

EBERHARD KARLS  
UNIVERSITÄT  
TÜBINGEN



Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Fakultät  
Institut für Politikwissenschaft

**MASTER THESIS**

# **‘Of populists, chauvinists and welfare states’**

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## **Populist Radical Right Parties’ social policy stance and its attitudinal and value base**

Schriftliche Arbeit zur Erlangung des Akademischen Grades „Magister Artium“  
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Erstgutachter: Prof. Dr. Hans-Jürgen Bieling  
Zweitgutachten: Dr. Rolf Frankenberger  
Eingereicht von: Moritz Gartiser

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## Abbreviations

**AfD** *Alternative für Deutschland*

**CEE** *Central and Eastern Europe*

**CEEC** *Central and Eastern European countries*

**EEA** *European Economic Area*

**ESS** *European Social Survey*

**ESS ERIC** *European Social Survey European Research Infrastructure*

**Fidesz** *Fiatal Demokraták Szövetsége*

**FN** *Front National*

**FPÖ** *Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs*

**KMO** *Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure*

**Lega Nord** *Lega Nord per l'indipendenza della Padania*

**MANOVA** *Multivariate analysis of variance*

**NGO** *Non-governmental organisation*

**NHS** *National Health Service*

**PCA** *Principal components analysis*

**PiS** *Prawo i Sprawiedliwość*

**PO** *Platforma Obywatelska*

**PRR** *populist radical right*

**PRRP** *Populist Radical Right Parties*

**PVQ** *Portrait Values Questionnaire*

**QCA** *Qualitative content analysis*

**REGWQ** *Ryan-Einot-Gabriel-Welsch-Range*

**RN** *Rassemblement National*

**SD** *Sweden Democrats*

**SVP** *Swiss People's Party*

**UKIP** *United Kingdom Independence Party*

## 1 Introduction

In contemporary European politics, no issue on the political agenda gets more attention from media, public and scientific research than the upsurge of Populist Radical Right Parties (PRRP). Their electoral successes in most European countries, their effect and influence on political debate and party conflict in Western democracies as well as their policies and actions in office dominate politics across Europe. As a party family the populist radical right (PRR) are not a recent phenomenon. Their history as an established party family goes back to the 1980s while their historical development goes back much further. In Europe the PRR emerged, as van Beyme (1988) described, in three separate but consecutive waves (see also Beyme 2018: 47ff., Mudde 2014: 217): started as a (1) neofascist post-war phenomenon; it later transformed into a (2) carefully moderate ‘respectable’ party-family from the far right which primarily rallied against economic problems in the 1970s; and finally established itself as a (3) resistant answer to external constraints on national sovereignty through processes such as globalisation and Europeanisation. The *Front National* (FN, since 2018 renamed ‘*Rassemblement National*’, RN), for example, was already founded in 1972 and is therefore seen by some commentators as the “prototype” for the modern PRR (Mudde 2007: 41). A new phenomenon, however, is the huge electoral success that these parties were able to register during the last decade. As arguably the most successful party family in contemporary Western democracies (cf. Mudde 2014: 217), the impact the PRR had on the political systems of their respective nations as well as on Europe generally is substantial. To name only a few instances, the decision in favour of ‘Brexit’ in the United Kingdom, the progressive dismantling of the rule of law within Poland and Hungary, the drastic turn in European immigration policy under the Italian populist coalition government of *Movimento 5 Stelle* and *Lega Nord* (short for *Lega Nord per l’indipendenza della Padania*) as well as the halting development of European integration – despite the seeming abundance of common problems and increasing inability of individual nations to solve them – illustrate the prominent impact of the PRR on the political development of Europe as a whole (see i.a. Hartleb 2017: 13ff. ). More concretely, the PRRP strongly impact on national party systems, the formulation of whichever policies they focus upon (especially immigration and security) and the democratic fabric in liberal societies (to this, see Mudde 2007: 277ff.).

The increasing significance of PRRP on the political system, policies and society overall has led to considerable scholarly interest and scientific studies in the subject, making the PRR one of the best-studied subjects in political science (Mudde 2016b: 2). The characteristics of the party family are mostly ascribed to the sociocultural context of identity politics, combining a nativist ideology and an authoritarian understanding of a hierarchically ordered society with a populist anti-establishment attitude (Mudde 2007, 2016a). Von Beyme (2018: 13f.) states correspondingly, that right-wing populist politics is “primarily identity politics” comprising not in a programme of consistent ideological design but in “culturalistic constructions of difference” (own translation). Their political agendas are thus often dominated by their nationalist and anti-

immigration stances as the central issues marking their programmatic positions and serving as the frame of reference for political articulation in most policy fields. In contrast to this explicit policy stance, the picture is far less clear-cut in other policy fields such as the environmental and climate policy (e.g. Lockwood 2018; Schaller & Carius 2019) or the social and economic policy (Becker 2018; e.g. Röth et al. 2018). For some authors, the ambiguities within these policy fields follow a clear strategic calculation: in order to maintain their appeal for different groups of voters the parties either consciously blur their positions on potentially dividing policy issues or downplay the salience of such issues (e.g. Rovny 2013; Afonso 2015; Röth et al. 2018). Especially the social policy field is important in this regard. By avoiding a clear party position on welfare, the parties can cater to the diverging social policy preferences and interests of different groups of voters and, in doing so, broaden their electoral base. Consequently, vague political statements and programmatic ambiguity on social and economic policies are a common feature among the PRR. In scholarly debate socioeconomic issues are therefore generally seen as secondary to the overarching importance of their sociocultural worldview (cf. Mudde 2007). PRRP are consequently viewed as a post-material phenomenon based primarily on identity considerations instead of objective material interest (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser 2013: 167).

That is not to say that there are no common positions regarding socioeconomic issues amongst these parties. On economic grounds they advocate anti-globalist positions and sometimes even actively promote economic protectionism. On social policy and welfare, meanwhile, they follow a ‘welfare chauvinist’ approach. This notion of welfare is essentially exclusionist in nature in that it aims primarily at reserving the extension of full benefits to a previously defined ‘native’ group while limiting or abolishing provisions for ‘non-natives’ (see below). Apart from these socioeconomic features culminating in an exclusionist attitude on the ideological level the parties diverge significantly, however. PRRP vary widely – both internally within the national context and externally across party lines – regarding the programmatic design of social policy and the envisioned structure of the welfare state. Fenger (2018) sees considerable differences between PRRP regarding their programmatic positions on social policies, the implementation strategy and the policy instruments used to achieve these policy goals. This variance exists despite the strategic muddling of social policy positions claimed by Afonso (2015). Seeing that PRRP increasingly influence government policy either directly through participation in government or indirectly through public debate and ‘issue-framing’<sup>1</sup>, I agree with Fenger on the importance of exploring and better understanding this policy divergence. As demonstrated by Becker (2018) in his analysis on the socioeconomic policies of PRRP, their approaches to economic and social policies differ widely even in office: following a (virtually) neoliberal (Hungary) or national-conservative orientation (Poland). For this reason, I aim to further explore the reasons underlying this programmatic variation among PRRP in this Master thesis. I will be focusing on the differences in social policy preferences of PRRP and the

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<sup>1</sup> Parties vary not only in what issues they engage with but also in how they do so. By adjusting their statements and emphasising different aspects of an issue they offer distinct cognitive frameworks of interpretation to their audiences (see Green-Pedersen 2010: 9f.; cf. Wehling 2017: 27ff.).

attitudes and values that underpin this variation. Therefore, I am seeking to answer the following research question:

*How and why do populist radical right parties diverge regarding their social policy positions?*

To answer this question, I will follow a mixed-method analytical approach which joins together quantitative and qualitative analytical methods in a common research design. This research design is based on the procedural understanding of the political system, as articulated first by Almond & Powell (1988). In this view, the formation of political support, demands and supply is based on underlying policy feedback effects. Policy feedback literature indicates that structuring institutions impact on the formation of political preferences, expressed by attitudes towards policies and general values influencing these expressions. Processes of socialisation and ‘frames’ set by the respective structure of the political, cultural and economic system thus influence the individual formation of attitudes and values among the public. These preferences are later articulated and aggregated in the political system via public mobilisation of political actors, primarily consisting of political parties. Following this line of argument to its logical conclusion, the positioning of parties should be similarly affected by policy feedback effects. Therefore, party positioning should reflect the distribution of general public attitudes and values. As such, in order to understand the mechanisms determining the positioning of parties, I follow a two-pronged strategy that (a) examines general public attitudes and values to evaluate the social policy preferences of the public and simultaneously (b) analyses the positioning of PRRP on this issue. Therefore, I will analyse both the demand and supply side of politics before comparing the findings to generate further insights into the mechanisms which affect the positioning of the PRRP. Moreover, these mechanisms may expose structural causes of policy-divergence between PRRP across Europe and thus add to the understanding of its underlying factors.

As the focus of this thesis lies on explaining the divergence of PRRP with regards to social policy positions, this is reflected in the specific institutions examined for their structuring potential. It stands to reason that distinct institutions affect the formation of different attitudes and values. For the formation of socioeconomic attitudes, the role of the social system is a crucial factor. This goes especially when considering the characteristic welfare chauvinism in PRRP. For this reason, I will focus on the impact of the welfare regime as a structuring institution on the socialisation and formation of welfare chauvinist attitudes among the public. Studies show that the generosity and inclusiveness achieved through the specific configuration of the welfare state influence the formation of feelings of social solidarity and generate social capital<sup>2</sup> within a society (e.g. Ferragina 2015, 2017). These, in turn, shape public attitudes towards the welfare state in different ways, leading to cross-country variation (see e.g. Larsen 2006, 2008; Roosma et al. 2013; Ferragina 2017). A similar effect can be observed with regards to welfare chauvinism, both generally (e.g. Soysal 1994; Sainsbury 2006) and regarding the use of specific narratives to justify welfare chauvinist attitudes (Larsen et al. 2018). The

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<sup>2</sup> Putnam (1995) defines social capital as „features of social organization such as networks, norms and social trust that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit“ (see Ferragina 2017: 57).



voters of PRRP, despite being generally more orthodox economically, should therefore follow this trend and roughly diverge in their general preferences regarding the size and generosity of the welfare state as well as the rationales they employ to justify welfare chauvinist attitudes. Apart from the structural factor of the welfare regime I will further supplement my analysis through the inclusion of indicators of political culture research to account for eventual discrepancies in the structural explanatory model and increase its explanatory power. According to Kulin & Meuleman (2015) there is a “striking difference between countries” with regard to the values underpinning and driving welfare attitudes. At the same time, values also significantly affect attitudes towards immigration (Davidov et al. 2008; Kulin & Svallfors 2013) and may thus give an additional indication as to the underlying causes of variation in the policy positions of PRRP.

The analysis itself will be structured in three separate parts: (1) an analysis of the public attitudes of European publics regarding welfare chauvinism; (2) an analysis of the value base of publics across Europe; and (3) an analysis of the welfare chauvinist rationales underpinning PRRP rhetoric. The first two parts will consist of a quantitative analysis: I will conduct a multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) using data from the European Social Survey (ESS) –from rounds seven (European Social Survey 2014) and eight (European Social Survey 2016) respectively. Following this, the third part of the analysis will comprise of a qualitative examination of the party programs of different PRRP. This includes the Austrian *Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (FPÖ)*, the German *Alternative für Deutschland (AfD)*, the *Sweden Democrats (SD)*, the Spanish *VOX*, the Italian *Lega Nord* and lastly the *United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP)*. Following the first part of the analysis, the focus will lie particularly on the rationales underpinning both welfare attitudes in general and the expressions of welfare chauvinism in particular. This is done to ascertain differences in the party positioning and, furthermore, the impact of both values and welfare attitudes on them.

After this short introduction into the issue, I will now proceed by shortly outlining the structure of this thesis. The starting point is a general overview of the current state of research on the PRR party family as the central subject of analysis, done in Chapter 2. Here, I will first aim to clearly delineate the subject in question (2.1), before continuing to give a summary of the, so far, understudied role of the socioeconomic dimension in PRR-research (2.2). Chapter 3 will mostly deal with conceptional issues and theoretical considerations that will form the foundation for the following analysis. I will proceed by introducing the theoretical framework of my basic research design by following Almond & Powell’s (1988) conception of the political system (3.1). After this I will give an overview of welfare regime theory as the primary explanatory variable (3.2). Policy feedback literature provides the theoretical link between welfare regimes and the social policy positions of PRRP by pointing out the impact of structural factors such as welfare regimes (and cultural context variables) on the formation of public attitudes and values (3.3). Finally, the value underpinnings of welfare chauvinist attitudes will be consulted as an additional explanatory factor structuring the sociocultural context across European countries as well as informing opinions and public debates about welfare chauvinism (3.4). Based on these theoretical accounts, I will then present the hypotheses which are put to the test in the following analysis in

Chapter 4. Chapter 5 deals with methodological issues and the data source and operationalisation of the analysis. First, I will present the data that will inform the analysis (5.1). After this I will present the methodological basis for my quantitative analysis dealing with the demand side of politics by examining the differences and similarities of attitudes and values in the European publics (5.2 and 5.3). Here, I will illustrate the analytical framework and the operationalisation of the single variables from the ESS dataset. Following this I will explicate on the third, qualitative part of the analysis dealing with the supply side of politics and examining the responsiveness or irresponsiveness of PRRP regarding public attitudes (5.4). The analytical framework of this second step will closely follow the foregoing quantitative framework to ensure comparability. In Chapter 6 I will present the results from the three parts of my analyses (6.1, 6.2. and 6.3). I will discuss my findings in Chapter 7, before finally concluding in Chapter 8 with a short summary and proposals for further research.

## **2 Populist Radical Right Parties and the socioeconomic position puzzle**

### **2.1 Defining the nature of PRRP**

#### *2.1.1 Populism as a 'thin' ideology*

PRRP have experienced a drastic increase of their electoral fortunes over the last decade and established themselves as serious competitors to mainstream political parties throughout Europe. In some cases the electoral success of these parties facilitated their participation in government either as part of a coalition (as seen in Austria, Italy, Switzerland, Norway, Estonia, Slovakia and Bulgaria) or even achieving absolute majority, as seen in the cases of the Polish *Law and Justice* (polish: *Prawo i Sprawiedliwość*; PiS) and the Hungarian *Fidesz* (short for *Fiatal Demokraták Szövetsége*, meaning Alliance of Young Democrats) (cf. Schaller & Carius 2019: 8). It is therefore no surprise that the electoral successes and the profound overall political impact of these parties on European party systems have given rise to intense scholarly interest in the subject and generated an exhaustive array of information and literature on the subject (see e.g. Mudde 2016b, 2017). Nonetheless, the clear delimitation of the phenomenon has continued to be a challenge for scientific activity (to this see e.g. Mudde 2007: 11, 2016a: 295ff.; Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser 2017: 1ff.; Hartleb 2017: 57ff.). The different parties assigned the PRR label differ markedly from one another regarding their development and individual historical legacies, the sets of issues and concerns they articulate, the composition of their constituent electoral groups as well as their positioning regarding social and economic political issues (cf. Hillebrand 2017: 9). Similarly, Priester (2017: 538) determines that the programmatic variation among the PRR is due to “bricolage and hybridisation” of components from diverse ideological backgrounds that were till then considered to be irreconcilable. Dependent on the specific issues in question or determined by contextual factors these parties adopt pieces of – often conflicting – ideologies seemingly at random (cf. *ibid.*;

Beyme 2018: 20). One of the most obvious of these contradictions is the mix of oftentimes social-Darwinian approach to modern society – e.g. the radical ordoliberal socioeconomic conceptions of the AfD or the open disdain and suspicion with which the FPÖ regards the poor and dependents of social assistance – with their proclaimed investment into the protection of ‘regular people’ (cf. Greven 2016: 5). This inherent, ostensibly chameleonic, changeability of the subjects in question accounts for the unclear disambiguation of the concept in scholarly debate. As Mudde (2007: 11f.) illustrates, there exist a plethora of different definitions of these parties. As such, different authors often create new – usually quite cumbersome – terms to describe the phenomenon. Abedi & Lundberg (2008), for instance, use the unwieldy designation “Right-Wing Populist Anti-Political Establishment Parties” to characterise UKIP. In order to avoid conceptual and terminological confusion, it thus seems necessary to first delineate *what I understand* under the designation ‘populist radical right party’ and what characterises it before going on to outline what these parties *stand for* regarding the socioeconomic dimension of politics.

Most of the conceptual ambiguity in handling the PRR stems from the ‘populist’ label of these parties. In everyday political debate, populism is often used as a discursive weapon to arbitrarily discredit the political opposition (to this see i.a. Müller 2017: 11f.; Skenderovic 2017: 42; Beyme 2018: 37f.). Apart from this use of the term as a negatively connoted political catchword, the understanding of populism(s) varies. As a concept, populism has proven to be elusive, its multifaceted and chameleonic nature making it difficult to characterise in a clear and systematic manner (cf. e.g. Taggart 2000: 10ff.). Jörke & Selk (2017: 79ff.) differentiate between definitions of populism as a political style or a style element of politicking, a thin-centred ideology, a particular mindset, a strategy to take over (political) power and, for the North American context, a particular political rhetoric of hope. While all these understandings of the term undoubtedly warrant deeper consideration, for the purpose of this thesis I will follow a simpler differentiation of Wolf (2017: 7) and Skenderovic (2017: 50ff.). Both authors describe the underlying conflict between those seeing populism as a political style (or a political strategy) concerned with communication and discourse and those seeing it as an ideology filled with ideas, perceptions and meanings (see also Panreck 2019: 38ff.). Wolf goes even further and describes populism as a mixture of both a political style or strategy *and* an ideological feature. As a rhetorical device, populism is a way for politicians to appeal to an audience by appearing ‘down to earth’ and approachable. This is done by discursively reducing the complexity of issues, making dichotomous ‘black and white’ statements, using overt simplification and avoiding clear programmatic statements in favour of opportunistically articulating public demands (Wolf 2017: 7ff.). In essence, populism is therefore an elementary political tool used by all political actors in varying degrees of intensity (cf. i.a. Jörke & Selk 2017: 80; Müller 2017: 9ff.; Wolf 2017: 8). When this political style is furthermore combined with a provocative confrontation between ‘the people’ and ‘the elite’, this creates a “thin populist ideology”<sup>3</sup> (Wolf 2017: 7;

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<sup>3</sup> The term ‘thin ideology’ was coined by Michael Freeden (1996; 1998). It differentiates between ‘real’ ideologies such as socialism and liberalism and ‘thin ideologies’ that are inherently limited in their ideational ambitions and scope by their „structural inability

10ff.). Populism in this sense is not understood as an independent ideology but rather as a “parasitic ideological fragment” that is inherently limited in its ability to provide the necessary range of argument and reasoning needed in order to support a profound worldview. It is thus in need of a ‘host-ideology’ in order to function (both cf. *ibid.*: 10; to this see also Taggart 2000: 115ff.). Similarly, Priester (2012) views populism as an inherently relational term, seeing it as a “mere cluster of ideas without a persistent carrier (substance) for its accidents” (own translation). This circumstance explains the inherent changeability of populism and, by extension, the PRR. Populism is consequently “unrelated to the left-right distinction” usually employed in the political sphere – it can’t be ascribed to a particular voter clientele, form of organisation or political project (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser 2017: 8). It is contingent on the historical context as it is “malleable enough to adopt distinctive shapes at different times and places” (*ibid.*, see also Priester 2017). But apart from its ability to adopt ancillary ideological features, what, then, does populism stand for, exactly? What characterises populist features? And, furthermore, what sets apart the PRR?

A concise account of populism features the following central elements: “an appeal to common sense, anti-elitism, anti-intellectualism, anti-politics, hostility towards institutions as well as the moralisation, polarisation and personalisation of politics” (cf. Priester 2012: 4, own translation). At the core of the populist ideology stands the antagonistic juxtaposition of the ‘people’ and the ‘elite’.<sup>4</sup> This discursively constructed dichotomy embodies a morally founded anti-pluralism: It puts forward a moral claim for exclusive representation of ‘the people’ (cf. Müller 2017: 44). This explains the difficult – indeed even hostile – relationship between populism and representative politics. For populists, representation is understood in the instrumental terms of an imperative mandate: political representatives are seen as intermediaries that should directly implement the people’s ‘general will’ rather than being independent in their decisions and committed only to their own conscience (cf. Müller 2017: 44ff.; Taggart 2000: 2f.). As such, the acts of deliberation, negotiation and compromise that normally permeate politics as well as the open mandate of parliamentarians are regarded with disdain and hostility by populists. In the words of Mudde (2007: 23):

*“[P]opulism is understood as a thin-centered ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, “the pure people” versus “the corrupt elite,” and which argues that politics should be an expression of the volonté générale (general will) of the people”*

We derived from the nature of the fragmented populist ideology that its decisive feature is its malleability. It is able to adopt different host-ideologies in order to fill it with meaningful content and conceptual frames of

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to offer complex ranges of argument“ (Freeden (1998: 750). For this reason thin ideologies need to assimilate or ,borrow‘ concepts from other, more complex (host)-ideologies in order to „fill out“ their insufficiencies with other idea-systems (*ibid.*: 751).

<sup>4</sup> This dichotomy is not universally acknowledged. For example, Taggart (2000) rejects this reduction upon the concept of a ,Volk‘ or ,people‘ as too vague and diffuse. For him, the notion is rather derived from the sense of and identification with a ,heartland“, meaning an idealised, nostalgic but ahistorical view of a ,landscape‘ of „the collective ways and wisdom“ constructed and populated by the ,people‘ (cf. *ibid.*: 3, also Priester 2012).

reference. In this respect, as Müller (2017: 17) puts it, “anything goes”. In the case of populism from the radical right, the thin populist ideology is similarly combined with elements ranging from xenophobia, ethnopluralism, Euroscepticism and an excessive need for security towards forms of economic and social protectionism (Wolf 2017: 14ff.). The people-elite dichotomy remains relevant in this context, but the notion of the ‘people’ undergoes a “semantic amalgamating” with that of the ‘nation’, thereby shifting from the idea of a unifying *demos* towards an *ethnos* as the basis of the ‘Volk’ or ‘people’ (cf. Skenderovic 2017: 52; Wolf 2017: 12f.). In other words, instead of the idea of a ‘people’ constituted by common citizenship status, populism of the radical right variety conceives of the ‘people’ as being constituted through a common historical legacy and culture (ibid.: 13). Consequently, next to identifying ‘the elite’ as part of a harmful ‘outgroup’ it forms an additional boundary between ‘the people’ and ‘foreigners’, ‘migrants’ and other minorities based on ethnic and sociocultural criteria (cf. ibid.).

### 2.1.2 *The Populist Radical Right Party family - a definition*

A definition of the PRR that accounts for the inherently relational core of populism and systematises the exclusionary features of these parties is the one forwarded by Mudde (2007: 20ff.) which I will adopt in this thesis. He perceives the PRRP as being constituted by three core ideological features: *nativism*, *authoritarianism* and *populism*. Nativism in this sense conflates the nationalist and xenophobic elements that become apparent in PRRP. It thus incorporates the xenophobic boundary formation between natives and non-natives that was already mentioned above. Nativism is here seen

*“as an ideology, which holds that states should be inhabited exclusively by members of the native group (“the nation”) and that non-native elements (persons and ideas) are fundamentally threatening to the homogenous nation-state”* (ibid.: 22).

For the second feature, Mudde draws on insights from the Frankfurt School of thought.<sup>5</sup> He therefore defines authoritarianism “as the belief in a strictly ordered society, in which infringements of authority are to be punished severely.” (ibid.: 23). This understanding of authoritarianism includes the excessive need for security described above that informs the PRR’s characteristic emphasis on law and order politics as well as their tendency for “punitive conventional moralism” (Smith 1967: vi, as cited in Mudde 2007: 23). The third ideological feature, populism, was already described above as consisting of a juxtaposition of ‘the corrupt elite’ and ‘the pure people’ while insisting on the absolute primacy of the general will of the people over constitutionally enshrined rights and rules. This last characteristic of populism puts it into „opposition to some key features of liberal democracy, most notably political pluralism and the constitutional protection of minorities” (ibid. 25). For Mudde, it demarcates the boundary between the anti-liberal PRR and what he calls the *extreme right* which he defines as inherently anti-democratic formations (ibid.: 23, see also Loch 2019:

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<sup>5</sup> He refers here, most of all, to *The Authoritarian Personality* by Adorno et al. (1969).

