Abstract:
The thesis explores the critical importance of infrastructure for peace in societies emerging from
long histories of conflict and war. Building sustainable peace requires more than just political
agreements; it necessitates the development of a comprehensive infrastructure, an integrated
framework that addresses political, social, economic, and cultural dimensions, designed to
foster stability and reconciliation over the long term. The study begins by contextualizing this
premise within the complex history of Lebanon, a country whose fragile statehood was
established amid regional turmoil and internal divisions.
The recent history of Lebanon underscores how the foundational weaknesses of the state,
compounded by external crises and regional conflicts, have rendered it highly vulnerable. The
establishment of the Lebanese state, particularly after independence and through the postindependence period, was accompanied by structural vulnerabilities that were soon exploited
by regional upheavals. These vulnerabilities were violently tested during Lebanon’s civil war and
subsequent conflicts, which resulted from a confluence of internal divisions and external
interventions. Multiple attempts at conflict resolution, primarily through power-sharing
agreements, intended as transitional mechanisms to restore normalcy, have repeatedly failed.
These agreements, such as the Taëf Accord, were designed as temporary solutions but
ultimately served as transitional phases that often entrenched sectarianism, enabling warlords
and political elites to consolidate power under the guise of legitimacy. Consequently, Lebanon
has cycled through recurrent crises, with each conflict deeper and more complicated than the
last.
A significant portion of this thesis analyzes the role that elections have played in Lebanon’s postwar trajectory, especially in restoring a semblance of normalcy. A detailed analysis of the
electoral laws enacted after the Taëf Agreement reveals that, although the intended goal was to
establish fair representation, democracy, and the rule of law, the outcome was often
counterproductive. The electoral system, instead of curbing sectarianism and democratizing
power, facilitated the entrenchment of traditional Lebanese political elites, commonly referred
to as “zaiim”, who transitioned from being militia leaders during the war to legitimate political
figures. This transformation allowed warlords and sectarian leaders to preserve and expand their
influence under the veneer of electoral legitimacy, undermining the democratic process and
perpetuating systemic inequalities.
