter possibility is linked to the thesis that philosophical concepts (*ergo* especially thick concepts) lack semantically constitutive cores

[70] According to FitzGerald and Goldie (2012), horror and sympathy are the appropriate emotions concerning the application of cruel.

altogether. This has influence on the stability:

> In the case of concepts which lack cores altogether we may have to allow for some extent of instability. For example, if one speaker believes that punishing a scapegoat is just and another that it is unjust, and neither would change her opinion upon reflection and discussion, then there seems to be no alternative but to grant that they mean slightly different things by their concepts of justice.[71]

Value concepts might indeed be more unstable than natural kind concepts and the non-evaluative meanings of thick concepts might vary more than the meanings of natural kind concepts. But, alternatively, if one wants to avoid such instability objections, one could suppose that thick concepts have a core consisting of placeholder beliefs about evaluative *essences*, thus assuming *representational essentialism* about morality and values. Representational essentialism must be differentiated from metaphysical essentialism. The former is about how people construe their reality, whereas the latter is a theory about a realist ontology of values.[72] The assumption of representational essentialism also explains what moral realists commonly assume about our moral practice and language. It is often held that value predicates are ascribed as if they were non-evaluative predicates and thus act as if moral judgements are beliefs about moral facts. It seems as if objective values are built into our moral language. So even if thick concepts are non-natural kind concepts, one has the belief that there is *the* good, although it can neither be observed nor explicitly spelled out what the good is.

[71] Jylkkä (2008, 65).

[72] For the distinction of various kinds of essentialist theories see Gelman (2004, 405).

Chapter 7

Conclusion

In this study three main ways to explain thick concepts have been scrutinized: separationist, non-separationist and pragmatic theories. The most comprehensive pragmatic approach to the thick is developed by Pekka Väyrynen. His approach combines philosophical understandings of the thick with linguistic methods. This way of proceeding has already offered new perspectives on the thick. However, Väyrynen's approach faces two challenges: Since his pragmatic account is based upon the assumptions that i) all thick concepts are principally open to be regarded as objectionable and ii) a pragmatic theory about the thick is more simple because it avoids semantic posits, Väyrynen must also contend that even thin concepts are principally open to be regarded as objectionable. Else his account cannot accommodate and explain thin concepts. But this suggests that his theory is not as simple as maintained. Yet, to assume that thin concepts are objectionable is highly implausible. Furthermore, a pragmatic account is challenged with explaining the robustness of the relation between thick concepts and evaluations. As has been pointed out his explanation evokes semantic mechanisms. (See chapter 3.5)
In chapter 2 the benefits of non-separationist views were compared with the requirements of such views. Non-separationist accounts make reference to cognitivism about values. The meaning of thick concepts is explained by postulating value properties which are picked out by thick concepts. Additionally, thick concepts are held to be unanalysable. This, however, implies a concept atomism. The concept atomism might be persuasive when it comes to natural kind concepts, with regard to thick concepts that are non-natural kind concepts it appears less attractive because it presupposes a version of radi-

cal nativism. (See chapter 4) By taking theories of non-evaluative concepts into consideration it also became clear that the shapelessness-thesis, which is one of the main arguments of non-separationists against separationists, cannot be used to argue against analyses of thick concepts only, but against concept analyses in general. Disproving classical concept analyses, however, does not imply that concepts are not analysable. It only proves that concepts are not analysable in a unique way. So, taking the considerations made in chapter 4 into account a separationist theory of the thick remains to be the most promising candidate in the field.

Thus the non-cognitivist account suggested in the preceding chapter can be interpreted as an attempt to establish a theory about the thick without evoking any value realist assumptions, even if this account might as well be compatible with cognitivism about values. Therefore, the study did not set out to refute non-separationist theories.

Concerning separationist views any view appears to presuppose that the evaluations conveyed by the use of thick concepts are semantic entailments and thus *at-issue* in conversations. But as was shown in chapter 3.4.1 the data employed by Väyrynen suggest otherwise.

Thus, a revised version of a separationist analysis has been proposed in the preceeding chapter which is based on Victor Kraft's thoughts concerning value concepts. This analysis is compatible with the thesis that evaluations entailed by the use of thick concepts are not at-issue.

