Asymmetric information in simple bargaining games : an experimental study

dc.contributor.author	Klempt, Charlotte
dc.contributor.author	Pull, Kerstin
dc.contributor.author	Stadler, Manfred
dc.date.accessioned	2019-04-09T09:26:21Z
dc.date.available	2019-04-09T09:26:21Z
dc.date.issued	2019
dc.identifier.issn	1465-6485
dc.identifier.issn	1468-0475 (online)
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/10900/87640
dc.language.iso	en	de_DE
dc.publisher	Oxford : Wiley-Blackwell	de_DE
dc.relation.uri	http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/geer.12138	de_DE
dc.rights	info:eu-repo/semantics/closedAccess
dc.subject.ddc	330	de_DE
dc.title	Asymmetric information in simple bargaining games : an experimental study	de_DE
dc.type	Article	de_DE
utue.kommentar.intern	Zunächst erschienen:	de_DE
utue.kommentar.intern	2017: University of Tübingen Working Papers in Economics and Finance ; No. 97 (http://hdl.handle.net/10900/75189)	de_DE
utue.publikation.seiten	29-51	de_DE
utue.personen.roh	Klempt, Charlotte
utue.personen.roh	Pull, Kerstin
utue.personen.roh	Stadler, Manfred
dcterms.isPartOf.ZSTitelID	German Economic Review	de_DE
dcterms.isPartOf.ZS-Issue	1	de_DE
dcterms.isPartOf.ZS-Volume	20	de_DE