50; Priester 2017: 542ff.).<sup>6</sup> While this distinction is not broadly shared in the literature, the heterogeneous nature of the far right<sup>7</sup> make it a sensible and practical necessity to differentiate between different ideological strands of far-right parties (for an overview see e.g. Mareš 2015; Panreck 2019: 35ff.).

To shortly summarise: the PRR is a heterogeneous phenomenon whose similarities amount to the three common ideological features of nativism, authoritarianism and populism. The latter being largely responsible for the often-ambiguous programmatic differences among the parties and their ability to flexibly adapt to various ideological influences. PRRP differ markedly from more extreme far right parties in that – while anti-liberal – they are not anti-democratic. After the delineation of the research subject I will now continue with an account of the contemporary state of research regarding the socioeconomic positioning (particularly the social policy positions) of the parties in question.

## 2.2 The socioeconomic puzzle

### 2.2.1 *The (un)conscious economic actor*

As was already briefly mentioned above, PRRP are primarily conceived of as a cultural phenomenon. Some authors (i.a. Rovny 2013; Afonso 2015; Röth et al. 2018) even assume that they consciously downplay the salience of socioeconomic issues and intentionally blur their positions regarding them in order to maximise their voter potential and avoid deterring different groups of voters with often conflicting socioeconomic interests. An internal strategy paper of the AfD that was leaked to the public seems to confirm this allegation, at least for the German case (see e.g. ARD-Aktuell/tagesschau.de 2017). In it, the AfD ascertains the divisionary potential of socioeconomic policies for its electorate and the consequent need to concentrate on more ‘important’ policy issues (cf. AfD 2016: 8). Developing patterns of social and economic protectionism are therefore often regarded merely as further programmatic elements for these parties. Mudde (2007: 133), for example, views the socioeconomic dimension as a secondary issue for the PRR which is subsumed under the ideological core features that were previously identified (v.s.). As such, welfare chauvinism (or social protectionism) is in this sense seen as an economic form of nativism rather than an individual ideological element of PRRP (ibid.: 22). While this notion has merit in an abstract sense, the increasing influence and impact of PRRP upon not only sociocultural issues and discourses but also upon the concrete policy formation over socioeconomic and sociocultural matters makes it necessary to pay closer attention to the socioeconomic content (or the conspicuous absence of it) within their policies, programs and speeches. Or, in the words of Manow (2018: 10):

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<sup>6</sup> In fact, Hungary’s prime minister Victor Orbán (26th of July, 2014) himself prominently declared a turn towards what he called ‘illiberal democracy’.

<sup>7</sup> Used here as an umbrella term encompassing the different strands of radical and extreme-right parties.

*“Those who want to talk about populism but not about capitalism at the same time, usually end up at identity politics only [...]”* (own translation)

### 2.2.2 Macro-structural explanations

Accounts of the socioeconomic political dimension of PRRP generally occur with reference to macro-structural transformation processes like globalisation, demographic change, economic development and post-industrialisation (i.a. Brinkmann & Panreck 2019: 5ff.). These processes affected the social and political fabric in the societies concerned and gave rise to new expressions of political discontent and protest at the micro-level (e.g. Dumas 2018; Rodrik 2017). A popular interpretation for this is the ‘losers of globalisation’ hypothesis. In this conception the electoral success of PRRPs is explained through economic, cultural and political globalisation processes that created new forms of competition within and across nations; dividing modern societies in new groups of winners and losers (see i.a. Kriesi et al. 2006, 2008; Kriesi 2012).<sup>8</sup> The PRR, in turn, was the most successful in mobilising the discontented ‘losers’ of these processes and thus managed to firmly establish itself in Western party systems. Another macro-economic phenomenon that is generally associated with PRR success are economic crises. In this view, an economic downturn or a recession are seen as catalysts driving the success of PRRPs (i.a. Frey & Weck 1983; Priester 2017; EEAG 2017: 60f.; Blyth & Hopkin 2019). According to this account, the experience of economic cutbacks (or the fear of them), leads to the deterioration of old party affiliations by eroding the trust placed in the ruling elites by their publics and fosters feelings of disappointment and resentment towards the overall party system (cf. Stockemer 2017: 1537ff.).

Embedded in these broader contextual explanations for PRRP-success – globalisation, modernisation and the effects of economic crises – demand and supply-side explanations proliferated. The two explanatory approaches examine the issue from different perspectives: The first looks at the people themselves, their interests, attitudes and values to determine what they expect political actors – especially parties – to do. They analyse the *demand* of the public to explain voter choices and the success or loss of parties. The second approach, the *supply* side of politics, in turn takes a closer look at the actions of political actors, their policies, attitudes and strategies to explain success or failure to mobilise voters or to reach office. At a first glance, the separation of the two approaches seems arbitrary. Both the demand and supply side of politics are deeply interconnected and interact continuously so that it is difficult to determine definite causal relations of one or the other separately. Moreover, on their own, they only give a limited perspective of the politics dimension. It is nonetheless convenient to separate them theoretically, if only to give a more clear-cut overview of the range

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<sup>8</sup> The authors fall back on Lipset and Rokkan’s (1967) cleavage theory in order to explain the transformation of underlying lines of conflict structuring Western democratic societies. Accordingly, the existing economic and cultural cleavages shifted to accommodate profound societal changes brought about by diverse processes of globalisation. They thus embody new economic and cultural conflicts that dominate political competition.

of scientific literature on the topic of PRRPs socioeconomic policies and their underlying dimensions. In the following both will therefore be presented separately.

### 2.2.3 Demand-side explanations

The core of a *demand-side* explanations that account for the socioeconomic bases of populist success builds on studies of the socio-structural base of populist party support dynamics and on socio-psychological accounts of the populist voter base. In this perspective, economic and social anxiety stemming from (subjective) perceptions of relative economic deprivation and feelings of political and cultural vulnerability present fertile ground for the devaluation of and hostility against perceived outsiders – the main direction of PRRP rhetoric. Accordingly, due to the composition of their social structure, the electorate of PRRPs are seen to be particularly prone to hostile reflexes towards perceived threats. The voters of PRRP typically comprise of older, predominantly male, non-manual and blue-collar workers as well as members of the petty bourgeois with often lower educational status (cf. Evans 2003; see also e.g.: van der Brug et al. 2014).<sup>9</sup> The voter base of PRRPs has undergone significant changes since the 1980s: it increasingly included voters from younger age-groups, became more female and gradually shifted away from the focus on the ‘anti-tax’ petty bourgeois voter towards a cross-class electorate by incorporating “disenchanted sections of the working class” (Evans 2003: 8). Both groups – the petty bourgeois as well as manual and non-manual workers – are broadly viewed as being especially receptive to the extreme sociocultural positions advocated by PRRPs. For one, according to Lipset’s (1959, 1963) thesis on latent authoritarianism within the working class, the lower strata of society are seen to be particularly vulnerable to authoritarian attitudes due to their socialisation, lacking education and a lower level of cultural capital.<sup>10</sup> The petty bourgeois, on the other hand, is seen as inherently status-oriented and ‘reactionary’ and therefore susceptible to extremist position under certain circumstances (cf. Lipset 1963: 137). This observation is seconded by the analysis of Aichholzer & Zandonella (2016), who trace the sources of PRR support not only to a perceived immigration threat but also to a social dominance orientation and, indirectly, to authoritarian tendencies. Correspondingly, Hartevelde (2016) shows that the main voter groups of PRRPs hold distinctly welfare nativist positions. Similarly, the German “Mitte-Studie” by Brähler et al. (2016) demonstrate that latent authoritarian, chauvinist and xenophobic attitudes can be observed for large parts of the respondents. Thus, it stands to reason that the potential for radical voting behaviour is not limited to the margins of society but rather a far more widespread condition extending into the midst of society. As Scheuch & Klingemann (1967) established in their *normal pathology thesis*, a small potential for PRR values – amounting to about 10 to 15 percent of the population – exists in all western societies, despite them being

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<sup>9</sup> Indeed, the level of education is seen to be a particularly strong predictor for radical voting behaviour. This is due to the increased importance of education within a globally linked labour market which creates new boundaries within and between traditional social classes (see e.g. Iversen 2006; Lucassen and Lubbers 2011). For Rydgren (2013: 7) “knowledge (not least formal education) increasingly becomes the dominant instrument of stratification” within the global process of macro-structural changes.

<sup>10</sup> In a short description, cultural capital may be understood as the subjective ability „to recognise cultural expressions and comprehend their meaning“ (Spruyt et al. 2016; see also van der Waal et al. 2010).



alien to the dominant liberal democratic values (see Mudde 2010: 1170). Mudde (2010) later expanded on this verdict by describing PRRPs as a “pathological normalcy” in contemporary western democracies: rather than an exception to the norm they may best be understood as “a radical interpretation of mainstream values” (ibid.: 1167). On the other hand, the composition of PRRPs brings together voters with heterogenous socio-economic interests between the anti-tax, anti-statist petty bourgeois and the pro-welfare, statist views of the manual and non-manual workers, the sales and service personnel (cf. Harteveld 2016). This is a potentially volatile combination able to divide the voter base of the parties should they take a clear-cut position on socioeconomic matters, which explains the second-order status and the oftentimes ambiguous position these parties take on the issue (ibid.).

Socio-structural explanatory models of PRR success can roughly be divided into three separate strands. The first refers to the disintegration of social relations over the course of economic and cultural globalisation – or *marketisation* and *individualisation* – as a partial explanation for PRR support (cf. e.g. Evans 2003: 299f.; Loch 2019: 55f.). Changes in employment relationships, declining ties to organisational structures (e.g. trade unions, religious denominations, etc.), the increasing disintegration of traditional family structures, but also economic uncertainties and unemployment add to societal fragmentation and a loss of social solidarity. All can be understood as symptoms adding up to a general feeling of social isolation especially among the disproportionately affected lower strata of society. In addition to this social isolation thesis, a second strand, the ethnic competition thesis, addresses threat perceptions among the electorate as a consequence of globalisation and immigration. An older variant of this strand aimed to explain radical voting via social marginalisation, i.e. through connecting it to forms of socioeconomic disadvantage. Experiences of socioeconomic hardship, in this view, fosters group-competition over scarce resources and welfare chauvinist attitudes (Rydgren & Ruth 2013). This hypothesis could not be confirmed through consecutive empirical analyses, as the findings showed a rather ambiguous picture (to this see Rydgren & Ruth 2013: 715f.). The second variant of the ethnic competition thesis concerned itself more with status politics. In this perspective, widespread anxieties over a relative loss of status were seen as the cause of PRR voting (cf. Loch 2019: 56). The argument was that voters that previously experienced social decline or feared experiencing it in the future may feel relative social deprivation (Gurr 1970).<sup>11</sup> Voters would furthermore translate the frustration about this perceived gap between their expectations and the observed realities into concrete political action, for example by voting populist parties. Incidentally, xenophobic parties like PRRP serve as the ideal channel for these frustrations, as they offer easy explanations and solutions to rather more complex problems. By constructing immigrants and/or other minority groups as competitors for scarce resources, political attention and regard they offered them up as easy scapegoats for deeper socio-economic problems (cf. Loch 2019: 56). Indeed, Manow (2018: 78) considers the fear of a loss of status and a pervasive feeling of relative deprivation

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<sup>11</sup> The concept goes back to T. R. Gurr, who defines relative deprivation as the “actors' perception of discrepancy between their value expectations and their value capabilities”, meaning the gap between their subjectively perceived entitlement in goods and conditions and the perceived reality of their present and possible future situation (cf. Gurr 1970: 24).

as central to explain support for PRRP in Western industrialised societies. According to him, the voters of PRRP are therefore not ‘losers of globalisation’, as those would sooner abstain from voting altogether, but rather labour-market insiders fearing a loss of status. Despite this distinction, the underlying conflict is still of a redistributive nature. Economic voting, in this sense, should accordingly be a socio-tropic rather than an ego-tropic phenomenon, meaning that it is related more to the perceived general social and economic situation than to actual experiences of deprivation and loss. For the case of Germany, Nachtwey (2016) illustrates that perceptions of a general decline of society and life circumstances are widespread throughout contemporary societies. According to him, these sentiments of economic degradation and declassing are indicative of a wider trend shaping the political and social realities in post-industrial societies; a process he refers to as a ‘regressive modernity’. The perceptions of social decline, insecurities and anxiety make way for frustration that is later articulated politically: increasing abstention from voting, the erosion of old party affiliations, increasing support for populist and xenophobic parties and a surge of protest movements are symptoms that express a more general dissatisfaction with political elites and uncovering a deep sense of nostalgia that permeates society (similar observations were made i.a. by Heitmeyer 2012; Gest 2018; Spruyt et al. 2016). As these considerations demonstrate, PRR support can be partly explained by diffuse subjective perceptions of economic decline and a threat to general and individual social status and well-being.

Moreover, these considerations of both generally experienced perceptions of social and economic decline and its relationship to the electoral success of PRRP validate Mudde’s observation, that PRRPs are a ‘normal’ phenomenon in contemporary societies. This is further affirmed by recent studies by de Vries & Hoffmann, that identify fear as the main motivation of populist success (Vries & Hoffmann 2016). Consequently, populist voters are motivated mainly by feelings of fear with regards to globalisation processes, feelings that are intermediated by factors such as age and education. Moreover, they observe a deep sense of nostalgia that permeates Western societies, connected to feelings of insecurity and anxiety and related to support for PRRP (Vries & Hoffmann 2018). Rydgren (2013) explicates on this connection between perceptions of social decline, nostalgia and support for PRRP. Accordingly, individuals finding or perceiving themselves to be at risk of social decline – either through perceived status competition vis-a-vis immigrants or minorities or through a deepening of socioeconomic cleavage structures – are more liable to sentiments of nostalgia as “the best they can expect from the future is the return of the old order, from which they expect the restoration of their social being.” (Bourdieu 1984: 111, as cited in Rydgren 2013: 7). As such, they have a perceived interest in the status quo ante as well as in a re-evaluation of established orders of values and may strive to change their situation using one of three strategies: (1) inciting the competing groups to leave; (2) changing the status hierarchy of society (i.e., redistributive measures); or (3) trying to “change the established group classification”, i.e. changing the premises for doing the classification in the first place (cf. Rydgren 2013: 8). As the capabilities for expulsion and redistribution are both limited in democratic societies the third strategy may seem especially appealing for such individuals (ibid.). As Rydgren (2013) states:

*“One way of using the third strategy is by arguing that the established order of group classification is irrelevant and/or artificial (e.g. social class) and that there is an alternative order that is essential and of true relevance (e.g. ethnicity).”*

Thus, subjective perceptions of personal social decline or a more general perception of societal stagnation or regression may constitute a fertile ground for radical voting behaviour among the public. Furthermore, they present a way to link socio-economic and socio-cultural approaches for explaining PRRP-success. According to Keskinen et al. (2016: 323) when they construct immigration as the central topic, PRRP closely connect socioeconomic issues and welfare benefits to socio-cultural issues and questions of national identity. As such, PRRP trace contemporary problems of the welfare state back to migration (Wolf 2017: 15). In other words, PRRP are able “to organise economic anger along non-economic cleavages” (Ost 2005: 9), leading Mrozowicki & Kajta (2018) to the conclusion that economic and cultural explanations are not mutually exclusive for them (see also Han 2016). Despite the mixed results for the explanatory power of traditional socio-structural models for PRRP reported in various studies (i.a. van der Brug & Fennema 2009; van der Brug et al. 2014), they can thus nonetheless be an important factor for explaining the processes underlying PRRP success. For Loch (2019: 59) they are indispensable: Even though they alone cannot explain the choice in favour of radical *right* parties, they are a necessary precondition to understanding the context factors influencing voter-choices in favour of PRRP. Similarly, Mewes & Mau’s (2012) findings indicate a significant explanatory effect of both determinants for perceived material risk and sociocultural attitudes corresponding to collective authoritarianism. It is important to note here, that the existence of social security systems is widely believed to alleviate globalisation pressures and reduce the economic and social risks stemming from economic crises and the processes of modernisation and post-industrialisation (i.a. Swank & Betz 2003). Thus, the welfare state can be seen as a counterbalancing force against the negative effects of globalisation (Loch 2019: 52). Following this line of thinking, welfare state provisions serve as institutions of inclusion and integration for contemporary societies by reducing people’s social and economic risks. As such they may be seen to indirectly reduce the appeal of radical right voting via social inclusion. Under migratory pressure, though, this alleviating *welfare effect* can be inverted. As Vadlamannati & Soysa (2017) demonstrate, higher levels of national welfare increase the effect of immigration on far-right voting (similarly Manow 2018). As such, differing levels of social spending should have a conditional effect on support for PRRPs while also shaping their respective policies towards the welfare state. A consideration I will follow up in more detail in Chapter 3.3.

#### 2.2.4 *Supply-side explanations*

As already briefly mentioned above, populist parties, especially of the radical right variety, seem to be the primary beneficiaries of the diverse environmental pressures arising in contemporary society. The specific policies they offer seem to best meet the demand of disenchanted voters. Next to demand-side explanations it

is therefore equally important to look at the supply-side when explaining PRRP-success. These explanations refer especially to so-called political opportunity structures created through party competition. As described above, the socio-structural base of PRRPs has gradually shifted since the 1980s. This is mostly due to a changing trajectory of their economic and social policy positions. For one, PRRPs have shifted to the left with regard to their economic and social policy positions. Early studies of the socio-economic profile of PRRPs argued that these parties mainly advocated liberal positions. Betz (1993), for example, saw them as ‘radical liberals’ campaigning i.a. for tax cuts, a reduction of the public sector, deregulation and privatisation. In the first comprehensively formulated account of their socio-economic profile, Kitschelt & McGann (1997 [1995]) observed these parties to combine an authoritarian stance on cultural matters with a right-wing, market-oriented position on economic matters. In Western Europe where party competition was structured along a dominant authoritarian versus liberal axis, this constituted a “winning formula” and the grounds for their electoral success. A decade later, the situation had changed. As described by Gidron & Hall (2017: 59), the economic platforms of the political mainstream parties of the centre-left and centre-right had converged towards the right, leaving behind the class-based interests of the traditional left voter clientele. This provided PRRPs with the prime opportunity to present themselves as an alternative to these disenchanting voter groups, as the defenders of the weak and deprived, by adopting more leftist socio-economic positions. In accordance with this line of thought, de Lange (2007) argued that the “new winning formula” for PRRPs today comprises of combining their authoritarian cultural position with a more centrist position regarding economic issues. Indeed, a shift in the economic positions of PRRPs can be observed in many European countries (see for example the volume by Becker et al. 2018). The new ‘moderate’ profile regarding social and economic policies has made PRRP a contender for votes from traditionally leftist electoral groups such as blue-collar workers (Loch 2019: 54). That PRRPs could establish themselves as credible contenders for leftist electoral potentials was thus possible only due to the political opportunity structures offered to them by their mainstream contenders. Supply-side explanations such as party system transformation are therefore inherently linked to demand side explanations exemplified i.a. by socio-structural accounts.

While these contextual factors are thus well studied and elaborated within scientific literature, the concrete content of PRRPs economic and social policy positions remains a controversial topic: While Kitschelt & McGann (1997 [1995]) placed them economically on the right side of the political spectrum, Lefkofridi & Michel (2014) see them moving to the left. Meanwhile, the analyses of Rovny (2013) and Afonso & Rennwald (2018) point towards a more ambiguous picture that is not easily captured in a dichotomous left-right ascription (cf. Otjes et al. 2018: 271). In their view, PRRPs deliberately avoid adopting clear-cut positions on the economic dimension in order to prevent a splitting of their core voter groups, the blue-collar workers and small business owners. The policy field in which programmatic ambiguity is rampant and this process of obfuscation is most openly practiced is in the field of social policy. Nonetheless, a set of common features can be identified, which I will discuss in the following.

### 2.2.5 *Welfare chauvinism – the unifying factor?*

To capture the ambiguity of PRRP's socio-economic profile it is best to go back to Mudde's (2007) assertion of the second-order status that economic issues occupy for PRRP. In this view, these parties do not follow a coherent worldview shaping their socio-economic profile but are rather "informed by, and thus subordinate to, their nativist, authoritarian, and populist ideology." (Ennsner-Jedenastik 2016: 412). Following this line of thinking, Ennsner-Jedenastik (2016) designed a group-based account of the social policy profile of PRRPs, arguing that these parties are less concerned with the actual scope of the welfare state, but rather with the allocation of welfare benefits. Therefore, in line with their core ideological features, they follow a non-economic view on economic matters and pursue exclusionary social policies best characterised through the labels of welfare chauvinism, economic nationalism and welfare populism.

The first ideological feature is welfare chauvinism. The concept of welfare chauvinism was coined by Andersen & Bjørklund (1990) to describe an exclusionist position on national welfare. In short, it reflects the opinion that social benefits should be rigorously restricted to nationals, the native population or another previously defined 'in-group' of deserving recipients (see i.a. Andersen & Bjørklund 1990; Oesch 2008: 352; Lefkofridi & Michel 2014; Schumacher & van Kersbergen 2014; Nordensvard & Ketola 2015; van Kessel 2016; Careja et al. 2016; Keskinen 2016; Nordensvard & Ketola 2015; Ennsner-Jedenastik 2018). Keskinen et al. (2016: 323) understand welfare chauvinism more narrowly as a political agenda deeply related to ethno-nationalism and active 'othering' by political actors. Likewise, according to Mudde (2007: 22), welfare chauvinism is part of a nativist vision of the economy which is characteristic for PRRP. As such, the issues of welfare and immigration are conflated in the logic of the PRR, making it possible to connect issues of the economy and welfare benefits with cultural notions and national identity (cf. Keskinen et al. 2016: 323).

The second feature, authoritarianism, introduces a distinction between those 'deserving' and those 'undeserving' of welfare state support. It is based on notions of what is deemed morally acceptable behaviour as a condition for receiving social benefits and thus presupposes conformity to social expectations (for example willingness to work). Insights from deservingness literature demonstrate that there exists a "universal dimension of support" throughout Western societies that establish a consistent ranking of 'deserving groups' following a similar pattern across countries (Coughlin 1980; see also van Oorschot 2005; Larsen 2008: 149). Accordingly, the public is most supportive of the elderly, followed by the sick and disabled, families with children, the unemployed, and lastly those on social assistance (ibid.). Similarly, Deeming (2018: 1110) determines that across Western countries there is near universal support for the provision of a decent standard of living for the old as well as health care for the sick. Perceptions of individual responsibility is an important tool for differentiating between different levels of deservingness: guarding against life course risks (such as age and health) is therefore seen more favourably than guarding against labour-market related risks (e.g. unemployment) (cf. Ennsner-Jedenastik 2016: 413).

The third feature of PRRPs social policy, welfare populism, in turn aims to retrench social benefits for the (political or bureaucratic) elites and rather restrict social spending to the ‘common man’ (ibid.). It therefore combines their anti-statist position with a more fundamental critique of the welfare state by depicting it as a self-serving tool for ‘insiders’ (such as politicians, civil servants, high ranking public officials) while simultaneously advocating a ‘true’ egalitarian stance in favour of ‘deprived commoners’ (cf. Koster et al. 2012: 6; Ennser-Jedenastik 2016: 414). A comparative analysis of Otjes et al. (2018) substantiated Ennser-Jedenastik’s argument. The authors could find a commonly shared nativist, authoritarian and populist economic profile of PRRPs which contrasted sharply with profound differences on the issue of state intervention in the economy, with only the French FN having occupied a clear interventionist position (ibid.: 285f.).

This picture is confirmed in the European context. Within the Northern European countries, studies show that PRRP’s socioeconomic policy can be mainly characterised by welfare chauvinist opinions, with centrist positions on redistributive politics (i.a. Andersen & Bjørklund 1990; Jungar & Jupskås 2014; Nordensvard & Ketola 2015; Careja et al. 2016; Keskinen 2016). Nordensvard & Ketola (2015: 357) conclude for the Swedish and Finnish case, that PRRPs do not “question a redistributive welfare state” but rather reframe it “as being linked to a sovereign and exclusive political community with distinct national boundaries”. The socioeconomic profile of PRRPs is nonetheless contradictory. For Jungar & Jupskås (2014) they paradoxically combine support for a strong welfare state restricted to natives with opposition to redistributive politics by means of progressive taxation. They therefore follow a different kind of egalitarianism restricted to people identified as being part of the national community (cf. Derks 2006). A similar picture emerges for continental European countries, where welfare chauvinism is similarly identified as the main pillar informing PRRP’s social profile (cf. van der Waal et al. 2010; Koster et al. 2012; Ennser-Jedenastik 2018). Similarly to Jungar & Jupskås, Becker (2018) identifies PRRPs in most Northern and Continental European countries and the UK as following an economic policy dominated by neoliberal elements with regards to taxation and labour market flexibilization. Within Continental Europe, they paradoxically combine this neoliberal outlook with a welfare chauvinist position on social policy which he ascribes to strategic considerations in order to expand their voter base. The exception here are France and Italy. Both the Lega Nord and the French RN exhibit strong national-conservative elements in their economic policy, including a more pro-active and statist economic and investment policy (ibid.).