According to Kraft, values are concepts and not properties of objects. Both values and value judgements depend on the evaluating subject. Values are ascribed to things or persons: "It invariably emerges for one particular person only, existing, for the nonce, solely for the person whose attitude is determined by the object that is distinguished. (...) Distinction (...) exists only subjectively, for the individual."[1]

Value judgements are distinct from mere expressive judgements because – as Kraft holds – value judgements are articulated from an inter-subjective perspective and by uttering a value judgement the speaker intends to persuade the hearer. This distinguishes his theory from an emotivism about values because value judgements are strictly differentiated from pronouncements expressing a personal point of view. A subjective distinctions finds expression in the form *I think that...*, whereas value judgements are articulated from an inter-subjective

[1] Kraft (1981[1951]), 129.

point of view. By uttering *The Mona Lisa is beautiful* the speaker intends to say more than just *I think that the Mona Lisa is beautiful.* The speaker intends to persuade the hearer that his or her way to evaluate things is best, that he or she is right and that the hearer should agree. In doing so, Kraft does not maintain that value judgements can be right or wrong in the sense of "fitting the facts", that is value judgements do not fit the criteria of verification which is in accordance to logical positivism. Instead, Kraft claims that value judgements are valid or invalid just like rules or norms which *ought to be recognised.* But recognition of validity is a personal act which cannot be demanded. In contrast to Hare's prescriptivism, value judgements are primarily evaluative and not prescriptive. Besides, Kraft's theory can be distinguished from quasi-realism because value judgements do not project emotional attitudes as though they were real properties, but values are ascribed to objects through subjective distinction.

Thus, Kraft's theory is semantic and separationist. That evaluations conveyed by the use of thick concepts are not at-issue in talks is not considered within his theory, but can easily be accommodated by holding that evaluations are lexically encoded in thick concepts and that the evaluations arising by the use of thick concepts in value judgements are thus conventional implicatures. Alternatively, one could try to prove that these evaluations are semantic presuppositions, but there are mainly three serious obstacles: i) it is difficult to give the content of these evaluations propositionally (especially when it comes to less objectionable concepts), ii) these evaluations do less function as background information, but are rather comments made by the speaker incidentally, iii) these evaluations – contrary to presuppositions – do not survive embedding in plugs. (See chapter 6.1.2.)

At the beginning of this study a thick concept was characterized as a concept whose representing term 'T' contains or entails 'x is good in a way (bad in a way)' iff 'x is T'. Subsequent results indicate further that thick concepts are non-natural kind, complex but analysable concepts with vague reference. Thick concepts are non-natural because there is no reference to value facts because the postulation of objective value facts is avoided. However, thick concepts have non-evaluative content in so far as they are world-guided and contain factual information. This non-evaluative meaning is expressible in non-evaluative terms. So, by uttering 'x is cruel' some non-evaluative properties are ascribed to x and the hearer gains factual knowledge about x. For

instance, a speaker calls torture cruel. This semantically entails that torture involves deliberate and intentional infliction of pain. But since evaluations also depend on the evaluating subject, deliberate and intentional infliction of pain might not necessarily be cruel. To avoid the objection that communication will not be possible, if everyone has only his or her own conception of cruel, Chris Barker's account of the use of vague concepts has been transferred to thick concepts. (See chapter 6.4.1.) These considerations yield the following at-issue content:

> S believes that x has properties X, Y, and Z (not specified) of general type A (specified with regard to a determined context).

If 'cruel' applies to x, then x involves the infliction of pain (property of general type A) and some properties X, Y, and Z which are not specified, such as the deliberate and intentional infliction of pain. It is the task of an ethical theory to specify the necessary non-evaluative properties of the general type A to which a thick concepts applies. This study leaves it as an open issue.
According to Kraft, if the assumed state of affairs is false, that is if x does not involve the infliction of pain, the value judgement 'x is cruel' must be false.
By uttering 'x is cruel' the speaker also ascribes negative valence to x in virtue of the infliction of pain. The negative valence is conventionally implicated. Additionally the value judgement conversationally implicates that the speaker tries to persuade the hearer to agree that torture is something bad. Also it is conversationally implicated that the speaker expresses his or her disapproval of x, a corresponding motivation, and the value judgement might give the speaker a reason to condemn, avoid, or refrain from x-ing.
In the opening chapter, nine questions have been raised which any consistent account about thick concepts needs to answer:

1. Are thick concepts evaluative, or normative in the sense of action-guidingness?
   Answer: Primarily thick concepts are evaluative, but can be used to express norms because value judgements containing thick concepts conversationally implicate that one should, e. g., refrain from the action. Otherwise, thick concepts can be used in subjective distinctions to only express an evaluation without even trying to give guidance to action.

2. What exactly is this evaluative and non-evaluative element, if thick concepts contain both?

Answer: The non-evaluative element is definable in non-evaluative terms. Nonetheless, it is not definable in a unique way. Only a 'rough' description can be given depending on the subjective conception in question. The evaluative element is non-cognitive and unanalysable.

3. How are these two elements connected or related to each other?
   Answer: The evaluative element is conventionally encoded in the meaning of thick concepts and gives rise to a conventional implicature. Therefore, a speaker refrains from applying a thick concept, if the assumed state of affair is not evaluated positively/negatively.

4. How is the phenomenon of evaluative flexibility explained?
   Answer: *Football is brutal* can express both a negative and a positive valence depending on context, at least it seems as if this could be the case. However, 'brutal' always expresses negative valence because the negative valence is encoded conventionally in the meaning of brutal. By uttering *Football is brutal* the speaker might nonetheless express his approval to the brutality of football by saying the utterance enthusiastically or smilingly. The utterance *Football is brutal, and this is what I love about it* is not contradictory because the approval in the second conjunct can be cancelled easily. The speaker might like football because of its brutality, although brutality is somehow bad.

5. How can objectionable thick concepts be included in the theory?
   Answer: An objector cannot apply a thick concept because this would implicate the evaluation which the objector actually rejects. Instead, the objector might use a thick concept ironically or in inverted commas to indicate that he or she objects to the conveyed value.

6. Can the theory explain why evaluative concepts are sometimes used in a nonevaluative fashion? Can it also explain the use of non-evaluative concepts in an evaluative way?
   Answer: Thick concepts can be used without negative or positive colouring, if the relevant values are common to all participants of a talk. For instance, a judgement might be called blasphemous without evoking an evaluation, if all participants know that religious values are not shared by anyone. blasphemous then is neutral due to its conventional meaning

within the conversation. Non-evaluative concepts might be used evaluatively due to facial expressions, gestures, or emphasis.

7. Is the difference between thick and thin concepts a difference of degree or a difference in kind?
   Answer: In this study it is assumed that even thin concepts are a bit thick. Thus the difference is a difference of degree and both thin and thick concepts can be treated equally. The specification of the non-evaluative content of thin concepts depends on the context in which the thin concept is uttered. (See Hare's discussion of a 'good motor-car' which is set out in chapter 2.2.4.)

8. Is the theory connected to any meta-ethical theories?
   Answer: The proposed account is based on Kraft's meta-ethical thoughts which is non-cognitivist.

9. Are presumptions on the basis of this theory justifiable? Are the possible implications of this theory desirable?
   Non-cognitivist theories are often criticised for its relativistic tendencies. But, according to Kraft, non-cognitivism is compatible with conventionalism. Moral standards might be defined within a society. The proposed account avoids value realist assumptions which is an undeniable benefit. Also the fact-value dichotomy is held up because values are mind-dependent and not disentangeably amalgamated with non-evaluative facts or properties.

In this study, Kraft's third way in between subjectivism and realism has been elaborated and appended so that a reasonable account of thick concepts could be proposed which answers the challenges raised in the introduction. It is a pity that Kraft's account has not been noticed and integrated into the debate about the thick, especially since Kraft combined thoughts about thick concepts' reference with classification and identification procedures of thick concepts by investigating conceptual analyses and scrutinizing psychological processes in classification procedures linked to thick concepts. Especially the connection between thick concepts and emotions which is mentioned only briefly (see chapter 5.3.3) is an interesting point which would be worth of further study. This study gave consideration to Kraft's theory by showing that even today his thoughts are still worth reflecting.

Appendix A

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