A welfare chauvinist position can also be observed among PRRPs in the more liberal countries of Switzerland and the UK, with UKIP and the Swiss People’s Party (SVP) selectively promoting social policies exclusive to natives (see Tournier-Sol 2015; Ennser-Jedenastik 2018). In a similar manner, welfare chauvinism had a big role to play during the Brexit campaign. Prime minister David Cameron’s efforts to renegotiate the terms of the UK’s EU membership were partly aimed at reducing welfare entitlements to EU nationals, while Boris Johnson’s infamous ‘bus campaign’ prominently called for the reallocation of funds for the EU towards the

British National Health Service (NHS) (cf. Taylor-Gooby 2016; Astana 2017; Prosser & Giorgadze 2018: 158). Within the Visegrád countries the picture is less consistent. According to Becker (2018), national-conservative elements define the economic policy of PRRPs in Hungary and Poland, while parties in Slovakia and the Czech Republic follow a more neoliberal trajectory. The Fidesz-government accordingly follows a “selective economic nationalism” aimed at strengthening domestic capital groups in specifically protected economic sectors such as the utilities, retail, construction, media and banking sectors while surrendering the manufacturing sector to the market (ibid: 79ff.). Regarding social policy, the government meanwhile follows a strongly moralistic and hierarchical concept of authoritarian deservingness similar to the expectations of Ennsner-Jedenastik (ibid.: 82f.): Provisions for the elderly and families were consolidated or extended while unemployment protection was subject to a radical process of retrenchment (see also Vidra 2018). Illustrative is the new labour law – dubbed “slave law” by the media – allowing employers to demand up to 400 hours overtime a year which incited huge protests throughout the country (cf. Deutsche Welle 2018). Additionally, the Fidesz pursues a welfare chauvinist policy aimed especially at the national minority of Roma (Becker 2018: 83). The PiS government in Poland, meanwhile, practices an active economic policy aimed at forced industrialisation and a stronger role for the state in bank lending (ibid.: 104f.). Paradoxically, the government furthermore introduced an expansive social policy – i.a. raising the minimum wage and extending provisions to the elderly, families and housing – while retaining the regressive tax system (ibid.: 105ff.). Despite high levels of overall xenophobia and anti-immigration sentiments previously expressed by PiS actors, welfare chauvinism plays no role in Polish social policy. This is largely due to the insignificant levels of immigration to Poland and applies equally to other Eastern European countries (see Pirro 2014: 602).

As this short overview of the socioeconomic background and profile of PRRPs has shown, socioeconomic variables are important to explain the success and genesis of these parties. First, macro-economic processes of globalisation, modernisation and economic crises constitute the backdrop for contemporary expressions of frustration and discontent that sustain PRRPs. Second, demand-side explanations of ethnic competition and status anxiety can bridge the gap between socio-economic and socio-cultural explanations for radical right success. They are therefore an important factor for understanding the political dynamic of the politics in contemporary societies and an integral part for explaining the genesis and sustainability of PRRPs. Third, PRRPs don't possess a coherent socioeconomic profile. Rather, their social and economic policy positions are determined by their core ideological features of nativism, authoritarianism and populism which generate a strongly moralistic and hierarchic understanding of deservingness of social assistance and state support while excluding against perceived ‘outsiders’ in the form of minority groups, immigrants or political elites. Therefore, except for a welfare chauvinist attitude towards social policy there exists no uniform picture of their social and economic preferences. Fenger (2018) identifies welfare chauvinism as a superordinate uniting principle for PRRP but notes that there exists a lot of variation on the programmatic level of social policies. He traces the reasons for this to two possibilities: for one, it may be a result of the political landscape and

especially the centre-left political competitor of PRRP; in essence, the political opportunity structure enabling a turn to the left for these parties in order to maximise their electoral appeal. For another, it may be a result of differing public demands related to diverging individual social policy preferences of voters, shaped in large part by their respective national welfare regimes. I will follow the second argument in this thesis in order to further both the *understanding of* the differing social policy positions of PRRP and the *explanations of the reasons* for this difference. The next section will thus proceed by presenting the theoretical framework for analysing PRRP socioeconomic positioning. It will begin with a general overview over the theoretical research design followed in this thesis (3.1), continues with a short account of welfare regime theory (3.2), before then explicating on the main theoretical approach of policy feedback literature (3.3) which is later supplemented through a concept on the basic value underpinnings of political attitudes (3.4) that will inform the analysis in the latter part of the thesis.

### **3 Theoretical framework of analysis – regimes, attitudes and values**

#### **3.1 Basic research design**

The thesis aims at analysing the structural and cultural factors underlying social policy attitudes of European publics and the rationales underpinning the positions of PRRP. Together, it tests if the positions of PRRP reflect broader underlying patterns of attitudes and values. Theoretically, it follows Almond & Powell's (1988) design of a political system (see Fig. 1). In this view, the political system is understood as a “particular type of social system” engaged in the “making of authoritative public decisions” (Powell et al. 2015: 50). It consists of a multitude of connected, interacting institutions and agencies – from political organisations, the mass media and churches up to the family – which together influence public political attitudes and the policy process. The authors advocate a structural-functional approach in which political structures – understood as “formal organisations engaged in political activities” – are seen to fulfil particular systemic and procedural functions that keep the overall system running (ibid.: 54). They identify six types of political structures, comprising political parties, interest groups, legislatures, executives, bureaucracies, and, lastly, courts. These structures influence public attitudes and policies through four so-called process functions, i.e. political activities that are required for the formulation and implementation of any policy (ibid.: 55). Those include (ibid.):


- (1) Interest articulation, meaning the expression of (public) needs and demands;
- (2) the aggregation of these interests into more specific policy proposals underpinned by political resources;
- (3) the transformation of proposals into concrete authoritative rules through policymaking; and



(4) the implementation and adjudication of these rules, namely their execution, enforcement and the resolution of possible conflicts over them.

The concrete policy decisions taken (i.e. the policy output) in turn affect the host society to a substantial degree. They determine the allocation of resources, both with regard to the ‘extraction’ of taxes and the ‘distribution’ of benefits and services, as well as the setting of general rules of conduct regulating behaviour in society (cf. *ibid.*: 57).

**Figure 1 - The political system and its functions**



*Source: Powell et al. (2015: 56).*

As such, policy outcomes can be seen to have a twofold feedback effect on society: First, they inform short-term reactions within the public, in that they shape basic public attitudes towards specific policies in the form of public demands and support. For another, they build and add to the domestic environment shaping the experiences and histories of the individuals that are part of the political system. Policies thus influence the overall configuration of the system and, in doing so, affect individual development, attitudes and basic values. This happens through three interrelated mechanisms that Almond & Powell name ‘system functions’ (Powell et al. 2015: 57, in the following), consisting of political recruitment, communication and socialisation. They are an incremental part of the political system as a whole and partly responsible for its long-term continuation or change. Furthermore, despite not being directly connected to it themselves, they permeate and influence the whole process of policymaking and constitute the fundamental basis on which it is build. It is particularly the function of political socialisation on which I focus in this thesis, as it describes the formation and change

of what the authors refer to as ‘political culture’, meaning dominant political attitudes and values within a society.

The concept of political culture goes back to Almond & Verba (1963 [1989]), who view it as “political orientations – attitudes toward the political system and its various parts, and attitudes toward the role of the self in the system” (ibid.: 12). The political culture of a nation is, therefore, “the particular distribution of patterns of orientation toward political objects among the members of a nation” (ibid.: 13) and comprises of “common worldviews, values, and expectations” towards ‘the political’ that are shared among the public (Powell et al. 2015: 63). Almond & Powell (1988; i.a. 1996) later amended and elaborated the concept by distinguishing three types of political culture: system culture, process culture and policy culture (Powell et al. 2015: 64 in the following). The system level refers to the public view of the (national) values and organisations composing the political system. The process culture comprises of public expectations towards regulations and the methods of decision-making and covers the relationship between government and individual citizen. Lastly, the policy culture encompasses public demands with regards to specific policies or, in the words of Almond (1996), the “distribution of preferences regarding the outputs and outcomes of politics” (as cited in Roller 2015: 295). In a narrow sense, the welfare state can be conceived of as a type of public policy covering various heterogeneous programmes such as unemployment protection and employment policies, pensions, provisions for sickness, family benefits or income redistribution (ibid.: 297). It can also be conceptualised more broadly as a social right, though, and therefore as a part of the array of democratic values that form public attitudes (e.g. Marshall 1950). In either way, the welfare state can be seen as the independent variable helping to determine the attitudes of publics and parties towards social policies.

In sum, political culture describes a set of common values and beliefs within a nation, even though the degree of agreement over these attitudes may differ within nations (Powell et al. 2015: 68). Nonetheless, a shared history, a common language, religion, ethnicity or other identity-markers may generate a distinct cultural trajectory within a nation (ibid. 69). Change in cultural norms is generally viewed to be a slow-going process, political culture therefore commonly reflects a relatively stable set of values understood as encapsulating “the history, traditions, and values of a society” (ibid.). Furthermore, the national patterns of cultural norms are often a reflection of the respective political systems. In this sense, political culture is a part of the feedback mechanisms that shapes the political attitudes and values which later flow back into the policy process through the formation and articulation of distinct policy interests. In the following explications, we will take a closer look at the dynamic of the feedback mechanisms of welfare policies by introducing a strand of literature that concerns itself exclusively with these feedback processes. This relates both to the specific political attitudes regarding social policies and, more broadly, to basic human values underpinning the political culture within a nation and thus partly responsible for shaping those public attitudes. In other words, we will examine both the structural and systemic feedback mechanisms of policy outcomes. The former with regard to the influence of policies on long-term attitude formation and the latter in relation to the value bases underpinning public

attitudes. But before that, we will first proceed with an account of the welfare state as the starting point for the subsequent analysis.

### 3.2 Welfare regime theory

The welfare regime literature has grown into an exhaustive list of books and articles in the recent years. The most influential contribution to this list and generally acknowledged as the catalyst for the recent surge of interest in welfare regime typologies was Esping-Andersen's (1990) *The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism*. Building on the theoretical foundations of previous work i.a. by Marshall (1965) and Titmuss (1958, 1974) he developed a typology of welfare regimes which characterised contemporary capitalist societies and substantially informed their policies and politics (to this, see Arts & Gelissen 2002: 138; Abrahamson 1999: 395ff.). Welfare regimes, as a concept, refers to a framework of norms, rules, institutions and understandings shaping policy-articulation and -formation as well as forming lasting public attitudes with regards to social policy. In the words of Esping-Andersen (1990: 80):

*“The concept of welfare-state regimes denotes the institutional arrangements, rules and understandings that guide and shape concurrent social-policy decisions, expenditure developments, problem definitions, and even the response- and demand structure of citizens and welfare consumers. The existence of policy regimes reflects the circumstance that short-term policies, reforms, debates, and decision-making take place within frameworks of historical institutionalization that differ qualitatively between countries.”*

The basic argument of Esping-Andersen is that welfare states cluster around three distinct welfare regime types which differ according to the degree of decommodification and the form of stratification they produce in society. Decommodification describes the degree to which social assistance is defined as a matter of right for citizens and the extent to which it exposes people to (or makes them dependent on) market forces in order to make a living. The system of stratification refers to the level of re-distribution imposed by the welfare state and the intensity in which it advances universal solidarity (both: *ibid.*: 3-4; Arts & Gelissen 2002: 141). Together, the two indicators define the character and inner logic of different welfare regimes. The three clusters of welfare regimes are defined as the liberal, conservative-corporatist and social-democratic model; respectively determined by the underlying dominant ideology. The focus of the analysis was on the distinct relations between the state, the market and familial structures (MacGregor 2014: 7). Each type followed qualitatively different historical trajectories which shaped the specific development of the respective regime types. In particular, the “nature of class mobilization” (especially that of the working class), the “class-political coalition structures”, and the “historical legacy of regime institutionalization” were seen as interacting causal factors for the development of welfare regimes (*ibid.*).

The liberal or residual model is characterised by “means-tested assistance, modest universal transfers, or modest social-insurance” with benefits catering “mainly to a clientele of low-income, usually working-class, state dependents” (Esping-Andersen 1990: 26). The prevailing liberal work ethic norms ensure strict entitlement rules and conditions applying for receivers of the modest benefits; benefits that are furthermore “often associated with stigma” (ibid.). In effect, the regime provides minimal amounts of de-commodification effects and establishes a stratification order that separates poor and stigmatised state-sponsored welfare-recipients from the privatised welfare schemes of the majority (ibid.: 27). The second model, termed conservative-corporatist, is shaped by the prevalent principle of the “preservation of status differentials”; the scope of social rights was therefore linked to status and class (ibid.). As such, direct state influence is “restricted to the provision of income maintenance benefits related to occupational status” through the contribution-based system; effectively keeping the redistributive effects at a moderate level and establishing the regimes corporatist character of restricted solidarity (Arts & Gelissen 2002: 142). Further features include the commitment to preserving traditional family structures with labour market participation of women being strongly discouraged by conspicuously targeted family benefits and underdeveloped services (e.g. day care centres) (ibid.; Esping-Andersen 1990: 27). Lastly, the ‘principle of subsidiarity’ emphasises “that the state will only interfere when the family's capacity to service its members is exhausted” (Esping-Andersen 1990: 27). The third model, the social-democratic welfare regime, followed the principles of universalism and decommodification by establishing a “system of generous and highly distributive benefits” (Arts & Gelissen 2002: 142). This is expressed through programs with universal aspirations and a highly de-commodifying character; aimed at individual independence both from traditional family structures and market-forces. Effectively, the model “crowds out the market, and consequently constructs an essentially universal solidarity in favour of the welfare state” (Esping-Andersen 1990: 28). The consequence of maintaining such a system of generous universal benefits is the inherent dependence of the social-democratic welfare regime on full employment. In the words of Esping-Andersen (1990: 28), “[it] is at once genuinely committed to a full-employment guarantee, and entirely dependent on its attainment.”

Esping-Andersen’s welfare regime typology was not intended to create fixed categories strictly ordering national states into the types of welfare regimes they followed. Rather, the intention was to construct heuristic devices serving to simplify real-world complexity and allowing for targeted comparisons between different systems of welfare provisions (cf. Arts & Gelissen 2002: 139; MacGregor 2014: 6; Aspalter 2018). As such he identified three Weberian-type ideal models with a holistic assertion of portraying and emphasizing the “essential features of a situation considered as a whole” (Arts & Gelissen 2002: 139). The liberal archetype was the USA; the conservative-corporatist regime was seen to cluster mainly continental European countries such as Germany, France, Austria or Italy; meanwhile, the Scandinavian countries exemplified the social-democratic type (cf. Esping-Andersen 1990: 26ff.). Though widely reviewed and certainly influential, Esping-Andersen’s tripartite typology was also criticised on various grounds, i.a. a perceived misspecification of both

the Mediterranean and Antipodean regimes, for neglecting gender as a formative dimension of social policy and for failing to account for personal social services or the importance of civil societal institutions (Abrahamson 1999; Arts & Gelissen 2002). Specifically, the first issue and its wider implications are of relevance here.

A number of authors argued in favour of extending Esping-Andersen's typology to include four or five regime models (i.a. Leibfried 1996 [1993]; Castles & Mitchell 1993; see Arts & Gelissen 2002). A point of contention was the allocation of the Mediterranean countries as belonging to the conservative-corporatist regime type. Leibfried (1996 [1993]), for example, assigns them to a fourth regime model comprising of the "Latin Rim" countries which he names the "rudimentary welfare state". Its characteristic features do not include the right to welfare but merely an "institutionalised promise" towards the development of one. Consequently, existing social security programmes developed only partially and often in connection to Catholicism. Likewise, Ferrera (1996) distinguishes a "Southern model of welfare" as a separate cluster. The central features he identifies for this regime type are

- (1) "a highly fragmented and 'corporatist' income maintenance system" with strong internal polarisation between, on the one hand, very generous pension provisions and, on the other, big "gaps of protection";
- (2) a health care system based on universalistic principles contrasting with corporatist tradition;
- (3) "a low degree of state penetration of the welfare institutions"; and lastly
- (4) a "persistence of clientelism" and strongly particularistic patronage structures regarding financing and cash benefits.

Bonoli (1997) mirrors this argument. Critical of the inability of Esping-Andersen's approach to distinguish between the Beveridge and Bismarck models of social protection, i.e. between universal state provision and insurance-based systems, he develops a two-dimensional approach classifying welfare states according to the level of provisions and the mode of benefit distribution located between the Bismarckian and the Beveridgean system. He identifies four clusters of countries, indicating an Atlantic/British, a Continental, a Scandinavian and lastly a Southern/Mediterranean model.

A similar controversy exists with regards to the Central and Eastern European countries (CEEC). In fact, Esping-Andersen (1987) himself considered including Hungary as a fourth ideal-type regime (cf. Aspalter 2018: 80ff.). According to Fenger (2007: 13) the historical legacy of communism left its marks on the current manifestations of welfare regimes in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). Therefore, the historical trajectories and the institutionalisation of welfare regimes were shaped by communism and the consecutive experiences of its collapse, the transition towards capitalist economies and the European accession. According to Deacon (2000: 147), welfare provision throughout Communist societies was a broadly coherent and generally similar system. It featured heavy subsidies on prices for housing, transport, food and basic necessities, the 'right to

work' embodied in nominal full employment, relatively high salaries for workers with low wage-differentials towards professionals or managers, and the cheap or even free provision of health, education and cultural services (cf. Deacon 1996 [1993]: 164; 2000: 147). According to Fajth (1999), three "big pillars" characterised CEE social security systems: the pension system, the health service and the family benefits schemes. Comparable in scope and importance to these provisions were employment-related benefits and consumer subsidies which further informed the CEE welfare regimes (ibid.). During the transition period economic crises necessitated an expansion of social programmes, therefore "relatively elaborate unemployment, disability, sickness and early retirement schemes" were introduced which were later restructured and largely curtailed (Fajth 1999; Fenger 2007: 14). Deacon (1996 [1993]) predicted a divergence between the CEECs in the long-term, the countries converging unequally with their Western neighbours by adopting the various logics from the welfare regime (a prediction partly validated by Bazant & Schubert 2008). In contrast, Ferge (2001) ascertains a dominating trajectory of neoliberal "residualisation" of welfare systems in CEECs due in large part to (1) financial dependence of most CEE-governments on foreign capital and supranational actors and (2) the virtual absence of the "essence of the European model<sup>12</sup>", i.e. efforts to curtail inequalities, establish social and labour rights, protect individual freedoms and ensure the social integration function and emancipatory potential of the welfare state (ibid.: 149; Deacon 2000). The latter is a consequence of the unique communist legacy comprising of the prevalent poverty, the necessity for reforms, the stifled social structure of formerly totalitarian societies and the de-legitimation of the socialist elites and values (Ferge 2001: 150ff.).

In sharp contrast to these ambiguous findings in the literature, a cluster-analysis performed by Fenger (2007) gives more clear-cut insights. He reveals six forms of welfare regimes, consisting of a conservative-corporatist type in which the Southern European countries form a distinct sub-type, a social-democratic Scandinavian type, a liberal type consisting of Anglo-Saxon countries, a former-USSR type including the Baltic states, a post-communist European type clustering the large majority of CEECs and lastly a developing welfare states type with substantially lower levels of social provision and well-being which includes only Romania on part of the EU. The striking feature of Fenger's analysis is his observation that the last three types, all of which cluster Eastern European countries, can be clearly distinguished from the traditional European welfare states on the grounds of substantially lower levels of social provisions, large differences with regards to the social situation in the countries and considerably lower levels of trust among citizens. This illustrates the existence of a still considerable gap between traditional European welfare states and the Eastern European countries. These stem from differences in the social situation rather than distinct social programs, which consist of a mix of conservative-corporatist and social-democratic elements, if to a smaller extent (ibid.: 26, see also Bazant & Schubert 2008). Simultaneously, though, he concludes that a distinct post-communist welfare regime type cannot be observed.

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<sup>12</sup> The existence of such a European welfare model is highly contested in the literature. Bazant and Schubert (2008), for example, strikingly demonstrate that there is no uniform model but merely basic similarities.

In light of these considerations and with regards to insights from policy feedback literature discussed below, the following analysis will differentiate between five models of welfare regimes, consisting of Esping-Andersen's traditional typology of liberal, conservative-corporatist and social-democratic types as well as two additional regimes of the Southern European and post-communist variety. I will name the distinct regimes after their geographical locations and consequently differentiate between the Anglo-Saxon, Continental, Nordic, Southern and Eastern regime types. In light of the differences and the developing welfare institutions illustrated in the literature this seems to be a prudent way to conciliate welfare regime theory with a pan-European analysis of variance in social policy attitudes and their value bases. After this short excursion to welfare regime theory, the next section will follow up on this theoretical base with further considerations relating to the influence of welfare regimes on other variables such as social behaviour, attitudes and values – a strand of theory commonly referred to as *policy feedback literature*.

### 3.3 Policy feedback literature

#### 3.3.1 A general account

Policy feedback literature can be understood as a particular subset of new institutionalism, a strand of theory interested in the influence of contextual, i.e. institutional, variables on political preferences (cf. Shore 2019: 29ff.). New Institutionalism assumes that social context variables substantially influence the choices, behaviours and attitudes of individuals (ibid.: 31). The implicit presumption is that institutional arrangements at the macro-level structure individual attitudes and behaviours at the micro-level (ibid.). While based on the same premises, policy feedback literature, going back to Schattschneider (1935, 1960), takes a more encompassing perspective. It not only focuses on the impact of statist institutions on individual attitudes but also that of the more flexible public policies which are seen to have a more immediate impact on people's experiences, as they come into more regular personal contact with them (ibid.: 38f.). It conceives political attitudes and actions as resulting through the interplay between "state structures and institutions, political actions and communication flows, mobilization and demobilization, and the density and the patterning of political organizations" (Mettler & Soss 2004: 58; cf. Shore 2019: 39). The scope and significance of policy feedback literature has been considerably broadened in recent years; covering various themes (e.g. the implications of positive or negative feedbacks, the proximity of policies to voters and the intermediate influence of context factors), conceptual foci (e.g. political participation and engagement or attitudes) as well as the different effects and mechanism involved in them (for a comprehensive overview see e.g. Larsen 2018).

According to Skocpol (1992: 58), the effects of policy feedback can be roughly divided into two categories: New policies can either "transform or expand the capacities of the state"; or they can "affect the social identities, goals, and capabilities of groups" (cf. Shore 2019: 39). According to Pierson (1993: 597) "there are

significant feedback processes – particularly those directly affecting mass publics rather than bureaucrats, politicians or organised groups”. It is therefore this latter, “remarkably undertheorized” avenue of research we will follow here (Mettler & Soss 2004: 60). Pierson differentiates between two mechanisms in which policies influence mass publics: First, resource effects refer to the way in which policies provide material resources to individuals and thus give them incentives to support or oppose specific (social) policies. Secondly, interpretive effects are concerned with the impact of policies on individual cognitive processes (Larsen 2018: 374). In this view, policies are purveyors of “salient information in the form of cognitive templates of interpretation” (ibid.). Individual attitudes are thus conditioned by cognitive processes determined by bounded rationality and uncertainty (Pierson 1993: 61ff.). As will be shown, both are relevant for determining the structural effects of welfare regimes, but it is especially the latter which will inform the approach taken in this thesis.

### 3.3.2 *Welfare regimes as structuring institutions*

With regards to the effects of welfare regimes on social policy attitudes, policy feedback literature studies how welfare regimes (the macro-level) structure attitudes and behaviour towards social policies (the micro-level)<sup>13</sup>. Individual attitudes are later fed back towards the macro-level through the democratic processes of the political system, which helps researchers to explain political continuity or change over the long term (cf. Larsen 2006: 13). The groundwork for this line of inquiry was already laid by Esping-Andersen’s (1990, 1999) considerations on the effects of welfare states on social attitudes and behaviour. He implied, though not explicitly, that the institutional logic of welfare regimes nurtures different understandings of social risks, solidarity and equality (cf. Esping-Andersen 1999: 40–46). He built on Marshall’s (1950) conception of linking social rights to citizenship not only for the purpose of moderating class conflicts but also in order to fully realise the civil and political rights of individual freedom, liberty, justice and participation. Extending this line of thought, Esping-Andersen (1990: 55) viewed the welfare state as an “agent of stratification” whose organisational features helped to “determine the articulation of social solidarity, divisions of class, and status differentiation.” In this sense,

*“welfare states may be equally large or comprehensive, but with entirely different effects on social structure. One may cultivate hierarchy and status, another dualisms, and a third universalism. Each case will produce its own unique fabric of social solidarity.”* (Esping-Andersen 1990: 58)

Positive feedback loops help to internalise these distinct *welfare logics* in the public and, in the long term, reproduce existing welfare state arrangements.<sup>14</sup> The logics thus determine the further developmental trajectory of welfare state reform and adaption, i.e. they generate path-dependency (Esping-Andersen 1999:

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<sup>13</sup> Or, as in the case of Shore (2019), how welfare regimes as redistributive institutions influence political participation and national democratic quality.

<sup>14</sup> To reference Almond and Verba (1963 [1989]), it could also be understood as a particular political culture, a *welfare culture*, if you will.



4; Arts & Gelissen 2002: 140). Pierson's (2001) work on the "new politics of the welfare state" illustrates this point. He identifies political conflict over the future development of the welfare state as one of the most salient issues in contemporary Western democracies. Generally, it juxtaposes political elites seeking welfare state reform under pressure from "permanent austerity" and their reluctant electorates, which largely support welfare policies. More concretely, he ascertains that national publics differ significantly in the level and quality of their resistance to welfare retrenchment initiatives and connects these differences to distinct institutional configurations of the welfare states. The individually pursued adjustment processes and reform initiatives occurring in response to fiscal pressures thus vary qualitatively and quantitatively in accordance with the particular welfare regime in question: In liberal regimes, where welfare support is moderate at best, neoliberal retrenchment is favoured, while the high level of welfare state support in conservative and social democratic regimes leads to a more careful path that builds on existing structures, respectively by updating or rationalising current programmes (ibid.: 455). As this shows, path-dependency via feedback effects does not preclude political change<sup>15</sup> but can rather be seen to affect the direction of change to accommodate and even replicate existing structures.

### 3.3.3 *The institutional framing of welfare attitudes*

Apart from these rather general accounts, more focused research on the feedback effects of welfare policies on the attitudes, behaviours and capabilities of mass publics has seen less attention and focuses on public attitudes towards social policy. According to Larsen (2006, 2008), there exist three different theoretical concepts examining the mechanisms linking welfare regimes to public support for social policy:

- (1) The power resource theory (Korpi 1983; Korpi & Palme 1998) which focusses on long-term class interests and in particular the existence of 'class coalitions' forged by the middle class to determine effects either in favour of welfare policy (social democratic regimes) or against it (liberal regimes).
- (2) Following the rational choice argument of short-term self-interests; another argues for the existence of a strong 'welfare clientele' of beneficiaries that boosts welfare state support (Pierson 2001).

Findings for both of these explanatory strands were quite disappointing (see Svallfors 2012).

- (3) A third strand, the culture theory, emphasises the role of cultural variables such as a "dominant welfare state ideology" (Andreß & Heien 2001). Though "almost impossible to falsify", internalised values and norms remain a rather blunt and unspecified instrument (Larsen 2006: 18). Thus, they often serve as the default explanation for otherwise inconclusive findings. In the words of Homans (1974), "the rule of distributive justice is a statement of what ought to be, and what people say ought to be is

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<sup>15</sup> To this, see for example the works on blame avoidance strategies to justify retrenchment initiatives (i.a. Weaver 1986; Wenzelburger and Hörisch 2016).

determined, in the long run, and with some lag, by what they find in fact to be the case” (as cited in Larsen 2006: 19).

All three strands experienced severe difficulties in empirically testing their theoretical assumptions (Korpi & Palme 1998: 682). Larsen (2006, 2008) attributes these difficulties to theoretical shortcomings. In contrast to such a “mechanical perception of the electorate” that assumes a direct causal relation between individual welfare attitudes and institutional variables he suggests a more political and flexible understanding of the linkages between the micro- and macro-level. A political individual is, in his conception, a “more reflexive ‘political man’, whose policy positions are open to different perceptions of reality” (Larsen 2008: 148). Borrowing from insights of framing effects on social policy attitudes (see i.a. Weaver 1986; Green-Pedersen 2002; Wenzelburger & Hörisch 2016) he develops an argument of *institutional framing* of welfare attitudes. According to this conception, “the institutional structure of the different welfare regimes influences or [...] frames the way the public perceives the poor and unemployed” (Larsen 2008: 148). Individual attitudes are here seen to be open to normative discussions about necessity, justice, suitability and the common good, discussions that are shaped by the respectively perceived reality (Larsen 2006: 22). To this effect, Larsen combines welfare regime theory with the literature on deservingness, specifically the deservingness criteria determined by van Oorschot (2000) to determine institutional effects on the public perceptions of the poor and unemployed according to three dimensions:

- (1) The *selectivity* of the welfare regime, which judges the extent to which benefits are provided universally;
- (2) the *inequality* (originally generosity) of the welfare regime, indicating its de-commodifying and de-stratifying effect, i.e. to what degree it reduces inequalities between the poor and rich segments of society;
- (3) the *labour-market trajectory* of the regime, which assesses to what extent it creates opportunities on the labour market for the least skilled segments of society (van der Waal et al. 2013: 165).

These dimensions are seen to determine the deservingness of the poor and unemployed according to their perceived (a) deviance, i.e. the extent to which they are viewed as a ‘special’ group of needy and therefore placed outside the societal norm; (b) need of welfare assistance; and (c) control over their own situation with regards to the labour-market (ibid.).

The measuring criteria of perceived deservingness of societal groups goes back to van Oorschot (2000). He identified five criteria influencing people’s perceptions regarding the entitlement to welfare benefits and the conditionality for receiving them. They are based on personal characteristics such as socioeconomic status and age, general perceptions and opinions regarding the system of social security, as well as basic values and attitudes. First, the degree of *control* people exert over their neediness is seen as the most important factor determining deservingness. The more control they have over – respectively the more they are seen to be

responsible for – their situation, the less deserving they are of assistance (ibid.: 36, 38). Second, the level of *need* or deprivation individuals experience naturally influence these external perceptions. Third, the perception to what degree groups of beneficiaries are seen to share in the same *identity* as the majority influences their perceived deservingness. Identity is a fluid concept which is mainly associated with perceived ethnic difference in welfare state literature (Alesina & Glaeser 2004; e.g. Soroka et al. 2007) but can also be related to stigmatisation and ‘othering’ on social and economic grounds (e.g. Taylor-Gooby 2016). According to Rothstein (1998: 158) “the very act of separating out the needy almost always stamps them as socially inferior, as ‘others’ with other types of social characteristics and needs”.<sup>16</sup> The fourth criterion concerns itself with the *attitude* welfare recipients express with regards to receiving social assistance. Consequently, the more humble, docile and grateful recipients behave on receiving their benefits and the more compliant they are to demands and conditions, the more deserving they are perceived to be. Related to this is the fifth criterion of *reciprocity*, which refers to past contributions recipients of welfare support have made or the likelihood for future returns social support may garner. Earlier contributions or a likely future return for society make individuals more deserving recipients of support.

Van Oorschot’s considerations are closely related to arguments on the “moral economy of the welfare state” (Mau 2014; Taylor-Gooby et al. 2018). According to Mau (2014: 81), welfare states vary not only on quantitative grounds, i.e. their generosity and size, but also qualitatively with regard to their respective mode of entitlement and social relations, i.e. their *logic* or *culture*. Thus,

*“[when] we talk about a welfare regime we embrace not only the beneficiality of the welfare state for one group or another, but also the socially and politically valid conception of who should get what, for which reasons and under which conditions. These justifications are expressions of the normative content of collective welfare arrangements that affect whether people regard certain policies as necessary, desirable or morally plausible. Ultimately, the moral economy of welfare regimes resides in such kinds of institutionalized normative assumptions that colour and influence the citizen’s attitudes towards the welfare state.”* (ibid.)

Other authors present similar findings. Svallfors (2012) confirms the effect of normative substance of social policy attitudes. While varying in their effect across groups and countries it is nonetheless “clearly the case that beliefs, values, and notions of deservingness all affect attitudes toward redistribution and welfare policies.” (ibid.: 227). In a comparative assessment of different moral economic models in Europe, Taylor-Gooby et al. (2018) conclude that “attitudes reflect regime differences” with Germany emphasising “reciprocity and the value of work”, Norway “inclusion and equality” and the UK work ethic and individual responsibility. Larsen (2006, 2008) examined differences in public attitudes on social policy with regards to the target group of the poor and unemployed. He finds that the means-tested system of liberal regimes

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<sup>16</sup> Due to its multifaceted nature, van der Waal et al. (2013) prefer the label ‘deviance’ instead of identity.

emphasises individual responsibility and singles out those in need, thus heightening in- and out-group dynamics between ‘ordinary people’ and ‘the needy’ as well as suspicion towards the targeted groups while lowering general solidarity (Larsen 2008: 152). Stigmatisation on the grounds of poverty and general discussions over ‘dependency culture’ are characteristic for liberal regimes (ibid.: 155; Taylor-Gooby 2016). In contrast, he finds that social-democratic regimes render most deservingness criteria irrelevant to popular consideration. The regime’s universal nature does not distinguish between those in need or those not, thus fostering a sense of group-belonging in the absence of clear winners and losers. Likewise, the criteria of reciprocity and attitude become irrelevant without a clear target group. Rothstein (1998: 160) concludes that

*“[welfare] policy does not, therefore, turn into a question of what should be done about ‘the poor’ and ‘the maladjusted,’ but rather a question of what constitutes general fairness in respect to the relation between citizens and the state. The question becomes not ‘how shall we solve their problem?’ but rather ‘how shall we solve our common problem (healthcare, education, pensions, etc.)?’”*

According to Ferragina (2017), this egalitarian effect in social democratic regimes is also due to its effect on interpersonal relationships. Apart from assuaging social risks such as inequality, poverty and social exclusion, universal welfare states can equally be connected to “denser social networks, more embedded social norms and higher institutional and personal trust in society”, i.e. they nurture higher levels of social capital.

Another feature is worth mentioning here. For conservative regimes, the distinct contribution-based system serves to disarm the control criterion further than in the other two models. It is arranged around the protection of labour market insiders and the traditional male-breadwinner model (Larsen 2008: 156f.). This contrasts with the liberal and social-democratic regimes, which aim for job growth respectively through the private or public sector (ibid.). Therefore, while labour-market ‘insiders’ have considerable safeguards against occupational risks, this is not true for ‘outsiders’ whose fate is often linked to the level of unemployment and are thus seen to be less in control of their situation (ibid.).

### *3.3.4 Welfare chauvinist rationales – framing immigration*

The notion of deservingness discussions introduced above is easily transferred to other ‘needy’ groups. Another group continuously perceived as less deserving of welfare benefits is the minority group of immigrants, a fact already pointed out by Larsen (2006). According to him, a particularly problematic point for this group may be the deservingness criteria of identity and reciprocity, as immigrants are not seen as part of the common, i.e. national, group and have not accumulated contributions in the past to legitimise assistance (ibid.: 49). In addition, they may trigger the control and attitude criterion, seeing as they “may be accused [of] having put themselves in a situation of welfare dependency and not receiving help with the right attitude” (ibid.). This is mirrored by international survey results, which reveal that a majority of the public throughout Europe “considers immigrants less entitled to welfare benefits and services than the native population” (van

Oorschot 2005; cf. van der Waal et al. 2013: 165). The two dominant theories explaining the matter are the ethnic heterogeneity theory (Alesina & Glaeser 2004) and the group threat theory (Olzak 1992). The first relates the degree of ethnic heterogeneity to the establishment of different kinds of welfare states, arguing that the social solidarity necessary for the development of more universal welfare regimes is higher in more homogenous societies. The second, meanwhile, traces welfare chauvinism to a struggle over scarce economic or cultural resources; mediated by factors such as the visibility of the minority group, the salience of ethnic conflicts, the economic situation or political context factors (cf. Nagayoshi & Hjerm 2015: 141f.). Other studies cannot confirm these theories: Neither ethnic diversity nor economic self-interest are seen to have a particularly strong effect on welfare chauvinist attitudes (cf. Soroka et al. 2007; Svallfors 2012; van der Waal et al. 2013).

Institutional explanations for varying degrees of welfare chauvinist attitudes appear more promising in this regard. A number of studies suggest that welfare state institutions mediate economic and political threat perceptions of immigrants and consequently affect immigration attitudes both quantitatively and qualitatively. Escandell & Ceobanu (2009) find that high levels of social protection significantly reduce the likelihood of anti-immigrant sentiments compared to less developed welfare systems (see also Boräng 2015). More explicitly, Soysal (1994) and Sainsbury (2006) link welfare regime theory to international migration and immigration regimes respectively. Soysal (1994) differentiates between different “incorporation regimes” varying mainly in terms of the capacity they concede immigrants “to formally create advocacy groups seeking political representation” (cf. Escandell & Ceobanu 2009: 6). Accordingly, the Scandinavian corporatist model incorporates immigrants via centrally funded occupational and faith-based collective organisations that manage extensive and inclusive service schemes; the liberal-decentralised model incorporates immigrants exclusively through the labour market; and the statist Continental regime sees the state as responsible and does not directly support associations of any kind. Sainsbury (2006), meanwhile, distinguishes between immigration regimes: (1) the liberal inclusive model where citizenship is tied to birthplace criteria; (2) the exclusive conservative model that bestows citizenship based on lineage; and (3) the social democratic inclusive model which confers citizenship rights based on residence (cf. Escandell & Ceobanu 2009: 6). Nagayoshi & Hjerm (2015), in contrast, examine the relationship between labour market policies and anti-immigrant sentiment. They find that the introduction of active labour market policies makes it more likely that people support immigration, seeing it more as an investment leading to returns in the form of potential future workers. Passive welfare, in comparison, is seen as a “closed system” and more likely to generate hostility against migrants (ibid.: 156). These findings therefore suggest that while welfare states, in fact, have an alleviating effect on group threat perceptions, this effect is contingent on multiple interrelated factors.

In contrast, van der Waal et al. (2013) link welfare chauvinist attitudes directly to Larsen’s institutional account of welfare deservingness. Accordingly, the deservingness of immigrants is analysed according to the institutional selectivity, equality and the prevalent labour-market trajectory of different welfare regimes. Their

findings confirm the relevance of the selectivity and especially the equality dimension on welfare chauvinism. The liberal and conservative regimes' significantly more selective programmatic structures and unequal societies explain higher welfare chauvinist attitudes compared with the universal provisions and more equitable resource allocation of social democratic welfare regimes. At the same time, though, the authors could not find a relation between labour-market trajectories and levels of welfare chauvinism, thus seemingly denying the relevance of the control and need criteria for welfare chauvinist attitudes. As such, they determine that neither the level of unemployment nor the stringency of employment regulation affected perspectives on welfare entitlements of immigrants. This seems to be a rather curious way to conceptualise both the need and control criterion, though, seeing as they are supposed to measure public perspectives on the circumstances of immigrants. A more appropriate distinction for these two criteria may thus lie in the *cause of migration*, i.e. the classification of the status of immigrants as either refugees or economic migrants.

The qualitative approach by Larsen et al. (2018) is instructive in this regard, giving important insights that add to the antecedent findings and may be a more fruitful approach to investigating differences in welfare chauvinist attitudes and their correspondence with PRRPs programmatic differences regarding social policy. The authors present an alternative way to study welfare chauvinist attitudes by comparing different rationales underpinning welfare nationalist attitudes across Europe. They differentiate between three rationales explaining welfare chauvinist attitudes: Self-interest, a lack of shared identity and sociotropic reasonings. Self-interest rationales broadly follow ethnic competition theories in assuming a competition between immigrants and natives over scarce resources such as jobs, benefits or services. Meanwhile, the shared identity rationale argues that welfare state support is "rooted in a feeling of mutual shared identity among members of a given nation state" (ibid.: 3). The nation state is thus viewed as the historically and socially developed boundary of the welfare state; as a system of social solidarity built around reciprocity, mutual obligations and national identity. The welfare state therefore does not extend to non-nationals. National identity nevertheless cannot be seen as a fixed concept. Rather, as illustrated by Sainsbury (2006), citizenship is defined differently across European countries. Furthermore, it may be informed by religious beliefs, or be mitigated by perceived deservingness not restricted to identity criteria, e.g. differentiating between refugees and economic migrants. These different versions reflect different understandings of deservingness. Lastly, sociotropic rationales refer to broader "concerns about the functioning of society overall" (ibid.: 4). Sociotropic justifications of welfare chauvinism are built around the perception that immigration is "dysfunctional for the overall society" and can take several different forms often rooted in perceptions of the costs and benefits of extending social rights to immigrants (cf. ibid.). As such, while they can be exclusively economic in nature, they may also concern the social order and thus refer to issues such as crime levels, cultural integrity or social cohesion. The findings suggest, first, that the lack of shared identity rationale was very relevant across countries but not related to ethnic concerns. Secondly, sociotropic rationales were the dominant rationale applied by respondents, but with a differentiated picture across Europe. Economic concerns were more relevant in the liberal and social

democratic countries of the UK, Denmark and Norway, while cultural concerns dominated in conservative Germany and Slovenia. Self-interest rationales, finally, were prominent especially in liberal Britain but virtually absent in social democratic Denmark and Norway as well as Slovenia, where respondents apparently did not consider the welfare state as a significant pull-factor attracting migrants (ibid.: 6ff.).

This qualitative approach offers obvious advantages for the analysis of PRRP positions on social policy, i.e. the underlying rationales employed to justify overt welfare chauvinism. Additionally, it represents a framework of analysis that incorporates insights from policy feedback literature by offering convenient discursive frames that align with the deservingness criteria discussed above. For this reason, it will inform the central part of the following quantitative and qualitative analyses. There are several factors that make it necessary to supplement the analysis, though: another independent variable may be better able to capture qualitative differences between Western and Eastern European countries. For one, the absence of substantive welfare states makes (economic) migration towards CEECs virtually a non-factor. As was noted above, this is reflected in public attitudes. Nonetheless, they demonstrate significantly higher levels of anti-immigrant sentiment. For another, the post-communist legacy and the experience of economic and democratic transition have had a strong impact on the basic values and perceptions of the populace. According to Kluegel et al. (1995) Eastern European publics unites a puzzling mix of both a powerful individual disposition towards “social explanations of inequality” and a “strongly rooted ethics of moralist individualism” (Escandell & Ceobanu 2009: 7). CEECs furthermore combine egalitarian views in favour of a comprehensive welfare state with low overall institutional trust. In line with these observations the quantitative analysis will be expanded to account for basic human values as another explanatory variable. I will explicate on this in the following part.

### 3.4 Value underpinnings

As was already mentioned, communism and the subsequent experiences of economic and democratic transition left their mark on the countries of CEE. For this reason, a supplement to the insights from policy feedback literature is introduced here, in order to explain welfare attitudes and anti-immigration sentiments in an area with neither institutionalised welfare policies nor significant migratory inflows. It addresses the feedback mechanism of socialisation active in political systems through the so-called system functions. In particular it means the political socialisation with values and norms via the domestic environment and its historical, cultural, economic and social legacy. In the foregone part of the thesis we discussed how institutions shaped the formation of political attitudes. More concretely, we examined how welfare regimes as institutionalised social policies influenced social policy attitudes. Now we go a level deeper and look at the basic values underpinning welfare attitudes across European welfare regimes. This helps us to accumulate additional insights into the differences between welfare regimes not only regarding dominant welfare attitudes but also with respect to basic value patterns substantiating them. For this purpose, we will look at variations

in the value bases across welfare regimes in Europe by referring to and building on insights from Kulin & Meuleman (2015).


As was already explicated above, the CEEC are not a blank slate for welfare provisions. Rather, the expansive welfare provisions under communism profoundly shaped the basic values and attitudes of the electorate. As Kulin & Meuleman determined, the value priorities underlying welfare priorities differ sharply from their Western counterparts (ibid.: 419). Drawing on the works of Schwartz (1992, 1994) on the structure of basic human values, the authors differentiate between ten value types “derived from universal requirements of human existence” that can be further clustered into four higher-order value types according to their motivational emphasis (Kulin & Meuleman 2015: 419). Values are here defined as “personal and abstract motivational goals that refer to preferable modes of conduct or end-states of existence, and which guide people’s attitudes and behaviour” (ibid.). In comparison, attitudes can be understood as “summary evaluations concerning specific objects or situations, [...] that predispose individuals to react to these objects in a favourable or unfavourable manner” (ibid.: 420). As such, values influence the attitude towards a specific object insofar, as the object in question has an impact on achieving the motivational goals related to that value (cf. ibid.). With regard to the welfare state, this means that if

*“the motivational goals associated with a particular value are promoted (or obstructed) by welfare state arrangements, that value will have a positive (or negative) impact on welfare state attitudes.”*  
(ibid.)

The higher-tier values can be distinguished in two orthogonal dimensions, separating the higher order values into two pairs (ibid.: 419f.; see Figure 2): First, they juxtapose self-transcendence and self-enhancement, i.e. “disregard for selfish interests in favour of the equal treatment and welfare of all individuals” are contrasted with the “promotion of individual interests, success and power”. Second, openness to change and conservation values are similarly opposed, i.e. values emphasising “readiness for change and independence of thought, action and feelings” and those aimed at the “preservation of a social order, compliance with established rules and customs, and obedience to authority”. In this sense, self-transcendence and conservation values are the two dimensions that most clearly affect welfare state attitudes (ibid.: 420f., in the following). Self-transcendence represents a motivational emphasis on equality and the promotion for universal welfare while the conservation values focus on preserving the existing social order, rules and customs, which can be seen to advocate both in favour of welfare and against it, depending on whether the provision of welfare is seen as an agent of stabilisation or transformation for the traditional forms of social order within society.



**Figure 2 - Theoretical model of relations among ten motivational types of values**



Source: ESS EduNet (2019b).

Kulin & Meuleman find that self-transcendence values generally indicate support for government intervention and note an especially strong effect in Western Europe, contrasting with the considerably lower effect in Eastern Europe. Conservation values, meanwhile, have a mixed effect across countries. While in post-communist areas such as in the CEECs and Eastern Germany it has a positive effect on welfare state support, indicating the socialisation impact of the “egalitarian authoritarianism” of the former socialist regimes (ibid.:426), in other Western European countries the effect is largely negative. This coincides with earlier assumptions on the effect of the communist legacy on public values and attitudes towards the welfare state. It furthermore illustrates that welfare support rests on fundamentally different essential values across Europe. Incidentally, the prevalence of conservation values in CEECs may similarly help to explain persistent anti-immigration attitudes. A study by Davidov et al. (2008) confirms that while self-transcendence values are positively related to attitudes towards immigration, the opposite holds true for conservation values. Similarly, Roccas & Amit (2011) have illustrated that conservation values are negatively associated with tolerance towards other cultural groups. Concurrently, self-transcendence values have the opposite effect by heightening tolerance. This corresponds with some of the considerations about latent authoritarian respectively reactionary and status-oriented attitudes amongst the general populace as right-wing voting potentials. Another case in point is made by Kulin & Svallfors (2013), who establish that the values-attitudes-linkage of the population is related to class affiliation and the level of poverty and inequality within the country. Accordingly, the attitude-value integration among privileged classes is higher than in lower classes. This is explained first by the ‘crowding-out’ hypothesis according to which more immediate worries about socioeconomic risks take precedence over general values among the working class. Secondly, the cognitive linkage between attitudes

and values is seen to be easier to establish for the privileged, often higher educated groups. This difference is alleviated substantially in countries with lower levels of inequality and poverty. This again juxtaposes countries according to welfare regime types, with more unequal liberal regimes registering higher levels of class-specific differences, social democratic regimes at the other end and conservative regimes somewhere in the middle.

This account shows the benefits in including the value-dimension to the subsequent analysis. It helps in understanding the different influencing variables for social policy attitudes both amongst the public and the PRRPs. Kulin & Meuleman's study illustrates the advantage in including an analysis of variations in the value-bases of policy support for differentiating between Eastern and Western welfare support attitudes. A further observation of Kulin & Svallfors, meanwhile, helps to explain the considerable variation across Western Europe. They determine the relevance of the higher order value type of self-enhancement on the formation of redistributive attitudes. In contrast to self-transcendence values, which were already positively associated with redistributive attitudes, self-enhancement values are seen to have the opposite effect. Self-enhancement values are diagonally opposed to the value types of self-transcendence, favouring self-interest, status orientation and individual work ethic. As such, they may be viewed as undermining welfare state support and thus negatively influencing welfare state attitudes, i.e. they align well with attitudes that favour retrenchment and residual welfare provisions. Likewise, self-enhancement values are connected to less favourable attitudes towards immigrants (see e.g. Leong 2008). According to Stangor & Thompson (2002), self-enhancement values are part of the 'social identity' approach, i.e. a process differentiating in-groups from out-groups previously described as 'othering'. More concretely, attitudes directed towards outgroups are relatively more negative than towards the 'favoured' in-group. As such, self-enhancement values are positively associated with prejudice and therefore align with anti-immigration respectively welfare chauvinist attitudes among publics. Davidov et al. (2008: 586) see the effect of self-enhancement values differently. In their view the picture is more ambiguous: While persons putting importance on self-enhancement values like wealth, social power and personal success might view immigrants as competition for their chances at achieving these goals, dominant groups in society could also view them as an exploitable resource and an opportunity to reach their goals of wealth, power and success. In this view, several contextual variables like the design and openness of the labour market as well as the affluence of a society come into play which can determine the effect self-enhancement values take for the public as a whole. Effects might therefore vary in accordance with the structuring of labour relations and therefore the welfare regime in a country. It seems fruitful, therefore, to include self-enhancement values in the following analysis in order to enable a more clear-cut illustration of variations amongst regime types. Consequently, I will analyse differences between welfare regimes with regard to the three higher order value types of self-enhancement, self-transcendence and conservation.

## 4 General theoretical expectations

The foregoing theoretical explications lead us to several general assumptions and hypotheses which I will endeavour to validate or reject through the subsequent analysis. First and most importantly, policy feedback literature argues in favour of the influence of institutions on public attitudes and values. Specifically, that welfare regimes as institutionalised policies affect the formation and development of social policy attitudes and basic values in societies. Especially their size, generosity and inclusivity shapes not only the circumstances of living for publics, but also the normative underpinnings about the need for intervention, the perception of deservingness for assistance, belonging and general societal versus individual responsibilities. These, in turn, affect the trajectory of discussion about social policies within societies, i.e. they frame policy attitudes among the public. Therefore, I expect to find variation between different policy regimes with regard to both public attitudes and basic values.

*Hypothesis 1: Welfare regimes differ with regard to the pattern of attitudes and values among their publics.*

Subordinate to this main hypothesis I expect several more concrete findings of cross-regime variation. Following the approach of Larsen et al. (2018), I expect to find differences between welfare regimes regarding the particular rationales used to justify welfare chauvinist attitudes.

*Hypothesis 2: The rationales underlying welfare chauvinist attitudes differ across Europe according to the structuring welfare regimes.*

More concretely, due to its emphasis on liberal values of individual responsibility and work ethic and its rejection of more communal approaches to social policy, I expect self-interest rationales to welfare chauvinist arguments to be especially relevant in liberal welfare regimes, succeeded respectively by the CEE, the Southern and the Continental regime types, while being less important in social democratic regimes (*Hypothesis 2a*). Similarly, I expect deservingness rationales to be arranged similarly, with deservingness discussions being more prevalent in states with more targeted welfare systems, thus following the argument of Larsen (2006, 2008) about the mechanisms of public deservingness perceptions (*Hypothesis 2b*). A different sequence is expected for sociotropic concerns. For economic sociotropic rationales I expect them to be particularly relevant in both liberal and social democratic regimes, succeeded by conservative regimes, Southern regimes and lastly CEE regimes (*Hypothesis 2c*). This is mainly due to the easy access to the labour markets in the former regime types. The inclusion functions respectively via the low-education service sector in liberal regimes and the inclusionary access to state-sponsored training opportunities in social democratic regimes. The conservative and Southern European labour market are geared towards the protection of insiders and therefore less prone to this kind of argument. Finally, the CEECs public do not see their welfare state as a pull factor and thus do not view economic immigration as equally problematic. With respect to cultural sociotropic rationales I expect the opposite to be the case. I assume cultural sociotropic concerns to be especially relevant in CEE regimes, followed by the Southern European and conservative regime types, with them being less

prominent in liberal and social democratic regimes (*Hypothesis 2d*). This is assumed to be due to the conservative value base within the former countries, which reinforces cultural threat perceptions within the former countries. To illustrate this point, I added an examination of the value bases within different welfare regimes to our quantitative analysis.

Following the work of Kulin & Meuleman (2015), I expect to find variations in the value bases between regime types.

*Hypothesis 3: There are marked differences in the underlying value bases across welfare regimes in Europe.*

Specifically, I expect self-transcendence values to be particularly dominant in social democratic regimes, followed by conservative, Southern European, CEE and lastly liberal regimes (*Hypothesis 3a*). Moreover, I predict conservation values to be the dominant value base in CEE regimes, followed by conservative and Southern European regimes and finally liberal and social democratic regimes (*Hypothesis 3b*). Finally, self-enhancement values are expected to be especially prominent in liberal regimes, followed by CEE and conservative regimes, with lower levels in Southern European and social democratic regimes (*Hypothesis 3c*).

In the last part of the analysis, the social policy positions of PRRPs will be analysed on variations in welfare chauvinist rationales and compared with the results above. Here, I expect to find similar patterns between representatives from the different welfare regimes in question as hypothesised before (H2).

*Hypothesis 4: The welfare chauvinist rationales employed by PRRPs show a similar pattern of variation in accordance with the respective regime types from which the parties originate.*

As such, PRRPs originating in social democratic welfare regimes should be generally both more supportive of social policies respectively more reluctant to retrench existing structures and less welfare chauvinist on the grounds of self-interest, deservingness and cultural sociotropic concerns than those of conservative, Southern (both with a medium level) or liberal regimes (with a high level). PRRPs from conservative and Southern regimes should be less concerned with economic backlashes due to immigration than their counterparts from liberal and social democratic regimes. Meanwhile, those parties should be especially focused on cultural sociotropic concerns, in line with their conservative value base. Building on these general expectations, I will now follow up the theoretical part of this thesis by elucidating on the data and methodology used in the subsequent analysis.

## 5 Methodology & data

### 5.1 The ESS dataset

As was already announced in the introductory part I followed a mixed-methodological design, organised in three separate parts. In the first and second part, I quantitatively examined the variation of both the attitudinal rationales of welfare chauvinism and the value structure underpinning welfare regimes across Europe. Following this, I qualitatively analysed the welfare chauvinist rationales employed by PRRPs using party programmes of select countries representing different welfare regimes. I later compared the results of both analyses in order to generate insights into the institutional feedback effects of different welfare regimes. For the quantitative part, I analysed ESS-data from rounds ESS-7 (European Social Survey 2014) and ESS-8 (European Social Survey 2016) to examine welfare chauvinist attitudes and the value bases of welfare regimes by using the program IBM SPSS Statistics© (IBM Corporation 2017). The ESS is a cross-national survey that collects data of the populations of more than 30 European countries. Since its establishment in 2001, the European Social Survey European Research Infrastructure (ESS ERIC) gathers data on attitudes, beliefs and behaviour patterns biennially in personal interviews with respondents (both: ESS ERIC 2019). The ESS-7 data is available for 21, ESS-8 data for 22 countries. For reasons of comparability, I concentrated on countries that are part of the European Economic Area (EEA) and therefore excluded Switzerland, Israel and the Russian Federation from the analysis. The number was correspondingly reduced to 19 countries respectively for the datasets in question. The remaining countries were then classified into the five welfare regime types (see Table 1).

**Table 1 - Countries included in ESS data sets**

<b>Welfare regimes</b>	<b>ESS-7</b>	<b>ESS-8</b>
<b>Anglo-Saxon</b>	Ireland (IE), United Kingdom (UK)	Ireland (IE), United Kingdom (UK)
<b>Continental</b>	Austria (AT), Belgium (BE), Germany (DE), France (FR), Netherlands (NL)	Austria (AT), Belgium (BE), Germany (DE), France (FR), Netherlands (NL)
<b>Nordic</b>	Denmark (DK), Finland (FI), Norway (NO), Sweden (SE)	Finland (FI), Iceland (IS), Norway (NO), Sweden (SE)
<b>Southern</b>	Portugal (PT), Spain (ES)	Italy (IT), Portugal (PT), Spain (ES)
<b>Eastern</b>	Czech Republic (CZ), Estonia (EE), Hungary (HU), Lithuania (LT), Poland (PL), Slovenia (SI)	Czech Republic (CZ), Estonia (EE), Hungary (HU), Lithuania (LT), Poland (PL)

*Source: own illustration.*

## 5.2 Welfare chauvinist attitudes

The first part of the analysis – the examination of welfare chauvinist attitudes amongst European publics – is based on the ESS-7 dataset, which includes 13 items gauging citizen’s attitudes towards immigration for the four types of welfare chauvinism (see Table 2 for exact wording). The categories include items representing the four welfare rationales identified by Larsen et al. (2018): First, self-interest rationales are represented through only one item designed to contrast public perceptions regarding the treatment of immigrants in comparison to the native group. More concretely, the item of ‘fraternal relative deprivation’ measures whether people perceive the group with which they identify as being at “risk of losing opportunities or privileges to which they are rightly entitled” in comparison to immigrants (European Social Survey 2015: 28). As such it can be seen to fit with threat perceptions of ethnic competition theory. Second, the deservingness rationales are aggregated through several items measuring perceptions on diverse qualifications of immigrants which merit them entering the country. This includes items measuring perceptions on educational status and work-skills, which can be attributed as fitting the notion of ‘reciprocity’ advocated by Larsen, but also items concerning the aspect of identity such as the ability to speak the national language and ‘commitment to the way of life in the country’ (ibid.: 14ff.). Additionally, it includes an item measuring the impact of the ‘refugee status’ of immigrants on perceived deservingness to enter the country as an indicator for a perceived ‘need’ of immigrants (ibid.: 12). The aggregated factor thus measures the relative strength of perceptions of deservingness across countries. The third factor, economic sociotropic concerns, is composed of items which are designed to assess the “realistic threat” perceptions within the population with regard to material threat due to immigration. It includes items on the perceived impact of immigration on the national economy overall as well as on more concrete material threat perceptions regarding jobs and services (European Social Survey 2015: 20f.). While the latter items could equally be ascribed to the self-interest rationale, the focus on overall economic impacts and the collinearity within the item design (confirmed by a preliminary factor analysis) served to relegate them to this broader dimension. Therefore, the items build the factor of economic sociotropic concerns. The fourth factor, cultural sociotropic concerns, contains three items measuring the opinions on the impact of migrants on national culture, religion and crime. The items questioned the symbolic threat perceptions of nationals by questioning the impact of immigrants on the ‘national culture’, the ‘national religion’ and on ‘security’ (ibid.: 22f.).

**Table 2 - Question wording for the ESS-7 items**

<b>Concept</b>	<b>Item no.</b>	<b>Question wording</b>	<b>Answer scale</b>
<b>Self-interest (SI)</b>	D17b	Compared to people like yourself who were born in [country], how do you think the government treats those who have recently come to live here from other countries?	1 (Much better) – 5 (Much worse)
<b>Deservingness (D)</b>	D1-6	Please tell me how important you think each of these things should be in deciding whether someone born, brought up and living outside [country] should be able to come and live here.	1 (Extremely unimportant) – 10 (Extremely important)
	D1	... how important should it be for them to... ..have good educational qualifications?	
	D2	... how important should it be for them to... ..be able to speak [country's official language(s)]?	
	D5	... how important should it be for them to... ..have work skills that [country] needs?	
	D6	... how important should it be for them to... ..be committed to the way of life in [country]?	
	D15	Some people come to this country and apply for refugee status on the grounds that they fear persecution in their own country. Using this card, please say how much you agree or disagree with the following statements. Firstly...The government should be generous in judging people's applications for refugee status	1 (Agree strongly) – 5 (Disagree strongly)
<b>Economic sociotropic concerns (ESC)</b>	B32	Would you say it is generally bad or good for [country]'s economy that people come to live here from other countries?	1 (Bad for the economy) – 10 (Good for the economy)
	D7	Would you say that people who come to live here generally take jobs away from workers in [country], or generally help to create new jobs?	1 (Take jobs away) – 10 (Create new jobs)
	D8	Most people who come to live here work and pay taxes. They also use health and welfare services. On balance, do you think people who come here take out more than they put in or put in more than they take out?	1 (Generally take out more) – 10 (Generally put in more)
<b>Cultural sociotropic concerns</b>	B33	Would you say that [country]'s cultural life is generally undermined or enriched by people coming to live here from other countries?	1 (Cultural life undermined) – 10 (Cultural life enriched)
	D9	Are [country]'s crime problems made worse or better by people coming to live here from other countries?	1 (Countries crime problems made worse) – 10 (Countries crime problems made better)
	D18	Do you think the religious beliefs and practices in [country] are generally undermined or enriched by people coming to live here from other countries?	1 (Religious beliefs and practices undermined) – 10 (Religious beliefs and practices enriched)

*Source: own illustration based on European Social Survey (2014).*

In order to check the suitability of the theoretically constructed factors, a preliminary principal components analysis (PCA) was conducted for 15 items representing perceptions on immigrants and immigration in general. The PCA is a specific type of factor analysis, a method commonly used to order and structure of a large set of variables (Bortz & Schuster 2010: 385). A factor analysis is a procedure aimed at reducing the complexity of variable sets by grouping them according to their correlative relationships into fewer independent factors (ibid.: 386). The rotation used to identify interpretable factors over the course of the PCA can either follow an orthogonal rotation procedure – which secures the independence of factors – or an oblique rotation allowing for correlation between the outcome factors (ibid.: 418). For this case I tested the item-variables using both an orthogonal Varimax as well as an oblique rotation (direct oblimin). After this preliminary test I proceeded with the main part of the analysis and carried out a MANOVA using the variables presented above. Generally, a MANOVA is an extension of an analysis of variance that tests the influence of one or more independent variables (factor) on several dependent variables (cf. Kuckartz et al. 2013: 185). The independent variable or grouping variable separates the dataset in random samples according to the number

of the factor levels (groups) it discloses (Bortz & Schuster 2010: 478). The MANOVA evaluates differences between these groups by comparing the composite means of the dependent variables according to the factor levels of the independent variable (cf. Tabachnick & Fidell 2013: 21). In this thesis, the MANOVA allows me to measure variation between regime types – the independent variable – in the characteristics of welfare chauvinist attitudes, measured through the aforementioned items representing the dependent – or latent – variables. In an additional step I conduct a discriminatory analysis to further explore the relationship between the regime groups and the latent variables, following the recommendation by Field (2017). The discriminant analysis allows me to discern the relevance the examined dependent variables have for differentiating between the compared group samples. More concretely, it determines weighting coefficients that indicate how the individual variables are to be weighted in order to attain the greatest possible separation (*'discrimination'*) between samples (cf. Bortz & Schuster 2010: 487).

### 5.3 Value base

In the second part of the quantitative analysis I replicated the approach above using different items representing basic value dimensions. The ESS-8 dataset offers a modified version of the Portrait Values Questionnaire (PVQ) measuring the ten basic human value types as theorised by Schwartz (1992). It includes 21 value items that combine into the ten value types which can be further aggregated into indexes representing the four high-order value types introduced in the part above (ESS EduNet 2019a). On a scale from 1 (very much like me) to 6 (not like me at all) respondents are asked to quantify to what extent they, as a person, concur with the statements in question (see Table 3 for exact wording). I followed previous studies (see Kulin & Meuleman 2015: 423), which similarly used the higher order value types as the basis of their analyses in order to avoid multicollinearity problems arising from the items' small number and broad content. As in the first step, I conducted a MANOVA followed by a discriminatory analysis in order to determine variation in the value bases across regime types. The items for the three higher-order value types of self-enhancement, self-transcendence and conservation were thus used as dependent variables to measure differences in basic values between the welfare regimes in Europe.



**Table 3 - Question wording for the ESS-8 items**

<b>Concept</b>	<b>Item no.</b>	<b>Question wording</b>	<b>Answer scale</b>
<b>Self-transcendence (ST)</b>	G3	She/he thinks it is important that every person in the world should be treated equally. She/he believes everyone should have equal opportunities in life.	1 (not like me at all) – 6 (very much like me)
	G8	It is important to her/him to listen to people who are different from her/him. Even when she/he disagrees with them, she/he still wants to understand them.	
	G12	It's very important to her/him to help the people around her/him. She/he wants to care for their well-being.	
	G18	It is important to her/him to be loyal to her/his friends. She/he wants to devote herself/himself to people close to her/him.	
	G19	She/he strongly believes that people should care for nature. Looking after the environment is important to her/him.	
<b>Conservation (CO)</b>	G5	It is important to her/him to live in secure surroundings. She/he avoids anything that might endanger her/his safety.	
	G7	She/he believes that people should do what they're told. She/he thinks people should follow rules at all times, even when no-one is watching.	
	G9	It is important to her/him to be humble and modest. She/he tries not to draw attention to herself/himself.	
	G14	It is important to her/him that the government ensures her/his safety against all threats. She/he wants the state to be strong so it can defend its citizens.	
	G16	It is important to her/him always to behave properly. She/he wants to avoid doing anything people would say is wrong.	
	G20	Tradition is important to her/him. She/he tries to follow the customs handed down by her/his religion or her/his family.	
<b>Self-enhancement (SE)</b>	G2	It is important to her/him to be rich. She/he wants to have a lot of money and expensive things.	
	G4	It's important to her/him to show her/his abilities. She/he wants people to admire what she/he does.	
	G10	Having a good time is important to her/him. She/he likes to 'spoil' herself/himself.	
	G13	Very successful is important to her/him. She/he hopes people will recognise her/his achievements.	
	G17	It is important to her/him always to behave properly. She/he wants to avoid doing anything people would say is wrong.	
	G21	She/he seeks every chance she/he can to have fun. It is important to her/him to do things that give her/him pleasure.	

*Source: own illustration based on European Social Survey (2016) and ESS EduNet (2019a).*

#### 5.4 The attitudinal base of PRRP

In the third part of the analysis, I examined the party programs of selected PRRP on their welfare chauvinist content. For this purpose, I utilised a structured qualitative content analysis (QCA) following Mayring (2015). The structured QCA requires a theoretically founded category system which carefully defines the categories of items under consideration and accordingly organises the analysis. More concretely, I implemented the method of scaled structuring, also called analysis of valence or intensity (ibid.: 106ff.). This method is aimed at assessing the content on a fixed ordinal scale of -1 ('welfare chauvinist/anti-immigration') to 1 ('non-exclusionary/pro-immigration'). The individual scores were later aggregated according to the superordinate categories, enabling me to make general statements about the content of PRRP programs as well as variations between them and across regime types. With regards to the previous quantitative data analysis, the category scheme used in this part was similarly based on Larsen et al.'s (2018) conception of welfare chauvinist rationales (see Appendix 3.1). This made it possible to compare the results with the empirical tests conducted in first part of the analysis. The employed category system therefore focused on active frames used by PRRPs

to justify welfare chauvinist attitudes. Generally, I followed the coding instructions as specified by the Manifesto Project Database, i.e. (1) disregarding text passages not representing core policy demands such as headlines, tables of content and introductory remarks and (2) separating the sentences so that they contain “exactly one statement or ‘message’” – so-called ‘quasi-sentences’ (cf. Werner et al. 2015: 5). The analysis proceeded in the following manner: First, in an initial sweep of the programmes, general welfare chauvinist policy positions were identified, extracted from the other content and then allocated into the quartered framework of different welfare chauvinist rationales. The framework and the definitions of the category scheme were then adjusted according to insights from this first inspection, if deemed necessary. In a second sweep of the contents, the essence of the respective statements was coded – sentence by sentence – according to the underlying driving rationale. Here, it is important to note that both self-interest and deservingness, or identity, rationales play a role in sociotropic rationales, if only generalised to include the whole of the population (see Larsen et al. 2018: 4). As such, it was particularly important to denote the boundaries of each respective category from the outset and formulate rules to follow during the analysis itself. For this reason, the category scheme was set up with multiple items for each of the four welfare chauvinist rationales from the start and later amended and added upon over the course of the second sweep of the content. On a side note, welfare chauvinism refers not only to immigrants in this instance, but also to specific minority groups such as the Roma or members of the Islamic denomination within the countries. Statements identifying these minority groups as ‘outsiders’ and expressing exclusionary intentions towards them were thus included in the analysis as welfare chauvinist content. Finally, I aggregated the individual data both for the individual parties and according to structuring regime types to ensure comparability between the programs and across regimes. For this purpose, I calculated two quotients: The first determines the overall scores per page in order to measure the importance of the rationales in question for the party program as a whole. I named this the *intensity ratio* for reasons of practicality. Though it is a rather crude measure due to differences in the design and composition of the programs, it can nonetheless give clues as to the importance relegated to welfare chauvinism overall and the separate rationales by the parties. The second quotient denotes the *relative relevance* which the individual parties put on individual rationales by calculating the ratio between the individual rationale scores as a proportion of the total rationale scores. It gives the most significant value in order to differentiate patterns of welfare chauvinist rationales between parties and regime types.

I included the party programmes of five parties from four different welfare regimes in the QCA: For the Anglo-Saxon regime type I included the UKIP interim party manifesto (UKIP 2018). For the Continental regime type the last party manifestos from both the German AfD (2017) and the Austrian FPÖ (2017b) were examined. The latter also provided a separate economic programme for the national elections, which was also incorporated in the analysis (FPÖ 2017a). For the Nordic regime type I included the party programme of the Sweden Democrats (Sverigedemokraterna 2014). Meanwhile, for the Southern regime type I analysed the programmes of both the Lega Nord (2018) and the new Spanish party VOX (2019). Lastly, I was unfortunately

unable to analyse a party programme of a PRRP from CEE. This is mostly due to the fact that the two most prominent parties' – the Hungarian Fidesz and the Polish PiS – have not published a party programme with information relevant to this analysis. In the case of the Fidesz, it did not publish a party programme for the last two national elections, relying instead on the tractive power of their party leader Orbán (Münch 2018). The last national election programme for the PiS party, meanwhile, was published in 2014 and thus before the start of the refugee crisis. A preliminary sweep of the program revealed that immigration does not play any kind of role in their party manifesto. Rather, it concentrates on a general critique of the *Civic Platform* (pol.: *Platforma Obywatelska, PO*), the then-governing party (cf. PiS 2014). The analysis of a PRRP from CEE was therefore not feasible and I chose to instead concentrate on the parties named above. After this account of the methodological underpinnings for the analysis, I will now present the results of the three separate parts in the following chapter.

## 6 Results

### 6.1 Differing welfare rationales

Before commencing with the results of the first part of the analysis, I will first report on the results of the preliminary factor analysis conducted beforehand (see Appendix 1.1). For both the Varimax and the oblique rotation, the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure (KMO) confirmed the sampling adequacy of the factor analysis with a value of  $KMO = 0.89$  respectively.<sup>17</sup> Regarding the individual items, the KMO was greater than 0.782 and therefore above the acceptable limit of 0.5 (cf. Field 2017: 600). The three factors identified through the analysis (together explaining 56.51 % of variance) could not confirm the previous theoretical generation of factors in its entirety. It verified the construction of the factor 'deservingness rationale' and furthermore corroborated the elimination of items reflecting racist and ethnocentric perceptions of immigrants, which were too far removed from sociotropic cultural concerns. Apart from this, the factor analysis did not separate the items in a more concise manner reflecting the theory-based factors above. The items representing the self-interest, the economic and the cultural sociotropic rationales loaded high on the first factor only. A differentiation according to the theoretical hypotheses was thus not confirmed by the analysis. This leads to two preliminary conclusions: First, different anti-immigrant perceptions and welfare chauvinist attitudes are highly related with each other. Separating economic and cultural concerns, for example, is therefore difficult due to the oftentimes diffuse and contingent nature of these perceptions. Secondly, the items offered by the ESS-survey may not be ideally suited for analysing welfare chauvinist rationales. Consequently, between-country differences and effect sizes within the analysis are likely to be affected negatively. Any interpretation must account for this issue. Despite these difficulties with the survey-design and the underlying data set, it

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<sup>17</sup> The KMO is the standard measure for testing the sampling adequacy of the data used in factor analysis (Ludwig-Mayerhofer 2016).

may nonetheless be possible to observe a general trend within the data which warrants further study into this line of questioning. Therefore, I proceeded with the theoretical factor composition presented above for the subsequent analysis. Before commencing, though, I started by subjecting all variables to a z-Transformation to ensure comparability and the normal distribution.<sup>18</sup>

The MANOVA examining the rationales underpinning welfare chauvinist attitudes generated mixed results, due mostly to problems with the available data (see Appendix 1.2). The analysis confirmed a significant effect of welfare regime types on the different patterns of welfare chauvinist attitudes using Pillai's trace, with  $V = 0,16$ ,  $F(16, 48040) = 124,01$  and  $p = 0,000$  (see Table 4).<sup>19</sup>

**Table 4 – Results for the MANOVA multivariate tests<sup>a</sup>**

Effect		Wert	F	Hypothesis df	Error df	Sig.
Intercept	Pillai's Trace	0,004	10,753 <sup>b</sup>	4,000	12007,000	0,000
	Wilks' Lambda	0,996	10,753 <sup>b</sup>	4,000	12007,000	0,000
	Hotelling's Trace	0,004	10,753 <sup>b</sup>	4,000	12007,000	0,000
	Roy's Largest Root	0,004	10,753 <sup>b</sup>	4,000	12007,000	0,000
Welfare_regime_type	Pillai's Trace	0,159	124,008	16,000	48040,000	0,000
	Wilks' Lambda	0,846	128,643	16,000	36682,629	0,000
	Hotelling's Trace	0,176	131,757	16,000	48022,000	0,000
	Roy's Largest Root	0,134	403,664 <sup>c</sup>	4,000	12010,000	0,000

a. Design: Intercept + Welfare\_regime\_type

b. Exact Statistic

c. The statistic is an upper bound on F that yields a lower bound on the significance level.

d. Computed using Alpha = ,01

Nonetheless, this result must be regarded with caution due to problems with foregoing assumption tests. Both the Levene-test<sup>20</sup> of equality of error variances and Box's M<sup>21</sup> testing the equality of covariance matrices were significant at the 0,01 level (having a p-value of  $p=0,000$  respectively, cf. *Tables 5 & 6*). Thus, there was no formal confirmation which let us reject the null hypothesis. Neither the elimination of multivariate outliers using *Mahalanobis Distance*<sup>22</sup>, nor the adjustment of group sizes through a random sampling of cases could eliminate these reservations. As both tests are highly sensitive to large sample sizes it is possible for me to disregard them both (Field 2017: 551f.). According to Tabachnick & Fidell (2013: 84f.; 253f.), when sample sizes are large and group sizes are equally distributed the robustness of multivariate significance tests like Pillai's trace and Hotelling's  $T^2$  can be assumed. Despite these caveats I was therefore able to proceed with

<sup>18</sup> The z-Transformation is a procedure which transforms arbitrary data into z-values, characterised by a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1 (Bortz and Schuster 2010: 586).

<sup>19</sup> Pillai's trace is one of the standard test statistics used for MANOVA, next to Hotelling's  $T^2$ , Roy's largest root and Wilks' Lambda. It measures the contribution of effect to the model with values (V) ranging from 0 to 1 with larger values signifying higher effect contributions. Meanwhile, the F-value (F) is the test value and determines if the variables are jointly significant. The p-value (p) decides whether or not the null-hypothesis is significant (to this see Bortz and Schuster 2010: 483; see also Statistics How To 2019).

<sup>20</sup> The Levene-test checks the homogeneity of variances (Field 2017: 193).

<sup>21</sup> Box's M tests the assumption of equality of covariance matrices (Field 2017: 551).

<sup>22</sup> The Mahalanobis-Distance is a statistical method for identifying multivariate outliers by assessing the individual distance of each case from all other cases (Tabachnick and Fidell 2013: 75).

the analysis due to the high sample size ( $N=12.015$ ) and the equal group sizes ( $N=2.403$ ) in the analysis. The individual effect of the respective welfare regimes suggested by the univariate test statistics (significant at  $p = 0,000$ , see Appendix 1.2: 36) seemed to confirm this assessment.

**Table 5 – Box’s Test of Equality of Covariance Matrices**

Box’s M	967,755
F	24,177
df1	40
df2	318176691,177
Sig.	<b>0,000</b>

Tests the null hypothesis that the observed covariance matrices of the dependent variables are equal across groups.

a. Design: Intercept + Welfare\_regime\_type

**Table 6 - Levene's Test of Error Variances<sup>a</sup>**

		F	df1	df2	Sig.
z-Value: Self-Interest Rationale	Based on mean	106,759	4	12010	0,000
	Based on median	90,227	4	12010	0,000
	Based on median with adjusted df	90,227	4	11729,777	0,000
	Based on trimmed mean	115,653	4	12010	0,000
z-Value: Deservingness Rationale	Based on mean	79,964	4	12010	0,000
	Based on median	74,925	4	12010	0,000
	Based on median with adjusted df	74,925	4	11655,358	0,000
	Based on trimmed mean	77,929	4	12010	0,000
z-Value: Economic Sociotropic Rationales	Based on mean	26,381	4	12010	0,000
	Based on median	22,486	4	12010	0,000
	Based on median with adjusted df	22,486	4	11802,247	0,000
	Based on trimmed mean	25,947	4	12010	0,000
z-Value: Cultural Sociotropic Rationales	Based on mean	10,909	4	12010	0,000
	Based on median	9,723	4	12010	0,000
	Based on median with adjusted df	9,723	4	11951,407	0,000
	Based on trimmed mean	10,694	4	12010	0,000

Tests the null hypothesis that the error variance of the dependent variable is equal across groups.

a. Design: Intercept + Welfare\_regime\_type

Despite the univariate test statistics significance, the SSCP Matrices indicated that the relationship between the outcome variables is the more important predictor for group differences, rather than the individual variables themselves (ibid.). Subsequent *post hoc-tests*<sup>23</sup> shed more light onto the type of difference between regimes by examining differences between group means (ibid.). The *Games-Howell* test confirmed that there were significant differences between regime types with regard to the self-interest rationale. Regarding the deservingness rationale, there was no significant difference between the Anglo-Saxon and the Eastern, as well as between the Eastern and the Continental types, while between the others significant differences exists.

<sup>23</sup> Post hoc tests like the Games-Howell and the REGWQ procedures (see below) “consist of pairwise comparisons that are designed to compare all different combinations of the treatment groups” (Field 2017: 406).

Meanwhile, with regard to the economic sociotropic rationale, significant differences existed merely with the Nordic regimes, while the other four do not show significant differences. Lastly, the cultural sociotropic rationale demonstrated significant differences between the Nordic, Southern and the other three regime types. The *REGWQ-test* (Ryan-Einot-Gabriel-Welsch-Range) demonstrated homogenous subgroups and differences in a more graphic way (see Tables 7 through 10). It showed significant differences between all regime types regarding the self-interest rationale, with the Anglo-Saxon regime clearly taking up the most welfare chauvinist position, followed by the Southern, Continental, Eastern and, lastly, Nordic regime type; the latter three taking a more positive view. For the deservingness rationale, attitudes were likewise clearly distributed. Here, the attitudes in the Nordic regime were the least welfare chauvinist, followed by the Southern regime, the Continental, Eastern and lastly Anglo-Saxon regime. The picture was far less clear-cut for the economic sociotropic rationale, where the Eastern, Anglo-Saxon and Southern regime were located at the end of welfare chauvinist attitudes, the Continental regime occupying the middle position and the Nordic regime type occupying the least welfare chauvinist position. Finally, for the cultural sociotropic rationale results showed the Anglo-Saxon and Continental regime at one end registering the most chauvinist attitudes, closely followed by the Eastern regime, while at the other end the Southern and, more prominently, the Nordic regimes are far less chauvinistic.

**Table 7 - REGWQ-range self-interest rationales**

Welfare Regime Type	N	Subgroup				
		1	2	3	4	5
Anglo-Saxon	2403	-0,3865806				
Southern	2403		-0,2003874			
Eastern	2403			-0,0642738		
Continental	2403				0,0440179	
Nordic	2403					0,4005671
Sig.		1,000	1,000	1,000	1,000	1,000

**Table 8 - REGWQ-range deservingness rationales**

Welfare Regime Type	N	Subgroup			
		1	2	3	4
Nordic	2403	-0,5628569			
Southern	2403		-0,1296356		
Continental	2403			0,1636935	
Eastern	2403			0,2052611	0,2052611
Anglo-Saxon	2403				0,2628151
Sig.		1,000	1,000	0,275	0,077

**Table 9 - REGWQ-range economic sociotropic rationales**

Welfare Regime Type	N	Subgroup		
		1	2	3
Eastern	2403	-0,1934499		
Anglo-Saxon	2403	-0,1420284		
Southern	2403	-0,1208442	-0,1208442	
Continental	2403		-0,0533805	
Nordic	2403			0,3092139
Sig.		0,041	0,038	1,000

**Table 10 - REGWQ-range cultural sociotropic rationales**

Welfare Regime Type	N	Subgroup			
		1	2	3	4
Anglo-Saxon	2403	-0,1873489			
Continental	2403	-0,1264328	-0,1264328		
Eastern	2403		-0,0947955		
Southern	2403			0,0092254	
Nordic	2403				0,2458140
Sig.		0,079	0,539	1,000	1,000

Means for groups in homogenous subgroups are displayed.

Basis: observed means.

The error term is mean of squares(Error) = ,972.

a. The critical Values for this data are not monotonous. Substitutions were made to ensure monotony. Therefore, the Type I error is smaller.

b. Alpha = ,01

To gain a more detailed view of the differences between welfare regimes with regard to welfare chauvinist rationales, I followed up the MANOVA with a discriminant analysis (see Appendix 1.3). The latter revealed four discriminant functions, the first explaining 76,6% of the variance (canonical  $R^2 = 0,344$ )<sup>24</sup>, while the second, third and fourth explained 17,3% ( $R^2 = 0,172$ ), 6% ( $R^2 = 0,102$ ) and 0,1% ( $R^2 = 0,015$ ) respectively. Together, the discriminant functions differentiated the welfare regime types significantly, with Wilks'  $\Lambda = 0,846$ ,  $\chi^2(16) = 2003,05$  and  $p = 0,000$ .<sup>25</sup> Without the first function, the second function also significantly differentiated between welfare regime types;  $\Lambda = 0,960$ ,  $\chi^2(9) = 488,108$  and  $p = 0,000$ . The third function did so as well without the first and second,  $\Lambda = 0,989$ ,  $\chi^2(4) = 128,097$  and  $p = 0,000$ . The fourth function, meanwhile, did not significantly differentiate between the groups,  $\Lambda = 1,0$ ,  $\chi^2(1) = 2,551$  and  $p = 0,110$ . As shown by the correlations between outcomes and discriminant functions, the deservingness rationale loaded highly on the first function ( $r = 0,87$ ) and reasonably on the second function ( $r = 0,47$ ); the self-interest rationale loaded highly negatively on the first ( $r = -0,68$ ) and highly positively on the second function ( $r =$

<sup>24</sup>  $R^2$  is the squared canonical correlation which serves as an effect size for the reported variance of the discriminant function (Field 2017: 561).

<sup>25</sup> The significance tests of the variates show Wilks'  $\Lambda$ , the "product of the unexplained variance" on the variates; the  $\chi^2$  (Chi-square) test statistic, signifying the amount of explained variance of the variate; and the significance (p) (Field 2017: 551, 60).

0,68). Meanwhile, both the economic sociotropic ( $r = -0,48$ ) and the cultural sociotropic rationale ( $r = -0,41$ ) loaded negatively on the first function and low on the second function. The economic sociotropic rationale, furthermore, loaded highly on the third function ( $r = 0,57$ ) (see Tables 11 & 12). Lastly, as shown in the discriminant function plot, the first function discriminated the Nordic welfare regime from its neighbours, with the Anglo-Saxon regime building its counterpart. The Continental, Southern and Eastern regimes occupied a middle position, but clustered more closely to the Anglo-Saxon type. Meanwhile, the second function differentiated the Southern regime type from the Eastern and Continental regime type.

**Table 11 - Standardised canonical discriminant function coefficients**

	Function			
	1	2	3	4
z-Value: Self-Interest Rationales	-0,467	0,926	-0,386	-0,132
z-Value: Deservingness Rationales	0,753	0,620	0,007	0,459
z-Value: Economic Sociotropic Rationales	-0,191	0,183	1,342	0,202
z-Value: Cultural Sociotropic Rationales	0,158	-0,419	-0,925	0,955

**Table 12 - Discriminant function structure matrix**

	Function			
	1	2	3	4
z-Value: Self-Interest Rationales	,873*	0,474	0,044	0,106
z-Value: Deservingness Rationales	-0,676	,676*	-0,218	0,197
z-Value: Economic Sociotropic Rationales	-0,411	-0,153	-0,171	,883*
z-Value: Cultural Sociotropic Rationales	-0,482	0,087	0,565	,664*

Pooled within-groups correlations between discriminating variables and standardised canonical discriminant functions

Variables ordered by absolute size of correlation within function.

\*Largest absolute correlation between each variable and any discriminant function

In sum, the MANOVA, despite remaining reservations, demonstrated that welfare regime types have a significant effect on distinct patterns of welfare chauvinist rationales. It most strongly distinguished the Nordic regime, which is significantly removed from the other regimes with regard to all outcome variables. Situated on the other side was the Anglo-Saxon regime type. The other regimes were located somewhere in the middle. The discriminant analysis confirmed this pattern and could give additional insights into the relationship between the independent variables. It suggests that the two underlying dimensions best describing welfare regime differences were (1) the negative relation between the deservingness rationale and the other outcome variables, but especially the self-interest rationale; and (2) the differences in economic and cultural sociotropic rationales and the patterns of the self-interest and deservingness rationales. The results partly confirmed the starting hypothesis, that the pattern of welfare chauvinist rationales differs across welfare regime types (H2). Similarly, it confirmed the expected pattern with regard to self-interest rationales, with the Anglo-Saxon as the most and the Nordic the least chauvinist regime (H2a). Regarding the deservingness rationale, the pattern likewise supported the prediction that this rationale is prominently expressed in Anglo-Saxon countries, less



so in the conservative regimes of Southern, Eastern and Continental Europe, while being far less notable in the Nordic countries (H2b). In contrast, the results for the sociotropic rationales did not follow the expected pattern. For the economic sociotropic rationale, the differences were small across regime types excepting the Nordic regimes, which expressed – contrary to my expectations – the least concerns about the economic impact of immigration for the wider community. The Eastern regime type featured more prominent economic concerns which similarly goes contrary to prior expectations. Accordingly, the sub-hypothesis could not be confirmed (H2c). Finally, the patterns for the cultural sociotropic rationale only partly confirmed prior assumptions (H2d): While the Nordic regime was the least concerned with immigration based on wider concerns about cultural cohesion, such concerns unexpectedly featured prominently for Anglo-Saxon regimes. Correspondingly, while the Continental and Eastern regimes results conformed to expectations, the Southern regime was far less concerned with the cultural consequences of immigration than previously predicted.

After this report on the results of the first empirical analysis, I will now proceed with the second step of examining differences in the value base of welfare regimes. This may further illuminate possible causes explaining the unexpected deviations in the first part.

## 6.2 The value bases of welfare regimes

The results from the second MANOVA analysing the variations in the underlying value bases of welfare regimes followed a similar pattern to the above, in that some problems with the data basis demand caution in their interpretation and generalisation (see Appendix 2.1). Despite remaining reservations, the analysis corroborated a significant effect of welfare regime types on the characteristic form of values in Europe. Again using Pillai's trace, this effect could be confirmed with  $V = 0,14$ ,  $F(12, 70230) = 275,71$  and  $p = 0,000$  (see Table 13 ).

**Table 13 - Results of MANOVA multivariate tests<sup>a</sup>**

Effect		Value	F	Hypothesis df	Error df	Sig.
Intercept	Pillai's Trace	0,958	177405,352 <sup>b</sup>	3,000	23408,000	0,000
	Wilks' Lambda	0,042	177405,352 <sup>b</sup>	3,000	23408,000	0,000
	Hotelling's Trace	22,737	177405,352 <sup>b</sup>	3,000	23408,000	0,000
	Roy's Largest Root	22,737	177405,352 <sup>b</sup>	3,000	23408,000	0,000
Welfare_regimes	Pillai's Trace	0,135	275,711	12,000	70230,000	0,000
	Wilks' Lambda	0,866	287,353	12,000	61932,038	0,000
	Hotelling's Trace	0,153	297,467	12,000	70220,000	0,000
	Roy's Largest Root	0,141	825,314 <sup>c</sup>	4,000	23410,000	0,000

a. Design: Intercept + Welfare\_regimes

b. Exact statistic

c. The statistic is an upper bound on F that yields a lower bound on the significance level.

d. Computed using Alpha = ,01

Like the tests above, the foregoing assumption tests – both the Levene-test and Box’s M – were mostly significant at the 0,01 level respectively, (see Table 14 & 15). The only exception was the value of Levene’s test for conservation values. On the basis of the trimmed means it was not significant ( $p = 0,011$ ) and could thus give a partial formal confirmation for the rejection of the null hypothesis. Mirroring the situation described above, I preceded the analysis by an elimination of outliers using Mahalanobis Distance and the adjustment of group sizes via a random sampling of cases. With a sample size of  $N = 23.415$  and equal group sizes of  $N = 4.683$  the robustness of multivariate tests was assumed, making interpretation and follow-up tests feasible. The significant univariate test statistics ( $p = 0,000$ ) further supported this assessment, indicating that all higher order values were significantly different across regime types. The SSCP matrices again suggested that the relationship between the independent variables was more important for this difference than the individual variables themselves.

**Table 14 - Box's test of equality of covariance matrices<sup>a</sup>**

Box's M	1256,544
F	52,341
df1	24
df2	1513139532,744
Sig.	0,000

Tests the null hypothesis that the observed covariance matrices of the dependent variables are equal across groups.

a. Design: Intercept + Welfare\_regimes

**Table 15 - Levene's test of equality of error variances<sup>a</sup>**

		F	df1	df2	Sig.
Conservation values	Based on mean	3,296	4	23410	0,010
	Based on median	3,575	4	23410	0,006
	Based on median and adjusted df	3,575	4	23343,082	0,006
	Based on trimmed mean	3,279	4	23410	0,011
Self-transcendence values	Based on mean	81,994	4	23410	0,000
	Based on median	72,921	4	23410	0,000
	Based on median and adjusted df	72,921	4	22451,240	0,000
	Based on trimmed mean	82,865	4	23410	0,000
Self-enhancement values	Based on mean	11,071	4	23410	0,000
	Based on median	12,032	4	23410	0,000
	Based on median and adjusted df	12,032	4	23366,928	0,000
	Based on trimmed mean	11,460	4	23410	0,000

Tests the null hypothesis that the error variance of the dependent variable is equal across groups.

a. Design: Intercept + Welfare\_regimes

I followed up the analysis with post-hoc tests in order to more closely examine group differences. The Games-Howell test corroborated the findings about a significant difference between regime types for both conservation values and self-enhancement values, all of which were significant at an  $\alpha$ -level of  $\alpha < 0,01$ . Solely self-transcendence values registered a non-significant difference between the Nordic and the

Continental welfare regime ( $p = 0,998$ ) as well as between the Southern and Continental regime type ( $p = 0,017$ ), which can subsequently be grouped together on this value division. The REGWQ-test corroborated this result through its homogenous subgroups (see Table 16 through 18). Regarding conservation values, it found significant differences between all regime types, being most prominent in the Southern type, closely followed by the Eastern, the Anglo-Saxon, the Continental and lastly the Nordic type. Self-transcendence values were more prominently represented in Nordic and Continental regimes, closely followed by the Southern, Anglo-Saxon and, lastly, Eastern regime type, thereby following the precise pattern hypothesized previously (H3b). Finally, self-enhancement values were most dominantly displayed in the Eastern regime type, followed by the Southern, Anglo-Saxon, Continental and Nordic types.

**Table 16 - REGWQ-range conservation values**

Welfare Regime Types	N	Subgroups				
		1	2	3	4	5
Southern	4683	2,4972				
Eastern	4683		2,5592			
Anglo-Saxon	4683			2,6815		
Continental	4683				2,7837	
Nordic	4683					2,9608
Sig.		1,000	1,000	1,000	1,000	1,000

**Table 17 - REGWQ-range self-transcendence values**

Welfare Regime Types	N	Subgroups			
		1	2	3	4
Nordic	4683	2,0658			
Continental	4683	2,0695			
Southern	4683		2,1121		
Anglo-Saxon	4683			2,1690	
Eastern	4683				2,3715
Sig.		0,980	1,000	1,000	1,000

**Table 18 - REGWQ-range self-enhancement values**

Welfare Regime Types	N	Subgroups				
		1	2	3	4	5
Eastern	4683	3,2034				
Southern	4683		3,3891			
Anglo-Saxon	4683			3,5325		
Continental	4683				3,6174	
Nordic	4683					3,9146
Sig.		1,000	1,000	1,000	1,000	1,000

Group means for homogenous subgroups are shown.

Basis: observed means.

The error term is mean of squares(Error) = ,962.

a. The critical values for the data is not monotonous. Substitutions were performed to ensure monotony. Therefore, the Type I error is smaller.

b. Alpha = ,01

The ensuing discriminant analysis shed light on the differences between welfare regimes with regards to the value bases underlying them (see Appendix 2.2). It reported three discriminant functions which respectively explain 92,5% ( $R^2 = 0,352$ ), 6,7% ( $R^2 = 0,100$ ) and 0,9% ( $R^2 = 0,037$ ) of the variance between regime types. In conjunction the functions discriminated the groups significantly, with  $\Lambda = 0,866$ ,  $\chi^2(12) = 3355,93$  and  $p = 0,000$ . But they did so also individually, the second through third function differentiating between the groups with  $\Lambda = 0,989$ ,  $\chi^2(6) = 267,64$  and  $p = 0,000$  and the third with  $\Lambda = 0,999$ ,  $\chi^2(2) = 31,25$  and  $p = 0,000$ . The correlations between outcomes and discriminant functions demonstrated that self-transcendence values loaded negatively on the first function ( $r = -0,37$ ), highly positive on the second ( $r = 0,88$ ) and moderately positive on the third function ( $r = 0,30$ ). Conservation values loaded moderately on the first function ( $r = 0,51$ ), highly on the second ( $r = 0,82$ ) and low on the third function ( $r = -0,27$ ). Finally, self-enhancement values loaded high on the first ( $r = 0,64$ ) and third function ( $r = 0,75$ ) but low on the second ( $r = 0,15$ ) (see Tables 19 & 20). The discriminant function plot demonstrated that the first function differentiated between the Eastern and the Nordic welfare regimes, mostly on the grounds of conservation and self-enhancement versus self-transcendence values. The Southern, Anglo-Saxon and Continental regimes were located between these two poles. The second function, meanwhile, discriminated between the Southern and the Eastern and Nordic regime types on the grounds of self-transcendence and conservation versus self-enhancement values.

**Table 19** - Standardised canonical discriminant function coefficients

	Function		
	1	2	3
Conservation values	0,714	0,545	-0,715
Self-transcendence values	-0,760	0,642	0,517
Self-enhancement values	0,558	-0,065	0,866

**Table 20** - Discriminant analysis structure matrix

	Functions		
	1	2	3
Self-transcendence values	-0,368	,879*	0,303
Conservation values	0,510	,818*	-0,266
Self-enhancement values	0,640	0,151	,754*

Pooled within-groups correlations between discriminant variables and standardised canonical discriminant functions

Variables ordered by absolute size of correlation within function.

\*. Largest absolute correlation between each variable and any discriminant function

The MANOVA confirmed a significant effect of the welfare regime type on the underlying value base. Particularly, the pattern of different values was suitable to differentiate between regime types. The discriminant analysis collaborated this verdict and demonstrated that one dimension, specifically the interplay between conservation and self-enhancement on the one hand and self-transcendence values on the other hand,

explained this group separation best. Here, too, the Nordic regime were distinguished most easily, scoring highly with regard to self-transcendence but with the lowest results both for conservation and self-enhancement values. It contrasted in particular with the Eastern regime type, which scored highly both on conservation and self-enhancement values but had the lowest score on self-transcendence values. The Southern regime was nearest to the Eastern regime type, while the Conservative regime clustered closer to the Nordic and the Anglo-Saxon regimes somewhere in the middle. As regards the assumptions made before the analysis, it confirmed that there are marked differences in the underlying value bases across welfare regime types (H3). The sub-hypotheses were only partially confirmed, though. The pattern of self-transcendence values followed the expected sequence, with Nordic and Continental regimes scoring highly, followed by the Southern, Anglo-Saxon and, lastly, Eastern regime type (H3a). Nonetheless, self-transcendence values were overall very much advocated for across regime types (the overall scores being between 2 – ‘like me’ – and 3 – ‘somewhat like me’) with the maximum difference between means amounting to a mere 0,31 scale points. For conservation values, in contrast, the expected pattern could not be wholly confirmed. Both the Southern and Eastern regime types scored highly on conservation values, but these values were not as prominent in the Nordic regimes. Contrary to the expectations, though, conservation values were far less pronounced in Continental regimes. The prior assumption was thus only partly verified (H3b). The overall difference amounted to 0,46 points of the scale, lying again between the values 2 and 3, illustrating a generally conservative nature of respondents across Europe. Finally, with regards to self-enhancement values, the pattern did not conform to the predictions (H3c). While among the Western regime types the Anglo-Saxon regimes had the highest score on this factor, its value was below the scores for both the Southern and the Eastern regime types. In the Continental and especially the Nordic regimes, this value type was far less pronounced, with the overall difference amounting to 0,71 points. Here, too, the range of means was clustered around the value 2 – ‘like me’ – demonstrating the prominence of self-interest, status-orientation and individual work ethic in Europe.


In sum, while differences between welfare regime types could be observed for both attitudes and values, the patterns presented in the analysis only partially reflected initial assumptions. Especially with regard to sociotropic rationales and self-enhancement values the pattern deviated strongly from prior predictions. I will now proceed with the qualitative analysis of PRRP positions regarding welfare chauvinist rationales, before going on to discuss the overall implications of these findings.

### 6.3 The welfare rationales of PRRP

A first sweep of the aggregated scores strikingly corroborated previous literature about the welfare chauvinist nature of PRRP. The aggregated scores of welfare chauvinist rationales were negative across dimensions; independent of the parties involved (see Appendix 3.8). Consequently, welfare chauvinism can be considered as a unifying characteristic of the otherwise quite ambiguous economic and social policy of PRRP. The mean

aggregated scores showed a prevalence of the deservingness rationale, followed by the cultural and economic sociotropic rationales and, lastly, the self-interest rationale. For PRRP across Europe, the entry into the country, the right to reside and work in it as well as the reception of (welfare) benefits were thus subject to conditions such as educational, linguistic or skill level qualifications; an ‘acceptable’ motivation for emigration (be that flight from persecution, war, poverty or lack of jobs); a clean criminal record; or a willingness to adopt the cultural conventions of the host country. Conditionality was an issue for all PRRP, though it differed in the particular emphasis put on different reasonings both for conditions to be imposed and for the assumptions underpinning them. Likewise, sociotropic rationales – both of a cultural and an economic nature – were observed in all party programs. The least balanced rationale according to the mean scores was self-interest. Despite this, these broader trends could not conceal that, individually, the PRRP vary widely in the specific pattern of welfare rationales they advocate (see Fig.3 and 4.).

**Figure 3 - Intensity ratio of rationale scores**




*Note: Ratio of the aggregated scores of differing welfare chauvinist rationales per page.*

For UKIP, the scores were evenly distributed over the categories. This was demonstrated by the intensity ratio, which was between -0,81 (cultural sociotropic rationale) and -0,94 (deservingness). Compared to the other parties, UKIP demonstrated a particular focus on self-interest rationales denoting ethnic competition especially with regard to the entitlement of immigrants to welfare services. Here, it had the highest intensity ratio (-0,88) while it likewise occupied a high relevance by making up 25 percent of the overall score. Another significant part of UKIP’s program was the deservingness score, which took second place behind the FPÖ with an intensity ratio of -0,94 amounting to 27 percent of the cumulative score. Similarly, economic

sociotropic concerns seemed to be far more prevalent for UKIP than the other parties. It led the evaluation of the intensity ratio with -0,88. It made up 25 percent of the total score for this rationale, topped only by the SD. Lastly, on the cultural sociotropic rationale UKIP took up a middle position. While the intensity ratio of -0,81 was second only to the AfD, with 23 percent of the total score it was one of the lower figures compared to the other parties. Largely, the even distribution of scores among the different rationale-categories featured by the UKIP program was unique compared to the more skewed balance for the other parties.

**Figure 4 - Relative relevance of rationale scores of parties**



*Note: Ratio of specific rationale scores as a proportion of the total rationale score.*

As mentioned above, the FPÖ published two separate programs: A general program and one meant exclusively for economic policy. Subsequently the contents demonstrated a different balance of rationales and varied in the specific weight attributed to the rationales. This made it difficult to pinpoint the parties exact score. A case in point: while the general program emphasised cultural sociotropic concerns, the economic program had not a single statement attributed to this category. It was therefore assumed, that the economic program with its focus on economic aspects severely skewed the balance between rationales, especially with regard to the self-interest and cultural sociotropic rationales. I therefore discuss its results separately from the general analysis. The general program scored negatively for all categories, with a particular focus on the deservingness and the cultural sociotropic rationale. The self-interest rationale featured strongly for the FPÖ, falling behind only UKIP on the intensity ratio (-0,42), the overall ratio amounting to 15 percent. Nonetheless, the general focus lied on the deservingness of immigrants to receive benefits and their qualification to enter the country. With an intensity ratio of -1,17 and taking up 42 percent in relation to the overall score, the FPÖ was one of the most prominent parties in this regard. Only the parties of the Southern regime type put more emphasis on this.

The FPÖ took a middle position on the economic sociotropic rationale with an intensity ratio of -0,46 and an overall ratio of 16 percent. The same held true for cultural sociotropic concerns, despite being one of the main foci of the FPÖ with a score of -0,75 per page and a general ratio of 27 percent. The inclusion of the economic program severely changed this balance. As such, while the intensity ratios for the self-interest rationale were fairly similar, the score for the deservingness rationale was halved (-0,59) and cultural sociotropic concerns were reduced to a third of the score in the general program (-0,24). This asymmetry markedly affected the relative relevance attributed to different rationales: general cultural concerns but also deservingness rationales were effectively side-lined. Therefore, the total ratio of the self-interest rationale increased to 26 percent and the economic sociotropic rationale to 25 percent, while both the deservingness and cultural sociotropic rationales decreased to a ratio of 35 and 14 percent respectively in relation to the overall scores.

Quite analogous, the AfD firmly focussed on cultural sociotropic concerns, followed by discussions of deservingness for immigrants and economic sociotropic concerns. Self-interest rationales, while present, played only a minor role for this party and concentrated mostly on immigrants receiving welfare benefits. This was illustrated by an intensity ratio of -0,13, making up only 5 percent of the total score for the self-interest rationale. Meanwhile, the deservingness rationale featured prominently with an intensity ratio of -0,85 amounting to 35 percent of the total score. Economic sociotropic concerns made up 21 percent of the overall scores with an intensity ratio of -0,5 per page, locating it in a middle position compared to the other parties. Lastly, cultural sociotropic rationales made up the main part of welfare chauvinist statements for the AfD, with an intensity score of -0,94 per page; proportionate to 39 percent of the total score. More concretely, the AfD propagated cultural differences between nationals and immigrants or the Muslim minority with regard to the perceived acceptance of liberal and democratic values as well as religious and individual freedoms. The party literally invoked a 'war of cultures' between Occident and the Islamic Orient that, it perceived, was shaping the current social life in Europe (AfD 2017: 63).

The SD, as the only Nordic PRRP, had the least mentions of all rationales overall. This was mostly due to the rather limited scope of its manifesto. The focus of the SD was unequivocally on sociotropic concerns and particularly on the economic ones. Meanwhile, the self-interest rationales were balanced between positive and negative statements, leading to a total score of zero. Discussions of deservingness seemingly played a secondary role for the SD, with an intensity ratio of -0,32 amounting to 27 percent of the total score it was the party least concerned with such rationales. The party put particular emphasis on economic sociotropic concerns. While it remained behind UKIP on the intensity ratio (-0,53), the overall importance of this rationale for the party was the highest among all parties (45%). With an average score of -0,32 per page and a relevance ratio of 27 percent, cultural sociotropic rationales were not quite as important for the SD, situated in a middle position among the other parties.

Similar to the SD, self-interest rationales played no role for VOX. The party's focus lied on discussions of deservingness and cultural sociotropic concerns, with economic sociotropic concerns playing a minor role.



Deservingness rationales, in contrast, featured prominently in the statements of VOX. While the intensity ratio was limited due to the small scope of the program itself (-0,70), its proportion of the overall scores was the highest among all analysed parties (53%). Especially illegal immigrants and criminal activity were cited as grounds for deportation and informed the score for deservingness discussions. Economic sociotropic rationales, meanwhile, were strikingly less important for the party, scoring only -0,09 per page, proportionate to only 7 percent of the total score. This was the lowest score among all parties. Meanwhile, cultural sociotropic concerns, while again limited in the aggregated and the pagewise score (-0,52), had the highest value among the parties with regards to the overall proportion of scores (40%). The concerns here were mostly based on perceived security threats coming from fundamentalist interpretations of Islam preached in Spanish mosques.


Finally, the Lega Nord presented a similar picture to the Spanish VOX. The aggregated scores showed a clear inclination towards discussion of deservingness and culturalist justifications of welfare chauvinism. Self-interest and economic sociotropic rationales played a minor part in comparison. With an intensity ratio of -0,11, adding up to 8 percent of the total score, self-interest was a small concern for this party. The same can be said for economic sociotropic concerns, which scored -0,13 per page – proportionate to 10 percent of the total scores. In contrast, the average intensity ratio of -0,54 for deservingness discussions was contradicted by an overall ratio of 44 percent, making it the highest value after VOX. Here, too, statements regarding the deservingness of illegal immigrants and refugees dominated the discussion. Lastly, the figures for cultural sociotropic concerns provided a comparable picture. While the intensity ratio was average (-0,45), it featured the third-largest value in proportion to the overall scores (37%).

Grouping the results together according to structuring welfare regime types made it easier to survey the results of the analysis and compare them to the results from the previous analyses. First, the aggregated scores, while not truly significant or suitable for analysis because of the huge differences in the scope of programs, nevertheless indicated a general trend. For one, it became clear that the Nordic regime continually featured the lowest scores across all categories. The only exception being economic sociotropic concerns. This suggests both a lower general importance of welfare chauvinism in these regimes and a reliance on economic sociotropic discussions when justifying welfare chauvinist positions. For another, it illustrated the preponderance of self-interest rationales for the Anglo-Saxon regime type and the focus on cultural sociotropic concerns for both the Continental and Southern regime type.

Second, the intensity ratio of aggregated scores confirmed this initial survey (see Fig.5). The Anglo-Saxon regime type featured most prominently for the self-interest and the economic sociotropic rationale. Additionally, it had one of the highest values on the rationale of deservingness and cultural sociotropic concerns. The Continental type, meanwhile, focussed heavily on cultural sociotropic concerns and discussions of deservingness, showed an average value for economic sociotropic concerns and low figures for the self-interest rationale. The low scores for the Nordic regime type mirrored the indications of the above. Similarly,

the relatively high score on the category of economic sociotropic rationale signified the relevance of this rationale for welfare chauvinist justifications in Nordic regimes. The Southern regime types presented a similar pattern to the Continental regime type, only with lower overall scores and less emphasis on economic sociotropic rationales.


**Figure 5 - Intensity ratio of rationale scores according to regime types**



*Note: Mean ratio of the aggregated score of welfare chauvinist rationales per page for welfare regime types.*

Third, the relative relevance of the individual scores – illustrated as the proportion of the total aggregated scores – gave the most significant indication of welfare regime trends for welfare chauvinist rationales (Fig. 6). It indicated the relative priorities for the parties in question, respectively the average priorities of the parties in different welfare regimes. For the Anglo-Saxon regime type, the priorities had a rather even distribution where deservingness rationales had the highest (27%) and cultural sociotropic rationales the lowest status (23%). Self-interest rationales featured by far the highest relevance in the Anglo-Saxon context (25%). Furthermore, with 25 percent economic sociotropic concerns were highly significant as well, eclipsed only by the Nordic regime. The Continental regimes featured a ratio that was much more skewed in favour of deservingness (38%) and cultural sociotropic rationales (33%). Both were exceeded only by the Southern regime type. Economic sociotropic rationales featured prominently as well for Continental regimes (19%). In contrast, self-interest rationales were no priority (10%) but larger than in Nordic or Southern regimes. Nordic regimes prioritised economic sociotropic rationales (45%), while scoring lower on deservingness and cultural sociotropic rationales (both 27%). They disregarded self-interest rationales entirely. Finally, the Southern regime type focussed clearly on deservingness (49%) and cultural sociotropic rationales (39%) while placing only low value on economic sociotropic (9%) and self-interest rationales (4%).

**Figure 6 - Relative relevance of rationale scores according to regime types (percentage of total scores)**



*Note: Mean ratio of the aggregated scores of specific rationales as a proportion of the total cumulative scores for the welfare regime type.*

The results of the QCA were mostly in line with our previous assumptions (H2). For one, the distribution of the ratios of self-interest rationales as a proportion of the total scores demonstrated that these rationales are particularly relevant in Anglo-Saxon regimes, less so in the conservative regimes of Continental and Southern Europe and mostly irrelevant in Nordic regimes (H2a). For the deservingness rationale this picture was largely confirmed regarding the scores per page. As a proportion of the overall scores deservingness was significantly less important for the Anglo-Saxon regime type, pagewise it seemingly placed more importance on these issues than most other parties, second only to the Continental regime. Looking at the individual party scores, it became apparent that only for the FPÖ deservingness rationales had a higher relevance than for UKIP, with the AfD following behind both. As such, the assumption of the pattern of deservingness rationale can be viewed as partially confirmed, it being more relevant for Continental and liberal regimes than for the Southern and Nordic type (H2b). The assumption about the importance placed on economic sociotropic rationales was likewise corroborated by the analysis (H2c). The rationale was prominently advocated by Nordic and Anglo-Saxon regimes, followed by Continental and lastly Southern regimes. Finally, the assumptions on cultural sociotropic rationales were similarly verified (H2d). The Southern and Continental regime types viewed them as particularly relevant, followed by Anglo-Saxon and Nordic regimes. This became apparent when comparing the average scores per page for cultural sociotropic concerns, with the former regimes significantly surpassing the latter in this regard.

Despite this seeming confirmation of previous assumptions, these conclusions only partially reflected previous quantitative results (as reported in Chapter 5.1). While both parts (partially) confirmed prior hypotheses regarding the pattern of self-interest (H2a) and deservingness rationales (H2b), the hypotheses regarding the sociotropic rationales did not align. In fact, the analyses contradicted each other on economic sociotropic

rationales, with Nordic regimes featuring the least concerns of all welfare regime types. Similarly, while the qualitative analysis corroborated previous assumptions about the relevance of cultural sociotropic concerns, this was contrary to some of the results for the public attitudes towards these questions across welfare regimes. The relevance of cultural sociotropic concerns for Anglo-Saxon regimes pointed out in the MANOVA was partially corroborated by the qualitative analysis (the scores per page being quite high). In contrast, the more mellow view of the Southern populace regarding these rationales was not confirmed by the QCA, as these regimes featured the highest total ratio for cultural sociotropic concerns. Therefore, I cannot fully confirm my previous assumption that the pattern of welfare chauvinist rationales employed by PRRP reflect the variation in welfare chauvinist rationales demonstrated by the populace of the welfare regime type from which the parties originate (H4). Following the presentation of the findings I will now proceed by discussing the results in greater detail in the following part.

## 7 Discussion

This thesis adds to the ongoing debate on PRRP's socioeconomic profile by drawing on insights from new institutionalism and welfare regime theory. More concretely, it contributes to discussions on policy feedback mechanisms and the effect welfare regimes have on shaping public attitudes and values. Furthermore, it shows that welfare institutions likewise have a role to play in structuring party positions with regard to welfare chauvinism. In line with this assertion, the thesis has shown that welfare regimes, understood as macro-level institutions, differ substantially regarding the distribution of welfare chauvinist attitudes across countries and the way these attitudes are articulated in society (H2). It therefore affirms previous theoretical debates on the structuring effects of welfare regime institutions on public attitudes on the issue of welfare chauvinism. Moreover, it illustrates how welfare regimes differ in their expressions of perceptions and attitudes towards immigration. Despite this positive overall result, the hypothesised mechanisms and dynamics developing within these welfare regimes to form such attitudes could only be partially confirmed.

The first part of the analysis verified previous assumptions about significant differences between welfare regimes respecting the rationales of self-interest and deservingness (H2a, b). Thereby the analysis corroborated prior assumptions about contrasting trends in attitudes between Anglo-Saxon and Nordic regimes<sup>26</sup> and substantiated accounts of the underlying mechanisms driving these differences (Larsen 2006, 2008; Larsen et al. 2018). Accordingly, the low scope of the welfare state in Anglo-Saxon regimes and its focus on targeted assistance nurtures a competitive, zero-sum relationship between 'natives' and immigrants (or minorities) with regards to governmental care and attention in line with arguments from ethnic competition theory. Within Nordic regimes such comparisons are much less prevalent in society mostly due to the

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<sup>26</sup> The differences in mean scores for the self-interest rationale, according to the REGWQ post hoc test, amount to a value of approximately 0,78, proportionate to 26 percent of the maximum range possible for z-scores.

substantial scope of social provisions following a universalistic principle. A similar picture emerged for the deservingness rationale<sup>27</sup>: within Anglo-Saxon countries, perceptions of deservingness are far more widespread in the public than in the other regimes; and particularly in the Continental and Nordic regime types. This substantiates theories on the structuring effect of targeted versus universal welfare regimes (ibid.). Consequently, societal discussions on the deservingness of certain groups of recipients are encouraged in Anglo-Saxon regimes due to their means-tested provisions which are often linked to far-reaching conditions being imposed on welfare recipients. This places welfare dependents under a general suspicion of engaging in abuse of the system ('welfare scroungers') and encourages the development of group-thinking and stigma associated with discussions on dependency (i.a. Taylor-Gooby et al. 2018). This is also reflected in the general public attitudes regarding immigrants; a group perceived to be disproportionately dependent on welfare while neither being part of the native group nor having contributed to the system – making them appear ineligible to receive benefits (Larsen 2006). The universal systems of Nordic regimes and the conservative systems of the Continental, Southern and Eastern variety differ markedly in this regard. The middle position occupied by conservative regimes is indicative of the systems' mix of extensive social provisions and significant conditional elements being reproduced in public attitudes towards immigrants. All the while the Nordic regime's universal approach to welfare makes discussions of deservingness largely superfluous as the provision of social benefits are mostly decoupled from conditions. Thus, they generally do not single out groups of the population. For immigrants this process cannot be realised in full, as was described in Chapter 3.3. Nonetheless, the socially more equitable Nordic regimes with their universal welfare provisions apparently soften the latent welfare chauvinist potentials in these regimes considerably. This mirrors previous theoretical accounts and analyses (see Escandell & Ceobanu 2009; van der Waal et al. 2013).

In contrast to these affirmative findings, economic and cultural sociotropic rationales did not align with the assumptions made beforehand. While significant differences could be observed for economic sociotropic rationales, the sequence of welfare regime types did not correspond to the previously hypothesised order which assumed relatively high values for the Nordic and Anglo-Saxon regimes. The most negative public views of immigrant's impact on the national economy were located in the Eastern, Anglo-Saxon and Southern welfare regimes. The Continental regime type followed closely, while the Nordic regime was the outlier located at the other end of the scale. The welfare chauvinist attitudes in the Anglo-Saxon regime confirmed prior assumptions. The finding consequently seems to corroborate expectations based on the different 'incorporation regimes' (Sainsbury 2006) and the consequences of their respective avenues of integrating immigrants. Accordingly, the approach followed by liberal/Anglo-Saxon regimes – allowing immigrants easy access to the labour market, particularly in the low-wage sectors with lower requirements for education and work-skills – nurtures public concerns with immigrants' impact on the general economy, particularly on driving down labour costs and putting a burden on social services. The logic here is thus closely related to

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<sup>27</sup> The differences in mean scores for deservingness rationale amount to 0,83, equivalent to 27 percent of the maximum range.

self-interest rationales advocating competition between ‘natives’ and ‘non-natives’. Meanwhile, the location of the Nordic and that of the Eastern and Southern regime type went contrary to prior expectations. For the Eastern regimes, these findings seemingly contradict previous studies suggesting that these countries did not consider their welfare regimes a pull-factor for immigrants (Larsen et al. 2018). Likewise, the expected salience of economic sociotropic rationales for the Nordic regime type could not be confirmed. Instead, attitudes in Nordic regimes were the least affected by these justifications of welfare chauvinism, confirming the general picture of the regimes’ distinct resistance to welfare chauvinist attitudes. This might be traced back the overall effect of a redistributing welfare regime (Escandell & Ceobanu 2009; Boräng 2015): The high level of social protection in Nordic regimes and their universal provision thus have a pronounced effect on welfare chauvinist attitudes – independent of the welfare chauvinist rationales applied. Giving a sound explanation for the deviation is difficult in the absence of marked patterns across regime types. Rather than a single cause, it is more likely that several intermediating factors are responsible for the reported discrepancies. Next to general welfare provisions this includes the recent experience of socioeconomic hardships in Southern and many Eastern regimes as well as general regime differences in the patterns of basic human values affecting public attitudes on immigration.

The findings for cultural sociotropic rationales are similar in this regard: The analysis revealed significant differences between welfare regimes while simultaneously countering parts of the previously expressed assumptions on the sequence of regimes. As expected, the conservative Eastern and Continental regimes presented a high prevalence of welfare chauvinist attitudes regarding cultural sociotropic concerns, indicating the high relevance of underlying conservative values in these regimes. Likewise, the significantly higher scores of the Nordic regimes substantiated the supposition of a lower impact of these rationales for this regime type, confirming arguments about the high levels of social and cultural capital within these regimes (Boräng 2015). In contrast, the Anglo-Saxon regime featured an unexpectedly high score on cultural sociotropic concerns; thus refuting earlier predictions. Likewise, the comparatively low pervasiveness of cultural sociotropic rationales in the Southern regime type (topped only by the Nordic regimes, if by a considerable margin) runs counter to expectations. It is important to note, though, that the overall differences between the examined regime types were significantly smaller for both the economic<sup>28</sup> and cultural sociotropic rationales<sup>29</sup> than they were for the other two rationales. This indicates that sociotropic rationales are a more common way of expressing welfare chauvinist attitudes across regime types as it is used in an almost uniform manner. In contrast, both the deservingness and self-interest rationales are far less prevalent, especially in Nordic regimes. This mirrors findings by Larsen et al. (2018) about the dominant nature of sociotropic rationales in justifying welfare chauvinism for European publics – independent of country affiliation. The reason for this could lie in

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<sup>28</sup> The differences in mean scores for economic sociotropic rationales amount to approximately 0,5, proportionate of to 16,7 percent of the maximum range of z-scores.

<sup>29</sup> The differences in mean scores for cultural sociotropic rationales add up to 0,43 which is equivalent to 14,4 percent of the maximum range of z-scores.

the fact that sociotropic justifications of welfare chauvinism are generally less morally charged than the more egocentric perceptions expressed in self-interest and deservingness rationales and are therefore acceptable for a wider range of the public (see e.g. Hainmueller & Hopkins 2014). Another possible explanation could be the underlying value structure. Self-enhancement values, with their emphasis on self-interest, social power and individual responsibility could be an underlying factor driving self-interest and deservingness rationales.

As an additional source of information into the complex relationship between structure and attitude, the second part of the analysis concentrated on the value base underpinning the attitudes on welfare across regime types. I expected these characteristics to support the assumptions within the first part of the analysis by putting them in relation to the reported variations in welfare chauvinist rationales and offer additional insights on the formation of the latter. The analysis was fruitful in the sense that it showed that the value base of welfare regimes differs significantly within the European context (H3). This substantiated the structuring effect of welfare regimes on underlying value bases. As before, the hypothesised outcomes were confirmed only in part though. For self-transcendence values, the pattern follows the predicted order. However, the differences between regime types are quite small, demonstrating the preponderance of self-transcendence values across regime types. Furthermore, the relatively small differences between regime types suggest that it is the interplay between the three different value types rather than them individually that affect differences between welfare regimes. A notion that is substantiated by the discriminant functions. Additionally, it supports previous observations about the differences in the effect of value types according to diverse context factors within the regimes in question. Kulin & Meuleman (2015) report the intermediary influence of social expenditure on the effect of values on welfare expenditure. Meanwhile, Davidov et al. (2008) observe different effect sizes according to the relative prosperity of a country. Accordingly, within poorer countries the effects of conservation and self-transcendence values on immigration attitudes are more pronounced than in richer societies. At the same time, though, attitudes on conditionality are more affected by values in richer countries. As such, the effects of human values on welfare chauvinist attitudes can be expected to be different according to (national) context factors. At the same time, the interplay of human values may explain differences across regime types. This conclusion is supported by the discriminant functions which juxtaposed self-transcendence with conservation and self-enhancement. Furthermore, the higher tier values cannot explain the prevalence of one rationale over another, individually. Yet together, they may help better explain patterns of welfare chauvinist attitudes amongst the publics across regime types.

For conservation values, the observed order of welfare regimes deviated in part from prior expectations. High scores for both the Southern and the Eastern regime types and a low score for Nordic regimes follow predictions. Unexpectedly, both the Anglo-Saxon and the Continental regimes scored averagely on conservation values. For the Anglo-Saxon regime type this unanticipated finding may explain the high preponderance of cultural sociotropic rationales observed in the first part, which went counter to the regime-based theoretical assumptions made beforehand. As such, cultural concerns may be related more directly to

conservation values than to the structuring effect of the liberal welfare regime, though the latter's narrow scope likely nurtures exclusionary group-thinking within the public and therefore reinforces this problem. The average score for the Continental regime type is similarly perplexing, especially concerning the considerable preponderance of cultural sociotropic rationales in this regime type. Adequately explaining these contradictory findings is difficult. It is important to note, though, that regime differences for cultural sociotropic rationales are quite small across regime types. Simultaneously, the scores reported a high prevalence of conservation values throughout Europe, independent of regime type. According to Kulin & Meuleman (2015) the attitude-values link should be higher in more affluent societies. This makes it possible that conservation values in Continental regimes are disproportionately affecting cultural sociotropic rationales. Also, while there is no direct causal link between values and attitudes, discrepancies might be the result of the interaction of different value types or other context variables. Further research is required to examine the exact relationship between welfare chauvinist attitudes and basic human values. Lastly, the regime sequence expected for self-enhancement values could not be observed in the data. While the order among the Anglo-Saxon, Continental and Nordic regime types were as expected, both the Southern and Eastern regimes featured surprisingly high scores on this value dimension, leading to the conclusion that wealth, status and individual achievement are values that are disproportionately important within these regimes.

The picture becomes clearer by breaking up the findings according to regime types. For Anglo-Saxon regimes, the observed pattern of values closely reflects public attitudes. Keeping in mind the referenced higher attitude-value link in more affluent societies, the average scores on self enhancement and conservation and the low figure on self-transcendence values can explain why welfare chauvinist sentiments are high across the board for this regime type. Furthermore, the higher linkage can expound on the relatively even distribution of welfare chauvinist rationales. Similar to what was argued by Larsen (2006, 2008) on the example of the unemployed, immigrants are easily segregated on the grounds of the criteria of deservingness rationales (cf. van Oorschot 2005). In Anglo-Saxon regimes this effect is more profound compared to the Nordic or even the Continental regime type because it is not mitigated by an extensive welfare state and the accompanying logic of universal provision. This even distribution across welfare chauvinist rationales was further confirmed when looking at the UKIP manifesto. Meanwhile, the Continental regime's low scores on self-enhancement values and relatively low scores on conservation values combined with high self-transcendence values are more difficult to interpret. First, high self-transcendence values should lead to lower welfare chauvinist attitudes; especially when combined with relatively low figures on conservation and self-enhancement. The average overall score relative to the other regimes is therefore inconsistent with this assumption. A higher values-attitude link in Continental regime could explain a disproportionately high effect of conservation and self-enhancement values in these regimes. Thereby, it can elucidate on the high score of cultural sociotropic rationales which depict the disproportionately high cultural threat perception amongst the publics of Continental regimes. In contrast to these ambiguous results, the case is very clear for the Nordic regime type: low overall scores of



welfare chauvinist rationales reflect the underlying value structure of high self-transcendence values and low score on self-enhancement and conservation values respectively. For the Southern regime type, high self-enhancement values may well explain relatively high scores on self-interest and economic sociotropic rationales. Apparently, the Southern public perceives immigrants as competition for scarce resources and a broader threat for economic prosperity. Simultaneously, the relatively low scores on cultural sociotropic rationales clash with the high scores on conservation values. Despite the conservative viewpoints held in these societies – oftentimes shaped by Catholicism – this does seemingly not translate to higher cultural threat perceptions in the public. Additional context factors may be important intermediary variables explaining these observations. The Southern regimes have been and, indeed, still are, inordinately affected by the recent financial crisis and the following rampant crisis of national debt and economic deficits. Following the crowding-out hypothesis, this might partly explain the preponderance of economic issues over questions over identity: the predominance of socioeconomic pressures on individual attitude-formation. For the Eastern regime type, the high scores on self-enhancement and conservation values combined with relatively low scores on self-transcendence explain comparatively high scores on welfare chauvinist rationales overall. Additionally, the high scores on conservation align with the preponderance of cultural sociotropic rationales. High figures on self-enhancement are accounted for in high scores for economic sociotropic rationales but clash with relatively low scores for self-interest rationales. Ostensibly, the publics in Eastern Europe do not perceive their government to be inordinately favourable towards immigrants compared to nationals and thus do not see themselves as threatened by ethnic competition. Despite this, they still perceive immigrants as a valid economic threat for their country in a general sense. While this does not conform to previous assumptions of the mechanisms underlying public attitudes in Eastern regimes, it may be explained by their status as transitional economies. As they are still in the process of economic transition and ‘catching up’ to their Western neighbouring countries, relative social deprivation is still a valid discursive frame shaping individual attitudes. As such, similarly to the Southern regime type, economic sociotropic concerns present an obvious reference category for the public. Together, the first and second part of the analysis could thus confirm significant differences between regime types on the grounds of both values and attitudes, confirming the main hypothesis (H1). Nonetheless, the assumptions on the mechanisms driving regime variance could not be fully maintained.

Finally, the results of the qualitative analysis conducted in the third part were closest to the assumptions made previously and largely confirmed the patterns of welfare regimes found above. It partly verified the hypothesised policy feedback mechanism according to which patterns of public attitudes of welfare chauvinism are reflected in the positions PRRP expressed in their programs (H4). For the Anglo-Saxon regime type, the findings confirmed the outcome on the prevalence of welfare chauvinist rationales amongst the public, mirroring the high scores across rationales and the even distribution among them. Also, they corroborated prior expectations on the relative importance of self-interest and deservingness rationales for this

regime type. Furthermore, the unexpected finding of relatively high scores on cultural sociotropic rationales for attitudes of both the general public and the PRRP are substantiated by a relatively high dissemination of conservation values. This indicates that welfare chauvinism in Anglo-Saxon regimes might, in no small part, be underpinned by a conservative value base which strengthens institutional structuring through the welfare state. Meanwhile, the results for the PRRP in Continental regimes confirmed the relevance of cultural sociotropic concerns and average scores on self-interest and economic sociotropic concerns – findings which were already demonstrated in general public attitudes. The scores on the deservingness rationale were higher than expected but not outside the acceptable frame. This might reflect the high scores on cultural sociotropic concerns, as questions of deservingness for entering the country or receiving benefits are intimately linked to questions on the identity of immigrants or minorities, as demonstrated by Larsen (2006, 2008). At the same time, though, these findings partly contradicted the outcomes of the value base underpinning the welfare regime: high self-transcendence values mixed with relatively low scores on self-enhancement and conservation suggested a different outcome. In contrast, the findings for the Nordic regime type largely corroborated prior findings on the generally low welfare chauvinist attitudes. This is substantiated by a firm foundation of self-transcendence values and a comparatively low dispersion of the value types of self-enhancement and conservation. At the same time, though, it also confirmed prior expectations on the relevance of economic sociotropic rationales for this regime type (to this see also Ennsner-Jedenastik & Köppel-Turyna 2018). At first glance this seems to be contrary to the results shown in the quantitative analysis. However, a closer look reveals that while this rationale is of more relative importance for Nordic PRRPs, the overall levels of welfare chauvinism across rationales remained low. As such, the findings do not necessarily contradict one another. The picture is less clear-cut with regards to the Southern regime type. While the results match well with prior expectations on the prevalence of cultural sociotropic rationales, this was not reflected in general public attitudes. Neither was the preponderance of economic sociotropic and self-interest rationales. The latter may be accounted for through comparatively high scores on self-enhancement values for the regime, though it clashes with findings from the qualitative analysis. Moreover, the rationales employed by PRRP were partly substantiated when looking at the high scores on conservation and self-enhancement values in these regimes which affirm the prevalence of economic and cultural sociotropic concerns but clash with low scores on self-interest rationales. The contradictions and discrepancies in the findings of all three analyses for the Southern regime type present a puzzle for any attempts at interpretation.

To explain these inconsistencies, it is necessary to take a step back and look for possible sources of error in the theoretical underpinnings, the methodological design and the data basis of the analysis. The empirical findings on general public attitudes and values demonstrated partially significant deviations from prior assumptions regarding both economic and cultural sociotropic rationales as well as the value types of self-enhancement and conservation across regime types. This suggests significant contradictions between both

analyses regarding the value bases underpinning latent attitudes. Some theoretical and methodological insights might explain the observed disparities.

First, the reported error can be partly explained by Kulin & Svallfors's (2013) theoretical arguments. The 'crowding-out' hypothesis proposes that the experience of pressing socioeconomic concerns represses broader values among the populace. Consequently, higher levels of inequality among the Southern and Eastern welfare regimes might substantially reduce the effect which underlying value bases exercise on the formation of welfare chauvinist attitudes. As such, the high conservation value of Southern welfare regimes might not have had a substantial impact on cultural sociotropic concerns due to more immediate concerns of respondents respecting their individual economic situation. Furthermore, the interaction of privilege and higher cognitive linkages between values and attitudes as advocated by the authors may also explain why the low score of Continental regimes on conservation values nonetheless has a significantly higher effect on public cultural sociotropic rationales. Not only is the standard of living higher in these countries compared to Southern and Eastern European regimes (see e.g. Eurostat 2019) but they were also largely spared from social cutbacks and economic hardships resulting from the financial crisis. A point in favour of the thrust of this argument are the small differences between regime types reported for both self-transcendence and conservation values. They indicate a virtually common value base across regime types which implies that individual effects of values may differ markedly according to additional context factors. Consequently, significant differences persist especially between the Anglo-Saxon and Nordic regime types, mirroring findings by Kulin & Meuleman (2015) on the variations in the impact of values according to their respective regime context. The relationship between attitudes and values is therefore not straightforward but rather contingent on intermediary context factors (similarly, Boräng 2015: 228).

Second, problems involving the available data set could account for some of the reported discrepancies. To begin with, the items that were chosen to represent welfare chauvinist rationales in the first part of the analysis may have been inadequate in their ability to represent the individual characteristics of the rationales in question. Therefore, they may have negatively affected the validity and significance of the results of the analysis and thereby drastically reduced its interpretative value. Both anti-immigrant attitudes and welfare chauvinism in its diverse forms are notoriously diffuse and interrelated concepts without a clearly demarcated boundary between the economic and the cultural; the sociotropic or the egotropic level. This is especially true in relation to public perceptions and attitudes. They are difficult to distinguish as they are often deeply interwoven and contingent on contextual factors. Accordingly, it would not be particularly surprising if the ability of the ESS items to adequately depict differences between welfare chauvinist rationales was ultimately lacking. The principal component factor analysis that was conducted beforehand suggests that this is partly the case, as it failed to differentiate especially between the two factors denoting the sociotropic rationales. Both of these factors – the economic and cultural sociotropic concerns – later demonstrated said discrepancies in the analytical outcomes. Likewise, the difficulties experienced during the analysis also suggests that the

‘fit’ of the data in question was not ideal. Future research would be needed in order to address these issues and possibly give a more accurate account of regime differences. Moreover, a research design specifically adjusted to distinguish between the rationales in question could dispel remaining doubts on the practicality of the analysis in question.

Third and connected to the previous point, the described problems with the data leads to the violation of the two basic conditions of homoscedasticity and of the equality of covariance matrices. This presents a possible source of error for the subsequent analysis; skewing the figures and making it possible to contest the results. While circumventing this problem as I have done is certainly possible and legitimate according to scholarly debate (see Tabachnick & Fidell 2013; Field 2017), it is nonetheless an inelegant method. A robust test of variance would have been the preferable solution. It could have sidestepped the brute-force approach that was used here. Furthermore, it would have preserved valuable data – data that was eliminated in order to generate valid results in the analyses above – and thus produced dependable findings ready for interpretation. Wilcox (2017) describes two robust methods for the testing of variance in MANOVA, the Munzel-Brunner method (Munzel & Brunner 2000) and the method generated by Choi & Marden (1997). Both methods use ranked data in order to compare groups on the grounds of multiple dependent variables. In this thesis it was not possible for me to apply these methods for two reasons. Firstly, the statistical program SPSS does not support robust tests of variance based on ranked data due to software limitations. Secondly and more immediate, the time needed to familiarise oneself to both the method and the program R<sup>®</sup> – which allows for the test to be implemented – would have far exceeded the available timeframe (Field et al. 2013: 733ff.). Conducting a truly robust test of variance according to the mentioned methods would have gone well beyond the scope of this thesis and was consequently dismissed.

Fourth, it can be strongly suspected that the time lag between the survey period of the ESS-7 (conducted before 2014 and, therefore, before the official onset of the ‘refugee crisis’) and the programmatic analysis of party positions might have unduly affected the findings. Differences in outcomes of welfare chauvinist rationales within the welfare regimes might consequently be quite pronounced. The reason for this lies in the more short-term effects of relative issue-salience – i.e. the relative importance which an individual attaches to the issue in question – on attitudes compared to more general preferences on immigration (cf. Hatton 2017). The formation of attitudes is a diffuse process contingent on contextual factors that may influence the formation of attitudes either perfunctorily in the short-term or, more fundamentally, over a longer time period. For policy issues like immigration, the relative salience of the issue in question at a specific point in time may radically impact on the short-term attitudes towards immigration and the granting of welfare benefits to immigrants both negatively and positively (Poli et al. 2017) without affecting them over the long-term. The salience is affected by multiple actors such as parties, the media, social movements, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and can be triggered by national and international events like rising numbers of refugees due to wars, persecution or discrimination; good deeds or crimes committed by immigrants in host countries (a good

example is here the shift in German public opinion after the incident during the New Year in Cologne); difficulties or successes in integration efforts or demonstrations of anti- or pro-immigrant groups.

Various studies demonstrated that immigration attitudes are influenced by contextual factors such as media coverage; both quantitatively (e.g. Benesch et al. 2018) and qualitatively (e.g. Poli et al. 2017). The salience of issues related to immigration skyrocketed with the onset of the ‘refugee crisis’ in 2015 and accordingly influenced the rise of PRRP throughout Europe. It can therefore be logically assumed that it had an influence on the recent party programmes of PRRP but not on the attitudes reported by the ESS analysed in Chapter 5.1. Lacking issue salience in the society can therefore explain not only the absence of references to immigration in the PiS program (see above) but also some of the discrepancies between the quantitative and qualitative analyses. This includes, for example, the low prevalence of cultural sociotropic concerns for Southern regimes which went counter to prior expectations and the conservative value base within the regime. Another factor that may influence public attitudes of welfare chauvinism in the short term was already mentioned in the analysis. The experience of socioeconomic difficulties in this view crowds out immigration concerns with more immediate worries about their individual well-being or sociotropic concerns for the national economy (Davidov et al. 2008). This prevalence of immediate economic worries is also present in many states from CEE, the post-communist transformation has hit these countries hard and made life much harsher compared to Western societies (see e.g. Hahn-Fuhr & Röhrborn 2018: 189). Future research should therefore account for these considerations and accordingly adjust possible research designs.

As was shown above, the thesis could provide significant evidence of welfare regime difference in all three parts of the analysis despite remaining reservations and limitations regarding the explanatory power of the analyses. Thereby, it contributes to ongoing theoretical debates on policy feedback effects of welfare regimes. This policy feedback affects both public attitudes and values as well as the communication national parties engage in on these grounds. Following the angle of differing welfare chauvinist attitudes among publics and parties between welfare regimes, the thesis gives new insights for the understanding of differences between PRRP and on the impact of welfare regimes on the formation of public attitudes towards immigration. Thus, it opens a further avenue for comparative party research especially with regards to the ongoing discussions on the ambiguous relationship of PRRP with socioeconomic issues. Following the line of reasoning taken up in this thesis, while PRRP share many broad characteristics they are also individually shaped by their surroundings. As such their positions on socioeconomic issues – apart from being welfare chauvinist in nature – are partly influenced by national context factors, of which the prevailing system of social assistance is the most significant. Party positions and, as shown in this thesis, the rationales employed by PRRP to justify welfare chauvinist positions are thus embedded into a broader context of public attitudes and values. This context is, in turn, fundamentally influenced by the respective developmental trajectory of the country in question, i.e. the *logic* which determines the mechanisms linking together specific structures, underlying values and individual attitudes on policy issues.

In this sense, following up this thesis with further research seems like a productive endeavour. I will explicate on connecting issues for further research and the ways in which it could add to the foregoing findings in the subsequent conclusion after reflecting on the approach taken in this thesis in a short summary.

## 8 Conclusion

In this thesis I combined theoretical insights from welfare regime theory and new institutionalist accounts on policy feedback mechanisms in order to further the understanding of the factors underpinning the socioeconomic policy stance of PRRP throughout Europe. For this I built on previous studies combining welfare regime theory with the literature on deservingness (Larsen 2006, 2008). In contrast to their focus on the deservingness for the unemployed, I instead shifted the focus of analysis towards another ‘undeserving’ group: Immigrants, the main target of PRRP. Here, I followed previous analyses examining the differentiated impact welfare regimes have on public expressions of welfare chauvinist attitudes (van der Waal et al. 2013) and rationales (Larsen et al. 2018). As an additional source of information on the underlying mechanisms determining welfare chauvinist attitudes across welfare regimes, I included an examination of different value bases across regime types based on prior accounts of Kulin & Meuleman (2015) and Davidov et al. (2008). On the grounds of these accounts I generated general hypotheses on the expected differences between regime types which I later tested empirically in three separate parts: (1) An analysis of variance of public attitudes across regimes; an (2) analysis of variance of underlying human values; and a (3) qualitative analysis of the latent rationales employed by PRRP.

For the first two parts of the analysis, I used data of the ESS survey rounds number seven and eight to analyse patterns of welfare chauvinist attitudes and underlying values of European publics. More concretely, I tested for the influence of national welfare institutions on the individual characteristics of the examined variables and, therefore, whether specific patterns of attitudes and values can be identified in different national regime groups. I conducted separate MANOVA’s in order to test for the suspected differences in the characteristics of (1) attitudes and (2) values (the dependent variables) as well as particular patterns of these attributes between welfare regime groups (the independent variable).

For the third part of the analysis, I conducted a QCA on selected party programs of PRRP originating from different welfare regimes within Europe. In order to compare the results with the empirical findings from the first part of the analysis, I generated a category system representing the four different rationales of welfare chauvinism already used in the first part of the analysis. It was used to evaluate the individual part-sentences within the programs on a fixed ordinal scale of -1 to 1. The framework set by this category system allowed me to systematically examine the party programs in a transparent manner. To ensure comparability with foregoing results I aggregated the individual scores of the category and computed two quotients which determined the overall intensity and relative importance of the different rationales.

The results confirmed previous hypotheses regarding significant differences between regimes for both public welfare chauvinist attitudes, the underlying value base and the specific welfare chauvinist rationales employed by PRRP. Accordingly, it seems both sensible and legitimate to conclude that not only do different welfare regimes structure public attitudes and values in distinctive ways, but that this variance also impacts on the rationales underpinning PRRP positions on the issue of immigration and immigrant rights to social benefits. Moreover, it confirmed suspicions that not only the scope of welfare benefits but also the specific logic transported by its provisions influence the public in different ways. This influence transfers back to the policy level via political actors. Consequently, the parties within welfare regime types are similarly affected by institutional structures and policy feedback effects. The mechanisms revealed by the literature on the different discussions of deservingness encouraged and generated by welfare regimes are a useful tool in this regard. They help to explain regime variance in a systematic manner. Similarly, the analysis of differing human value bases across regimes helps in the interpretation of the findings, as it can both support findings but also point to deeper-seated value conceptions which explain deviance from expected outcomes.

Nonetheless, the deservingness mechanisms were insufficient in explaining all the results generated in the analyses. While the pattern of rationales applied by PRRP largely corroborated previous expectations, significant discrepancies were revealed in the findings for welfare chauvinist attitudes among the public. Likewise, the findings of the underlying higher tier values, while constructive in some regards, could not erase the remaining reservations about the results of the analysis and, in some cases, even seemed to contradict them. Irrespective of possible errors in the applied methodology or the underlying data set, this leads me to the belief that additional context factors influence public attitude formation. While the identification and analysis of these context factors goes well beyond the scope of this thesis, some suggestions were made on the influence of immediate economic concerns and experiences of large-scale immigration events. Both of these factors affect the relative salience of the immigration issue by either focussing or diverting societal attention from the issue of immigration.

Adding up the findings above, I can safely answer the research question driving forward this thesis. I therefore conclude that structural explanations play a part in explaining the differences between PRRP regarding these parties' social policy positions. More concretely, PRRP differ both in the scope of their welfare chauvinist arguments and in the rhetoric they employ to justify welfare chauvinist sentiments according to welfare regime types. This is the case, because welfare regimes not only differ on the extent to which they secure their citizens against the life-course or labour-market related risks, but also on the specific *logic* they follow in such services. This logic or culture is reflected in the distinct emphasis placed on discussions of deservingness in these societies. Incidentally, the logic also affects which rationales are employed towards immigrants as receivers of benefits, the criteria that are applied to determine their individual worth and the intensity with which this debate is held in society. While we can thus ascertain that structure has a role to play and even see some of

the processes that underpin this effect, it has nonetheless proven difficult to identify how far this structural influence reaches and what intermediary contextual variables affect it.

In this sense, it may be a worthwhile endeavour to further explore the relationship between welfare regime structures and public attitudes towards immigration. For this reason, I will present some possible starting points for further research while accounting for the shortcomings of the foregoing analyses:

- (1) A more systematic examination of the concrete relationship between welfare chauvinist attitudes and values could deepen the understanding of individual linkages between the differing welfare chauvinist rationales and the higher tier human values. This would enable a more clear-cut account of the mechanisms underpinning the formation of these attitudes in society. Some research has already been done on this (see Davidov et al. 2008; Kulin & Meuleman 2015), but the connection is still sparsely investigated.
- (2) More concretely, following up the work of Larsen et al. (2018) and van der Waal et al. (2013) on specific mechanisms underpinning welfare chauvinist rationales would be instructive in this regard. Especially broadening the scope of analysis towards Southern and Eastern regime types could give additional insights into the discrepancies experienced in the foregoing analysis.
- (3) Individual country-level comparisons to further our understanding of the variance between regime types. Furthermore, it could help in identifying outliers in the data and confirm assumed similarities in regime types. Conversely, it may demonstrate cross-regime similarities and identify possible correlations between countries. In other words, it could refine the rather heavy-handed approach followed in this thesis.
- (4) Further investigating the linkages between public attitudes and the policy positions of PRRP should be helpful in determining the effects of welfare regime structure. Revising the foregoing analysis of welfare regime rationales with more suitable items or specifically designed surveys or qualitative interviews could help to affirm or reject conclusions reached in the parts above.
- (5) Lastly, accounting for intermediary effects of economic concerns and the relative salience of the issue under investigation could help in broadening the research perspective. For example, short-term attitude changes could be dealt with either by conducting more immediate individual analyses which circumvent the time gap between survey and party program or by conducting longitudinal analyses able to map changes in public attitudes over time.



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